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Durha Constructions Private Limited v. Bateman Engineering (India) Private Limited

Karnataka High Court
Dec 15, 2011
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Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

The present writ petition challenges the order dated 04.08.2011 of the Learned XXVI Additional City Civil Judge, Mayohall, Bangalore, which dismissed IA No. 2 filed by the defendant-petitioner under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking a reference of the dispute to arbitration.

The underlying civil suit is O.S. No. 27279/2009, in which the plaintiff-respondent seeks a decree for Rs. 10,88,10,521.96 with interest at 15% from 21.12.2008. The suit arises from a contract recorded by a letter of intent dated 18.12.2006 and a letter of acceptance dated 03.01.2007, under which the defendant agreed to execute specified civil, structural steel and architectural works for a project. The contract provided a schedule (completion of at least 80% in 6½ months, balance extendable to 9 months) and liquidated damages of 1% of the contract value per week, subject to a ceiling of 10% of contract value, for delay.

The plaintiff alleges that despite payments being honored, the defendant failed to perform, did not submit reconciliation and supporting documents for final billing, and that the defendant either fabricated or wrongfully obtained a final completion certificate and other documents to support a bogus claim. The defendant filed an application under Section 8 (IA No. 2) asserting that the letter of intent (Clause 12) and the letter of acceptance (Clause 5) contain an arbitration clause and that the matter must be referred to arbitration. The trial court rejected that application, finding no arbitration agreement as contemplated by the Act; the defendant sought judicial review by way of this writ petition. Patil, J. heard the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the clauses in the letter of intent (Clause 12: "Venue of arbitration in case of any dispute shall be Bangalore") and the letter of acceptance (Clause 5: "It shall be applicable as per Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996") together constitute an arbitration agreement within the meaning of Section 7 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 such that the Court below erred in refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Act.
  2. Whether the Court below committed any apparent illegality in holding that there was no intention expressed by the parties to subject themselves to arbitration and to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the dispute between them.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Defendant) — Principal Contentions

  • The clauses appearing under the heading "Arbitration" in the letter of intent (Clause 12) and the letter of acceptance (Clause 5) demonstrate a clear agreement between the parties to resolve disputes by arbitration and to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
  • Reliance was placed on precedent (including K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums, and N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers) to contend that the Civil Court should have referred the dispute to arbitration and that the trial court committed an apparent illegality in refusing to do so.
  • Specifically, reliance was placed on the proposition in N. Radhakrishnan that where an arbitration agreement exists and the dispute falls within its scope, referral should ordinarily be made; and on Hindustan Petroleum to contend that the Civil Court should not scrutinize the applicability of the clause when an arbitration agreement is accepted to exist.

Respondent (Plaintiff) — Principal Contentions

  • There is no arbitration agreement as contemplated by Section 7 of the Act; the parties did not intend to refer their dispute to arbitration and the relevant clause in the letter of intent merely refers to the venue of arbitration (Bangalore) rather than constituting an agreement to arbitrate disputes in substitution for court proceedings.
  • Serious allegations of fabrication of documents, cheating and fraud have been made against the defendant, and in such circumstances recourse to arbitration is not permissible (reliance placed on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander and YL Eservices Private Limited v. Silverline Business and Tech Park Private Limited).
  • The plaintiff also filed additional objections before the trial court resisting the Section 8 application, and these objections include the fraud-related allegations that the plaintiff says require court adjudication.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi (1998 3 SCC 573) Sets out attributes that must be present for an agreement to be considered an arbitration agreement (e.g., that the tribunal's decision will be binding, that jurisdiction flows from consent/statute, that substantive rights are to be determined by tribunal, impartiality and enforceability, and that the dispute is formulated at reference). The Court relied on these attributes as the benchmark to examine whether the clauses in the letter of intent and letter of acceptance constitute an arbitration agreement and concluded that those attributes were not present here.
Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (2007 5 SCC 719) Holds that the words used in an arbitration clause should disclose a determination and application to go to arbitration (not merely contemplate the possibility), and that the parties must have agreed that the tribunal's decision will be binding. The Court applied this principle to determine that mere references (venue or applicability of the Act) did not disclose the requisite intention to go to arbitration or to be bound by a tribunal's decision.
State of Orissa v. Bhagyadhar Dash (AIR 2011 SCW 5303) If a clause does not provide for reference of disputes to arbitration, does not state that the arbitrator's decision would be binding, and does not require the arbitrator to act judicially, such a clause is not an arbitration agreement. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the clauses in the instant case (venue alone and a mechanical reference to the Act) do not amount to an arbitration agreement.
N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers (2010 1 SCC 72) Holds that even where an arbitration agreement exists, disputes requiring detailed investigation and elaborate evidence, or involving serious allegations of fraud/malpractice, may be more appropriately tried by a court rather than by an arbitrator. The petitioner invoked this case to argue for referral to arbitration where fraud is not alleged. The Court noted the principle but observed that in the present matter the threshold question of existence of an arbitration clause itself is not satisfied, making detailed application of this principle unnecessary.
Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums (2003 6 SCC 503) Authority invoked to contend that where an arbitral clause exists and is accepted, the Civil Court should refer the dispute to arbitration and not examine the applicability of the clause in detail. The Court observed that in Hindustan Petroleum the existence of an arbitration clause had been accepted by the parties; by contrast, in the present case the existence of an arbitration agreement was disputed and could not be inferred from the clauses relied upon.
YL Eservices Private Limited v. Silverline Business and Tech Park Private Limited (2008 1 KCCR 363) Relied upon by the respondent in support of the proposition that serious allegations of fabrication/cheating/fraud make arbitration inappropriate in the circumstances. The Court noted the respondent's reliance on this authority but held it was unnecessary to decide the fraud-related question because there was no arbitration clause that would require or permit reference to arbitration in the first place.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. The Court identified and reproduced the two relevant contractual passages: Clause 12 of the letter of intent under the heading "Arbitration" stating "Venue of arbitration in case of any dispute shall be Bangalore," and Clause 5 of the letter of acceptance under the heading "Arbitration" stating "It shall be applicable as per Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996."
  2. The Court posed the central question whether the trial court committed an apparent illegality in holding there was no intention to subject disputes to arbitration and to exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
  3. The Court referred to settled law (notably K.K. Modi and Jagdish Chander) that an arbitration agreement must either expressly or impliedly manifest the parties' intention to refer disputes to arbitration and the agreed attributes (e.g., binding nature of tribunal's decision, authority of tribunal to determine substantive rights, impartial/judicial functioning, enforceability).
  4. The Court reviewed State of Orissa v. Bhagyadhar Dash which emphasized that a clause that does not provide for reference of disputes to arbitration, or does not specify that an arbitrator's decision will be binding and judicial, is not an arbitration agreement.
  5. Applying these principles to the clauses, the Court concluded that Clause 12 (venue-only clause) and Clause 5 (a mechanical statement that the Act is "applicable") do not, either singly or together, disclose an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration or that the arbitrator's decision would be binding. The clauses lack the essential attributes required of an arbitration agreement.
  6. The Court distinguished authorities relied on by the petitioner (e.g., Hindustan Petroleum and N. Radhakrishnan) by noting that in those cases the existence of an arbitration clause had been accepted; where existence is not in dispute, Section 8 mandates referral. In the present case the existence of an arbitration agreement was the very issue and the clauses did not suffice to constitute such an agreement.
  7. The Court observed that because it found no arbitration clause to support reference, it was unnecessary to decide the separate question raised by the respondent concerning allegations of fabrication/fraud and whether such matters would bar arbitration.
  8. On that basis the Court held that the trial court's dismissal of IA No. 2 under Section 8 was correct and justified.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The Court upheld the order of the trial court dismissing IA No. 2 filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

DISMISSED

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The trial court's decision refusing to refer the dispute to arbitration stands; the dispute remains to be adjudicated in the Civil Court pursuant to the suit (O.S. No. 27279/2009). The writ petition is dismissed and costs were not awarded ("No costs").
  • Broader implications: The opinion confines itself to the application of established authorities (K.K. Modi, Jagdish Chander, State of Orissa, etc.) to the facts; it does not purport to announce a new principle beyond those precedents. The decision turns on the lack of an arbitration agreement on the facts presented rather than on a novel rule of law.

End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

3. (2010) 1 SCC 72 N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers (Ref) 10 4. (2007) 5 SCC 719 Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (Ref) 11 5. (2008) 1 KCCR 363 Yl Eservices Private Limited v. Silverline Business and Tech Park Private Limited (Ref) 11 6. AIR 2011 SCW 5303 State of Orissa v. Bhagyadhar Dash (Ref) 14

Sri Naveen Sharma, Advocate for Petitioner;
Sri Ashok Haranahalli, Senior Counsel for M/s. Trilegal, Advocates for C/R

Patil, J.:— IA No. 2 filed by the defendant-petitioner herein under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Act’) seeking to refer the parties for arbitration, having been dismissed vide order dated 04.08.2011 passed by the Learned XXVI Addl. City Civil Judge, Mayohall, Bangalore, the present writ petition is filed.

2. Petitioner is the defendant in O.S No. 27279/2009. Plaintiff-respondent herein has filed the said suit seeking a judgment and decree against the defendant-petitioner herein to pay a sum of Rs. 10,88,10,521.96 alongwith interest at 15% with effect from 21.12.2008 The suit is based on a contract entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant as per the letter of intent dated 18.12.2006 whereunder the defendant is stated to have agreed and undertaken to execute and complete certain civil, structural steel and architectural work in accordance with the specifications and drawings prepared and approved by the plaintiff in respect of a project.

3. According to the plaintiff, the defendant agreed to complete the execution of the work to the extent of atleast 80% within 6½ months from the date of issuance of letter of intent and the balance work was extendable to a maximum period of nine months from the date of letter of intent. Failure to complete the work within the stipulated period entailed payment of a sum equal to 1% of contract value per week or part thereof beyond the schedule period of completion subject to a ceiling of 10% contract value towards damages. It was alleged by the plaintiff that despite the plaintiff honouring its payment obligations, defendant failed to perform its responsibilities and although defendant was called upon to submit reconciliation statement and supporting documents for measurement and ascertainment of the final billing, defendant failed to respond. Allegations are made in the plaint stating that defendant had either managed to fabricate final completion certificate or obtain the same through wrongful means and that the defendant had resorted to fabrication of documents to support its bogus claim to the detriment of the plaintiff's interests.

4. Having entered appearance, defendant filed an application under Section 8 of the Act contending that Clause 12 of the letter of intent dated 18.12.2006 and the letter of acceptance dated 03.01.2007 issued by the defendant contained an arbitration clause, therefore, the Court has to refer the parties to arbitration.

5. The application was objected by the plaintiff-respondent herein contending that there was no arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated by Section 7 of the Act nor was there any intention on the part of the parties to refer their dispute for arbitration and that the relevant clause in the letter of intent merely referred to the venue of arbitration as Bangalore, hence there was no indication that the parties intended to get their dispute resolved by way of arbitration in substitution of judgment of the Court.

6. The Court below has dismissed the application holding that the clauses on which the defendant relied upon did not disclose that the parties had an intention to subject their dispute for arbitration by excluding the jurisdiction of the Court. In this regard, the Court below has placed reliance on various judgments. It is this order that is called in question in this writ petition.

7. I have heard the Learned Counsel for the petitioner and the Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent. Both of them have relied upon various judgments. Before considering the effect of the said judgments, it is useful to refer to the two clauses that are found in the letter of intent and the letter of acceptance.

8. Clause 12 of the letter of intent bears the heading ‘Arbitration’. Beneath that, the following expression is found.

‘Venue of arbitration in case of any dispute shall be Bangalore.’

9. In the letter of acceptance, Clause 5 bears the heading ‘Arbitration’. As against the same, the following expression is found.

‘It shall be applicable as per Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996’.

10. The contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner is, that these two clauses clearly demonstrate that the parties had agreed for the mode of resolution of their dispute as arbitration excluding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and therefore, the Court below committed an apparent illegality in recording a finding to the contrary. He has placed reliance on the judgments in the case of K.K Modi v. K.N Modi . 1998 3 SCC 573; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums. . 2003 6 SCC 503; and N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers . 2010 1 SCC 72..

11. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of K.K Modi v. K.N Modi (Supra) particularly on paragraphs 17 to 21. He has also placed strong reliance on the judgments in the case of Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander . 2007 5 SCC 719, and YL Eservices Private Limited v. Silverline Business and Tech Park Private Limited . 2008 1 KCCR 363. He has further contended that serious allegations of fabrication of documents, cheating and fraud are made against the defendant by the plaintiff-respondent herein and in such circumstance the recourse for arbitration is not permissible. He has also drawn the attention of the Court to the additional statement of objections filed to the application filed by the defendant seeking reference of the dispute to arbitration.

12. In the light of the nature of the terms and conditions agreed upon by the parties in the letter of intent, the question that arises is,

“whether the Court below has committed any apparent illegality in holding that there was no intention expressed by the parties to subject themselves for arbitration and to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the dispute between them?”

13. It is well settled that an agreement to refer the dispute or differences to arbitration must be expressly or impliedly spelt out from the relevant clauses in the contract. It is unnecessary to refer to long line of decisions on this aspect of the matter. In the case of K.K Modi v. K.N Modi (Supra), the Apex Court has held that among the attributes which must be present for an agreement to be considered as an arbitration agreement, the following are essential.

(i) the arbitration agreement must contemplate that the decision of the Tribunal will be binding on the parties to the agreement.

(ii) that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the rights of parties must derive either from the consent of the parties or from an order of the Court or from a statute, the terms of which make it clear that the process is to be an arbitration.

(iii) the agreement must contemplate that substantive rights of parties will be determined by the agreed Tribunal.

(iv) that the Tribunal will determine the rights of the parties in an impartial and judicial manner with the Tribunal owing an equal obligation of fairness towards both sides.

(v) that the agreement of the parties to refer their disputes to the decision of the Tribunal must be intended to be enforceable in law and lastly,

(vi) the agreement must contemplate that the Tribunal will make a decision upon a dispute which is already formulated at the time when a reference is made to the Tribunal.

14. In a recent decision in the case of State of Orissa v. Bhagyadhar Dash . AIR 2011 SCW 5303, the Apex Court after referring to number of decisions has held that if the relevant clause in the agreement does not provide for reference of dispute between the parties to arbitration and does not specify that the decision of the arbitrator would be binding on the parties and that the arbitrator has to act judicially, such a clause is not an arbitration agreement. The Apex Court has made extensive reference to the judgments in the case of K.K Modi v. K.N Modi (Supra) and in the case of Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander (Supra) and has emphasized the observation made in Jagdish Chander's case to the effect that if the terms of the agreement clearly indicate an intention on the part of the parties to the agreement to refer their disputes to a private Tribunal for adjudication and willingness to be bound by the decision of such Tribunal on such disputes, it is arbitration agreement. The principles set down in Jagdish Chander's case, wherein it has been specifically stated that the words used in the arbitration clause should disclose a determination and application to go to arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility of going for arbitration and that the parties should have agreed that the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the disputes wiil be binding on them and further that the mere use of words arbitration or arbitrator in the clause will not make it an arbitration agreement are emphasized.

15. In the case of N. Radhakrishnan v. Maestro Engineers (Supra), it is held that despite existence of arbitration agreement and the dispute in question falling within the purview thereof, if the dispute required detailed investigation and production of elaborate evidence, it must be tried by a Court. In the said case, as serious allegations of fraud and malpractice in the account books of the partnership firm had been made. The Apex Court held that the matter did not warrant to be tried and decided by the arbitrator and that in the interest of justice, it should be tried in a Court of law. Placing reliance on this judgment, Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the absence of any such allegations of fraud or manipulation and in view of the agreement entered into between the parties to refer the matter for arbitration, the Court below committed a mistake in rejecting the application filed. He has also placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway Petroleums. (Supra) to contend that the Civil Court is required to refer the dispute for arbitration and the question about the applicability of arbitration clause cannot be gone into by the Civil Court.

16. It has to be stated at the outset, in the facts of the above case, the existence of an arbitral clause in the agreement had been accepted by both the parties and as also by the Learned Counsel. In such event, in view of the mandate in Section 8 of the Act, the Apex Court held that the Court below ought to have referred the dispute for arbitration.

17. In the instant case, the question raised is with regard to the existence of an agreement to refer the matter for arbitration. The Court below has found that there is no such clause which provides the reference of dispute to arbitration. As rightly held by the Court below, Clause 12 of the letter of intent only refers to venue of arbitration and states that in case of any dispute, the venue of arbitration shall be Bangalore. Except this, there is no other clause which states that the disputes have to be referred for arbitration and the decision of the arbitrator will be binding, let alone exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Courts. The letter of acceptance communicated by the petitioner incorporates a mechanical expression under the head ‘arbitration’ at Clause No. 5 stating that it shall be applicable as per Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore, it is very clear that there is no clause incorporated in the agreement nor can it be deduced either from the letter of intent or the letter of acceptance to hold that the parties have agreed to refer their dispute for arbitration and that the decision of the Tribunal will be binding on them.

18. In the light of the long line of authorities of the Apex Court including K.K Modi's case and Jagdish Chander's case and the one recently rendered in the case of State of Orissa v. Bhagyadhar Dash (Supra), the clause in the letter of intent and the letter of acceptance, in the instant case, do not show that there is an arbitration agreement between the parties. Thus, the clauses do not contain the attributes that are required to be present for an agreement to be considered as arbitration agreement. Therefore, the Court below was right and justified in passing the impugned order dismissing the application IA No. 2 filed under Section 8 of the Act.

19. Though the Learned Counsel for the respondent has contended, by referring to the additional objections filed to the application before the Court below that the allegations of fabrication of documents by adopting wrongful means to support the bogus claim are made against the petitioner herein and therefore the matter has to be dealt with by the Civil Court and not by the arbitrator, it is unnecessary to go into this question as I have come to the conclusion that there is no arbitration clause that provides for reference of dispute for arbitration.

20. Hence, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.