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United India Insurance Company, Ltd., Bangalore v. K.N Thipperudraiah And Others

Karnataka High Court
Aug 14, 1996
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Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals arise from judgments and awards passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (M.A.C.T) in two cases, M.V.C No. 71 of 1987 and M.V.C No. 165 of 1987, involving claims for compensation by employees of Karnataka Soap and Detergent Ltd. The claimants, K.N. Thipperudraiah and M.R. Sathyamurthy, were injured in a collision between a van owned by their employer and a bus owned by the Karnataka State Tourist Development Corporation on August 31, 1986. Both claimants filed petitions under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation from multiple respondents including their employer, the insurers, and the owner and driver of the bus. The Tribunal partly allowed these claims awarding compensation with interest. The insurance companies aggrieved by these awards filed the present appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether employees covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act) can claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident while travelling in employer-provided transport.
  2. Whether the bar under Sections 53 and 61 of the Employees' State Insurance Act precludes claimants from seeking compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act when they have availed benefits under the ESI Act for employment injuries.
  3. The legal effect of tortious liability in the context of injuries sustained by employees covered under the ESI Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The claimants being employees covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act and having availed ESI benefits, are barred by Sections 53 and 61 of the Act from claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • The Tribunal erred in allowing the claims because the injuries were employment injuries and the claimants should have sought remedy only under the ESI Act.
  • The claimants are not entitled to compensation from the insurance companies under the Motor Vehicles Act as the claims are barred by the ESI Act provisions.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The claimants are entitled to compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act due to the tortious liability arising from the negligent driving of the vehicles involved in the accident.
  • The injuries, though sustained during the course of employment, give rise to a separate cause of action under the Motor Vehicles Act beyond the ESI Act benefits.
  • The claimants should not be barred from seeking compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act despite having availed ESI benefits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. v. P. Venu [A.I.R 1972 Mys. 255] The right to sue under the Motor Vehicles Act arises from the Law of Torts and is not barred by Section 6-I of the Employees' State Insurance Act. The Court noted the distinction between the right to sue and the claim for compensation, but subsequent analysis favored the bar under Sections 53 and 61 for employment injuries.
K.S Vasantha v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation [1982 (1) Kar. L.J 202] Injuries sustained by employees travelling in vehicles provided by employer are employment injuries; remedy lies under the Employees' State Insurance Act, not Motor Vehicles Act. The Court applied this principle to bar claims under the Motor Vehicles Act when ESI benefits are availed.
Annapurna v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation [1984 (1) Kar. L.J 270] Death/injury of employee due to accident during employment is an employment injury; Motor Vehicles Act claims barred by Section 53 of Employees' State Insurance Act. Supported the bar on claims under Motor Vehicles Act where ESI benefits are available and availed.
P. Asokan v. Western India Plywoods Ltd. [1987 (1) L.L.N 333] Employees' State Insurance Act does not bar tortious liability claims; suit for tortious damages not barred even if ESI benefits are received. The Court distinguished this case, noting that the present claimants did not challenge the sufficiency of ESI benefits and did not pursue remedies under the ESI Act.
A. Trehan v. Associated Electrical Agencies [1996 (2) L.L.N 97] Application for compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act barred by Section 53 of Employees' State Insurance Act when injury is an employment injury. The Supreme Court upheld the bar under Section 53, affirming the High Court's view that claims under Motor Vehicles Act for employment injuries are barred by the ESI Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the injuries sustained by the claimants and held that the injuries were employment injuries within the meaning of Section 2(8) and Section 51-C of the Employees' State Insurance Act, as the claimants were travelling in employer-provided transport at the time of the accident. The Court found the Tribunal's contrary finding unsustainable.

It was established that the claimants had availed benefits under the Employees' State Insurance Act, including medical treatment and monetary benefits. The Court emphasized that the Employees' State Insurance Act is a self-contained code providing a speedy remedy for employment injuries and bars similar claims under other laws, including the Motor Vehicles Act, by virtue of Sections 53 and 61.

The Court considered the bar created by these provisions and held that the claimants, having availed ESI benefits and having not challenged their adequacy through the ESI Board or Court, were precluded from claiming additional compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

While recognizing the tortious liability arising from the accident, the Court held that the bar under the ESI Act prevails for employment injuries. The Court also reviewed relevant precedents, including decisions of this High Court and the Supreme Court, which supported the bar on claims under the Motor Vehicles Act for injuries covered under the ESI Act.

Holding and Implications

The appeals are allowed, the impugned orders are set aside, and the claim petitions filed by the claimants are dismissed.

The direct effect of this decision is that employees covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act who sustain employment injuries and avail benefits under that Act cannot claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act for the same injuries. No new precedent beyond the application of existing statutory bars and case law was established. The claimants must seek redress exclusively through the Employees' State Insurance Corporation and its adjudicatory mechanisms.

Show all summary ...

1. These appeals are preferred by the insurance companies being aggrieved by me judgment and award, dated March 5, 1990, passed in M.V.C No. 71 of 1987 and the judgment and award, dated November 24, 1988, passed in M.V.C No. 165 of 1987 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, allowing partly the claim petitions for compensation of the petitioners.

2. The facts leading to these appeals are that on August 31, 1986, at about 10.30 EM one K.N Thipperudraiah and M.R Sathyamurthy who are the employees of Kamataka Soap and Detergent, Ltd., which comes under the Employees' State Insurance Corporation were travelling in a van bearing No. CAR 3865 belonging to the said employer. When the van reached near the Government Junior College (Ammani College) at chowdaiah Road, bus bearing No. CAA 918 belonging to Karnataka Government Tourist Development Corporation Collided with the van in which these petitioners were travelling, as a result of which these persons sustained multiple grievous injuries including compound fractures. Therefore, they lodged claim petitions under S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation against the Karnataka Soap and Detergent, Ltd., Karnataka Government Insurance Department (Insurer of Van CAR 3865), Karnataka State Tourist Development Corporation (Owner of the Bus CAA 918), United India Insurance Company, Ltd., (Insurer of the bus CAA 918) and K.L Venkata Krishna alias Krishna (driver of bus CAA 918).

3. After enquiry, the Tribunal allowed both M.V.C Nos. 71 and 165 of 1987. In M.V.C No. 165 of 1987, filed by Thipperudraiah, me Tribunal has held that he is entitled for a compensation of Rs. 33,000 with interest thereon at 9 per cent per annum from the date of petition till the date of realisation from respondents 1 to 5 and as far as respondents 2 and 4 are concerned, each is directed to pay 50 per cent of the compensation in favour of the petitioner.

4. In M.V.C No. 71 of 1987 which was filed by M.R Sathya Murthy me Tribunal has held that the petitioner therein was entitled to Rs. 35,992 with interest at 9 per cent per annum and directed respondents 1 to 4 therein to jointly and severally pay the amount. Further respondents 2 and 4 were directed to pay the compensation amount to the extent of 50 per cent each with interest These orders have been assailed in these appeals.

5. As against the award passed in M.V.C No. 71 of 1987, i.e, in favour of Sathya Murthy the K.G.I.D preferred an appeal in M.F.A No. 1338 of 1990 and in M.F.A No. 416 of 1996 the United India Insurance Company also questioned mat award.

6. In M.F.A No. 715 of 1989 the United India Insurance Company has questioned the award of compensation in favour of K.N Thipperudraiah in M.V.C No. 165 of 1987. It may be mentioned here that neither the owner nor the driver of the bus CAA 918 has filed any appeal. Similarly, the employer of these claimants has also not preferred any appeal. Only the insurance companies have preferred these appeals as stated earlier.

7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.

8. The learned advocates appearing for the appellants have vehemently argued that the claimants viz., Sathya Murthy and also Thipperudraiah being the employee so the Karnataka Soap and Detergent, Ltd, factory are covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. They have availed Employees' State Insurance facilities from the factory. Therefore, they are not entitled to file applications before the Tribunal in view of the bar contained under Ss. 53 and 61 of the Employees' State Insurance Act. On that ground they submitted that the Tribunal should have dismissed their applications.

9. The advocates appearing for the claimants however submitted that they are entitled for the compensation payable to them due to the tortious liability of the third party, notwithstanding the fact that they are covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act.

10. Admittedly these two claimants are the employees of the second respondent. The van bearing No. CAR 3865 was provided by their employer respondent to go to their house after their work in the factory These two employees of the second respondent sustained injuries while returning home and it has to be construed that they sustained these injuries during the course of their employment in view of S. 51-C of the Employees' State Insurance Act. Both the Tribunals have held that it is not an employment injury. This finding is unsustainable. The vehicle in which they were travelling after their factory work is not their own vehicle. On the other hand, the vehicle was provided by the employer. Under S. 51-C of the Act, it is held as follows:

“Accidents happening while travelling in employer's transport.— (1) An accident happening while an insured person is, with the express or implied permission of his employer, travelling as a passenger by any vehicle to or from his place of work shall, notwithstanding that he is under no obligation to his employer to travel by that vehicle, be deemed to arise out of and in the course of his employment, if,—

(a) the accident would have been deemed so to have arisen had he been under such obligation; and

(b) at the time of the accident, the vehicle—

(i) is being operated by or on behalf of his employer or some other person by whom it is provided in pursuance of arrangements made with his employer, and

(ii) is not being operated in the ordinary course of public transport: service.”

Under the circumstances, I hold that the injuries sustained by the claimants are only employment injuries as defined under S. 2(8) which reads:

“‘employment injury’ means a personal injury to an employee caused by accident or an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, being an insurable employment, whether the accident occurs or the occupational disease is contracted within or outside the territorial limits of India.”

The finding of the learned Tribunal contrary to this cannot be accepted.

11. Therefore the next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the claimants have availed the benefits as provided under Chap. V of the Act.

12. Sathya Murthy who was examined before the Court in M.V.C No. 71 of 1987 has stated that he was removed to Sanjay Gandhi Hospital and on the next day he regained consciousness. Thereafter, he went to Puttur bone setter and took treatment for about 3 months. However, he has stated that he did not get the salary for the said period. He was getting gross salary of Rs. 2,000. He got Employees' State Insurance benefit of Rs. 820 per month. He has spent Rs. 15,000 for the treatment both in the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital and Puttur bone setter and for conveyance.

13. Similarly, the claimant M.V.C No. 165 of 1987 also was examined as PW. 1. He also has stated that he was removed to K.C General Hospital, Malleswaram, on the same night. He was shifted to Sanjay Gandhi Hospital for further treatment where he was treated for 21 days as inpatient. According to him, he was earning Rs. 300 to Rs. 400 per month which was overtime. He was not given incentive at the rate of Rs. 100 per month for three months when he was taking rest. He was getting a salary of Rs. 1,000 per month. He was also not paid salary for 3 months when he did not come for work. During that period he receive Rs. 400 per month from the E.S.I, benefit. According to him, he has spent Rs. 10,000 for medical expenses, conveyance, etc. Both of them have admitted in the cross-examination that there is a major E.S.I Hospital situated in Rajajinagar. All kinds of facilities are available in the said E.S.I Hospital for the treatment of such injury. He has stated that because it was a case of accident, he took treatment is Sanjay Gandhi Hospital. These statements made under oath have not been questioned or controverted by the employer. It is not even suggested to the claimants that they have not undergone treatment in Sanjay Gandhi Hospital, nor have they produced any rebuttal evidence. Therefore, the fact remains that notwithstanding the fact that all facilities are available in the E.S.I Hospital the claimants have undergone treatment in the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital. There also treatment is free. However, forms their own admission, it is clear that they have availed all other facilities provided under the Employees' State Insurance Act. Therefore, it is clear that the claimants sustained employment injury and they availed the facilities from the Corporation.

14. In view of this, the only argument of the appellant is that the claimants are debarred from filing applications under Motor Vehicles Act, in view of Ss. 53 and 61 of the Employees' State Insurance Act as they are not entitled for any relief and the Tribunals have committed error in granting compensation in favour of the claimants. This argument has been repelled by the claimants and they supported the impugned order on the ground that these injuries are due to tortious act of the drivers of the bus and the van.

15. It may be mentioned that the finding of the Tribunal that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of both the vehicles has not been questioned by the respondents therein. Hence that finding of the Tribunal is final. Therefore, it can be safely held that the accident is a tortious liability as these injuries were sustained in the course of employment and, therefore, these injuries are employment injuries. With this prelude it is now necessary to consider the bar contained under Ss. 53 and 61 of the Act which has been raised by the appellants, which read as follows:

“53. Bar against receiving or recovery of compensation or damages under any other law.— An insured person or his dependents shall not be entitled to receive or recover, whether from the employer of the insured person or from any other person, any compensation or damages under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) or any other law for the time being in force or other wise, in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured person as an employee under this Act.

61. Bar of benefits under other enactments.— When a person is entitled to any of the benefits provided by this Act, he shall not be entitled to receive any similar benefit admissible under the provisions of any other enactment.”

These objections were raised before the Tribunal and the Tribunal after relying on the decisions cited before it held that the petition cannot be said to be barred under S. 53 of the Employees' State Insurance Act when the relief is sought for under the Motor Vehicles Act and it is not confined to employment injury, etc., From a reading of the finding of the learned Tribunal it appears that the Tribunal has proceeded under the assumption that if the claim is against third party the petition is maintainable. If that is so, no liability should have been fastened on the employer because the employer is contributing the amount to the Corporation as provided under the E.S.I Act and the Corporation had provided all facilities to the employer. If the employer is not liable, naturally the insurance company where the vehicle was insured also is not table to indemnify the owner. Therefore, that finding of the Tribunal is contrary to its own conclusions. It is not the case of the claimants that the benefits received from the Corporation are insufficient or that they have not availed any benefit. On the other hand, they have availed all the benefits as provided under the Employees' State Insurance Act. Therefore, they cannot claim the additional benefit or in other words the benefit provided under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Employees' State Insurance Act is a self-contained Act and it is provided for speedy and efficacious remedy to the employees who are covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act. If they are not satisfied with the benefits provided to them, the only recourse open to them is to approach the Board or the E.S.I Court. In this case admittedly the claimants have not raised their little finger saying that the benefits provided to them are either inadequate or insufficient. They have also not made out any ground on that aspect. They further did not approach the Corporation either by way of a suit or by way of an appeal as provided under the Employees' State Insurance Act. Therefore, it is clear that though it is employment injury and notwithstanding the fact that they have availed the benefit as provided under the Employees' State Insurance Act, they approached the M.A.C.T under the Motor Vehicles Act, which is barred under Ss. 53 and 61 of the Employees' State Insurance Act. Chapter V of the Employees' State Insurance Act deals with benefits and S. 61 under that chapter is a general clause which prohibits a person from claiming any benefits under any law when he has received any similar benefit admissible under the provisions of any other enactment. Chapter VI deals with adjudication of dispute and claims. For this purpose the Insurance Court also was established and the Court has to decide the matters connected with the employees covered under the insurance.

16. The learned Tribunal has relied on a decision in Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. v. P. Venu [A.I.R 1972 Mys. 255], wherein this Court has held that though the claim of compensation could be made only under the provisions of Chap. VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, the right to sue is a quite different matter which originates from substantive law, viz., Law of Torts, which is common law and not an enactment. Consequently, S. 6-I of the Employees' State Insurance Act, would not bar a claim under S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Subsequently this Court had an occasion to deal with Ss. 53 and 61 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, in a decision in K.S Vasantha v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation [1982 (1) Kar. L.J 202]. In that case the bus was taken on contract basis by the N.G.E.F to facilitate its workmen to reach the factory and to return to their respective places from the factory. As a result of an accident to the bus either persons were injured and two died and claims were made under S. 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act by the injured and the representatives of the deceased for compensation, wherein it is held:

“(1) Reading S. 2(B) along with S. 51-C of the Employees' State Insurance Act, the injuries sustained and me death of the two persons was nothing but employment injury.

(2) The remedy open to the injured and the LRs. of the deceased was to approach the Employees' State Insurance Corporation constituted under the Employees' State Insurance Act and not the Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act or under any other law for the time being in force including common law right under the Law of Torts.”

This decision was subsequently followed by our High Court in a decision in Annapurna v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation [1984 (1) Kar. L.J 270], the question before the Court was that the employment injury-death of an employee of the transport Corporation by an accident in the depot of the Corporation due to careless driving of a bus whether the legal representatives of the deceased can claim compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. Held no; S. 53 of the Employees' State Insurance Act has other remedies.

17. Therefore, from the above discussion it is abundantly, clear that the injury sustained by the claimants are employment injuries and that they were not only insured under the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, but they have also availed the benefits as provided under the Act. Therefore, they are not entitled to lodge a claim before the Motor Vehicles Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act.

18. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that it is a tortious liability. It is no doubt true that the accident occurred on the main road but while they were travelling in the vehicle provided by the employer, that means any injury sustained by them in the motor vehicle accident as detailed above, is an employment injury. Under those circumstances, they cannot say that as it is tortious liability they are entitled for the benefit. Further, they have also relied on a decision in P. Asokan… v. Western India Plywoods Ltd., Cannanore…., Ltd., Cannanore [1987 (1) L.L.N 333]. In that case, the appellant therein suffered an employment injury. He had filed a suit against his employer claiming compensation not based on any enactments. He also filed an application under Order 33, rule 5, Civil Procedure Code. The Trial Court while considering the application under Order 33, rule 5, Civil Procedure Code, held that the suit itself is not maintainable on account of the bar contained under Ss. 53 and 61 of the Employees' State Insurance Act and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against that order before the Kerala High Court and the matter was referred to the Full Bench. The Full Bench has held that if the appellant had paid Court fee, the Court could not have dismissed the suit at the threshold holding that the suit is not maintainable. Therefore, the Court held that the dismissal order is not sustainable. While allowing that appeal, the Full Court has held that the scheme of Employees' State Insurance Act of a close analysis, takes care of only such liabilities as are geared to the employment injury. They did not purport to deal with the tortious liability of an employer. The enactment is not one intended to relieve the employer of the alleged hardship arising out of a multiplicity of liabilities, which is simultaneously a tort under common law and a violation of a statutory provision. A different view would produce patently discriminatory results which could hardly be upheld by an alert judicial mind.

19. In A. Trehan v. Associated Electrical Agencies [1996 (2) L.L.N 97]. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered S. 53 of the Employees' State Insurance Act (as amended in 1966) and Ss. 2(8) and 2(15) and held that an application under S. 2(22) of Workmen's Compensation Act for compensation in respect of an employment injury filed by an injured person attracted the bar under S. 53. In that judgment their Lordships also considered the Full Bench decision rendered by the Kerala High Court in P. Asokan case [1987 (1) L.L.N 333] (vide supra), partly overruled and partly distinguished. In that connection it is held, in Para. 13, at page 101 of 1996 (2) L.L.N:

“… We cannot agree with some of the assumptions and observations made by the Kerala High Court. Moreover, the Kerala High Court has taken that view without referring to and considering the effect of the clear and express words used in that section. Again, that was not a case where a question whether an employee and an insured person under the Employees' State Insurance Act can again claim the compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act had arisen for consideration. We are, therefore, of the opinion that neither the observations made by K. Ramaswamy, J., in Francis De Costa [1993 (1) L.L.N 6], nor the decision in P. Asokan case can be of any held to the appellant.”

Their Lordships have also considered the judgment rendered by the Karnataka High Court in K.S Vasantha case (vide supra) and Annapurna case (vide supra), and held that the effect of the bar created by S. 53 of the Employees' State Insurance Act with respect to the claim for compensation made under the Motor Vehicles Act for injuries received because of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment, that the view taken by this High Court with respect to the object of S. 53 of the Employees' State Insurance Act and the nature and effect of the bar created by it appears to be correct. Under the circumstances, me contention of the respondents mat the claim petitions do not come under the purview of Ss. 53 and 61 of the Act is unsustainable.

20. In the result therefore, I proceed to pass the following:

21. These three appeals are allowed. The impugned orders are hereby set aside. Consequently, the applications filed by the claimants stand dismissed. Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, mere is no order as to costs.