Pappu v. Raja Tile And Match Works

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Bhaskaran Nambiar, J.:— The applicability of S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act to a claim for bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act, arises for determination in this appeal.

2. The facts are not in dispute. The appellants are two employees of a Tile and Match Factory, claiming bonus for the year 1978–79 at the rate of 17.75 per cent of the wages as declared by the employer. The employer paid the bonus deducting seven days' wages, paid for national and festival holidays. These two employees claimed that bonus was payable to them with reference to the wages received by them for these holidays as well; but the employer did not accede to this demand. They, therefore, moved the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The employer questioned the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the application; but the same was overruled and the employer was directed to pay the two appellants Rs. 27.50 towards bonus. This decision was challenged by the employer under Art. 226 of the Constitution and a learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and quashed the decision of the Labour Court holding that the “dispute” raised by the management was an “industrial dispute” under S. 22 of the Payment of Bonus Act and was, therefore, not a matter to be decided under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Aggrieved, the employees have filed this appeal.

3. The appellants contend that when the applicability of the Payment of Bonus Act (for short, the Act) to the establishment is not disputed and the rate of bonus payable is also fixed and declared, the dispute, if any, thereafter relates only to the computation of the amount of bonus payable and thus an application under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was maintainable. On the other hand, the employer contends that the dispute “with respect to the bonus payable under the Act” is deemed to be an industrial dispute under S. 22 of the Act, and, therefore, the remedy available to the employer should be found in the Industrial Disputes Act for settlement of this dispute; and without such settlement, no application under S. 33-C(2) which is only in the nature of an execution application, will lie. It is also stressed that even though the payment of wages for the national and festival holidays is a statutory liability, they are not wages earned by the employees for any work done by them and, therefore, the liability to pay bonus under the Act for this period is disputed and the merits of this dispute can only be decided by an award or settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act. It is submitted that when this decision has to be taken in appropriate proceedings under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, it is not proper for the Labour Court under S. 33-C(2) or this Court under Art. 226 to consider the mertis or demerits of the case put forward by the employees.

4. In the nature of the controversy raised before us, two questions mainly arise for determination:

(i) whether the Payment of Bonus Act excludes the applicability of S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act; and

(ii) what, if any, are the bonus disputes that are covered by S. 33-C(2).

It becomes necessary, therefore, to trace the legislative history and refer to the specific statutory provisions to consider whether every dispute with respect to bonus without reference to its nature, character and quality, can only be a matter for adjudication and settlement under the Industrial Disputes Act. It has also to be noted that the dispute regarding bonus in this case lies in a very narrow compass, for, there is no dispute regarding the rate of bonus or the applicability of the Act to the establishment. The dispute is with reference to the seven national and festival holidays in 1978–79.

5. Regarding national and festival holidays, the Standing Labour Committee constituted by the Government of India expressed the view that the industrial workers in the private sector of industrial under takings should have seven paid holidays and that necessary legislation should be so under taken for the purpose. Government of India did not think it practicable to undertake legislation on an all India basis, but desired the States to take the necessary initiative. The Kerala State, therefore, enacted the Kerala Industrial Establishments (National and Festival Holidays) Act, 1958 (47 of 1958), which came into force on 29 December, 1958. Section 3 of that Act provided:

“3. Grant of national and festival holidays.— Every employee shall be allowed in each calendar year a holiday of one whole day on 26 January, 15 August and 1 May and four other holidays each of one whole day for such festivals as the Inspector may, in consultation with the employer and the employees, specify in respect of any industrial establishment:

Section 5(1) of that Act directed that, notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, every employee shall be paid wages for each of the holidays allowed to him under S. 3. It is admitted that under this Act, the appellants were entitled to seven paid holidays in 1978–79, they did not work on those days, but they were actually paid wages as stipulated under this provision.

6. Bonus got a statutory lift with the enactment of the Payment of Bonus Act in 1965 and payment of bonus was geared to the wages earned by the employees. The Act provides in S. 10 that the employer shall be bound to pay every employee a minimum bonus which shall be 8.33 per cent of the salary or wage earned by the employee. Section 11 of the Act directs that where in any accounting year the allocable surplus exceeds the amount of minimum bonus payable to the employees under S. 10, the employer shall, in lieu of such minimum bonus be bound to pay to every employee in respect of that accounting year bonus which shall be an amount in proportion to the salary or wage earned by the employee subject to a maximum of twenty per cent of such salary or wage. It is not disputed that for the accounting year 1978–79, the employer has fixed the maximum bonus at 17.75 per cent of the salary or wage earned by the employee during that accounting year. Thus wages due and paid by the employer to the two employees are known, the rate of bonus which is in proportion to those wages is also declared and thus the amount payable requires calculation or computation. But, contends counsel for the employer, that the bonus is with reference to wages “earned” by the employee and that the appellants did not “earn” their wages for this period by doing any work and thus he has no statutory liability to pay bonus. Moreover, according to him, if once the Act treats the dispute so raised as an industrial dispute, a settlement of that dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act is a pre-requisite before any action is taken to recover bonus. This takes us to the two relevant sections under the Act, Ss. 22 and 39.

7. Section 22 of the Act reads as follows:

“22. Reference of disputes under the Act.— Where any dispute arises between an employer and his employees with respect to the bonus payable under this Act or with respect to the application of this Act to an establishment in public sector, then such dispute shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or of any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in a State and the provisions of that Act or, as the case may be, such law shall, save as otherwise expressly provided, apply accordingly.”

8. Section 39 of the Act runs thus:

“39. Application of certain laws not barred.— Save as otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), or any corresponding law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in a State.”

9. These two provisions have been construed by the Supreme Court in Sanghvi Jeevraj Ghewar Chand v. Secretary, Madras Chillies, Grains and Kirana Merchants Workers' Union [A.I.R 1968 S.C 530], and the relevant observations are these:

“An industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act would be between a workman as defined in that Act and his employer and the dispute can be an industrial dispute if it is one as defined therein. But the definition of an “employee” under S. 2(13) of this Act is wider than that of a “workman” under the Industrial Disputes Act. A dispute between an employer and an employee, therefore, may not fall under the Industrial Disputes Act and in such a case the Act would not apply and its machinery for investigation and settlement would not be available. That being so, and in order that such machinery for investigation and settlement may be available, S. 22 has been enacted to create a legal fiction whereunder such disputes are deemed to be industrial disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act or any other corresponding law. For the purposes of such disputes the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act or such other law are made applicable. The effect of S. 22 thus is

(1) to make the disputes referred to therein industrial disputes within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act or other corresponding law; and

(2) having so done to apply the provisions of that Act or other corresponding law for investigation and settlement of such disputes.

But the application of S. 22 is limited only to the two types of disputes referred to therein and not to others.

Except for providing for recovery of bonus due under a settlement, award, or agreement as an arrear of land revenue as laid down in S. 21, the Act does not provide any machinery for the investigation and settlement of disputes between an employer and an employee. If a dispute, for instance, were to arise as regards the quantum of available surplus, such a dispute not being one falling under S. 22, Parliament had to make a provision for investigation and settlement thereof. Though such a dispute would not be an industrial dispute as defined by the Industrial Disputes Act or other corresponding Act in force in a State, S. 39 by providing that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the Industrial Disputes Act or such corresponding law makes available the machinery in that Act or the corresponding Act available for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes thereunder for deciding the disputes arising under this Act.

Parliament by enacting S. 39 has sought to apply the provisions of those Acts for investigation and settlement of the remaining disputes, though such disputes are not industrial disputes as defined in those Acts.

It is thus clear that by providing in S. 39 that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of those Acts, Parliament wanted to avail of those Acts for investigation and settlement of disputes which may arise under this Act. The distinction between Ss. 22 and 39, therefore, is that whereas S. 22 by fiction makes the disputes referred to therein industrial disputes and applies the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and other corresponding laws for the investigation and settlement thereof, S. 39 makes available for the rest of the disputes the machinery proivded in that Act and other corresponding laws for adjudication of disputes arising under this Act.”

10. The Bonus Act applies not only to employees covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, but also to other employees, for, the definition of “employee” in the Bonus Act is wider than that of “workman” as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act. The Act intended that the adjudicatory and settlement procedure available under the Industrial Disputes Act should not be denied to the employees under the Bonus Act and, therefore, created a legal fiction in S. 22 to treat those disputes as industrial disputes so that S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act can be invoked. But even then, S. 22 limited the right of the employees to raise only two types of disputes:

(1) with respect to bonus payable under the Act; and

(2) the applicability of the Act to the establishment.

The entitlement to bonus under the Act is the prime dispute covered by S. 22 and thus the applicability of the Act which gives rise to the claim for bonus, and the liability to pay which arises under the Act are the two aspects of the dispute which can be settled by invoking S. 22. There may be other bonus disputes which may not be disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Those disputes too may require adjudication and settlement. Section 39 of the Act attracts the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act to those disputes as well. The Act, therefore, intended to provide a machinery for settlement of disputes with respect to bonus and achieved that purpose through Ss. 22 and 39. It is, unnecessary to consider any further the nature of disputes that can be referred for adjudication under S. 22 of the Act or to which S. 39 of the Act applies, for, whether the bonus dispute is an industrial dispute or not, the dispute, if any, under the Act can be adjudicated and settled under the Industrial Disputes Act.

11. With this position settled by the Supreme Court, we have to consider the impact of the Bonus Act on the right claimed under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This takes us to the jurisdiction exercised under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

12. The legislative history for enacting Ss. 33-C(1) and 33-C(2) shows that the Industrial Disputes Act, as it was originally passed, made only provisions for adjudication of industrial disputes. If an individual employee did not seek to raise an industrial dispute but desired only to implement or to enforce his existing rights, it should not be necessary for him to take recourse to the remedy prescribed by S. 10(1) of the Act. But, then there was no other remedy available under the Act. Rightly, the Act was criticised for omitting to make provisions for speedy enforcement of the existing rights of the individual workmen. To meet this criticism, S. 20 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (roughly corresponding to S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act) was inserted in 1950. In 1956, the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (48 of 1950) was repealed and Ss. 33-C(1), 33-C(2) and 33-C(3) providing for recovery of amounts, were inserted. Thus by inserting S. 33-C, Parliament achieved its object of providing speedy relief to workmen when they sought to enforce their existing individual right without having to take recourse under S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, or without having to depend upon their union to espouse their cause. It was bearing in mind these relevant considerations that the Supreme Court held in Central Bank of India v. P.S Rajagopalan [A.I.R 1964 S.C 743], thus:

“The construction should not be so broad as to bring within the scope of S. 33-C cases which would fall under S. 10(1). Where industrial disputes arise between employees acting collectively and their employers, they must be adjudicated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance, by reference under S. 10(1). These disputes cannot be brought within the purview of S. 33-C. Similarly, having regard to the fact that the policy of the Legislature in enacting S. 33-C is to provide a speedy remedy to the individual workmen to enforce or execute their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude from the scope of this section cases of existing rights which are sought to be implemented by individual workmen. In other words, though in determining the scope of S. 33-C, we must take care not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, we must also bear in mind that cases which fall under S. 10(1) of the Act, for instance, cannot be brought within the scope of S. 33-C.”

13. Sections 33-C(1) and 33-C(2) read thus:

“33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.— (I) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A or V-B the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf or in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of money due to him and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue:

Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date of which the money became due to the workman from the employer:

Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant have sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount from which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months:

Provided that where the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think fit.”

14. Section 33-C(2) is a cheap, efficacious speedy, summary remedy for recovery of money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money by a workman from his employer. This provision, therefore, applies where there is an enforceable existing right to receive a monetary benefit. The remedy under this section is thus akin to execution proceedings. When the dispute is regarding the amount so due it is a matter to be decided in proceedings initiated under this section. There is thus a qualitative difference between the dispute under S. 10(1) and the claim under S. 33. A claim under S. 33 for a mere computation of the amount due under an existing right is outside the scope of S. 10(1). The scope of S. 33 cannot of course, be widened to bring within its scope cases which would fall under S 10(1). Section 10(1) is intended to resolve a dispute regarding a right asserted and the right disputed while S. 33 is meant to settle the amount claimed under an existing right. The right may accrue under a settlement or award under the Industrial Disputes Act or any of the provisions of Chap. V of the same Act. It may accrue under any other statute, scheme or agreement. The money claimed pursuant to that right already accrued can be recovered under S. 33-C(1) or 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

15. In East India Coal Company v. Rameshwar [A.I.R 1968 S.C 218], where the claim of bonus under the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948, was sought to be enforced under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was held thus:

“It is clear that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer. Since the scope of Sub-sec. (2) is wider than that of Sub-sec. (1) and the sub-section is not confined to cases arising under an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chap. V-A, there is no reason to hold that a benefit provided by a statute or a scheme made thereunder, without there being anything contrary under such statute or S. 33-C(2) cannot fall within Sub-sec. (2). Consequently, the benefit provided in the bonus scheme made under the Coal Mines Provident Funds and Bonus Schemes Act, 1948, which remains to be computed must fall under Sub-sec. (2) and the Labour Court, therefore, had jurisdiction to entertain and try such a claim, it being a claim in respect of an existing right arising from the relationship of an industrial workman and his employer. The contention that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction because the claim arose under the said scheme or because the benefit was monetary or because it involved any substantial question between the company and the workmen must, in view of the said decisions, fail.”

16. It only remains to consider whether the Bonus Act expressly or impliedly excludes the application of S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The legislative history and the statutory provisions leave no room for doubt that the Bonus Act is in addition to and not in derogation of the Industrial Disputes Act. Tracing the legislative history of the Bonus Act, it would be noticed that bonus was originally regarded as a gratuitous payment dependent purely on the volition of the employer. The employees did not have any claim to bonus as of right. A committee appointed by the Government of Bombay in 1924, found that the employees did not have any enforceable claim to bonus, customary, legal or equitable, which could be upheld in a Court of law. Subsequently, when in 1948 and 1949, there was a bonus dispute in the textile industry in Bombay, the dispute was referred to the Industrial Court which expressed the view that both labour and capital contributed to the profits of the industry, both were entitled to a legitimate return of the profits and evolved a formula for fixing a percentage of the balance of profits as bonus. The mills which had suffered loss were exempted from the liability to pay bonus. The Labour Appellate Tribunal, in appeal, approved broadly the method of computing bonus as a fraction of the surplus profit and adopted a formula, mainly, referred to as the Full Bench formula, for calculating the surplus available for distribution. It was in Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, Kanpur [A.I.R 1955 S.C 170], and subsequent decisions that the Supreme Court laid down

(1) that bonus was not a gratuitous payment nor a deferred wage; and

(2) that when the wages fall short of the living standard and the industry makes profit part of which is due to the contribution of labour, a claim for bonus may be legitimately made by the workmen.

The Full Bench formula was generally approved by Supreme Court in Associated Cement Companies, Ltd. v. Its workmen [A.I.R 1959 S.C 967]. When later, there was a plea raised for revision of bonus and this affected several industries, the Supreme Court suggested that the question of revising the formula should be comprehensively considered by a high powered commission. Accepting this suggestion, the Government of India appointed a commission by its resolution, dated 6 December, 1961. The recommendations of the committee were broadly accepted by the Government and the Payment of Bonus Act was enacted to implement those recommendations. Bonus is no longer a bounty. It is a right recognised by the statute and enforceable under its provisions. When it was noticed that a claim to bonus may not be enforceable as an industrial dispute under S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Act made specific provisions for bringing those disputes within the purview of S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Act did not create any independent machinery for settlement of bonus disputes; but relied on the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act for its enforcement. It cannot be assumed that the Bonus Act intended some of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act alone to be applied to the claim for bonus. The Act has not expressly or impliedly excluded the application of the Industrial Disputes Act.

17. In the present case, there is no dispute regarding the liability to pay bonus under the Act. There is thus an existing right to bonus conferred under the Act. This right to bonus is, however, dependent on the statutory rate of bonus fixed under S. 10 for earning minimum bonus or on the rate of bonus to be fixed by the employer under S. 11 of the Act for claiming maximum bonus. Maximum bonus so payable is in lieu of the minimum bonus. Bonus is geared to the wages earned by the employee. When all the facts for fixing the exact amount of bonus are thus already available, a mere computation alone is required for determining the amount due to the employees and this naturally lies within the statutory corners of Ss. 33-C(1) and 33-C(2).

18. It was contended by Sri K.A Nayar appearing for the employer that the dispute raised by him regarding the quantum of bonus was not really a dispute regarding quantum alone but was a dispute regarding the liability to pay bonus in respect of the wages paid for national and festival holidays. The right to bonus is in respect of a particular accounting year. The year is the unit for the payment. There is no dispute that for the year in question, namely, 1978–79, bonus was payable. The dispute now raised by the employer thus is only regarding the quantum of bonus which requires to be calculated and S. 33-C(2) is the appropriate remedy and the only remedy available.

19. It was also contended by the counsel that the employee is entitled only to wages “earned” by him and when he did not work on holidays he was not entitled to bonus for the wages paid in respect of those holidays When the statute compelled payment of wages for national and festival holidays, they were wages “earned” by the empolyees. The payment of wages for this period was, therefore, a part of the term of employment itself. They were amounts payable in respect of employment. It was remuneration co-related to service, payable as long as the employer-employee relationship subsisted. They were thus “wages” as defined in the Act itself. When bonus is calculated with reference to wages, the employer cannot deduct these wages in the computation of bonus. The Labour Court was, therefore, right in directing payment of bonus calculating the wages for the seven national holidays as well. It is apposite to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nityanand v. Life Insurance Corporation of India [(1969) 2 SCC 199 : A.I.R 1970 S.C 209], where computation of holiday wages was held to be within the scope of S. 33-C(2). It was held thus:

“It is plain from the wording of Sub-secs. (1) and (2) of S. 33-C that the former sub-section deals with cases where money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chap. V-A, while the latter sub-section deals with cases where a workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. In the present case applications were filed by the employees against the respondent for computing in terms of money the benefit of holidays and for recovering the amount. This case falls squarely within Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33-C. There is no award or settlement under which benefit of holidays had already been computed.”

20. We are, therefore, with respect, not in agreement with the views expressed by the learned Single Judge that the claim made under S. 33-C(2) was not maintainable.

21. We shall now refer to some decisions which have considered this aspect, of the applicability of S. 33-C(2) to the claim for bonus.

22. In Aranha (Major D.) v. Universal Radiators [1974—I L.L.N 260], the Madras High Court held thus Para. 4, at page 261:

“yet another contention for the appellant is that since the first respondent did not question the appellant's entitlement to bonus but only pleaded that the consolidated payment made to” the appellant included bonus too, the dispute would not be comprehended within the scope of S. 22 of the Payment of Bonus Act. But, in our opinion, the words ‘any dispute… with respect to bonus payable under the Act’ are wide enough to cover not merely questions relating to entitlement but also the quantum and a plea of discharge.”

23. With great respect to the learned Judges, we cannot agree with this reasoning. The content of S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and its impact on the bonus dispute have not been adverted to. In fact, as we see it, the observations made were not necessary for the disposal of that appeal. In that case, the bonus for the year 1965–66 was not even declared by the management and when the employer raised a dispute regarding his liability to pay, it was a dispute either under S. 22 or 39 of the Bonus Act to which S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act was attracted. On the facts of that case, therefore, S. 33-C(2) did not apply and while the conclusion of the learned Judges seems to be unassailable on those facts, the observations extracted above were really not necessary to reach the same conclusion.

24. In Anand Oil Industries v. Labour Court, Hyderabad [1980—I L.L.N 268], a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that the minimum bonus payable under the Act is a claim enforceable under S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is also held that there is no express provision in the Bonus Act excluding the operation of the provisions of S. 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. We are in respectful agreement with this reasoning and conclusion. It is, however, stated thus in Para. 28, at page 279:

“We are, therefore, clearly of the view that a dispute raised by an individual employee with regard to the payment of minimum bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act cannot be deemed to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 22 of the Payment of Bonus Act.”

25. We cannot agree with this dictum in view of the Supreme Court ruling in Sanghvi Jeevraj Ghewar Chand v. Secretary, Madras Chillies, Grains and Kirana Merchants Workers' Union [A.I.R 1968 S.C 530] (vide supra). Dispute under S. 22 of the Bonus Act is, by a statutory fiction, expressly deemed to be an industrial dispute. When S. 22 operates, it is not possible to hold that the dispute is not an industrial dispute simply because the dispute was raised by an individual employee. It is open to the Legislature to treat a dispute raised by one individual employee also as an industrial dispute as has been done under S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act itself.

26. In Bawa Singh v. State of Punjab [1973—II L.L.N 331], the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held in Para. 8, at page 333:

“… we are unable to construe S. 22 of the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965, in the manner that every minor dispute regarding the payment of bonus, even when there is no dispute regarding the rate at which it is to be paid and the only dispute is regarding the exact amount to be paid, should be termed as industrial dispute…”

“… Section 22 of the Payment of Bonus Act, in our opinion, does not exclude filing of an application under S. 33 C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, for the payment of bonus…”

27. We agree with this reasoning and conclusion as they are in accord with our own reasoning.

28. In this appeal, even though notice was given to the employer, as he did not initially appear in Court and as important questions of law were raised, we thought it was necessary to appoint an amicus curiae to assist the Court. On our request, Sri M Ramachandran appeared and assisted the Court and we record our appreciation for the wholesome assistance he rendered. After the amicus curiae was appointed, Sri K.A Nayar appeared for the employer. We had the advantage of hearing his arguments as well. We are happy that all relevant aspects have been ably presented before us by Sri Anil, counsel for the appellant and Sri K.A Nayar, counsel for the employer.

29. In the result, we allow the appeal set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge and dismiss the original petition, but in the circumstances of the case, no costs.