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Nagaraj And Another v. Ammayamma

Karnataka High Court
Jun 29, 2001
Smart Summary (Beta)

Summary of Legal Opinion (Thakur, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises from a decree passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore in O.S. No. 98/87, which restrained the defendants (appellants) from interfering with the plaintiff/respondent's possession of the suit schedule property. The respondent originally filed O.S. No. 3272/1983 before the 12th Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, seeking a permanent prohibitory injunction against Shri Muniswamappa (deceased) and the present appellants; the suit was transferred to the Family Court after the Family Court Act came into force and renumbered O.S. No. 98/87, which resulted in the decree impugned on this appeal.

The respondent's pleaded factual case was that she was the second lawful wife of Muniswamappa, who had given her exclusive possession of a house with an open site around 1965–1966; she ran a fuel depot with a Corporation licence, tethered cattle and sold milk. She alleged that appellants (Muniswamappa's son and son-in-law) interfered with her peaceful possession and fabricated documents to dispossess her. The defendants denied the allegations, contending that the respondent was not a lawful wife but a mistress/concubine, denying the existence of a fuel depot, and asserting that Muniswamappa was the real owner and in possession.

The trial Court framed five issues for determination, the evidence included the plaintiff/respondent's testimony and one additional witness (P.W.2 Appi Reddy); the defendants did not lead independent witnesses. The Family Court found that the plaintiff and the deceased had cohabited and were treated as husband and wife, that the plaintiff had peaceful possession of the suit property, and decreed the suit granting an injunction and costs. This appeal challenges those conclusions, including the Family Court's jurisdiction to try the suit after the death of Muniswamappa.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule property was given to her by the first defendant to live separately and to carry on her business and as such she is in lawful possession of the same on the date of suit?
  2. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendants obstructed her possession?
  3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction sought?
  4. What order or decree should be passed?
  5. Additional issue: Whether Defendant No. 2 proves that this Court has ceased to have jurisdiction over the matter involved in this case and the suit is therefore liable to be dismissed?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Written statement allegations: the respondent was not the legally wedded wife but a mistress/concubine; the respondent was allowed to occupy property as a concubine and therefore had no entitlement to protection against interference with possession, particularly if Muniswamappa was willing to maintain her; the defendants denied the fuel depot allegation and contended Muniswamappa was in possession.
  • Jurisdictional challenge: Appearing for the appellants, counsel (Mr. Rao) argued that under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act the Family Court's jurisdiction is limited to suits of the nature enumerated in the Explanation, and that the suit ceased to be within the Family Court's jurisdiction after the death of Muniswamappa.
  • Merits challenge (argued by counsel identified as Mr. Vishwanath in the opinion): even on the plaintiff's own version the property belonged to Muniswamappa; if Muniswamappa had permitted the plaintiff to occupy, she could not claim an injunction against the true owner; and there was no evidence that the plaintiff was the legally wedded wife so as to confer rights qua the property.

Plaintiff / Respondent's Case (as presented in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff asserted she was the lawfully wedded second wife of Muniswamappa and had been placed in exclusive possession of the suit premises since 1965–1966.
  • She asserted she ran a fuel depot on the open space attached to the house and held a Corporation licence; she tethered cattle and sold milk for livelihood.
  • She alleged that the appellants interfered with her peaceful possession and attempted to dispossess her by fabricating documents, prompting the suit for injunction.
  • Evidence relied upon included the plaintiff's own testimony, testimony of P.W.2 (Appi Reddy), and documentary materials (including a Demand Promissory Note describing the plaintiff as wife, a Show Cause Notice marked Ext. P.8, and an enumeration form describing her as wife).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Arokiamary v. Sampammal Cited by counsel; the specific rule or principle relied upon is not described in the opinion. The Court observed that this decision, as relied upon by counsel, does not advance the appellant's case and “do[es] not state the legal position differently.”
Venkatappa v. Chairman, Family Courts, Bangalore & Others Cited by counsel; the opinion does not state the precise principle extracted from this decision. The Court held that this authority does not alter the legal position argued by the appellants and therefore does not assist them.
Gowri v. Satish Cited by counsel; the opinion does not specify the rule or principle relied upon. The Court recorded that this decision likewise “do[es] not state the legal position differently” and therefore does not help the appellants' case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a twofold analysis: (1) whether the Family Court retained jurisdiction to try and dispose of the suit after the death of Muniswamappa; and (2) whether the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction restraining interference with her possession.

On jurisdiction, the Court examined Section 7 of the Family Courts Act (which confers on Family Courts the jurisdiction exercisable by district or subordinate civil courts in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature described in the Explanation). The Court identified clauses in the Explanation as relevant to the present suit: clause (CA) (a suit between parties to a marriage with respect to property of the parties or either of them) and clause (d) (a suit for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship).

The Court reasoned that:

  • At the time the suit was instituted and transferred to the Family Court it clearly fell within clause (CA) because the dispute concerned property said to be owned by Muniswamappa and the plaintiff's rights thereto.
  • Even if the death of Muniswamappa subsequently removed the suit from clause (CA)'s literal scope, the nature of the dispute (an injunction claimed arising out of a marital relationship) meant the suit still fell squarely under clause (d).
  • Accordingly, issues concerning the marital relationship and whether the plaintiff's possessory or other rights were related to that relationship remained relevant and could properly be tried by the Family Court despite the husband's death.
  • The trial Court was therefore justified in holding that the suit continued to be within the Family Court's jurisdiction (issue No. 5 decided against the defendants).

On the merits, the Court reviewed the evidence supporting the trial Court's factual findings:

  • The trial Court found long cohabitation and that persons known to the parties treated them as husband and wife. This finding was supported by P.W.2 (Appireddy), a close relative of the deceased who stated he had attended their wedding; the Court found nothing in cross-examination to impeach his credibility.
  • Documentary corroboration included a Demand Promissory Note naming the plaintiff as wife, a Corporation Show Cause Notice (Ext. P.8) describing her as the deceased's wife, and an enumeration form similarly describing her.
  • The deceased's own admission that he had lived with and maintained the plaintiff “as mistress” was treated as material corroboration of cohabitation and the long-term relationship.

On the question whether the plaintiff's possession entitled her to protection, the Court reasoned:

  • The plaintiff had been in peaceful, uninterrupted possession of the premises for a considerable period and had thus acquired a possessory title entitling her to protection against interference.
  • The provision by Muniswamappa of separate residence to the plaintiff could be legitimately related to his obligation under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (which recognises a wife's right to demand separate residence in certain situations, including where the husband has another wife).
  • Having placed the wife in possession for her separate residence, neither the husband nor anyone claiming through him could lawfully interfere with that possession.
  • The Court explicitly stated it was unnecessary to decide whether such possession would be enlarged into an absolute estate under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; the narrow conclusion was that the respondent wife was entitled to prevent interference with her possession until substantive rights were adjudicated in a proper civil action by a competent court.

Given these findings and legal applications, the Court saw no reason to interfere with the Family Court's judgment and decree.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The appeal is dismissed; the impugned judgment and decree of the Family Court are affirmed. The Court dismissed the appeal "without any orders as to costs."

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The Family Court's decree restraining the appellants from interfering with the plaintiff/respondent's possession of the suit schedule property is maintained.
  • The respondent is entitled to continue to prevent interference with her possession until substantive rights as to ownership or other property rights are determined by a competent court in appropriate civil proceedings.
  • No costs were awarded against the appellants (the appeal was dismissed without any orders as to costs).

Broader legal implications:

The opinion does not purport to lay down any new principle of law beyond applying Section 7 of the Family Courts Act and relevant statutory provisions to the facts of this case. The Court noted and considered earlier authorities cited by counsel but concluded they did not change the legal position; the opinion does not state that it establishes a new precedent.

Show all summary ...

Thakur, J.:—

This Miscellaneous First Appeal arises out of a Decree passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore, in O.S No. 98/87 restraining the Defendants Appellants herein from interfering with the possession of the Plaintiff/Respondent over the suit schedule property.

The Respondent claims to be the lawfully wedded wife of one Shri Muniswamappa, father of appellant No. 1 and the father-in-law of Appellant No. 2. O.S No. 3272/1983 was filed by her initially before the 12th Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore for a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the said Shri Muniswamappa and the appellants herein from interfering with the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff - Respondent over the suit schedule property. With the coming into force of the Family Court Act, the said suit was transferred to the Family Court for trial and disposal, where it was renumbered O.S No. 98/87 and eventually decreed by the impugned judgment.

The Plaintiff's case as set out in the plaint is that her husband deceased Muniswamappa was married thrice, the Respondent being second out of the three wives. Her further case is that since relations between the Respondent and the third wife of Muniswamappa did not remain cordial, Muniswamappa, put the Plaintiff/Respondent in possession of the suit schedule property comprising a house with an open site in which the Respondent has been living ever since the year 1965-1966. According to her she has been carrying on business in the open space attached to the house by using the same as a fuel depot. A licence was also issued in her favour for that purpose by the Corporation. She was also tethering cattle on a part of the suit property and eking out a living by vending milk. The plaint went on to state that Muniswamappa had at the instigation of his son and son-in-law, appellants herein started interfering with her peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. They were, she alleged fabricating documents in an attempt to throw her out of the suit property forcing the plaintiff to seek the protection of the Court in the suit instituted by her.

The written statement filed by the defendants denied the allegations made in the plaint and inter alia alleged that the Plaintiff - Respondent was not the legally wedded wife of Muniswamappa but is kept mistress. The allegation that the Plaintiff was running a fuel depot in the suit property was also denied and it was alleged that Muniswamappa was himself in possession of the said property. It was alleged that although she was allowed to occupy the property and carry on business as a concubine of Muniswamappa she was not entitled to any protection against interference with her possession especially when Muniswamappa was ready and willing to maintain her.

On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following five issues:—

“1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule property was given to her by first defendant to live separately and to carry on her business and as such she is in lawful possession of the same on the date of suit?

2. Does she further proves that the defendants obstructed her possession?

3. Is plaintiff entitled to the injunction sought for?

4. What order? What Decree?

5. Additional Issue:—

Does Defendant No. 2, proves that this Court has ceased to have jurisdiction over the matter involved in this case and the suit is therefore liable to be dismissed?”

In support of her case, the Plaintiff stepped into the witness box besides examining P.W 2 Shri Appi Reddy. The defendants did not examine any witness apart from getting their own statements recorded. Appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, assembled by the parties led the trial Court to hold that the Plaintiff/Respondent and late Shri Muniswamappa, had cohabited for a long time and that persons known to them had treated them as husband and wife. The plaintiff was held to be in peaceful possession of the suit schedule property for a considerable length of time hence entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the same. Issue No. 5, relating to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit was also held against the defendants and the suit of the plaintiff decreed with costs.

Appearing for the appellants Mr. Rao, argued that the finding of the Family Court in regard to issue No. 5, was erroneous and unsustainable. He submitted that the jurisdiction of the Family Court was in terms of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, limited to trial of suit and proceedings enumerated thereunder. The suit filed by the Respondent had according to the learned Counsel, ceased to be a matter within the jurisdiction of the Family Court after the death of Muniswamappa, the alleged husband of the plaintiff.

Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, reads thus:—

“7. Jurisdiction.- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall-

(a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any district Court or any subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and

(b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a District Court or, as the case may be, such subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.

Explanation:— The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely:—

(a) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage (declaring the marriage to be null and void or, as the case may be, annulling the marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;

(b) a suit or proceeding for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage or as to the matrimonial status of any person;

(c) a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them;

(d) a suit or proceeding for an order or injunction in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship;

(e) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;

(f) a suit or proceeding for maintenance;

(g) a suit or proceeding in relation to the guardianship of the person or the custody of, or access to, any minor.

(2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall also have and exercise-

(a) The jurisdiction exercisable by a Magistrate of the first class under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974); and

(b) such other jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by any other enactment.

It is evident that the Family Court is competent to exercise jurisdiction in respect of suits and proceedings detailed in the explanation to sub-section (1) (Supra), Clause (CA) and (d) of explanation are in the instant case relevant. While Clause (CA) envisages proceedings between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property owned by them or either of them Clause (d), envisages a suit or proceeding, for an order of injunction arising out of a marital relationship. The suit filed by the plaintiff Respondent in the instant case involved determination of the right of the plaintiff qua the suit property which was according to her owned by Muniswamappa, her husband but assigned to her exclusively for her use and occupation. It was therefore a suit which clearly fell under Clause (CA) of the explanation on the date the same was instituted and transferred to the Family Court. Even assuming that after the death of Muniswamappa the suit would stand excluded from the purview of Clause (CA), yet, it could be tried and disposed of by the family Court having regard to the nature of the dispute, raised in the same; and the fact that the same would fall squarely under Clause (d) of the explanation. The suit was for injunction which was in turn claimed in circumstances arising out of a marital relationship between the plaintiff and the deceased Muniswamappa. The essence of the controversy even after the death of Muniswamappa, related to her being the wife of Muniswamappa and the later providing for her residence in a part of the property owned by him. The trial Court had in the background of the allegations made in the proceedings to consider whether there was any marital relationship between the plaintiff and Muniswamappa, if so, whether the possessory or other rights claimed by the plaintiff, over the suit property were relateable to that relationship and whether an injunction as prayed for by her could be granted. These issues remained relevant for adjudication even after Muniswamappa had died and the cause of action to file the suit for a prohibitory relief died with him. The trial Court was in that view justified in deciding issue No. 5 against the defendants appellant herein and holding that the suit continued within its jurisdiction. The decisions of this Court in 1) Arokiamary v. Sampammal* . ILR 1990 4 Kant. P. 3917.. 2) Venkatappa v. Chairman, Family Courts, Bangalore & Others . 1990 1 KLJ 225.. 3) Gowri v. Satish* . ILR 1991 2 Kant. 1581., relied upon by Mr. Vishwanath, do not in our opinion advance his case as they do not state the legal position differently.

It was then argued by Mr. Vishwanath, that even according to the plaintiff's own version the property in question was owned by Muniswamappa. He urged that assuming that Muniswamappa had put the plaintiff in possession of the property as claimed by her, she could not according to the learned Counsel claim an injunction against Muniswamappa who was the real owner of the property. It was also contended that there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff was the legally wedded wife of Muniswamappa so as to confer any right upon her qua the property owned by him or any portion thereof.

The trial Court has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff and Muniswamappa had cohabited for a long period and lived together as husband and wife. That position was in fact supported by no less a person than P.W 2 Appireddy, who happens to be Muniswamappa's brother-in-law. According to the said witness the plaintiff was the legally wedded wife of Muniswamappa and that he had attended their wedding. There is nothing in the cross-examination of the witness to shake his credibility nor do we see any reason why the statement made by a close relative of the deceased in relation to a matter about which he would have certainly known should be disbelieved. That apart there is considerable corroboration to the version of the plaintiff and her witness forthcoming from the documents produced by her. These documents comprise among others a Demand Promissory Note to which Muniswamappa was a party in which the plaintiff has been described as his wife. Show Cause Notice issued by the Corporation Authorities marked Ext. P. 8, also describes plaintiff as wife of Muniswamappa besides the enumeration Form which too described her as the wife of Muniswamappa. All these circumstances, were in our opinion sufficient to conclude that the plaintiff and Muniswamappa had lived as husband and wife and that people had known and treated them as such. The fact that Muniswamappa admits having lived with and maintained the plaintiff as Mistress, leads significant support to the version of the plaintiff that they had cohabited together for a long time. We have therefore no difficulty in affirming the finding recorded by the trial Court in so far as the plaintiff being the legal wedded wife of Muniswamappa is concerned.

The next question then is whether the arrangement made by Muniswamappa, for the separate residence of plaintiff, and her possession over the premises, provided to her would entitle her to prevent any interference with the same. It is evident from the material on record that the plaintiff had been in possession of the suit premises for a considerable length of time. Her possession over the suit property had remained peaceful and uninterrupted. She had thus acquired a possessory title over the property which would entitle her to protection against interference with the same. That apart the provision made by Muniswamappa for separate residence of the plaintiff could be legitimately related to his obligation under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. That provision recognises the right of a Hindu wife to demand a separate residence in situations enumerated thereunder. One of those situations is where the husband had another wife living as was the case with Muniswamappa. Having made a provision and put the plaintiff wife in possession of the suit property, neither the husband nor any one claiming through him could interfere with the possession of the wife. It is not necessary for us to examine whether the wife's possession over the property assigned to her for her separate residence or in discharge of the husband's obligation to arrange her maintenance could in view of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 get enlarged to an absolute estate. All that we need say is that the respondent wife was in the light of the facts found by the trial Court entitled to prevent any interference with her possession over the suit property till such time the substantive rights of the parties qua the property in dispute were adjudicated upon by a competent Court in a proper civil action brought for that purpose. In the circumstances we see no reason to interfere with the Judgment and Decree under challenge.

This Appeal has no merit which fails and is hereby dismissed but without any orders as to costs.