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Executive Engineer, T.C Division, K.S.E Board, Palghat v. J.H Sharma And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The first respondent obtained a money decree against the second respondent in O.S. 390 of 1981 (Sub Court, Trivandrum) based on a compromise. Before judgment, an attachment was effected of a sum of money said to belong to the judgment-debtor and reportedly lying in the hands of the appellant, who was the Executive Engineer of the Kerala State Electricity Board (K.S.E. Board). The decree-holder initiated execution proceedings under Order XXI, Rule 46A, Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) and filed E.A. 566/84 seeking an order directing the appellant to remit the attached amount into Court.
The appellant opposed the application in the executing court, contending that the amount in his hands was a security deposit of the judgment-debtor, that the judgment-debtor had abandoned contract causing losses to the Board, and that final liability had not been determined — including an assertion that on proper computation the Board might not owe money but rather be owed money by the judgment-debtor. The executing court overruled these objections and allowed the decree-holder's application, prompting the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the garnishee (appellant) was entitled to raise objections to liability for the attached sum at the stage of execution, despite not having raised those objections at the time of the attachment before judgment.
- Whether the executing court was required to issue a formal notice under Order XXI, Rule 46A, C.P.C. to the garnishee calling upon him to pay or to show cause, before passing the impugned order.
- Whether correspondence sent by the court (letters requesting payment) could be treated as the requisite notice under Order V, Rule 30, C.P.C., or under the rules governing attachment of debts (O. XXI, R.46A–46C).
- Whether, when a garnishee disputes liability, the court must treat the dispute as an issue in a suit and decide it under Order XXI, Rule 46C, C.P.C., before ordering compliance or treating an order as a decree against the garnishee.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The sum in the appellant's hands was a security deposit deposited by the judgment-debtor with the K.S.E. Board.
- The judgment-debtor had abandoned the contract, causing substantial losses to the Board, and final liability had not been determined.
- On proper computation the Board would owe no money to the judgment-debtor; on the contrary, a substantial amount might be due from the judgment-debtor to the Board.
- The court below erred in holding that the appellant could not raise these objections at the execution stage.
Decree-holder's Arguments
- The appellant did not raise objections when the attachment before judgment was effected and did not object in response to notice under Order XXI, Rule 46A, C.P.C., and therefore should not be permitted to raise objections thereafter.
- Counsel for the decree-holder also relied on Order V, Rule 30, C.P.C. to argue that the letters sent by the court should be deemed to be proper notice.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analysed the statutory scheme governing attachment before judgment and attachment in execution, focusing on the interplay between Order XXXVIII (attachment before judgment) and Order XXI (attachment of debt in execution), and the specific procedures established by Rules 46, 46A, 46B and 46C of Order XXI.
Key legal steps in the court's analysis:
- Attachment before judgment was effected under Order XXXVIII, Rule 5, C.P.C., and being an attachment of a sum of money in the hands of a third person it operated by way of a prohibitory order. The court noted Rule 11A of Order XXXVIII which directs that provisions of the Code applicable to attachments made in execution shall, so far as may be, apply to attachments made before judgment that continue after judgment.
- The court reviewed Order XXI, Rule 46, C.P.C., which prescribes that attachment of debt in execution is effected by a written order prohibiting the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payment until further orders, and that the debtor so prohibited may (but is not compelled to) pay the amount into Court (sub-rule (3)). The court emphasised that R.46 is enabling and does not compel payment into Court.
- The court then examined Rules 46A–46C (as they apply in the State): R.46A prescribes the procedure upon application by the attaching creditor to issue notice to a garnishee to pay into Court or show cause; R.46B provides consequences if the garnishee does not pay or show cause (court may order compliance and execution may issue as if the order were a decree against him); R.46C provides that where the garnishee disputes liability, the court may order that the necessary issue(s) be tried as if they were issues in a suit and, on determination, make such order as may seem just.
- From these provisions the court derived the following legal consequences: (a) the rules contemplate a specific and formal opportunity to the garnishee to show cause under R.46A; (b) if the garnishee appears and disputes liability, R.46C imposes a duty on the court to direct trial of the necessary issue(s) as in a suit and determine them before passing final orders; and (c) the garnishee need not have filed objections suo motu at the time of the attachment before judgment in order to preserve the right to raise objections when called upon under R.46A.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the court found that the executing Court never issued a formal notice under R.46A. The executing Court had sent letters (one dated 29-6-1984 and a reminder dated 26-7-1984) requesting the amount be sent to Court. The court held that Order V, Rule 30 (which permits substitution of a letter for a summons in limited circumstances) applies to the procedure for summons and not to notices under R.46A; moreover the letters did not contain particulars required in a summons/notice and therefore could not be treated as compliant with R.46A.
- The court observed the procedural history: execution petition filed 9-2-1984; a letter requesting remittance was sent on 22-2-1984; appellant replied on 7-8-1984 denying that any money belonging to the judgment-debtor was with the Board and stating that an amount might be due from the judgment-debtor to the Board; the decree-holder filed E.A. 556/84 purportedly under R.46A, but even then no formal notice was issued; the appellant later appeared by counsel and filed objections on 12-3-1985, after which the executing court passed the impugned order.
- The court concluded that, because the garnishee had filed a counter-affidavit and thereby raised contentions regarding liability, those pleadings could be treated as objections under R.46C even in the absence of a formal R.46A notice. Consequently the executing court had a duty under R.46C to order that the disputed question be tried as an issue in a suit and to decide that issue rather than summarily overruling the objections.
- The court found that the executing court did not consider the merits of the dispute raised by the appellant, and that its view that the appellant could not contend that no amount was available with him was unsustainable. The executing court's remark that the garnishee "had no case that he is not the garnishee" was held to be meaningless: while the appellant was a garnishee in the sense of having received a prohibitory order, it remained open to him to contend he did not have money belonging to the judgment-debtor or due to the judgment-debtor, and such contentions must be considered when properly raised.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed; the impugned order of the executing court is set aside and the proceedings are remanded for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The executing court's order overruling the appellant's objections is vacated.
- The matter is remitted to the executing court to proceed in accordance with Order XXI, Rules 46A–46C, including issuing appropriate notice (if not already issued), permitting the garnishee to show cause, and—if the garnishee disputes liability—trying the necessary issue(s) as if in a suit and then passing such orders as are just.
- The appeal is allowed without costs.
Broader doctrinal implications: The opinion does not purport to lay down a new principle of law beyond its application of the statutory scheme in Order XXI (R.46A–46C) and Order XXXVIII; it confines itself to holding that the executing court failed to follow the procedures mandated by those rules and therefore remanded the matter for proper determination.
Appeal allowed.
Bhat, J.:— The first respondent herein obtained a money decree against the second respondent in O.S 390 of 1981 of the Sub Court, Trivandrum on the basis of a compromise. At the instance of the decree-holder attachment before judgment was effected of certain sum of money said to be belonging to the judgment-debtor in the hands of the appellant herein, executive Engineer of the K.S.E Board. The decree-holder subsequently filed execution petition under O. XXI, R. 46A, C.P.C He filed E.A 566/84 seeking direction to the appellant to remit the amount in Court. The application was opposed by the appellant, but was allowed by the executing court. Hence this appeal.
2. In the Court below appellant contended, inter alia that the amount in his hands is the security amount deposited by the judgment-debtor, that the judgment-debtor abandoned contract and thereby the Board sustained huge loss, final liability has not been fixed and on a proper computation the Board would owe no money to the judgment-debtor and on the other hand sustantial amount would be due to the Board from the judgment-debtor. The court below held that these contentions were not available to the appellant. The court below also took the view that the garnishee had no case that he is not the garnishee. Thus the objections were overruled.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant would reiterate the contentions raised in the court below. He also contends that the Court below was in error in holding that appellant could not raise the objections at that stage. Learned counsel for the decree-holder would contend that the appellant did not raise objections when attachment before judgment was effected, that he did not raise any objection in response to notice under R. 46-A of O. XXI, C.P.C and therefore he could not be allowed to raise his objections thereafter.
4. Attachment before judgment was effected under O. XXXVIII, R. 5, C.P.C Since the attachment was of a sum of money allegedly belonging to the judgment-debtor and lying in the hands of the appellant, it would have been effected by way of prohibitory order. R. 11A of O. XXXVIII states that the provisions of the Code applicable to an attachment made in execution of the decree shall, so far as may be, apply to an attachment made before judgment which continues after the judgment by virtue of the provisions of R. 11. According to ft. 11, where property is under attachment by virtue of the provisions of O. XXXVIII, and a decree is subsequently passed in favour of the plaintiff, it shall not be necessary upon an application for execution of such decree to apply for a re-attachment of the property.
5. Attachment of debt in execution of a decree is dealt with in R. 46 of O. XXI. Attachment is to be made by written order prohibiting the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payment thereof until further orders of the court. Sub-r. (3) of R. 46 states that the debtor so prohibited may pay the amount of debt into Court. This is only an enabling provision. There is nothing in R. 46 which compels the debtor to pay the amount of debt into court.
6. The further procedure is dealt with by R. 46A onwards. Rules 46A, 46B and 46C as they apply in this State reads as follows:
“46A. Procedure when debt or any movable property not in the possession of the judgment-debtor.— The Court may, in the case of any debt due to the judgment-debtor (other than debt secured by a mortgage or a charge or by negotiable instrument), or any movable property in which he has an interest, but not in his possession, which has been attached under R. 46 of this Order, upon the application of the attaching creditor, issue notice to any person liable to pay such debt or deliver an account for such movable property such person to be hereinafter called the ‘garnishee’ calling upon him either to pay or deliver into court the debt due from or the property deliverable by him to such judgment-debtor, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree and costs of execution, or to appear and show cause why he should not do so. Such application shall be supported by an affidavit verifying the fact alleging and stating that in the belief of the deponent the garnishee is indebted to the judgment-debtor.
Provided that if the debt or property in respect of which the application aforesaid is made is of value beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court, the execution case shall be sent to the District Court to which the said Court is subordinate and thereupon the District Court shall deal with it in the same manner as if the case had been originally instituted in that Court.
46B. Procedure when garnishee does not forthwith pay the amount. — Where the garnishee does not forthwith or within such time as the Court may allow, pay or deliver into Court, the amount due from him or the property deliverable by him to the judgment-debtor or so much thereof as is sufficient to satisfy the decree and the costs of execution, or does not appear and show cause in answer to the notice; the court may order the garnishee to comply with the terms of such notice, and on such order being made, execution may issue as though such order were a decree against him.
46C. Procedure where garnishee disputes his liability. — Where the garnishee disputes his liability, the Court may order that any issue or question necessary for the determination of the liability shall be tried as if it were an issue in a suit and upon determination of such issue shall make such order as may seem just:
Provided that where the garnishee admits his liability but disputes its extent and the decree-holder does not seek to recover from the garnishee any sum in excess of what he admits is due from him the Court shall not be bound to decide the dispute and may direct the garnishee to pay such sum or so much thereof as is sufficient to satisfy the decree and the costs of the execution proceedings.”
6A. It has to be noticed that R. 46 does not contain any provision enabling the garnishee to raise any objection though it gives opportunity to the garnishee to subject himself to the order by making payment into Court. The next step is provided by R. 46A. He has to be given notice either to pay the amount into court or to show cause why he should not do so. According to R. 46B, where he fails to pay the amount in Court and also fails to appear and show cause in answer to the notice, the court may order him to comply with the terms of the notice and on such order execution may issue as though such order were a decree against him. This is the consequence of his failure to respond in terms of the notice under R. 46B. Where he appears and disputes his liability R. 46C requires that the court should decide the question as if it were an issue in a suit and upon the determination of such issue the court should pass such order as it deems fit. The Court may uphold the contention raised by the garnishee or reject his contention and pass appropriate orders. Such an order is appealable under R. 46H. Thus the scheme of the rules contemplates a specific opportunity being given to the garnishee to show cause why he should not pay the amount into Court. If he raises an objection the court has a duty to consider the objection and pass appropriate orders. The rules do not require him to raise an objection suo motu before receiving a show cause notice under R. 46A. The fact that he did not suo motu file an objection when the attachment was effected before judgment does not take away his right under the above rules to raise an objection.
7. Let us now see what exactly was done in the executing Court. Execution petition was filed on 9-2-1984. The Court did not order notice to the garnishee. The order sheet shows that on 22-2-1984 the Court directed a letter to be written for the amount. That is evidently a letter to the appellant requesting him to remit the amount. The case was adjourned awaiting reply. The appellant as per letter dt. 7-8-1984 sent a reply stating that the Board did not have any money belonging to the judgment-debtor and that actually amount will be due from the judgment-debtor to the Board on finalising the matter. It was thereafter that the decree-holder filed E.A 556/84 purportedly under R. 46A praying that the Court may be pleased to issue notice of execution to the garnishee to allow the decree-holder to recover the decree amount due from him as though he is the judgment-debtor. Even on this petition notice was not ordered. But meanwhile the appellant appeared through counsel and filed objection on 12-3-1985. Thereupon the court passed the impugned order.
8. We find that the executing Court at no stage had taken care to issue notice to the garnishee under R. 46A calling upon him either to pay the money into court or to show cause why he should not do so. The only endorsement on the execution petition is that letter was sent to him. Learned counsel for the decree-holder invites our attention to O. V, R. 30, C.P.C and contends that letter must be deemed to be notice. This rule enables the court to substitute for a summons a letter signed by the Judge or an appointed officer where the defendant is, in the opinion of the Court, of a rank entitling him to such mark of consideration. However, the letter shall contain all the particulars required to be stated in the summons. The rule applies to summons and not to notice. Office copy of the letter sent to the appellant is seen in the file. Letter dt. 29-6-1984 refers to the attachment before judgment, that is, prohibitory order and states:
“In continuation of the Order under reference, I request that the amount may be sent to this court for giving credit to the concerned suit.”
The reminder letter dt. 26-7-1984 does not refer to any earlier order. But nevertheless it states thus:
“Please refer to the order cited. Neither a reply nor any amount has been received so far.
Hence I request you to let me know the result immediately failing which steps under O. 21, R. 46-B, C.P.C will follow. The case stands posted to……”
These letters do not contain any of the particulars required to be stated in the summons or notice and therefore would not attract R. 30 of O.V We are therefore of the opinion that prior to the passing of the impunged order garnishee was not served with a notice under R. 46A. Notice was not ordered to the garnishee either in the E.P or in the E.A referred to earlier. The appellant appeared in court only in response to the letter and filed counter-affidavit raising certain contentions. Since he raised his contentions in the counter-affidavit, the same can be treated as objections contemplated under R. 46C, even in the absence of a formal notice under R. 46A. That being so, the court below had a duty under R. 46C to order that the disputed question be tried as it were an issue in a suit and to decide the issue. In the impugned order the Court below did not consider the merits of the dispute raised by the appellant. The view taken by the Court below that the contention raised that no amount is available with him is not open to him is unsustainable. The observation of the court below that garnishee had no case that he is not the garnishee does not convey any meaning. He is a garnishee in the sense that he received a prohibitory order. But it is open to him to contend that he does not have any money belonging to the judgment-debtor or due to the judgment-debtor. If such a contention is raised at the appropriate stage in response to notice under R. 46A the Court has a duty to consider the same.
9. In the result, we set aside the impugned order and remand the proceedings for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is thus allowed, but in the circumstances without costs.
Appeal allowed.
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