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B.S Yeddyurappa v. State Of Karnataka And Another

Karnataka High Court
Aug 26, 2011
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitions challenge the legality of an order passed by the Special Judge for Lokayukta Cases, Bangalore City in P.C.R. No. 18/2011. The second respondent, Y.S.V. Datta (a sitting MLC), presented a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., alleging that the petitioner (a former Chief Minister and Chairman of Karnataka Neeravari Nigam) committed criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (punishable under Section 13(2)). The complaint alleged favouritism in awarding a higher tender to RNS Infrastructure Limited instead of lower tenders from Kirloskar Brothers Limited, that RNS Infrastructure was blacklisted by Himachal Pradesh Electricity Supply Company, and that illegal gratifications were routed through companies owned by the petitioner’s sons and son-in-law via a sister concern (M/s. Murudeshwara Power Corporation).

The Special Judge, after perusing the complaint and hearing counsel for the complainant, by order dated 8.8.2011 referred the complaint to the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore Urban, for investigation and report under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The petitioner filed writ petitions questioning the legality and correctness of that referral order.

At the hearing before this Court, Mr. Uday Lalit, Learned Senior Counsel, represented the petitioner and confined submissions to the specific jurisdictional question whether a Special Judge could invoke Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to refer a private complaint for investigation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Learned Special Judge has power to invoke the provision under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in referring the private complaint of the second respondent to the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore City, for investigation and report?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be invoked and exercised only by a Magistrate empowered under the Code of Criminal Procedure (i.e., a Magistrate under Section 190), not by a Special Judge appointed under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • Relying on the decision in Jamiruddin Ansari v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2009 6 SCC 316), a private complaint cannot be referred under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. (in that context, the Special Judge lacked jurisdiction to refer the complaint), and thus the Special Judge's order dated 8.8.2011 should be quashed.
  • Although a Special Judge may take cognizance of an offence on a private complaint, the Special Judge does not have the power to refer the matter for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

The opinion does not set out detailed adversarial arguments from the second respondent in the text beyond the fact that counsel for the complainant was heard and the complaint was presented.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jamiruddin Ansari v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 6 SCC 316 Held that in the context of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime (MCOC) Act, a Special Judge would not get jurisdiction to refer the matter under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. where there has been failure to comply with the statutory requirement (Section 23(2) of MCOC Act). The Court distinguished this authority as inapplicable to the Prevention of Corruption Act: Jamiruddin Ansari arose under the MCOC Act where a specific statutory bar (Section 23(2)) existed; no similar bar is present in the Prevention of Corruption Act, so the Jamiruddin decision did not preclude the Special Judge here from invoking Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 (Constitution Bench) Established that a Special Judge may entertain a private complaint in respect of offences committed by public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act; generally, Cr.P.C. provisions can be exercised by a Special Judge unless expressly excluded by the statute creating the offence. The Court relied on this decision to hold that, absent any exclusion in the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Special Judge may exercise powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.; this precedent formed a principal basis for rejecting the petitioner's contention.
Raghuthaman v. State of Kerala & Anr., 2002 CRI. L.J. 337 (Kerala High Court) Ruled that a Special Judge enjoys all powers of a Criminal Court of original jurisdiction except those specifically denied; accordingly a Special Judge can send a private complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The Court cited this decision as supportive authority: it confirmed that a Special Judge may refer a private complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., reinforcing the conclusion that there was no illegality in the referral and subsequent police registration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded on the narrowed question framed by the petitioner’s counsel — whether the Special Judge had power to invoke Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in referring the private complaint for investigation. The Court set out and analyzed the petitioner's principal contentions:

  1. Petitioner argued that Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is exercisable only by a Magistrate (under Section 190) and that a Special Judge, appointed under the Prevention of Corruption Act, cannot invoke that provision. The petitioner relied on Jamiruddin Ansari to support the proposition that a private complaint cannot be referred under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in similar contexts.
  2. The Court examined Jamiruddin Ansari and explained that that decision concerned the MCOC Act where a specific statutory provision (Section 23(2) of MCOC Act) required compliance and created an embargo on referral; therefore Jamiruddin's ratio was limited to the special statutory scheme under the MCOC Act.
  3. The Court then considered whether the Prevention of Corruption Act contained any comparable bar. On perusal, the Court found no provision in the Prevention of Corruption Act that barred a Special Judge from exercising powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
  4. The Court relied on the Constitution Bench decision in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak which held that a Special Judge may entertain private complaints under the Prevention of Corruption Act and that Cr.P.C. provisions can be exercised by a Special Judge except where the statute clearly bars such exercise. This principle was applied to conclude that the Special Judge is not prohibited from invoking Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
  5. The Court also cited the Kerala High Court decision in Raghuthaman v. State of Kerala which held that a Special Judge can invoke Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. because a Special Judge enjoys the powers of a court of original criminal jurisdiction except where specifically denied. The Court treated this decision as supportive of the present case.
  6. Finally, the Court noted the petitioner’s concession that a Special Judge has the right to take cognizance of offences on a private complaint and observed the logical inconsistency in arguing that a Special Judge may take cognizance but may not refer the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

On that basis, the Court concluded there was no legal bar preventing a Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act from referring a private complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., and therefore no infirmity in the Special Judge's order.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petitions are rejected; the challenge to the Special Judge's order referring the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The Special Judge's order of 8.8.2011 referring P.C.R. No. 18/2011 to the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, for investigation and report under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. stands.
  • The Court expressly found no illegality or infirmity in a Special Judge sending a private complaint to the police for investigation and in the police registering a case based on such a referred private complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
  • No novel legal principle was created by this decision; the Court applied and relied upon existing precedents (A.R. Antulay and Raghuthaman) and distinguished Jamiruddin Ansari on statutory differences. The effect is to confirm the existing position that, under the Prevention of Corruption Act, a Special Judge may invoke Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.
Show all summary ...

Manjunath, J.:— The legality and correctness of the order passed by the Special Judge for Lokayukta Cases, Bangalore City in P.C.R No. 18/2011 referring the complaint of the second respondent for investigation and to report, to the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore Urban, under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C is called in question in these petitions.

2. We have heard Mr. Uday Lalit, Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner.

3. The facts leading to this case are as hereunder;

Second respondent — Y.S.V Datta is a sitting MLC. He presented a complaint under Section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the Special Judge for Lokayukta Cases, Bangalore City. The said complaint came to be registered as P.C.R No. 18/2011, in which it is alleged that the petitioner has committed the offence of criminal misconduct under Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 punishable under Section 13(2) of the aforesaid Act.

It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner as a Chief Minister of State of Karnataka and Chairman of Karnataka Neeravari Nigam by abusing his official position as a public servant has illegally exercised favouritsm for pecuniary gain and accepted higher tender of Rs. 1,032 crores of RNS Infrastructure Limited against the lowest tender of Kirloskar Brothers Limited of Rs. 1,025 crores, Rs. 1,020 crores and Rs. 1,006 crores alternatively. It is further alleged in the complaint that RNS Infrastructure suffered lack of qualification and was black listed by Himachal Pradesh Electricity Supply Co., for the period 15.2.2007 till 14.2.2012, which fact was within the knowledge of Karnataka Neeravari Nigam Ltd. It is further alleged that M/s. Murudeshwara Power Corporation, a registered Company in Karnataka under Companies Act, is a sister concern of RNS Infrastructure and that illegal gratification of Rs. 2 crores and Rs. 11 crores respectively, have been paid by RNS Infrastructure through his sister concern M/s. Murudeshwara Power Corporation to M/s. Sahyadri Health Care and Diagnostic Pvt. Limited and M/s. Davalagiri Properties Pvt. Ltd., which companies are owned by two sons of the petitioner by name B.Y Vijayendra, B.S Raghavendra and son-in-law R.N Sohankumar and another person by name B.S Ashwathkumar. Alleging that illegal gratification has been received by the petitioner from the sister company of RNS Infrastructure through the aforesaid companies of his kith and kin, a private complaint was lodged with a prayer (a) to refer the matter to Superintendent of Police, Office of Lokayukta, Bangalore City, Bangalore for investigation and to report under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C, (b) to take cognizance of the offence, either on investigation report under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C or on the complaint of the complainant after the adverse report under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C in accordance with law, for the offences of criminal mis-conduct under Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act and punish him under Section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act in accordance with law.

The Learned Special Judge after receiving the complaint, on perusal of the complaint and on hearing the Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2, referred the complaint for investigation to the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore Urban under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C by his order dated 8.8.2011

The legality and correctness of the order passed by the Special Judge, referring the complaint of the second respondent under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C is called in question in these petitions.

4. Though several grounds are urged in these writ petitions at the time of arguments, Sri. Uday Lalit, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that he would confine his arguments only in regard to the jurisdiction of the Special Judge invoking the Provision of Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C and further requested the Court to not to consider the case of the petitioner on merits. Therefore, in the light of the submission made by the Learned Senior Counsel, we are required to consider:—

“Whether the Learned Special Judge has power to invoke the provision under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C, in referring the complaint of the second respondent to the Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore City for investigation and to report”?

5. According to Mr. Uday Lalit, Learned Senior Counsel, Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C can be invoked and exercised only by a Magistrate empowered under the Code of Criminal Procedure and not by a Special Judge appointed under the Provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act. Relying on sub-Section 3 of Section 156 of Cr.P.C contended that only a Magistrate is empowered under Section 190 to order for an investigation and therefore, the order passed by the Special Judge is liable to be quashed.

6. He further submitted that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jamiruddin Ansari v. Central Bureau of Investigation . 2009 6 Supreme Court Cases 316, a private complaint cannot be referred under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C for investigation and report. Therefore, he requests the Court to set-aside the order dated 8.8.2011 passed by the Special Judge for Lokayukta Cases, Bangalore City. He further contended that a Special Judge can take cognizance of the offence, if the allegations in the complaint are made out by a complainant, but the Special Judge has no power to refer the matter for investigation and report under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C

7. Having heard the Learned Counsel for the petitioner, we are of the opinion that the judgment relied upon by him of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jamiruddin Ansari's case is not applicable to the facts of these cases for the following reasons;

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case while considering the provision of Maharastra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, held that a Special Judge is entitled to take cognizance of offence under MCOC Act even in a private complaint after due compliance of Section 23(2) of MCOC Act. According to their Lordship, in view of specific provision of MCOC Act, a Special Judge would not get jurisdiction to refer the matter under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C, as the complainant therein has failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23(2). Therefore, under the aforesaid circumstances, their Lordships have ruled that in order to refer the matter under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C, a Special Judge while dealing the matter arising out of MCOC Act, 1999 has to see whether there is due compliance of Section 23(2) of the aforesaid Act. But in the instant case, the Special Judge for Lokayukta Cases, Bangalore City considering the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has exercised his powers under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C Therefore, what is required to be considered by us is whether there is any bar under the Prevention of Corruption Act, which is in para-materia with the provisions of Section 23 (2) of MCOC Act?

8. On perusal of the Prevention of Corruption Act, in our view, such an embargo is not there on the Special Judge. Therefore, the judgment relied upon by the Learned Senior Counsel has no bearing to the facts of this case. If that is so, the question that arises for our consideration is:—

“Whether a Special Judge under the P.C Act, 1988 can invoke the power incorporated under Section 156 (S) of Cr. P.C”

This point is no more in res-integra in view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak . 1984 2 SCC 500 (a Constitution Bench) wherein, it is ruled that a private complaint can be entertained by the Special Judge in respect of the offences committed by public servants under Prevention of Corruption Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further ruled that on accepting the principles of criminal jurisprudence anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. In other words, their Lordships have held that provisions of Cr.P.C can be exercised by a Special Judge except the provisions, which are clearly barred under the Act. Under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, a Special Judge is not prohibited for exercising his powers under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C When there is no exclusion of power to a Special Judge in respect of the question raised in these petitions, this Court relying upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak (Supra), has to negative the contention of the Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Uday Lalit. In addition to that, similar question was also considered by Kerala High Court in Raghuthaman v. State Of Kerala & Anr. . 2002 CRI. L.J 337. In the aforesaid case, the very same question raised by the Learned Senior Counsel was raised and it is ruled by the Kerala High Court that Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C can be invoked by a Special Judge on the ground that a Special Judge will enjoy all powers which a Criminal Court of original jurisdiction enjoys save and except the ones specifically denied. But further ruled that the Court of Special Judge being the Court of original criminal jurisdiction, Special Judge can send a private complaint received by him to the Police for investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C In view of what has been laid down in the aforesaid decisions, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in sending the private complaint to the Police for investigation and also the Police registering the case on the basis of the private complaint referred for investigation under Section 156 (3) of Cr.P.C Further, Mr. Uday Lalith fairly submitted that the Special Judge has right to take cognizance of the offences on a private complaint. Therefore, when a Special Judge has power to take cognizance of a criminal offence on a private complaint, we cannot understand the logic in the contention of Learned Senior Counsel that Special Judge has no power to refer the complaint under Section 156(3) of Cr. PC. to the Police for investigation and report. Therefore, the grounds urged by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner has to be rejected.

9. In the result, we do not see any merits in these petitions. Accordingly, the petitions are rejected.