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Smt. Yashoda Bai v. Smt. Lakshmamma
Judgment Summary — Srinivasa Reddy, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision arises from a tenant's challenge to the order dated 20 June 2000 of the learned Small Causes Judge, Bangalore in H.R.C. 721/97, which allowed the respondent-landlord's eviction petition under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (the "repealed Act"). The landlord had petitioned for eviction on the ground that she required the petition premises to accommodate her son Ramkumar who had attained marriageable age. The petition premises were described as comprising a hall, room, kitchen, bathroom and pooja room; the respondent said the accommodation available to her otherwise was only a small room.
The petitioner-tenant denied that the respondent was the owner, asserting the respondent was only a rent collector and thus could not maintain an eviction petition; the tenant also contended that, though two portions fell vacant after the petition was filed, the landlord did not occupy them and instead let them out for higher rent. The Court below allowed the eviction petition under clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the repealed Act, and the tenant filed this revision challenging that order. The revision was heard by Srinivasa Reddy, J.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person who is a "landlord" as defined in the later Karnataka Rent Act (1999) — including one who receives or is entitled to receive rent (a rent collector) — is entitled to present an eviction petition, or whether only an "owner" can file such a petition.
- Whether the respondent-landlord has proved title or entitlement to present the eviction petition (in particular, whether the katha certificate and admissions in cross-examination establish her right to maintain the petition).
- Whether the respondent's asserted need to accommodate her son (i.e., the meaning and sufficiency of "requires" for personal use) was bona fide and sufficient to ground eviction under the relevant provision.
- Whether the landlord would be disentitled to claim eviction on the ground of personal need if she had, during the pendency of proceedings, allowed or let out other suitable accommodation for higher rent.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Tenant)
- Only an "owner" can file an eviction petition; a mere "landlord" or rent collector cannot maintain eviction proceedings under Section 21(1)(h) of the repealed Act.
- The respondent is only a rent collector and has not produced material to show ownership of the petition premises.
- Although two portions allegedly fell vacant during the pendency of the petition, the landlord did not occupy them and instead rented them out for higher rent, which would disentitle her to evict on the ground of need.
- Eviction would cause greater hardship to the petitioner-tenant.
Respondent's Arguments (Landlord)
- It is not necessary to be an "owner" to present a petition for eviction; the Rent Act's language refers to "landlord" and does not require ownership.
- The respondent is in fact the owner: the katha certificate (Ex P2) bears her name, and the tenant admitted in cross-examination that she paid rent to the respondent after the death of Srinivas (the respondent's husband), and that the respondent and her children are the owners.
- The respondent requires the petition premises to accommodate her son; the available accommodation with her is only one room and the son's family is living separately for want of accommodation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| DAS A.R v. Sarguman, 1983 1 KAR. LJ. 93 | Whether a settler during the lifetime of the settlor can present an eviction application under Section 21(1)(h) of the repealed Act (held there that a settler could not maintain such a petition). | The Court observed that the question in DAS A.R. concerned a settlor during the lifetime of the settlor and is not applicable to the present facts where the respondent became owner after her husband's death; thus the decision was not relevant to displace the respondent's entitlement to sue. |
| Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, 1976 4 SCC 184 | Confirmed that in landlord-tenant suits the landlord may terminate tenancy and institute eviction proceedings; the tenant is estopped under Section 116 of the Evidence Act from disputing the landlord's title as it stood at the commencement of tenancy; non-joinder of co-owners is not a ground to throw out the suit. | The Court relied on this authoritative Apex Court pronouncement to hold that the tenant's late attempt to challenge the respondent's title was not tenable and to support the view that the landlord (as defined) can institute eviction proceedings. |
| MR. P.B. Desai v. C.M. Patel (citation in text) | Interpreted the term "requires" to mean there must be an element of need and not mere desire; when a lower court finds that the landlord bona fide requires premises, that finding is one of fact and the High Court should not interfere by reappreciating evidence. | The Court applied this principle to accept the trial court's factual finding that the landlord's need was bona fide and reasonable, and held there was no basis for reappreciation of the evidence on that question. |
| Amarjit Singh v. Smt Khatoon Quamarain, 1986 4 SCC 736 | Held that if a landlord could have reasonable accommodation after the need arose but, by her conduct, let it out for higher income, she would be disentitled to evict the tenant on the ground of need. | The Court found this authority inapplicable on the facts because it was not shown that any premises fell vacant during the pendency of proceedings and were let out by the respondent; therefore Amarjit Singh did not aid the tenant's case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court approached the matter by first examining statutory language and the evidence presented. It noted the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 (which came into force on 31 December 2001) uses the term "landlord" in Section 27 and does not require that an eviction petition be presented only by an "owner". The Court relied on the statutory definition of "landlord" in Section 3(e) of the Act, which includes any person who for the time being is receiving or entitled to receive rent, whether on his own account or on behalf of another — thus capturing a rent collector within the definition.
Applying that broad statutory definition, the Court concluded that the respondent falls within the definition of "landlord" because she produced the katha certificate (Ex P2) showing her name and, critically, the tenant admitted in cross-examination that she paid rent to the respondent after the death of Srinivas (the respondent's husband) and that the respondent and her children were owners of the property. Given those admissions and documentary evidence, the tenant could not, in revision, contend that the respondent was not entitled to maintain the eviction petition.
On the issue of need, the Court considered the evidence that the respondent's son had married while proceedings were pending and that the son and daughter-in-law were residing separately for want of accommodation. The respondent's evidence that she had only one room as accommodation went unchallenged. The Court accepted the Court-below's factual finding that the need was bona fide and reasonable. It relied on the principle from MR. P.B. Desai v. C.M. Patel that when the lower court correctly finds a landlord bona fide requires premises, that factual finding should not be disturbed by reappreciation of evidence. The Court further observed that the Amarjit Singh authority (disentitling a landlord who let out other suitable premises) was inapposite because there was no evidence here that any premises fell vacant during the pendency of proceedings and were let out by the respondent.
The Court therefore upheld both the respondent's entitlement to maintain the eviction petition (as landlord under the statutory definition) and the trial court's factual conclusion that the eviction was sought bona fide for personal use by the son.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision was dismissed; the order of the learned Small Causes Judge allowing the eviction petition under clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the repealed Act was upheld. The petitioner-tenant was given three months to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the respondent-landlord.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The tenant must vacate the premises within three months and deliver vacant possession to the respondent.
- On legal principle: The Court applied the broad statutory definition of "landlord" and accepted that a person receiving or entitled to receive rent may maintain eviction proceedings; the Court also affirmed that a lower court's factual finding of bona fide need should not be interfered with in revision when adequately supported by evidence.
- No new legal precedent was announced by this decision beyond its application of existing statutory definitions and the cited authorities; the result follows from the facts and the cited authorities as applied by the Court.
All content in this summary is derived exclusively from the provided opinion text and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.
Srinivasa Reddy, J.:—
In this revision by the tenant the challenge is to the order dated 20th June, 2000 passed by the learned Small Causes Judge, Bangalore in H.R.C 721/97 by which the learned Judge allowed the petition filed by the respondent-landlord under Section 21(I)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (‘the repealed Act’ for short).
2. The Landlord filed the petition against the petitioner-tenant stating that the petitioner is a tenant under her on a monthly rent of Rs. 175/- and that she requires the petition premises to accommodate her son Ramkumar who has attained marriageable age. The case of the petitioner is that the accommodation available to her is only a small room and the accommodation available in the petition premises is a hall, room, kitchen, bathroom and a pooja room and she requires this accommodation for accommodating his son who is to be married. The petitioner-tenant denied that the landlord is the owner of the premises and set up a case that she is only a rent collector and in her capacity as rent collector she could not claim the eviction of the petitioner. It was further contended by the tenant that though two portions fell vacant after the filing of the petition the landlord did not choose to occupy the same but rented them out for higher rent. She also claimed that she would be put to greater hardship if eviction is ordered. The Court-below considered relative merits of the contentions urged by both sides, passed an order allowing the eviction petition under clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-tenant has come up in this revision.
3. I have heard the learned Counsel on both sides.
4. Mr. V.B Shivakumar, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that only as ‘owner’ can file an eviction petition and not a ‘landlord’. His submission is that the respondent being a mere rent collector she could not have preferred a petition for eviction under Section 21(I)(h) of the repealed Act. According to him, the respondent has not produced any material to show that she is the owner of the petition premises and, therefore, not entitled to (maintain the petition for eviction.
5. According to learned Counsel Mr. S. Srinivasa Murthy it is not necessary that one has to be an owner of the property in order to file a petition for eviction. It is submitted by him that the respondent is in fact the owner of the property and the katha of the property stands in her name.
6. The Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 has come into force with effect from 31st day December, 2001 (‘the Act’ for short) and nowhere in the entire Act there is any stipulation that a petition for eviction can be presented only by a owner and not by any other person. In fact, Section 27 of the Act, extracted hereunder, does not make any reference to an owner.
“27. Protection of tenants against eviction- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by the Court, District Judge or High Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant save as provided in sub-section (2)”.
The reference made in the provision is to ‘the landlord’ and not to ‘an owner’. Section 3(e) of the Act defines landlord as;
‘Landlord’ means a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person or as trustee, guardian, or receiver for any other person or who would so receive the rent or to be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant.’
The relief sought by the respondent in the present case is under Section 27(2)(r) of the Act and Section 27 speaks in terms of a petition presented by a landlord and landlord is defined in a very broad sense and it includes a person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent which certainly would include the respondent herein. The contention now urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the respondent is not the owner of the petition premises is also without substance as the respondent has produced the katha certificate Ex P2 in which her name appears. Also in the cross-examination the petitioner has clearly stated that she has been paying rent to the respondent after the death of Srinivas, the husband of the respondent, and that after Srinivas the respondent and her children are the owners of the property. It is not, therefore, open for the petitioner to now contend in this revision that the respondent is not the owner of the premises in question.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited several decisions in support of his submission. Considering that it is not open for him to make such submission on record in the light of the admissions made by the petitioner in the course of her cross-examination before the Court below, I need not venture into that question at all. Nevertheless, in none of the decisions cited by Mr. Shivakumar it has been held that a petition for eviction can be filed by the owner alone and not by rent collector. In DAS A.R v. Sarguman . 1983 1 KAR. LJ. 93. relied by Mr. Shivakumar the question in issue was whether a settle can during the lifetime of settlor present an application for eviction of a tenant. It was in that regard that it was held that a settle could not maintain a petition under Section 21(I)(h) of the repealed Act. Such question does not arise here at all as the present respondent after the demise of her husband who was the owner of the petition premises has become, along with her children, the owner of the property. The question is no longer Res integra as it has been settled by the authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath . 1976 4 SCC 184 at para 15, in the following terms:
“15. There are two reasons for our not being able to accept the above submission. Firstly, the plea pertains to the domain of the frame of the suit as if the suit is bad for non-joinder of the other plaintiffs. Such a plea should have been raised for what it is worth at the earliest opportunity. It was not done. Secondly, the relation between the parties being that of landlord and Tenant only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the lease property is irrelevant. It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-pleading of other co-owners as such.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, the contention advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioner is without basis and it is especially so in the light of the broad definition given in the Act to the term ‘landlord’ in Section 3(e) of the Act.
8. In so far as the need of the landlord is concerned, it has come on record that the son of the respondent — landlord got married when the proceedings were pending before the court-below. It is also elicited in the cross-examination of the petitioner that the son and daughter-in-law are residing separately for want of accommodation. The need urged by the respondent in her eviction petition is for the accommodation of her son. The evidence of the respondent that the accommodation presently available with her is only one room has gone unchallenged in cross-examination. Learned Counsel for petitioner Mr. V.B Shivakumar relied upon the decision in MR. P.B Desai v. C.M Patel,3 wherein the Apex Court interpreted the terms ‘requires’ to mean that there must be an element of need and not a mere desire. The Apex Court while interpreting the said term also observed when the Court should interfere with a finding of fact recorded by the lower Court, in these terms:
‘Where the lower Court interpreted the word ‘requires’ in Section 13(1)(g) correctly to mean that there must be an element of need and not mere desire before a landlord can be said to require the premises for his own use and occupation and arrived at a finding that the landlord reasonably and bona fide required the premises for his own use and occupation, the finding was a finding of fact and it was not competent to the High Court to interfere with this finding by reappreciating the evidence. If the lower Court had applied a wrong test on a misconstruction of the word ‘requires’ the finding recorded by it would have been vitiated by error of law.”
The Court-below in the present case has interpreted the need of the landlord correctly and has characterised it as bonafide and reasonable. Notwithstanding that such consideration is not essential in the present situation of law, as I have concurred with the said view, there is no need at all for any reappreciation of evidence as in my considered view the need propounded by the respondent - landlord in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be classified as a mere desire. The characterisation of the need for purpose of identifying whether it is a mere desire or an absolute need is not required at all in the light of the present Act. That apart, this decision cited by the learned Counsel for the tenant runs contrary to the case set up by the tenant in this revision and in fact aids the case of the landlord as the finding of fact recorded by the Court-below in the present case is in favour of the landlord and the ratio of the decision is that the High Court is not competent to interfere with such finding of fact. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on Amarjit Singh v. Smt Khatoon Quamarain. . 1986 4 SCC 736 wherein it was held that, if a landlord could have reasonable accommodation after his or her need arose and she by her own conduct disentitled herself to that property by letting it out for higher income, she would be disentitled to evict her tenant on ground of her need. This decision is of no avail to the petitioner as it was never brought out on record that any premises fell vacant during the pendency of these proceedings and that the respondent-landlord rented out the same for higher rent without occupying it.
10. In the ultimate analysis, I find no merit in this revision and the revision is, accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is given three months time to quit and deliver vacant possession of the premises to the respondent-landlord.
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