- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Bangalore Printing & Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Soukar T. Premnath
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Petitioner is a tenant of shop premises bearing No. 355/2 at Old Statute Square, Mysore. The premises are described in the opinion as measuring more than 14 square metres of built-up area. The opinion states the monthly rent as Rs. 120 in one place, while the petitioner's counsel for arguments described the monthly rent as Rs. 100 (see the text for both figures).
Respondent is the owner of the premises and filed a suit for possession before the Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), Mysore. While the suit was pending, the petitioner sought to amend his written statement under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to raise a jurisdictional plea: that because the annual rental value and the mesne profits claimed were below Rs. 25,000, the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction and the suit should have been instituted in the Court of Small Causes.
The trial judge rejected the amendment application primarily on two grounds: (1) that the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and had participated in the trial so could not later question jurisdiction; and (2) that, having regard to Section 2(3)(g) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, the suit before the Civil Court was competent. The petitioner challenged that interlocutory order by way of this writ petition. The petition was ultimately rejected with costs of Rs. 1,000.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Trial Judge was justified in holding that he had jurisdiction to try the suit for possession and, on that basis, rejecting the petitioner's application to amend the written statement to raise a jurisdictional objection.
- Whether, having regard to the statutory provisions (notably Section 2(3)(g) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and the jurisdictional provisions of the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964), the suit for possession should be tried by the ordinary Civil Court or by a Court of Small Causes.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The suit is essentially a suit for ejectment and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Causes Courts is determined by the annual rental value of the premises.
- Counsel contended that the monthly rent (argued as Rs. 100) yields an annual rental value of Rs. 24,000, which is below Rs. 25,000, and therefore the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction; the suit ought to have been instituted before the Court of Small Causes.
- The petitioner relied on Section 8 of the Small Causes Courts Act, 1964 and the decision of this Court in Ramesh P. Seth v. M.S. Krishnamurthy (ILR 2002 KAR 565) to support the contention that the Small Causes Court had exclusive jurisdiction.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent defended the trial court's order upholding the jurisdiction of the Civil Judge. The opinion records only that counsel for the respondent defended the order; specific elaboration of respondent's separate legal contentions is not detailed in the text.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ramesh P. Seth v. M.S. Krishnamurthy, ILR 2002 KAR 565 | Relied on by the petitioner to argue that, where annual rental value is below the pecuniary limit, ejectment proceedings should be instituted in the Court of Small Causes rather than Civil Court. | The court distinguished Ramesh P. Seth as being decided under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (where the statutory scheme preserved the landlord-tenant relationship even after termination). The present case is governed by the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 and is excluded by reason of Section 2(3)(g), so Ramesh P. Seth was held inapplicable. |
| B.S. Giridhar v. P.V. Shetty (Supreme Court decision cited in Ramesh P. Seth) | Authority for the proposition that termination notice under the Transfer of Property Act does not necessarily terminate the landlord-tenant relationship if a Rent Act provision keeps the relationship alive for purposes of eviction petitions before Rent Courts. | The opinion notes that Ramesh P. Seth relied on this Supreme Court decision; the present court used that chain of reasoning to explain why Ramesh P. Seth turned on the Rent Control Act, 1961. The Giridhar ratio was not directly applied to change the outcome here because the Rent Act, 1999 excludes its operation for the subject premises. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's reasoning proceeds in distinct analytical steps, each tied to statutory text or the character of the remedy available:
- Statutory exclusion under the Rent Act, 1999:
The court observed that Section 2(3)(g) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 excludes the Act's operation "to any premises used for non-residential purpose but excluding premises having a plinth area of not exceeding fourteen square meters used for commercial purpose." The admitted fact that the premises here has a plinth area of more than 14 sq. m. brings the premises within that exclusion, thereby removing the entire operation of the Rent Act, 1999 (including the Act's definition of 'tenant').
- Consequences of exclusion — governing law and remedy:
Once the Rent Act is excluded, the relationship between landlord and occupier is governed by the Transfer of Property Act (TPA). Section 111 of the TPA governs determination of leases (efflux of time or quit notice) and the remedy available to a lessor after determination is a suit for possession in the ordinary Civil Courts. The court emphasized that after determination under the TPA the occupant ceases to be a tenant for purposes of Rent Acts and is an unauthorized occupant; hence a suit for possession (not an ejectment petition) is the correct remedy before ordinary civil courts.
- Interpretation of Small Causes Courts Act:
The court examined Section 8(1) and (2), Section 9 and the Schedule to the Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, 1964. Those provisions generally vest courts of Small Causes with cognizance of suits of civil nature where value does not exceed Rs. 25,000, but the Schedule excepts certain suits from Small Causes jurisdiction — notably "a suit for the possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property" excepts many of them, with a specific carve-out for "suit for ejectment" in clause (4) of the Schedule when the property has been let under a lease or occupied by written instrument or orally.
The court reasoned that the Act itself distinguishes between 'suit for possession' and 'suit for ejectment': Small Causes Courts are generally excluded from suits for possession of immovable property (regardless of value), while a limited category of ejectment suits fall within Small Causes jurisdiction. Where the dispute arises under the Transfer of Property Act after determination of tenancy, the remedy is a suit for possession before the ordinary Civil Court and cannot be equated with a 'suit for ejectment' falling within Small Causes jurisdiction.
- Distinguishing prior authority relied on by petitioner:
The court analysed Ramesh P. Seth and explained that that decision involved facts governed by the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 — under which a tenant's status could continue after termination and consequently eviction petitions could fall within Rent Courts/Small Causes jurisdiction. Because the present case is governed by the Rent Act, 1999 and the subject premises are expressly excluded from that Act, the factual and legal matrix in Ramesh P. Seth differs materially and the decision was held distinguishable.
- Additional factual point — mesne profits:
The court also noted that the plaintiff had claimed mesne profits and sought an inquiry under Order 21 Rule 12 CPC. If mesne profits are considered part of the subject-matter, the pecuniary value may exceed the Small Causes Court limit (Rs. 25,000), which is another ground supporting the Civil Judge's jurisdiction.
- Conclusion of analysis:
On the combined statutory reading (Section 2(3)(g) of Rent Act, 1999; Section 111 TPA; Sections 8 and 9 and the Schedule of the Small Causes Courts Act), and having distinguished the prior authority relied upon by petitioner, the court concluded the Trial Judge was justified in holding that he had jurisdiction to try the suit and in rejecting the amendment application.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is dismissed — the Court held that the Civil Judge had jurisdiction to try the suit for possession and thus the amendment application raising a jurisdictional objection was properly rejected. The petition was rejected with costs of Rs. 1,000.
Implications: The direct consequence is that the pending suit for possession before the Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), Mysore remains properly before the Civil Court rather than being transferred to a Court of Small Causes. The court treated the Rent Act, 1999 exclusion (Section 2(3)(g)) and the consequent application of the Transfer of Property Act as determinative of the proper forum. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond the application of existing statutory distinctions; it distinguishes reliance on Ramesh P. Seth on the ground that that case turned on the earlier Rent Control Act, 1961 rather than the Rent Act, 1999.
Note: Counsel names appear in the opinion as Sri S.N. Bhat for the petitioner and Sri M.C./M.G. Ranganna for the respondent (both spellings/initials appear in the text).
Sri S.N Bhat, Advocate for Petitioner
Sri M.C Ranganna, Advocate for Respondent
Rangavittalachar, J.:—
1. This is a tenants Writ Petition questioning the jurisdiction of civil Court to entertain a suit for possession filed by the landlord.
2. Facts in brief are:
Petitioner is a tenant in respect of shop premises bearing No. 355/2 situate at Old Statute Square in Mysore on a monthly rent of Rs. 120., measuring more than 14 sq. mtrs. of built up area and the respondent is its owner. Respondent filed a suit for possession against him before the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dvn.), Mysore. When the suit was in progress, petitioner filed an application under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure seeking to amend the written statement by taking up a plea viz., “that having regard to the annual rental value of the leased premises and also the mesne profits claimed by the plaintiff being below Rs. 25,000/-, Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit; the plaintiff should have instituted the suit before the Court of Small Causes”. Trial Judge rejected the application mainly on the ground that petitioner having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court and having participated in the trial, cannot turn around and question the jurisdiction, and; that having regard to the provisions of Section 2(g) of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999, the suit instituted before him was perfectly competent. This order is questioned.
3. Sri S.N Bhat, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff is essentially a suit for “ejectment” and having regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Causes Courts which is decided by the annual rental value of the premises, in this case the monthly rent of the premises is Rs. 100/- the annual rental value would be Rs. 24,000/- thus the value of the subject matter of the suit will be less than 25,000/- therefore, the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to decide the case in view of the decision of this Court in Ramesh P Seth v. M.S Krishnamurthy . ILR 2002 KAR 565..
4. Per contra, Sri M.G Ranganna, Counsel for the respondent defended the order.
5. The question therefore, that arises for consideration in this petition is “whether the Trial Judge was justified in holding that he had the jurisdiction to try the suit and on that ground to reject the application for amendment”. Before answering the said question, it is necessary to State that the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 was repealed by Karnataka Act 34/2001 (i.e, the Karnataka Rent Act of 1999). The suit being instituted in the year 2002, it is the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 which applies to the case, Section 2(3) of the 1999 Act excludes from its operation the entire provisions of the Act with regard to premises of certain descriptions, one of them being a commercial premises having a plinth area of more than 14 sq. mtrs. The relevant clauses of Section 2(3) is referred to herein omitting what is not necessary.
Section 2(3): Nothing contained in this Act shall apply:
(a) to any premises belonging to
(i) the State Government or the Central Government or a local authority;
(ii) a Muzarai or religious or charitable institution;
(iii) a wakf.
(b) to any building belonging to a co-operative Society registered or deemed to be registered under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (Karnataka Act 11 of 1959) or the Multistate Co-operative Societies Act, 1984 (Central Act 51 of 1984);
(c) to any building belonging to a Market Committee established under the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act, 1966 (Karnataka Act 29 of 1966);
(d) to any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the State Government or the Central Government in respect of any premises taken on lease or requisitioned by the State Government or/the Central Government;
(e) to any premises, deemed rent on the date of commencement of this Act or the standard rent of which exceeds,-
(i) Three thousand five hundred rupees per month in any area referred to in part A of the First Schedule; and
(ii) Two thousand rupees per months in any other area.
(f) to any premises constructed or substantially renovated, either before or after the commencement of this Act for a period of fifteen years from the date of completion of such construction or substantial renovation.
(g) to any premises used for non-residential purpose but excluding premises having a plinth area of not exceeding fourteen square meters used for commercial purpose.
6. Admittedly, the premises in question is a commercial one having a plinth area of more than 14 sq. mtrs. Therefore, by virtue of Section 2(3)(g), the entire operation of the Rent Act 1999 including the definition clause of ‘tenant’ is excluded. If the said Act is excluded in entirety, then the relationship of the petitioner and the respondent in respect of the premises in question is governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and not the Rent Act. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for determination of lease i.e If the lease is for a fixed duration, the lease is determined by efflux of time, or if the lease is for month to month, it is determined by quit notice issued as per Section 111 of the Act. If a tenant does not vacate the premises even after determination of the lease under Section 111, his status will not continue to be that of ‘tenant’ which is otherwise the case of tenants governed by the provisions of Rent Acts. In such a circumstance, the right of lessor is only to file a suit for possession to recover the premises by approaching the ordinary Civil Courts and not Rent Courts.
7. In this case, according to the respondent plaintiff, he determined the lease by the issue of a quit notice. Since the tenant - petitioner failed to hand over possession, he was filed the suit for possession. Hence, the suit by the first principles of law, before the Civil Judge was fully competent. Since, the argument of Sri S.N Bhat was based mainly relying on Section 8 of the Small Causes Court Act, 1964 and the decision on this Court in Ramesh P Seth's case to contend that it is the Small Causes Court which has jurisdiction and not the Civil Courts, let me examine the relevant provision of the Small Causes Courts Act and the decision referred to, to appreciate how far the same is tenable. Section 8 of the Karnataka Small Causes Court Act, 1964 defines the jurisdiction of the Court of Small Causes.
Section 8(1) and (2) relevant for the present purpose is extracted herein.
Section 8(1): A court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the Schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of small causes.
(2) Subject to the exceptions specified in the schedule and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed twenty five thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.
Provided that the State Government, in consultant with the High Court, may by notification, direct all suits of which the value does not exceed three thousand rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the notification.
The schedule reads as under:
Schedule:
Suits excepted from the cognizance of Court of Small Causes:
1.……………….
2.……………….
3.……………….
4. A suit for the possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property but not including a suit for ejectment where
(a) the property has been let under a lease or permitted to be occupied by a written instrument or orally and,
………………….
Section 9 of the Act excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the suits are to be exclusively tried by the Court of Small Causes.
8. Thus by a combined reading of Section 8(1)(2) and Section 9 and Schedule of the Small Causes Courts Act, the jurisdiction of Small Causes Court is excluded generally in all cases of a “suit for possession of immovable property” no matter what its value or its rent is. But an exception is carved out by way of clause (4) of the Schedule viz., that in case of ‘suit for ejectment’; or where the property has been let under a lease or permitted to be occupied by a written instrument or orally, then only the Court of small causes would be competent to take cognizance of ‘suit for ejectment’. Thus the Small Causes Courts Act (in the schedule) itself makes a distinction between a ‘suit for possession’ and ‘suit for ejectment’. In the former case, Small Causes Courts jurisdiction is excluded and in the latter, it is included Suit for ejectment, in the context would only mean cases where suits for possession are not covered. A suit for possession could only mean that in all cases where a transaction is governed by the provisions of Transfer of Property Act, the remedy of a lessor against a lessee on the determination of lease, is to file only a ‘suit for possession’ before an ordinary Civil Court. Such cases cannot be construed as a ‘suit for ejectment’. Thus, Section 8 of the Small Causes Courts Act relied by the Petitioner in no way advances his case. Per contra, justifies the finding of the learned Civil Judge.
9. In Ramesh P. Seth's case on which much reliance was placed, the facts being that an eviction suit was filed by the lessor in respect of a non-residential premises of a value of Rs. 870/- per month when the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 was in operation. The defendant to the suit questioned the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit by contending that having regard to the annual rental value of the leased premises, the ejectment should have been filed before the Court of Small Causes. This Court relying on the decision of Supreme Court in B.S Giridhar… v. P.V Shetty…. where the Supreme Court had held ‘merely because an exception was provided under Section 31 of the Act in respect of petitions to be filed before the Rent Courts, the relationship of landlord and tenant did not snap notwithstanding the termination notice issued under the Transfer of Property Act’ and also on Section 31 of the Rent Act, 1961 held as the defendant continued to be a tenant under the plaintiff and hence, he should file an ‘ejectment petition in view of Section 31 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act’, evidently because of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 exempting its operation of Chapter 5 pertaining to ‘protection of tenants’ against eviction only. But, in all other respects, the Act applied with equal force even in respect of non-residential premises of a rental of more than Rs. 500/-
10. It is also necessary to mention that, under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, a ‘tenant’ has been defined under Section 2(n)(ii) to include even a person in possession of premises after the termination of tenancy and his relationship with his landlord continues to be that of a landlord and tenant or lessor and lessee. But under the general law it is not so, i.e, after the determination of tenancy, the tenant becomes a person in ‘unauthorised occupation of premises’ and the landlord cannot resort to Rent Acts for recover of possession, but has to file only a ‘suit for possession’ like any other ordinary suits. This is the distinguishing feature between a suit for ejectment and a suit for possession contemplated. In the schedule of Small Causes Courts Act. Ramesh P. Seth's case was dealing with a case covered by Rent Control Act, 1961. But the present case is not so in view of the exemption clause of Rent Act, 1999. Thus, Ramesh P. Seth's case is distinguishable.
11. In the light of the discussions made above, the Civil Judge had jurisdiction to try the suit and the finding in this regard cannot be faulted.
12. Apart from that, one another factor that also has a bearing to the facts of the case being that the plaintiff had also claimed mesne profits and for an enquiry under Order 21 Rule 12, CPC and if the claim for mesne profits is also taken as the subject matter of the suit it would exceed the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court also. Looked from this angle also, the Civil Judge had the jurisdiction.
For the reasons stated and the discussions made above, I do not find any merit in the petition.
Petition is rejected with costs of Rs. 1,000/-
Alert