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Doddananjappa And Others v. The Sub-Registrar, Hoskote, Bangalore And Others

Karnataka High Court
Dec 13, 2002
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Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants/petitioners challenged the order dated 24-3-2001 in P. Misc. No. 5/97 in which the learned Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, refused permission to the appellants to sue as paupers. The appellants asserted that, except for the suit schedule property, they possessed no movable or immovable property worth Rs. 1,000/- (including wearing apparel) and could not raise a loan on the suit property to pay court fees; accordingly they sought permission to sue as indigents. The respondents opposed the petition, alleging suppression of material facts and asserting that the appellants owned several properties in and around Yelachahalli village and that the petition did not conform to Order XXXIII, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). At trial, the appellants examined one witness (PW-1); the respondents examined RW-1 and produced documents marked Exs. R1–R10. The trial court, after hearing the parties and evidence, refused the appellants' request; the appellants appealed from that refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing the appellants permission to sue as paupers under Order XXXIII of the CPC?
  2. Whether the appellants suppressed material facts or properties and thereby failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of furnishing a schedule of movable and immovable property with estimated values as required by Order XXXIII, Rule 2 of the CPC?
  3. Whether omissions in the application to sue as an indigent person are fatal (i.e., indicate lack of bona fides) so as to justify refusal to allow proceedings in forma pauperis?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contended that, apart from the suit property, they did not own any property worth Rs. 1,000/- (movable or immovable) including wearing apparel.
  • They asserted they could not raise a loan on the suit property to pay the court fee and therefore sought permission to sue as paupers.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that the appellants had suppressed material facts and various properties they held in and around Yelachahalli village, including house properties.
  • They argued the petition did not conform to the mandatory provisions of Order XXXIII, Rule 2 of the CPC (no schedule of properties with estimated values was annexed) and therefore the relief should be refused.
  • The respondents relied upon documentary evidence (Ex. R1 and Exs. R2–R10) and the testimony of RW-1 to establish ownership/regrants of lands in the appellants' names.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chingakham Chaoba Singh, AIR 1964 Manipur 31 When a party seeks to sue in forma pauperis, they must disclose all property; the burden is on the applicant to show bona fides; intentional non-disclosure leads to dismissal. The court relied on the principle that suppression of property is fatal to a claim for pauper status and cited it to support refusal where disclosure was incomplete.
Rajinder Singh, AIR 1965 Punjab 331 Expressed a view similar to Chingakham Chaoba Singh regarding non-concealment and the duty to disclose property. Cited as supporting authority for the requirement that applicants must disclose all properties when seeking to sue as paupers.
Ramniklal v. Mathurlal, AIR 1965 Gujarat 214 An application to sue as pauper not containing particulars required by Rule 2 must be rejected; later supplying particulars is not a defence. Cited to emphasize the mandatory nature of Rule 2 disclosures and that omission cannot be remedied subsequently as a defence.
AIR 1976 Patna 127 Similar view to Ramniklal on mandatory disclosure under Rule 2. Used to reinforce the principle that non-compliance with Rule 2 is fatal.
AIR 1977 Andhra Pradesh 15 Similar view regarding mandatory disclosure and consequences of omission. Referred to as further authority supporting mandatory compliance with Rule 2.
V. Krishna Bhat v. Ravishankar, AIR 1978 Kant 117 Not every omission is fatal — only omissions showing lack of bona fides; whether omission is deliberate depends on facts and circumstances. Quoted to acknowledge the narrower approach that some omissions may not be fatal unless they indicate bad faith; court assessed facts to determine deliberate omission here.
M.L. Balaram v. Canara Bank, ILR 2001 Kant 4796 : 2002 AIHC 746 Court refused to interfere in dispaupering where petitioner had not disclosed all business assets. Applied as an example of refusing relief where disclosure omissions indicated lack of full disclosure; the present court followed similar outcome.
Ranganatha v. The Chief Secretary, State of Karnataka, (2000) 3 Kant LJ (SN) 30 : 1999 AIHC 1951 Held that rejecting an application because the applicant was a co-sharer in coparcenary property is not sustainable when the applicant has no other assets or wherewithal to pay court fee. Cited as a qualifying authority showing rejection is not automatic when co-shares exist; court nonetheless found actual undisclosed assets here.
D.S. Premakumari v. D.S. Srinivasamurthy, (1994) 3 Kant LJ 445 : ILR 1993 Kant 1862 An application to sue as indigent cannot be rejected merely because of receipt of maintenance amounts in execution proceedings. Cited to show contexts where disclosure of certain receipts does not automatically disqualify an indigent application; not determinative in present factual matrix.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by examining the evidence and the statutory requirements in Order XXXIII of the CPC.

  1. Documentary and testimonial evidence: The court relied on Ex. R1 (produced by respondents) which showed that appellants 1 and 2 were regranted five lands (including Sy. No. 66, the suit property) by order dated 19-8-1988 to the extent of one-third share each. RW-1's statement corroborated Ex. R1 and was not challenged by the appellants.
  2. Additional documents (Exs. R2–R10) indicated names of appellants 1 and 2 with respect to lands Sy. Nos. 13, 15, 30, 54, 59 and 106. The court identified Sy. Nos. 13, 15, 30, 59 and 66 as regranted lands (with 2/3rds regrant noted) and observed that, excluding the suit property Sy. No. 66, there remained four lands in which appellants had interests.
  3. Admissions in evidence: PW-1 (a fourth appellant) admitted that four lands had been regranted to his father and the first appellant and that those lands had neither been disposed of nor resumed by the Government. PW-1 also admitted the existence of another house near the respondents' houses, in addition to the residential house. PW-1 stated he earned Rs. 300 per month working in a dairy; no salary was stated for his father (a "Thoti").
  4. Statutory requirement and purpose of Rule 2, Order XXXIII CPC: The court analyzed Order XXXIII Rule 2 (contents of application) and emphasized that a schedule of movable and immovable property belonging to the applicant, with estimated values, must be annexed to an application for permission to sue as an indigent person. The court interpreted the mandatory wording ("shall") and linked it with Rule 5(a) which allows rejection where an application is not framed or presented as prescribed.
  5. Application of precedents: The court surveyed authorities holding that concealment of property or failure to furnish particulars may be fatal to an indigent application (e.g., Chingakham Chaoba Singh; Ramniklal) while acknowledging decisions that not every omission is fatal and that bona fides must be judged in context (V. Krishna Bhat). Weighing these authorities, the court found the present omissions to be deliberate rather than innocuous.
  6. Conclusion on the evidence: Given the unchallenged documentary evidence and the admissions on record, and the absence of any schedule or particulars and estimated values in the appellants' application, the court concluded that the appellants had deliberately omitted material details to create the impression of not having sufficient means. Thus, they failed to demonstrate they lacked "sufficient means" to pay the requisite court fee.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED.

Implications and consequences:

  • The trial court's order refusing permission to sue as paupers was upheld because the appellants failed to comply with Order XXXIII, Rule 2 of the CPC by not annexing a schedule of properties with estimated values and by omitting material property disclosures which the court treated as deliberate suppression.
  • As a practical consequence, the appellants do not get the benefit of proceeding in forma pauperis. However, the court granted the appellants one month's time from the date of the judgment to pay the requisite court fee on the plaint, if they desire to proceed with the suit by paying the fee.
  • Broader precedential effect: The opinion applies existing principles about mandatory disclosure under Order XXXIII and the significance of bona fides; the court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond the authorities it cited. No new precedent beyond application of established principles was announced in this judgment.

Appeal dismissed. One month's time allowed to appellants to pay the requisite court fee on the plaint if they so desire.

Show all summary ...

1. The appellants/petitioners are aggrieved by the impugned order dated 24-3-2001 passed in P. Misc. No. 5/97 since their request to permit them to sue as paupers, has been turned down by the learned Prl. Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore.

2. It is the case of the appellants that except the suit schedule property, they are not having any property worth Rs. 1,000/- either movable or immovable, including wearing apparel, and even they could not raise loan on the security of the suit property for the purpose of paying Court fee and hence, sought permission to sue as paupers. However, the respondents disputed the said claim on the ground that the appellants have suppressed material facts and the properties held by them, though they have several properties in and around Yelachahalli village besides house properties and, even otherwise, the petition filed by appellants is not in conformity with Order XXXIII, Rule 2 of CPC and against the mandatory provisions contained in CPC and consequently, they requested to refuse the relief. The appellants examined one of them whereas, respondents have examined the second respondent and got marked 10 documents in support of their case. However, after hearing, the learned Civil Judge turned down the request of the appellants.

3. Heard both sides. It is submitted for appellants that the trial Court was wrong in refusing the permission whereas, it is argued for the respondents that the appellants have suppressed the fact of possessing properties and hence, permission was rightly refused. Perused the record carefully.

4. At the outset, it may be noted that Ex. R1 produced by the respondents shows that the appellants 1 and 2 were regranted five lands, including the survey number of the suit property i.e, Sy. No. 66, by order dated 19-8-1988 to the extent of 1/3rd share each. In fact, the statement of RW-1 is also available with regard to said record. Neither the said evidence nor the said document has been challenged by the appellants in any manner. Further, there are documents at Exs. R. 2 to 10, which show names of appellants-1 and 2 with regard to land Sy. Nos. 13, 15, 30, 54, 59 and 106. Five lands, which have been regranted to the extent of 2/3rd as per said order dated 19-8-1988, are Sy. Nos. 13, 15, 30, 59 and 66. Admittedly, Sy. No. 66 is suit property. So, if that is excluded as property held or possessed by the appellants for the purpose of raising loan for paying Court fee, there are four other lands belonging to them. It is even specifically admitted by PW-1 that four lands have been regranted to his father and first appellant and said lands have not been disposed of by them nor the Government has resumed possession of such regranted lands. So, in view of the said clear statement of PW-1 and the evidence of RW-1 corroborated by unchallenged documents, there can be no hesitation to hold that the appellants hold lands Sy. Nos. 13, 15, 30 and 59 of Yelachahalli village. However, no reference of these lands is found in the pleading of the appellants.

5. It is also pertinent to note that PW-1, who is none other than the fourth appellant, has categorically admitted in his cross-examination that there is one more house near the house of respondents-2 and 3 in addition to the house in which they are residing.

6. Further, according to PW-1, he is working in a dairy, getting salary of Rs. 300/- per month whereas, his father (second appellant) serves as a “Thoti” in the village, though not stated salary of his father as “Thoti”. If there is no salary, what is the income as “Thoti” is also not stated by said witness.

7. It is well settled that mere possession of some property by itself is not sufficient to hold that a person, who seeks for permission to sue as pauper, has “sufficient means” and consequently, able to pay the requisite Court fee, unless the property in his possession shows that he has “sufficient means”, which enables him to pay the prescribed Court fee. It means that applicant seeking permission to sue in forma pauperis has to show or disclose property, whether movable or immovable i.e, his means as that is the basis on which, it could be ascertained and said that he has or has no “sufficient means” to pay the requisite Court fee on the plaint.

8. So, though Rule 1 of Order 33 of CPC says as to when a person can institute a suit as pauper, what should be the contents of an application, made for seeking permission to sue as pauper, is prescribed in Rule 2 of Order 33 of CPC. In that view, Rule 2 has much significance in the matter, which is again clear from Rule 5(a) of Order 33 of CPC, which says that the Court shall reject an application for permission to sue as an indigent person where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by Rules 2 and 3 of Order 33 of CPC. So, now reference can be had to Rule 2.

9. Order XXXIII Rule 2 of CPC is as under:—

“2. Contents of application.— Every application for permission to sue as an indigent person shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits; a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant, with the estimated value thereof, shall be annexed thereto; and it shall be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings.”

(Underline supplied)

Said provision makes it clear that when any application is filed seeking permission to sue as an indigent person not only it shall contain the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits; even a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof shall also be annexed thereto.

10. It need not be said that in the absence of particulars of properties belonging to an applicant with their estimated value, whether or not, the applicant has “sufficient means” to pay the requisite Court fee cannot be ascertained. So, furnishing a schedule or at least particulars of movable and immovable property belonging to an applicant with estimated value thereof is made mandatory to ascertain and hold whether or not, the applicant in such a case possesses “sufficient means” to pay the requisite Court fee on the plaint as, in the absence of such particulars, the Court will not be able to know and hold whether or not, the applicant is able to pay the Court fee on the plaint. This can be inferred from the word “shall” used in said Rule when seen with Order 33, Rule 5(a) of CPC besides the object with such a schedule of property (movable and immovable) belonging to applicant is required to be annexed to the application.

11. In the case of Chingakham Chaoba Singh, AIR 1964 Manipur 31, it is held that when a party comes to Court and seeks its aid to file a suit in forma pauperis, he must not attempt to conceal any of his property and he must show his bona fides and burden is on him to satisfy the Court that he has disclosed all his properties and that he was really not in a position to pay the Court fee and any intentional departure from good faith whatever the motive might be, must attract the consequence of a dismissal of the petition. Almost same view is expressed in the case of Rajinder Singh, AIR 1965 Punjab 331. In fact, in the case of Ramniklal v. Mathurlal, AIR 1965 Gujarat 214, it is held that application to sue as pauper, not containing particulars required by Rule 2, has to be rejected and even if the particulars are supplied subsequently, that will not be a defence. Similar view has been expressed in the decisions reported in AIR 1976 Patna 127 and AIR 1977 Andh Pra 15.

12. Of course, in the case of V. Krishna Bhat v. Ravishankar, AIR 1978 Kant 117, this Court has taken a view that it is not every case of omission that is fatal, but only omissions indicative of lack of bona fides or good faith on the part of the applicants, that would indeed be fatal and the party lacking any good faith is not entitled to the concessions at all. It is further held therein that whether the conduct of a party lacks good faith and whether the omission to mention all the properties belonging to him, is a deliberate act of suppression, has to be ascertained from the facts of that particular case and the surrounding circumstances. So, recently in the case of M.L Balaram v. Canara Bank, ILR 2001 Kant 4796 : (2002 AIHC 746), this Court has refused to interfere in the order of dispaupering a petitioner on the ground that he had not disclosed all his business assets in his application filed seeking permission to sue as pauper.

13. It is true that a learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Ranganatha v. The Chief Secretary, State of Karnataka (2000) 3 Kant LJ (SN) 30 at page 23 : (1999 AIHC 1951), has held that rejection of application on the ground that applicant is the co-sharer of co-parcenery property is not sustainable in law when it is found that he has no other property or wherewithal to pay for Court-fee. Further, in the case of D.S Premakumari v. D.S Srinivasamurthy (1994) 3 Kant LJ 445 : ILR 1993 Kant 1862), this Court has held that an application for permission to file a suit as an indigent person cannot be rejected on the ground of receipt of certain amount towards maintenance in an execution proceeding.

14. So, according to me, there is a mandate in Order 33, Rule 2 of CPC, not only to show any movable and immovable property belonging to him but also to give the estimated value of such movable and immovable property belonging to the applicant, so that it can be ascertained and held as to whether property possessed by him i.e means he has is such that it enables him to pay the required Court-fee or not.

15. However, in the present matter, without giving description/particulars of any movable or immovable property belonging to them and except stating that they are not having any property worth Rs. 1,000/- either movable or immovable including wearing apparel, the appellants have neither annexed any ‘schedule’ to their application filed under Order 33, Rule 1 of CPC nor they have furnished particulars or description of any property belonging to them nor they have given estimated value of any such property belonging to them.

16. Admittedly, the appellants have 2/3rd share in four landed properties, which they got by way of regrant in the year 1988 itself, besides a house property in addition to their residential house. This can be said even if three other landed properties bearing Sy. Nos. 19, 54 and 106, found in Ex. R1, are ignored for the reason that they were not regranted to them. However, for the reasons best known to them, they have not disclosed any of the said properties anywhere in the application nor annexed any schedule to the application much less the value of such properties. Simply because the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 have only 1/3rd share each in the said four lands, besides land Sy. No. 66 in which the suit property comes, that itself could not have been a ground for the appellants not to mention said properties, when Order 33, Rule 2 of CPC requires them to disclose those properties with estimated value thereof. In fact, no reason much less satisfactory reason is forthcoming for said omission.

17. In the circumstances, it can be said to be a deliberate omission on their part in order to show that they do not possess “sufficient means” to pay requisite Court fee and not an accidental or a bonafide omission. So, in view of the material on record, that the appellants have failed to show that they have no “sufficient means” to pay the requisite Court fee and as such, no infirmity is found in the finding arrived at by the trial Court against them.

In the result, the appeal fails and accordingly, it is dismissed. However, the appellants are given one month's time from today to pay the requisite Court fee on the plaint, if they desire to do so.

Appeal dismissed.