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Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner

Karnataka High Court
Dec 11, 2001
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a registered firm that filed a writ petition seeking issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash an order dated March 9, 2000 (Annexure "B") passed by respondent No. 1 in appeal No. ATGA/6(6)/2000. The core dispute concerns whether a "Special Allowance" agreed by the petitioner with the Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Workers Union and Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Workers and Employees' Association under a settlement dated March 19, 1996 should be treated as part of "basic wages" for the purpose of provident fund contributions under Section 2(b) read with Section 6 of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (the Act).

Clause 5 of the 1996 settlement sets out the Special Allowance payable monthly from April 1, 1996 to employees on the muster roll based on length of service (sub-clauses (a) to (d) of Clause 5). The petitioner contends the Special Allowance is not "basic wages" within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Act and is therefore not liable to be included for provident fund contributions under Section 6. The Provident Fund authority (respondent) held otherwise in the impugned appellate order, treating the Special Allowance as within the definition of "basic wages" and consequently liable for contribution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Special Allowance agreed under Clause 5 of the settlement dated March 19, 1996 constitutes "basic wages" within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, so as to be included for the purpose of provident fund contribution under Section 6 of the Act.
  2. Whether the appellate authority's order dated March 9, 2000 (Annexure "B") holding that the Special Allowance falls within "basic wages" is legal and requires interference by the Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Special Allowance agreed under Clause 5 of the settlement is not "basic wages" as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act and is therefore excluded from the definition under Clause (ii) of Section 2(b).
  • The Special Allowance is not a uniform payment payable to all concerns or earned by all permanent employees in all concerns of the petitioner; consequently it should not be included for provident fund contribution calculations under Section 6.
  • Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench decision in Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. v. Union of India to support the contention that the Special Allowance is not to be treated as basic wages for provident fund purposes.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The definition of Section 2(b)(ii) read with Section 6 of the Act requires inclusion of the Special Allowance for provident fund contributions; the impugned order correctly applies the statutory definition.
  • The Special Allowance payable under Clause 5 of the settlement must be taken into account for provident fund contributions.
  • Reliance was placed on Supreme Court judgments, notably Daily Partap v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Prantiya Vidhyut Mandal Mazdoor Federation v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board, which interpret Section 2(b) and Section 6 and support treating such allowances as basic wages in the circumstances indicated by those cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. v. Union of India Earlier authority relied upon by the petitioner regarding coverage of allowances; invoked on the question of what amounts fall outside "basic wages". The court observed that the petitioner's reliance on Bridge & Roof was misplaced in view of subsequent Supreme Court pronouncements; the appellate authority had considered Bridge & Roof along with later cases and recorded a finding consistent with those later decisions.
Daily Partap v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Punjab, Haryana, H.P. & Union Territory of Chandigarh Interpretation of Section 2(b) and Section 6; explanation of exception (ii) to the definition of "basic wages" and the legal test for a genuine production bonus scheme (paras 10, 15 quoted). The court extracted and relied on paras 10 and 15 of Daily Partap to assess whether the Special Allowance was a production bonus (thus falling within exception (ii)) or part of basic wages. Applying the tests stated in Daily Partap, the court concluded the allowance did not qualify as a production bonus exception and thus fell within basic wages.
Prantiya Vidhyut Mandal Mazdoor Federation v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board After interpretation of Section 2(b) and Section 6, sets out items I to IV clarifying the expression "basic wages" for provident fund computation. The court relied on the criteria and exposition in this judgment to conclude that the Special Allowance under Clause 5 of the settlement falls within the inclusive definition of "basic wages" under Section 2(b) of the Act.
Ramanathan Chettiar Jewellers v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madurai Authority relied upon by the Appellate Authority in evaluating whether certain allowances form part of basic wages. The appellate authority considered this judgment among others in recording its finding that the Special Allowance is part of basic wages; the court noted this reliance in assessing the lawfulness of the impugned order.
Burma Shell Oil Company v. Regional P.P. Commissioner, reported in 1981-II-LLJ-86 (Del-DB) Authority considered by the Appellate Authority in relation to the treatment of allowances for provident fund purposes. The appellate authority referenced this decision when reaching its factual and legal conclusion that the Special Allowance is includible in basic wages; the court treated that reliance as part of the reasoning supporting the impugned order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the impugned appellate order to determine whether the respondent correctly concluded that the Special Allowance falls within "basic wages" under Section 2(b) read with Section 6 of the Act. The analysis proceeded on the following lines, as expressed in the opinion:

  1. The appellate authority had exercised its appellate jurisdiction after considering the parties' legal contentions and recorded a finding that the Special Allowance payable under Clause 5 of the settlement is within the definition of "basic wages" under Section 2(b).
  2. That authority examined Sections 2(b) and 6 of the Act in light of the factual terms of the settlement between the petitioner and the trade unions and placed reliance upon relevant precedents (including Ramanathan Chettiar Jewellers and Burma Shell Oil Company) in reaching its conclusion.
  3. The court reviewed the Supreme Court's decisions relied upon by the respondent, particularly Daily Partap and Prantiya Vidhyut Mandal Mazdoor Federation, which interpret Section 2(b) and Section 6 and clarify when an allowance constitutes a production bonus under exception (ii) to Section 2(b). The opinion quoted and discussed paras 10 and 15 of Daily Partap (including the test that a genuine production bonus must vary with extra output and have a direct nexus to extra production).
  4. Applying the tests articulated in those Supreme Court decisions, the court observed that for an allowance to be excluded as a production bonus it must genuinely be tied to extra output (either collectively or individually) and must vary with production. The appellate authority had found that the Special Allowance under the settlement did not meet the criteria to qualify as a genuine production bonus exception, and therefore remained in the realm of basic wages.
  5. The court concluded that the appellate authority's findings were supported by the statutory definitions (Section 2(b) read with Section 6) and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (as set out in Daily Partap and Prantiya Vidhyut), and that the reasons given in the impugned order were legal and valid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed; the court upheld the impugned appellate order which treated the Special Allowance as part of "basic wages" for the purpose of provident fund contributions.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The impugned order dated March 9, 2000 in appeal No. ATGA/6(6)/2000, insofar as it holds the Special Allowance payable under Clause 5 of the 1996 settlement to be part of "basic wages" and hence includible for provident fund contribution calculations, is upheld; the petition seeking certiorari to quash that order is dismissed as devoid of merit.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion states that the appellate authority's conclusion is in conformity with the Act and the law laid down by the Supreme Court (Daily Partap, Prantiya Vidhyut and related jurisprudence). The judgment does not indicate that it establishes a new principle beyond applying existing Supreme Court authority; it treats the matter as resolved by applying those precedents and the statutory definitions.
Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner-registered firm has filed this writ petition seeking for issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated March 9, 2000 produced at Annexure "B" passed by respondent No. 1 in the appeal No. ATGA/6(6)/2000 urging various legal contentions.

2. The subject matter of dispute between the petitioner and the respondent-Provident Fund Commissioner is that provident fund contribution need not be paid taking into consideration the Special Allowance as agreed upon by the petitioner-management with its Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Workers Union and Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Workers and Employees' Association. The settlement dated March 19, 1996 with regard to various conditions of the workmen and employees working in the petitioners' firm are entered by the petitioner and the trade unions of its workmen. Clause 5 of the said settlement deals with regard to Special Allowance agreed to be paid in favour of the employees and workmen by the petitioner employer; whose names are borne on the muster rolls of the establishment and continued to be in service shall be paid Special Allowance every month from April 1, 1996 based on the respective length of service as enumerated under Sub-clause (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Clause 5 of the settlement referred to above. The submission of special allowance agreed to be paid by the petitioner firm to its employees association cannot be taken into consideration as "basic wages" in terms of Section 2(b) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (in short "Act") as the Special Allowance is not the basic pay as defined under Section 2(b) read with Section 6 of the said Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Special Allowances are exempted under Clause (ii) of the definition of Section 2(b) of the Act, as per the said clause of the definition of the Act the special allowance payable to the workmen pursuant to the settlement agreed between the parties is not included in the definition of "basic wages". Therefore the payment of special allowance is not within the inclusive definition of Section 2(b)(ii) of the Act and further the basis of inclusion of special allowance are clearly included under Section 6 of the Act. The special allowance as agreed to be paid to the employees and workmen under Clause 5 of the settlement is not payable by the petitioner firm in all the concerns and it is not earned by all permanent employees to be included in the basic wage for the purpose of contribution to be worked out under Section 6 of the Act. Further it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that whatever is not payable by all the concerns of the petitioner's firm or may not be earned by all employees of concern is excluded for the purpose of payment of provident fund contribution of the employees of the petitioners firm. In support of the said proposition of law, learned counsel Smt. Shubha Ananth placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. v. Union of India, . Rebutting the said proposition, learned Standing Counsel Smt. Vijay R. Hanumanthgoud on behalf of the respondent placed strong reliance upon the definition of Section 2(b)(ii) read with Section 6 of the Act and justifies the impugned order. The special allowance payable by the management under Clause 5 of the settlement to its employees and workmen shall be taken into consideration for payment of Provident fund contribution to its employees and workmen. Further she has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Daily Partap v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Punjab, Haryana, H.P. & Union Territory of Chandigarh, wherein the Apex Court after the interpretation of Section 2(b) and Section 6 and also the exception allowance carried out under Sub-clause (ii) to Section 2(b) of the Act, it has held after considering the Judgment of Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. v. Union of India referred to (supra) and other judgments of the Apex Court the term "basic wages" as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act, it must be shown that "the scheme in question to offer production bonus to be in extra output wherein either collectively bonus may be fixed to all of them on the basis of total extra output on a sliding scale or may be given to number of workers by their efforts earn such benefits". With reference to the fact situation of that case, Supreme Court has held that the extra wages payable must be treated as basic wages and she has also further placed reliance upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in Prantiya Vidhyut Mandal Mazdoor Federation v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board, . After interpreting the provisions under Section 2(b) and Section 6 of the Act, in the aforesaid case 4 items have been extracted in the judgment regarding the expression "basic wages" for the purpose of computation of various components 01 wages to pay the provident fund contribution amount of its employees to the respondent. The payment of special allowance to its employees and workmen under the settlement referred to supra falls within the definition of basic wages as the same has been expressly spelt out by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case. Therefore learned counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that the order passed in the appeal by the respondent is in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the law laid down by the Supreme Court and norther contended that the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Bridge & Roof company (India) Ltd. is explained by the Apex Court in the subsequent judgments referred to (supra) upon which she has placed reliance to sustain the impugned order.

3. With reference to the judgments of the Supreme Court, I have examined the correctness of the legal submission made at the Bar on behalf of the parties to find out and answer whether the impugned order is legal and valid or warrants interference by this Court. The respondent has exercised his appellate power and jurisdiction after considering the legal contentions referred to above urged by the learned counsel in the appeal and he has recorded his finding holding that the special allowance payable to the employees and workmen by the petitioner pursuant to Clause 5 of the settlement is the Special Allowance which falls within the definition of basic wage as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. The Appellate Authority while recording such a finding has examined and considered the provisions of Section 2(b) and Section 6 of the Act keeping the view the settlement entered between the petitioners firm and the workers union and employees association and placed reliance upon the Judgment reported in Ramanathan Chettiar Jewellers v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Madurai and also Burma Shell Oil Company v. Regional P.P. Commissioner, reported in 1981-II-LLJ-86 (Del-DB) and records a finding with reference to the factual aspects of the case and held that the special allowance payable to the employees and the workmen by their employer would be a part of the basic wages in terms of the definition of Section 2(b) of the Act. The said finding is recorded by the Appellate Authority with reference to the law laid down by me Apex Court in the case of Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. v. Union of India and other Judgments referred to (supra) upon which much reliance is placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent. After careful examination of the findings recorded by the respondent-authority with reference to the contentions urged by the petitioners counsel that Court holds that the findings recorded in the impugned order with reasons are in conformity with the definition of Section 2(b) read with Section 6 of the Act and also law laid down by the Apex Court in its Judgments reported in Daily Partap v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Punjab, Haryana, H. P. & Union Territory of Chandigarh wherein the Apex Court after considering Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. v. Union of India, has clearly laid down the law at paras 10, 15, the relevant portions of which are extracted as hereunder:

"10. Therefore, the short question is whether the disputed amounts paid to the workmen employed by the appellants during the relevant time were paid by way of Production Bonus or not. An incidental question will also arise namely, whether in any case the said amount can be said to be covered by the latter part of the exception category (ii) of the definition Section 2(b) being similar allowance payable to the employee in respect of his employment or the work done in such employment. It was submitted that in any case this allowance was paid for the extra work by way of incentive. The aforesaid contention of learned counsel for the appellants will have to be examined in the light of the Production Bonus Scheme in question which has been the Sheet- anchor of the appellant's case for getting out of the sweep of Section 6 read with Section 2(b) of the Act. The said scheme which is identical in nature for both the appellants reads as under:

Production Bonus is paid for the following reasons:

1. Less than the normal number of people doing the normal work of a working shift, in which case the Production Bonus is paid according to the deficiency in the numerical strength of the staff.

2. Extra output given by any workman in any staff. Output of compositors and distributors is measured in terms of column inches of type that of machine men in terms of the speed of the machine and of the process Section in terms of plates and negatives. Allowance is made for delays caused by factors beyond the control of the workmen.

Production Bonus is 11/2 times the normal daily wage. It may be reduced or increased on account of special reasons at the discretion of the management. It is variable from month to month and is apart from the basic wage of the workman."

15. It therefore, becomes clear that in order to become a genuine Production Bonus Scheme so as to get covered by exception (ii) to the definition of "basic wages" as found under Section 2(b) of the Act, it must be shown that the scheme in question seeks to offer production bonus to the workmen concerned who put in extra output wherein collectively bonus be fixed to all of them on the basis of total extra output on a sliding scale or may be paid individually to a given number of workmen who by their own efforts earn such bonus. Thus in each case payment of bonus cannot be a fixed or proven nature having no nexus with the quantity of extra output produced by them. As in the present case the scheme relied on by the appellants does not fulfil this legal test, it does not attract the exception (ii) to Section 2(b). It remains in the realm of basic extra wage. The decision rendered by the learned single Judge of the High Court as confirmed by the Division Bench decision cannot, therefore, be found fault with. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants that in the scheme in question there was no compulsion for the workman to put in extra work and the management could not compel him to do extra work nor can it allege any misconduct on the part of such workman who does not want to do excess work cannot be of any avail to the learned counsel for the appellants as even if this criteria may be common to the present scheme as well as the genuine Production; Bonus Scheme, the further requirement of the scheme to become a genuine Production Bonus Scheme, namely, that the payment by way of bonus to the concerned eligible workman should vary in production to the extra output put by him beyond the norm of output prescribed for him is conspicuously absent in the present scheme, as seen earlier, and on the other hand this requirement which is the very heart of a genuine Production Bonus Scheme is missing in the present scheme and, therefore, similarity on only one aspect between the genuine production incentive scheme and the present scheme, namely, that the workman could not have been compelled to carry out extra work pales into insignificance on the facts of the present case. Therefore, the second question has to be answered against the appellants and in favour of the respondent".

Further the Apex Court has reiterated in another case Prantiya Vidhyut Mandal Mazdoor Federation v. Rajasthan State Electricity Board and Ors., (supra) the Apex Court after careful interpretation of Section 2(b) and Section 6 of the Act, the expression -"basic wages" has been clearly set down at items I to IV. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid case, the special allowance agreed to be paid to all employees and workmen under Clause 5 of the settlement by the petitioner's firm will come within the inclusive definition of "basic wage" under Section 2(b) of the Act. Therefore the findings recorded by the Appellate Authority in the impugned order is in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the law laid down by, the Supreme Court and therefore the reasons assigned in the impugned order are legal and valid which does not call for interference by the Courts. The reliance placed upon judgment of Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. (supra) by the learned counsel for the petitioner is misplaced, having regard to the subsequent pronouncement of the Supreme Court referred to (supra) wherein the law laid down in the said Bridge & Roof Company (India) Ltd. v. Union of India by the Apex Court has explained in the subsequent cases referred to supra upon which learned counsel for the respondent has rightly placed reliance, as the ratio laid down in the said case with all fours applicable to the facts of the case.

4. For the reasons stated, there is no merit in the petition. Petition must fail. Accordingly, petition is dismissed as devoid of merit.