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K. Shashidhara Rao v. Dr. Ambedkar Institute Of Technology, Bangalore And Another

Karnataka High Court

Feb 19, 1998

Judgment

Subsequent
References

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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a student who had obtained less than 40% marks in aggregate (specifically 38.3%) in the Second Year Pre-University Examination in 1994, the qualifying examination for admission to the B.E. degree course. A private management (the respondent institute) admitted him to the B.E. course under its quota and collected fees. The college principal permitted the student to appear for the first and second semester examinations for the academic year 1995–1996; subsequently the results of those examinations were not announced. The student was refused admission to the third semester of the B.E. course. When the results were withheld and admission to the third semester was denied, the student approached this Court seeking relief.

The respondent University stated in a brief note that the petitioner’s examination results were not announced because the college’s admission of the petitioner had not been approved by the University; the University relied on the amended Rules (the Karnataka Selection of Candidates for Admission to Engineering, Medical, Dental, Pharmacy and Nursing Courses (Amendment) Rules, 1994). The respondent institute did not file a return and its counsel did not appear at the hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the University was obliged to announce the petitioner’s first- and second-semester examination results and whether refusal to permit the petitioner to pursue the third semester was arbitrary or illegal.
Whether the petitioner’s admission (and the college’s permission to appear in examinations) estops the University or the college from disapproving the admission — i.e., whether principles of promissory estoppel apply to prevent disapproval of an admission that contravenes statutory rules.
Whether the proviso to Rule 3 (as amended by the 1994 Rules) which requires a minimum of 40% marks for eligibility to certain seats (including SC/ST and Category-I reservation seats) renders the petitioner ineligible and justifies the disapproval of the admission.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

The petitioner’s counsel (Sri B.G. Sridharan) argued that since the student had been admitted and was permitted to appear for the first and second semester examinations, the University was obligated to announce the results of those examinations and could not arbitrarily refuse admission to the third semester.
The petitioner relied on the observations of the Supreme Court in Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University (AIR 1976 SC 376) to support the duty to announce results once a student had been admitted and allowed to take examinations.
He further argued that the college’s permission to the student to prosecute studies and appear for examinations estops the respondents from cancelling the admission; this contention invoked the principle of promissory estoppel and relied upon Sanatan Ganda v. Berhampur University (AIR 1990 SC 1075) and other decisions.

Respondent University’s Arguments

The University’s brief note stated that the petitioner’s examination results were not announced because the admission granted by the college had not been approved by the University.
The University placed reliance on the Karnataka Rules as amended by the Amendment Rules, 1994 (specifically the proviso to Rule 3) to justify its action of non-approval and non-announcement of results.
Counsel (Sri N.K. Patil) informed the Court that the University had communicated its stand to the college on 11-6-1996 (prior to the college permitting the student to appear for the examinations) and cited Sri Jagadeshchari v. Bangalore University (W.A. 721/1990) as an authoritative pronouncement supporting the University’s position.

Respondent Institute’s Participation

The respondent private management (the institute) did not file a return and its counsel did not appear at the hearing. The opinion notes the institute's non-participation in defending the admission decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Krishnan v. Kurukshetra University, AIR 1976 SC 376	Principle that once a student has been admitted and allowed to take an examination, there is a limitation on power to withdraw the student from the examination process.	The Court noted the principle but distinguished its applicability: it did not treat Krishnan as an absolute bar to disapproval where statutory ineligibility was shown. The Court observed that Krishnan "does not held the appellant" (i.e., is not determinative in the present circumstances where statutory disqualification exists).
Sanatan Ganda v. Berhampur University, AIR 1990 SC 1075	Use of estoppel to prevent a university from acting contrary to its representations or conduct (estoppel-related observations).	The petitioner relied on this authority to support promissory estoppel. The Court held that the principle of promissory estoppel has no application where it would operate against a statutory rule; thus the Court found the argument without substance in the present context.
AIR 1986 SC 1448	Observed in the opinion as a case where principals had granted admission for capitation fee (cited as an instance of improper admissions).	The Court cited it as illustrating instances where admissions were granted improperly; it was used in the discussion about when courts may or may not sympathize with students admitted despite ineligibility.
AIR 1987 SC 2305	Referred to as a case criticizing the practice of admitting ineligible candidates but finding circumstances involving bona fide interpretation that warranted sympathy.	The Court used it to indicate that admission despite ineligibility may, in some cases, attract sympathy if the admission followed a bona fide interpretation of a regulation; the Court contrasted such cases with the present facts.
ILR (1990) Kant 522	Stated that under Article 226 of the Constitution the Court may consider a case on equitable or sympathetic grounds.	The Court cited this to acknowledge that Article 226 allows equitable/sympathetic consideration, but then proceeded to examine whether equitable relief was appropriate given the statutory disqualification in the present matter.
Sri Jagadeshchari v. Bangalore University (W.A. 721/1990 D.D. 16-7-1990)	Referenced by the University as an authoritative pronouncement relevant to the issue (specific rule/principle not detailed in the opinion).	The University cited it in support of its position; the opinion records the citation but does not elaborate the detailed application beyond acknowledging reliance on that pronouncement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner, adhering closely to the statutory rule and the facts established on the record:

Eligibility under Rule 3 (Amendment Rules, 1994): The Court referred to Section 14 of the Karnataka Educational Institutions Prohibition of Capitation Fees Act, 1984, which authorized amendment of the selection rules, and reproduced the proviso substituted to Rule 3 by the Amendment Rules, 1994. The proviso required that the minimum marks for the purpose of qualification for free seats shall not be less than 40% for SC/ST and Category-I candidates. A plain reading, the Court held, makes it clear that no student can be admitted to the engineering course unless the student has secured at least 40% marks in the qualifying examination.
Application to the present facts: The petitioner had secured 38.3% in the qualifying examination and was therefore ineligible under the statutory proviso to Rule 3. The Court concluded that the private management (the college) could not lawfully admit the student, and that the admission was contrary to the proviso.
Responsibility of the institute and the University: The Court criticized the educational institution for admitting an ineligible student despite knowledge of the 40% requirement. The University was also faulted for turning a blind eye to such blatant violations. However, the Court analyzed the legality rather than assigning remedial blame beyond legal consequence.
On promissory estoppel: The Court rejected the promissory estoppel argument, reasoning that promissory estoppel cannot be applied against a statutory provision. Because the 40% requirement is statutory, a mere permission by college authorities to prosecute studies cannot operate as an estoppel to override the statutory rule. The Court also noted that college admissions are provisional, subject to University approval; since the admission contravened the statutory proviso, the University was justified in disapproving it.
On precedents invoked (Krishnan and others): The Court examined earlier authorities and distinguished them on facts. It observed that Krishnan does not operate as a blanket bar to disapproval where statutory ineligibility is demonstrated. The Court reviewed other Supreme Court decisions cited (including cases involving capitation fee admissions and bona fide interpretation of regulations) and treatments of equitable relief, and concluded that the present facts did not call for sympathetic intervention in light of the statutory disqualification.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed.

Implications:

The direct legal effect is that the petitioner’s writ petition seeking declaration/relief in respect of his examination results and continuation to the third semester is dismissed; the University's disapproval of the admission is upheld on the basis that the petitioner was statutorily ineligible (having obtained less than 40% marks in the qualifying examination).
The Court held that the principle of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to circumvent a statutory eligibility requirement; as a consequence the provisional permission granted by the college does not estop the University from disapproving an admission that is contrary to the statutory rule.
No broader change in legal precedent is announced by the Court in this opinion; the decision applies the statutory rule to the facts and distinguishes earlier authorities rather than overruling or extending them. The immediate consequence is limited to the parties: the admission is treated as invalid and the petition was dismissed. (The opinion does not articulate any new, general precedent beyond applying the statutory provision and established principles.)

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the statements and material contained in the provided opinion. No information outside the opinion has been added.

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1. Youth in his prime suffered by inhuman acts of the authorities, screams with a silent prayer God, Gaud What solace hath thou. Since prayers were not answered with total resentment and frustration knocks at the doors of this Court for justice. Cases like this are innumerable but the authorities who are charged with the duty of looking after the welfare of these students act insensitively and in total violation of norms but who is to be blamed? a blase public that has shrugged off this hideous mincing of youth in his prime, a seasoned killer like respondent institute or the University which is insensitive to this human issue. When a gentle lad is neatly chopped and packed in boxes to be thrown overboard piece meal, the University shrugs off and leaves the loved ones in the hands that held him close, cradled him and crooned lullaby to heal this raw wound. Who is the villain of this saga? Is it the college or the University? In my view both, but my hands are tied with precedents and I can only pretend that the tears are from cutting of onions and pray God, give these unfortunate lads peace and tell them justice hath not completely fled our shores and that demons shall surely pay fo their deeds.

2. Cause for the agony is the disapproval of the admission by the University made by a private management on extraneous considerations and in blatant violation of the norms set down by the rules and the regulations by the State Government. Student had passed preuniversity examination securing less than 40% marks in aggregate in the year 1994. On an application made by him, respondent institute admitted him to B.E degree course in its quota by collecting the necessary fees etc. Student was allowed to appear for first and second semester examinations of the academic year 1995-1996 by the principal of the college who also happens to be the Chief Superintendent of the examinations for their center. The result of the examination is kept in dark. When the student was refused admission to the third semester of B.E degree course and when his results of the earlier semester examinations are not made known to him, he was constrained to approach this Court for the necessary and suitable reliefs.

3. Respondent University in its brief note only says that the results of the examination of the petitioner is not announced only because his admission to the course by the college has not been approved by the University. They totally place reliance on the amended Rules of the Karnataka Selection of Candidates for Admission to Engineering, Medical, Dental, Pharmacy and Nursing Courses (Amendment) Rules, 1994 to justify their action.

4. Learned counsel Sri B.G Sridharan for petitioner pleads that the respondents having permitted the student to appear for first and second semester examination of B.E Degree Course was not justified in not announcing the results of the examination and further not permitting the student to appear for third semester course and the ensuing examination. Relying on the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of Krishnan v. Kurukshethra University, AIR: 1976 SC 376, submits that once the petitioner was admitted and allowed to appear for first and second semester examination the respondent University was obliged to announce the results of the examination and refusal to permit the student to prosecute third semester in B.E degree course is wholly arbitrary, illegal and opposed to constitutional provisions.

5. Learned counsel next submitted that the respondent institute was well aware of the fact that the petitioner had not secured 40% marks in their qualifying examination, yet he was permitted to prosecute his studies and therefore respondents action in cancelling the admission is hit by the principles of promissory estoppel. In support of this contention, learned counsel strongly relies upon the certain observations made by Supreme Court in the case of Sanatan Ganda v. Berhampur University, AIR 1990 SC 1075 and other decisions.

6. To keep away from those abrasions and legal tangles, most conviniently respondent institute does not even bother to file its return nor its counsel cares to appear at the time of hearing of this petition.

7. Sri N.K Patil informs me that the University had made known its stand to the college on 11-6-1996 i.e much before the college authorities had permitted the student to appear for the examination and further submits that the points canvassed by learned counsel for petitioner is no more a debatable issue in view of the authoritative pronouncement of this Court in the case of Sri Jagadeshchari v. Bangalore University (W.A 721/1990 D.D 16-7-1990).

8. Before I advert to the contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties let me notice what this Court had to say when a student had inherent lack of qualification and manifest ineligibility for admission to L.L.B Course. This Court after taking into consideration the observations made by the Supreme Court in Kurukshetra University's case (AIR 1976 SC 376) was pleased to observe:

5. We have given our very careful consideration to the above argument. There is no such uniform rule, when merely a student has been admitted though he lacks eligibility to be admitted, he must be allowed to continue irrespective of the circumstances. In AIR 1986 SC 1448, as seen from the passage occurring at page 1455, that was a case where for the sake of capitation fee the Principals of the colleges had granted admission to the applicants, AIR 1987 SC 2305 was a case wherein though the practice of admitting ineligible candidates was criticised, yet it was found that it was a bona fide interpretation of a regulation which made the Court exercise sympathy in favour of the student. AIR 1976 SC 376 does not held the appellant because, that merely lays down once a student had been admitted and allowed to take the examination, there is no power to withdraw from the examination. AIR 1990 SC 1075 was again a case which related to estoppel. That is not the position here. ILR (1990) Kant 522 merely stated that under Article 226 of the Constitution, it would be open to the Court to consider a case on equitable basis or on sympathetic consideration.

6. In the case on hand what is important to be noted is the letter of the Registrar of the University dated 19-9-1986, which we have extracted above. There was a misapprehension as to whether the appellant would be entitled to the benefits extended to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes candidates on the ground that he was a displaced goldsmith. It was this which enabled him to gain admission and he merrily continued for one year and later on when on 17-12-1987 he was informed that he did not possess even the eligibility, he came forward with the writ petition. Fortunately for the appellant, he was able to obtain stay and under the cover of stay he had practically completed the course. Under these circumstances, we are unable to see how he could ever say that his case must be viewed sympathetically. In so far as the concerned regulations did not provide for any relaxation of minimum percentage in the qualifying examination to the members of displaced goldsmiths family, the claim of the appellant is misconceived. Where, therefore, he had been put on notice about ineligibility and under the cover of the stay order if he had completed his course, he cannot claim any sympathy on the score of the above decisions. As a matter of fact this Court has consistently taken the view that where there is inherent lack of qualification — a manifest ineligibility, it is not a case for the Court to interfere.

9. It is not in dispute that the petitioner had secured less than 40% marks in aggregate in his qualifying examination. To be precise he has secured 38.3% marks in IInd year preuniversity examination which is the qualifying examination for admission to B.E Degree course.

10. Section 14 of the Karnataka Educational Institutions Prohibition of Capitation Fees Act, 1984, authorises the State Government to amend the Karnataka Selection of Candidates for Admission to Engineering, Medical, Dental, Pharmacy and Nursing Courses, Rules 1993. The State Government exercising its powers conferred on it by the aforesaid section has amended Rule 3 of the Rules by an amendment known as Amendment Rules, 1994 which has been notified on 22nd June, 1994. The proviso which has been substituted to the Rule 3 reads as under:

Provided that the minimum marks for the purpose of qualification specified for free seats shall not be less than forty per cent in case of candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Category-I specified in the relevant Government orders for the purpose of reservation.

11. A plain reading of the proviso to the Rule reproduced above makes it clear that no student can be admitted to the engineering course unless he has secured atleast 40% marks in qualifying examination for admission. Admittedly petitioner has secured less than 40% marks in the qualifying examination and consequently the petitioner is ineligible for admission in Engineering Course. In view of this statutory rule debarring the admission of a student to the professional course who had secured less than 40% marks in the qualifying examination, first respondent private management could not have admitted the student and the institute has no authority to relax the rules. The admission of the student to the professional course is contrary to proviso to Rule 3 of the Rules 1994. Now who has to be blamed for this sorry state of affairs. First I think the educational institution for indefensible act since it did not act fairly, though knowing fully well that a student who has secured less than 40% marks in the qualifying examination is ineligible for admission to professional courses. Nextly it is the University which closes its eyes in spite of blatant violation of arms set down by the rules and regulations by these educational institution. In the end the sufferer is the gullible student and his parents and this Court has to rest content with the academic pronouncement of the true legal position.

12. The contention with regard to the principles of promissory estoppel is concerned, in my view it has no substance whatsoever for the reason that the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be applied against a statute. As noticed above, proviso to Rule 3 of the Rules is a statutory rule, according to said rule no student can be admitted to B.E degree course unless he or she has obtained 40% marks in the qualifying examination for admission (SC/ST student). Since the obtaining of 40% marks in aggregate in the qualifying examination is a condition precedent for the eligibility for admission to the professional course, a mere permission granted by the college authorities to prosecute their studies cannot operate as estoppel, the same being contrary to the statutory rule. Even otherwise the admissions made by the college authorities is only provisional subject to the approval of the University authorities since the admission itself was contrary to proviso to Rule 3 of the Rules, the University is justified in disapproving the admission of the petitioner.

13. Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion no ground justifying the relief is made out. The petition is therefore dismissed. No order as to costs.

Petition dismissed.