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Irrigation Engineeri... v. The Small Scale Indu...
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners (appellants in Crl. A. No. 358/02) challenged an order dated 10.7.2002 by which the sentence imposed by the Trial Court was suspended on condition that they deposit 20% of the total fine amount before the Trial Court within one month and execute a personal bond for Rs. 1 lakh with one solvent surety for the like sum.
The petitioners were accused in CC No. 30459/00 before the 13th Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore City. The Trial Court had convicted them and sentenced them to pay a fine of Rs. 17 lakhs, with default imprisonment for one year. The Appellate Court suspended that sentence on condition of deposit of 20% of the fine amount. The petitioners sought revision, relying on Section 357(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and on the decision in V. Prasada Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2002 Crl. L.J 395).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an Appellate Court, while suspending a sentence, may impose a condition requiring the accused to deposit a portion of the fine (here, 20% of the total fine).
- Whether Section 357(2) Cr. P.C. prohibits payment (or deposit) of fine or compensation during the period allowed for presenting an appeal or while an appeal is pending, such that an Appellate Court cannot require deposit as a condition of suspension.
- Whether Section 357(2) Cr. P.C. must be read together with Section 389 Cr. P.C. so as to automatically stay payment obligations (including compensation) upon suspension of sentence by an Appellate Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners contended that Section 357(2) Cr. P.C., read with Section 389 Cr. P.C., operates to stay payment of the fine/compensation when the sentence is suspended by the Appellate Court, so that imposing a condition to deposit 20% of the fine is improper.
- They relied on the decision in V. Prasada Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2002 Crl. L.J 395) to support the proposition that the stay in Section 357(2) applies to compensation under sub-section (3) of Section 357, which they argued should prevent the Appellate Court from conditioning suspension upon deposit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| V. Prasada Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh . 2002 Crl. L.J 395. | That the stay under Section 357(2) equally applies to compensation under sub-section (3) of Section 357. | The court acknowledged that the cited decision holds the stay applies to compensation, but held that this does not preclude an Appellate Court from passing a conditional order suspending sentence requiring deposit by the accused; thus the authority did not assist the petitioners' challenge to the conditional suspension. |
| Jagannath Choudhary v. Ramayan Singh . 2000 5 SCC 659 | Describes the scope of revisional power: to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, procedural irregularity, neglect of proper precaution, or apparent harassment causing injury or undue hardship. | The court applied this principle to conclude that revision should not be invoked where there is no illegality, material irregularity, perversity or miscarriage of justice in the impugned order; finding none, the court refused to exercise revisional jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court examined the factual posture: the Trial Court imposed a fine of Rs. 17 lakhs with default imprisonment; the Appellate Court suspended the sentence on condition of depositing 20% of the fine. The court observed that the Appellate Court's order was a conditional suspension—the suspension became operative only on compliance with the deposit condition.
The court analyzed Section 357(2) Cr. P.C., which provides that if a fine is imposed in a case subject to appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period for presenting the appeal has elapsed or, if an appeal is presented, before the decision of the appeal. The court concluded that the term "payment" in Section 357(2) refers to payment to the person entitled to receive compensation (i.e., payment to the victim) and does not refer to a deposit by the accused made pursuant to an Appellate Court's conditional suspension order.
The court rejected the petitioners' argument that Section 357(2) must be read with Section 389 Cr. P.C. to automatically stay payment obligations whenever sentence is suspended. It noted that the Appellate Court did not order payment of fine or compensation to the respondent; it merely suspended the sentence on a depositional condition. Having regard to the powers conferred by Section 389 and the scope of Section 357, the court found no error, illegality, irregularity or infirmity in the Appellate Court's conditional suspension.
Finally, invoking the principles in Jagannath Choudhary v. Ramayan Singh regarding the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction, the court held that revision is not justified in the absence of manifest illegality, perversity or miscarriage of justice; none of these were present in the impugned order.
Holding and Implications
PETITION REJECTED.
Direct effect: The revision petition was dismissed and the petitioners are required to comply with the impugned conditional order; the court granted 30 days from the date of the decision for compliance. The opinion does not purport to create a new precedent beyond the application of Sections 357(2) and 389 Cr. P.C. and the established limitations on revisional jurisdiction.
Majage, J.:—
The petitioners, who are appellants in Crl. A. No. 358/02 on the file of the Appellate Court have challenged the impugned order dated 10.7.2002, by which the sentence imposed by the Trial Court against them is suspended on condition that they shall deposit 20% of the total fine amount before the Court below (Trial Court) during the period of one month from that date and shall execute a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 1 lakh with one solvent surety for the like sum to the satisfaction of the Court below.
2. According to the petitioners, who were accused in CC No. 30459/00 on the file of the 13th Addl. C.M.M at Bangalore City and who are appellants before the Appellate Court, in view of the provision contained in Section 357(2) of Cr. P.C, the Appellate Court was not right in asking them to deposit 20% of the total fine amount, and relied on a decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of V. Prasada Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh . 2002 Crl. L.J 395..
3. Perused the record carefully
4. In the case on hand, the petitioners were convicted by the Trial Court sentencing to pay a fine of Rs. 17 lakhs and, in default of payment of that fine amount, to undergo simple imprisonment for one year. However, when challenged by them, the Appellate Court ordered to suspend the same on condition that they shall deposit 20% of the fine amount.
5. Thus, the Appellate Court has ordered suspension of sentence on condition and not without any condition. In other words, if 20% of fine amount is not deposited, the order of suspension of sentence does not come into operation. No provision of law or authority has been brought to my notice that the Appellate Court has no power or cannot impose any condition while ordering suspension of sentence.
6. Of course, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, placing reliance on the decision referred to above, vehemently contended that Section 357(2) requires to be read with Section 389 of Cr. P.C, since a sum of Rs. 16 lakhs has been ordered to be paid as compensation to the respondent and consequently, the order of suspension of the sentence passed by the Appellate Court automatically stays the payment of fine amount also and as such, imposing a condition to deposit 20% of the fine amount while suspending the sentence imposed by the Trial Court is not proper.
7. Further, it may be noted that the Appellate Court has not ordered for payment of fine or compensation or any part of fine or compensation to the respondent. It has simply suspended the sentence imposed on the petitioners on deposit of 20% of the fine amount.
8. What Section 357(2) of Cr. P.C says is as under:
“If the fine is imposed in a case which is subject to appeal, no such payment shall be made before the period allowed for presenting the appeal has elapsed, or, if an appeal be presented before the decision of the appeal.”
Nowhere it says that the Court of Appeal, while suspending sentence imposed on an accused cannot impose a condition of depositing a part of fine amount. It is true that as per the decision relied on for the petitioner, stay engrafted under the said provision of law equally applies to the compensation granted under sub-section (3) of Section 357 of the Code, but it cannot be taken to hold or read that the Appellate Court cannot pass a conditional order for suspending a sentence.
9. According to me, the word “payment” found in Section 357(2) of Cr. P.C, does not refer to the deposit of compensation or fine amount by an accused in pursuance of an order passed by Appellate Court while suspending sentence imposed on an accused since, to my mind, the word ‘payment’ refers to payment to be made to the person, who is ordered to be paid compensation and not the fine amount, inclusive of compensation amount to be ‘deposited’ by accused. The stay engrafted in the said provision of law is with reference to the ‘payment’ of such amount earlier to the expiry of the appeal period or, where appeal has been preferred, during the pendency of such appeal. So, Section 357 need not and cannot be read with Section 389 of Cr. P.C In fact, neither the petitioners-appellants applied for, nor the Appellate Court ordered suspension of the sentence relating to compensation of Rs. 16 lakhs only. On the other hand, when the suspension of impugned sentence passed against them is seen with the power given to the Appellate Court under Section 389 of Cr. P.C, besides the ambit or scope of Section 357 of Cr. P.C, there will not be any difficulty in holding that there is no error of record or infirmity or irregularity or illegality in the impugned order passed by the Court of Sessions suspending the sentence on condition of depositing 20% of the total fine amount imposed on them (petitioners).
10. In this view of the matter, neither Section 357(2) of Cr. P.C nor the decision relied on for the petitioners is of any help to the petitioners.
11. At this stage, it may not be out of place to note that the revisional power is to correct the mis-carriage of justice arising from mis-conception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or apparent harassment of treatment, which has resulted some injury to maintenance of law and order and undeserved hardship to individual, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Jagannath Choudhary v. Ramayan Singh . 2000 5 SCC 659.. Further, it is well settled that when the Court concerned has not committed any illegality or material irregularity or impropriety in passing impugned order, the revisional power should not be invoked. It is equally well settled that in the absence of any manifest illegality, perversity or miscarriage of justice, Courts will not be justified in invoking revisional power.
12. In the case on hand, none of the said things is found to say that the matter requires to be entertained in revision, as no exception can be taken to the impugned order by which sentence has been ordered to be suspended on condition of depositing 20% of the fine amount within a given time.
In the result, the petition is rejected. However, from this day, time of 30 days is given to comply the impugned order.
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