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Michael Mascarenhas v. John Mascarenhas
Judgment Summary — B. Pamaraj, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by the defendants in O.S. No. 10182/85 (IV Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore) challenging an interlocutory order dated 27.2.96. The impugned order rejected the defendants' counsel's request to mark (exhibit) an affidavit sworn by P.W.1 (the plaintiff/respondent) in earlier probate proceedings. The plaintiff's suit (O.S. No. 10182/85) seeks a declaration of right of common enjoyment and usufruct from coconut and other fruit trees, payment of the plaintiff's share of usufruct, exclusive possession of certain coconut trees if defendants fail to pay, and various injunctive reliefs restraining letting out, boarding, alienation or interference with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment. At trial, while the plaintiff was being cross-examined, the defendants sought to confront P.W.1 with an affidavit said to bear his signatures; the trial court sustained an objection and refused to mark the affidavit, which led to this revision petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the interlocutory order of the trial court refusing to permit the defendants to mark and confront an affidavit sworn by the plaintiff (P.W.1) constitutes a "case decided" and is therefore amenable to revision under Section 115 CPC.
- Whether the affidavit sworn by P.W.1 (filed in prior probate proceedings) could be confronted and its contents used as admissions by marking it in evidence or, alternatively, proved through its maker during cross-examination.
- Whether the trial court's refusal to permit confrontation of the affidavit amounted to a failure or illegality in exercising jurisdiction vested in it, thereby justifying interference under Section 115 CPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' (Defendants') Arguments
- The trial court's order rejecting the request to mark the affidavit was opposed to law and facts and amounted to a misapplication of the law of evidence which ordinarily excludes affidavits as substantive evidence.
- P.W.1, the maker of the affidavit, admitted in his deposition (16.10.95) that the affidavit bore his signature on each page; that admission, according to the petitioners, amounted to consent to mark the affidavit—relying on the decision in Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra Saha (AIR 1968 Cal. 532).
- The affidavit was relevant to issue Nos. 7 and 12 and contained matter challenging attestation of a Will; without revoking the Will and probate, the suit's maintainability is affected—so refusal to mark the affidavit prejudiced the petitioners' right to substantiate their defence.
- The trial court failed to exercise its jurisdiction properly by not giving due weight to the admitted signature and denying the defendants the opportunity to confront the maker with the affidavit.
Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The impugned order does not amount to "a case decided" and hence is not revisable under Section 115 CPC.
- The affidavit is not "evidence" within the meaning of Section 4 of the Evidence Act and therefore cannot be treated as evidence in the suit; the trial court was correct in rejecting the request to mark it.
- The trial court did not commit any illegality or material irregularity warranting interference under Section 115 CPC.
- Reliance was placed on several decisions to support the proposition that such interlocutory rulings (for example, refusing to admit an affidavit or overruling/allowing objections during examination) are not ordinarily revisable: M.C. Madhura v. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan & Ors, K.N. Venkataramanaiah Setty v. B.N. Srinivas, Murigappa v. Channappa, and Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra Saha.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra Saha, AIR 1968 Cal. 532 | Cited by the petitioners to support that admission of signature by the maker may amount to consent to mark an affidavit. | The court recorded that this decision was relied upon by petitioners for the proposition that the maker's admission of signature is relevant to marking the affidavit; the decision was considered in the context of admissibility and confrontation but the court's ultimate interference was based on other reasoning (see final order). |
| M.C. Madhura v. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan & Ors., 1980 2 Kar. L.J 305 | Cited by the respondent in support of the proposition that certain interlocutory orders are not revisable. | The court acknowledged this authority as among the respondent's supports for the non-revisability proposition; the judgment of the court engaged more broadly with the law on revisional jurisdiction. |
| K.N. Venkataramanaiah Setty v. B.N. Srinivas, 1988 3 Suppl. Kar. L.J 208 | Holds that mere erroneous or contrary exercise of discretion in admitting/refusing a document is generally not a ground for interference under Section 115 CPC; admissibility objections are often better addressed on appeal. | The court quoted this decision and its principle but distinguished the present case on facts: where the refusal to admit an affidavit effectively shut out the party's right to adduce particular evidence, the order could amount to a "case decided" amenable to revision. |
| Murigappa v. Channappa, AIR 1977 Kar. 111 | Holds that by upholding or overruling an objection to a question put to a witness no 'case' is decided and hence not open to revision under Section 115 CPC. | The court considered this authority (and related Supreme Court authority) for the general principle that not every interlocutory ruling is revisable; nonetheless, it explained why the instant refusal to permit confrontation of the affidavit was different because it decided a party's right to adduce specific evidence. |
| R.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon, 1964 4 SCR 409 | Defines the term "case" in Section 115 comprehensively: it may include parts of proceedings and is not limited to the entirety of a suit. | The court relied on this authority to interpret "case" broadly, concluding that interlocutory orders deciding rights or obligations in the context of proceedings can constitute a "case decided" for purposes of revision. |
| Basant Singh v. Janki Singh, 1967 1 SCR 1 | Affirms that statements in pleadings (and by analogy statements in affidavits) can be used as admissions under Section 17 of the Evidence Act. | The court used this authority to support the proposition that statements made on oath (including affidavit statements) may be used as admissions and that contents of an affidavit can be proved through the affidavit's maker. |
| Baldevadas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC 201; AIR 1970 SC 406 | Reiterates that every order in the course of a suit is not a "case decided" for Section 115 CPC; specifically, overruling or upholding objections to questions generally do not amount to a case decided. | The court referenced this Supreme Court dictum (via Murigappa decision) to explain the general rule but then distinguished the present order because it deprived the defendants of their right to confront the affidavit-maker and thereby disposed of a right to adduce evidence. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a structured manner:
- It first set out the conditions for invoking the High Court's revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC: (1) there must be a "case decided" by a subordinate court; (2) the deciding court must be subordinate to the High Court; (3) no appeal must lie to the High Court against the decision; and (4) the subordinate court must have either exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, failed to exercise vested jurisdiction, or acted illegally or with material irregularity. These conditions were expressly recited from established authorities.
- The court examined the meaning of "case" in Section 115 CPC, relying on R.S. Khanna v. F.J. Dillon to adopt a broad interpretation: "case" includes parts of proceedings and is not confined to the final adjudication of a suit. The court accepted that not every interlocutory order becomes a "case decided" but emphasized that where an order adjudicates some right or obligation of the parties for purposes of the suit, it can amount to a case decided.
- The court reviewed authorities (including K.N. Venkataramanaiah Setty and Murigappa) that typically counsel restraint in interfering with discretionary interlocutory rulings on evidentiary admissibility, noting that many admissibility disputes are better remedied on appeal after final disposition.
- Applying the law to the facts, the court observed that: (a) P.W.1 was confronted during cross-examination with an affidavit he had sworn in probate proceedings and admitted that it bore his signatures on each page; (b) although affidavits as such are not substantive evidence, statements made on oath can be used as admissions under Section 17 of the Evidence Act; (c) the contents of an affidavit can be proved by confronting the maker; and (d) the defendants' object was to confront P.W.1 with statements in that affidavit to disprove a fact (that the executors had attested the Will).
- The court reasoned that the trial court's refusal to permit confrontation of the affidavit effectively shut out the defendants' right to place that piece of evidence before the court. That denial adjudicated a right of the defendants to adduce specific evidence and therefore decided a right or obligation in controversy for the purposes of the suit.
- On this basis, the court concluded that the impugned interlocutory order was a "case decided" within the meaning of Section 115 CPC and, furthermore, that the trial court had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it (by declining to allow the evidence without adequate legal basis). Consequently, intervention under Section 115 CPC was warranted.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The revision petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The Court below is directed to permit the learned Counsel for the defendants to confront the statements made by P.W.1 in the affidavit sworn to by him in the Probate Proceedings.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The trial court is ordered to allow the defendants to confront P.W.1 with the affidavit; this restores the defendants' immediate right to adduce and test that evidence during trial.
- Scope for broader precedent: The opinion explains and applies existing principles on the scope of "case" under Section 115 CPC and on the use of affidavit statements as admissions, but it does not purport to lay down a novel doctrinal rule beyond application of cited authorities. The decision is tied to the factual finding that the order shut out a party's right to adduce evidence and thereby decided a right within the meaning of Section 115 CPC.
This summary is strictly confined to matters contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or law beyond that opinion.
B. Pamaraj, J.:—
Though this matter was listed for preliminary hearing, the same was taken-up for final disposal by consent of both sides.
2. This is a revision petition filed by the defendants in O.S No. 10182/85, on the file of the IV Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, under Section 115 of CPC., challenging the validity of the order passed by the Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, on 27.2.96 in O.S No. 10182/85, rejecting the request of the petitioner's Counsel to exhibit an affidavit sworn to by P.W 1 (the respondent/plaintiff). The respondent is the plaintiff in O.S No. 10182/85, on the file of the IV Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore. The plaintiff has filed the suit for a declaration declaring the plaintiff and his family members have a right of common enjoyment of the suit schedule property and usufruct from the coconut and other fruit yielding trees, directing the defendants to pay regularly the plaintiff's share of usufruct from coconut and fruit trees and on their failure, the plaintiff to exclusively take 3 out of 12 coconut trees and also for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents etc. from keeping any boarders, lodgers or any other person except those whose names have been mentioned in the ‘Will’ and from preventing or interfering with and his family members of their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property and to remove the boarder/s presently occupying a portion of the suit property and not to let out any portion to any person whatsoever and restraining from alienating, encumbering or disposing of the suit schedule property in any manner.
3. At the trial of the suit, when the plaintiff was being cross-examined by the Counsel for the defendants, after putting certain preliminary questions with respect to an affidavit said to have been sworn by the plaintiff on 22.9.82, wanted to get the said affidavit marked through P.W 1. and at that stage the other side took objection for marking of the affidavit. Thereupon, the learned Additional City Civil Judge heard the learned Counsel for the parties in detail on this aspect of the case and passed an order rejecting the request of the Advocate for the defendants for marking the affidavit, being of the view that the affidavit sworn to by the plaintiff cannot be marked in evidence. This order of the Court-below is the subject matter of challenge in this revision petition.
3. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contended before me that the impugned order made by the Court below is opposed to law and the facts of the case. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the Trial Court while interpreting the law of evidence which excludes affidavits, failed to note that in this case, the maker of the affidavit-P.W 1 in his deposition on 16.10.95 has deposed about the affidavit confronted to him that the affidavit shown to him bears his signature on each of the pages and this according to the learned Counsel clearly amounts to consent to mark the affidavit as per the decision reported in Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra Saha . AIR 1968 Cal. 532.. The learned Counsel contended that the Trial Court ought to have relied upon the admission of P.W 1 in regard to his signature put on the affidavit and mark the affidavit as an exhibit. He also contended that the Trial Court failed to note the relevancy of the said affidavit in regard to issue Nos. 7 and 12 raised in the suit as P.W 1 wants to challenge the ‘Will’ made by his mother Mrs. Rosie Mascarenhas on the ground that the petitioners-1 and 2 herein being executors of the Will have attested it, which, fact has been disproved in the affidavit of P.W 1 and the suit O.S No. 10182/85 is not maintainable without revoking the Will and the probate granted in P & SC. 10075/82 dated 28.7.83, wherein he had no objection for grant of the probate. He, therefore, contended that the Trial Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction only vested in it in law by not properly interpreting the admitted signature of P.W 1 on the affidavit which has been sworn to by him. Further, he, contended that the petitioners are greatly prejudiced in the Trial court's refusing to mark the affidavit admitted by P.W 1.
3A. Learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the order of the Court-below will not fall within the category of “a case decided” and hence it is not amenable to revision under Section 115 of C.P.C He also contended that the affidavit is not an evidence within the meaning of Section 4 of the evidence Act and it cannot be treated as evidence in the suit. He, therefore, contended that the Trial Court was well within its powers in passing the order under revision and it does not suffer from any illegality so as to call for interference, by this Court under Section 115 of C.P.C In support of his contentions, he relied upon the following decisions:
1) M.C Madhura v. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan & Ors. . 1980 2 Kar. L.J 305.
2) K.N Venkataramanaiah Setty v. B.N Srinivas . 1988 3 Suppl. Kar. L.J 208.
3) Murigappa,… v. Channappa,…. . AIR 1977 Kar. 111.
4) Parekh Brothers v. Kartick Chandra Saha
3B. There could be no dispute that the revisional powers or this Court under Section 115 CPC. cannot be invoked unless the following conditions exist:
(1) There must be a case decided by a Court;
(2) The Court deciding the case must be subordinate to the High Court, and
(3) No appeal must lie (to the High Court) against the decision; and
(4) In deciding the case, the subordinate court must appear to have
a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law, or
c) acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
4. In this context, it is required to be stated that the meaning of the expression “case” being of comprehensive import; it includes civil proceedings other than suits and it is not restricted to the entirety of the proceedings in a civil suit. To interpret ‘case’ as an entire proceeding and not a part of proceeding would be to restrict the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court resulting in gross injustice to an aggrieved litigant. In the view that ‘case’ includes a part of a case, there is no escape from the conclusion that a revisional jurisdiction may be exercised irrespective of the question whether an appeal lies from the ultimate order or decree passed in the suit. But every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided. A case may be said to be decided if the Court adjudicates for the purpose of the suit some right to obligation of the parties in controversy. A complete and exhaustive definition of case is not possible. It is something wider than suit, but at the same time it is not so wide as to include every order passed during the trial of a suit or a proceeding. It is, however, no longer possible to claim that a case decided could relate only to main suit and not any other proceedings between the initiation of the suit and its final adjudication. In R.S Khanna v. F.J Dillon . 1964 4 SCR 409, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:—
“The expression “case” is a word of comprehensive import; it includes civil proceedings other than suis, and is not restricted by anything contained in the section to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil court. To interpret the expression ‘case’ as an entire proceeding only and not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence to which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not, subject and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. The expression ‘case’ includes a suit, but in ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, there would be no warrant for equating it with a suit alone.”
5. It has to be mentioned that from the inception to the final disposal of the suit, certain proceedings may crop up and they have to be decided in such proceedings and if in such proceedings, some right or obligation of the parties in controversy gets decided that would amount to case decided. Therefore, as I have already stated that in the view case includes a part of a case there is no escape from the conclusion that revisional jurisdiction may be exercised irrespective of the question whether an appeal lies from the ultimate order or decree passed in the suit.
6. In K.N Venkataramanaiah Setty v. B.N Srinivasa, this Court has held as under:—
“Whether a document is admissible or inadmissible is a decision which the Court has to take at the appropriate stage. If an admissible document is not admitted, it will be a good ground in appeal when the suit is disposed of if any thing turns on that document. If an inadmissible document is admitted and thereby a party is prejudiced then also it will be a good ground to get the adverse findings set aside in appeal. Merely because the Court either in ignorance of law or contrary to law declined to admit a document in evidence, this Court cannot under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code interfere with that order. It is seen, in proceedings of discretionary nature the Court has to exercise its discretion in regard to the admissibility or in admissibility in favour of one view or the other. That is no reason why this Court should interfere at this stage because another view is possible.”
In that case the original document was said to have been registered in the year 1920 and the apprehension on the part of the plaintiff who objected to the admissibility of the certified copy of the partition deed was that the defendant may claim presumptive value provided for under Section 90 in regard to due execution of the document, and it is in the light of that argument the trial Judge held that the object of producing the document was not to prove the contents of the document but to claim the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. On the facts and circumstances of that case, this Court held that is a matter which ultimately depends upon the totality of the evidence recorded and the issues framed and decided by the Court and therefore the proper time at which the relevancy of this document both in regard to its admissibility as well as its contents can only be decided at the stage of appeal if necessary and not at this stage.
7. In ‘Murigappa,… v. Channappa,…., this Court held that by upholding or overruling objection to a question put to a witness no case is decided and hence the order of the Trial Court not open to revision. In that case, while relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported in ‘Baldevadas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Private Ltd. . 1969 2 SCC 201, the learned Chief Justice Mr. G.K Govinda Bhat, as his Lordship then was, proceeded to observe as under:—
“It is not shown how this is a case ‘decided’ by a Court subordinate to the High Court in order to enable this Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C In Baldevadas Shivalal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) private Limited, (1969) 2 SCC 201 : AIR 1970 SC 406, the Supreme Court has laid down that “every order of the Court in the course of a suit does not amount to a case ‘decided’, within the meaning of Section 115 CPC. By overruling an objection to a question put to a witness and allowing the question to be put, no case is ‘decided’. The instant case is a converse one where an objection is up-held. When the trial Judge allow an objection and disallows a question put to the witness or when he overrules an objection and allows the question put to the witness, it cannot be said that the case is ‘decided’ within the meaning of Section 115 of C.P.C Therefore, the revision petition under section 115 CPC is not maintainable. Accordingly, this revision petition is dismissed but without costs.”
8. In this context, it is useful to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court, which reads as under:—
“A case may be said to be decided if the Court adjudicates for the purpose of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of CPC.”
9. In the cases cited above, this Court as well as the Supreme Court were dealing with the cases where certain questions were either disallowed or allowed by the Trial Court and it was held that it was not a case decided but they do not delineate extensively as to adjudication of what types of rights or obligation of the parties would amount to a case decided. It has, however, been observed by the Supreme Court that a case may be said to be decided if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit, some right or obligation of the parties and then it would amount to a case decided. Therefore, it has to be mentioned in this context that the decisive factor to find out the revisability of an order is whether by such order right or obligation of the parties in controversy gets decided. The right or obligation need; not necessarily have a nexus to the main lis and in the progression of the suit towards its final adjudication and the final resolution of the controversy between the parties. Very many rights and obligations do crop up and they have foundations both in substantive law as well as I in procedural law and if they get decided by such interlocutory orders, they are certainly revisable.
10. In the instant case, during the course of the trial of the suit, when the plaintiff was being cross-examined by the learned Counsel for the petitioner/defendants certain questions were put to P.W 1 in relation to an affidavit said to have been sworn to by him in a Probate proceedings and also elicited from P.W 1 that the said affidavit bears his signature on each page and at that stage, an objection was raised by the other side that the affidavit cannot be marked in evidence and the Trial Court by a separate order upheld the said objection. It is stated that the said affidavit contained certain admission and the endeavour of the defendant's Counsel in getting the said affidavit marked through P.W 1 was to confront the admission made by him in the affidavit. It is not in dispute that P.W 1, to whom the affidavit was confronted in the cross-examination, was the maker of the affidavit and in fact, he has also admitted that it bears his signatures at each page. In this context, it may be mentioned that the statements made in an affidavit may be used as admissions under Section 17 and the sections that follow, like statements made by a person in the written statement or in another suit. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Basant Singh v. Janki Singh . 1967 1 SCR Page 1., wherein it is held as under:
“All the statements in the plaint are admissible in evidence. The, plaintiff can rely upon a statement in the plaint with regard to a matter in issue as an admission, though she is not prepared to accept the correctness of the other statements in the plaint. Nor is the Court bound to accept all the statements as correct. The court may accept some of the statements as correct and reject the rest.
Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no distinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. An admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true.”
Thus, the statement made in an affidavit may be used as an admission. As a matter of fact, any statement made on oath may be used against him as an admission. In uncontested proceedings under the probate and other like matters, the Court may direct any fact to be proved by an affidavit. In this case also, it is not in dispute that the affidavit which the learned Counsel for the defendants wanted to confront to P.W 1 was an affidavit sworn to by P.W 1 himself in a previous Probate Proceedings. Therefore, the learned Counsel wanted to rely on a certain statement made by P.W 1 in his affidavit by confronting the affidavit, in the cross-examination, by prefacing certain questions in this regard and after getting an admission from P.W 1 that it contains his signatures at each page. Therefore, the main object of the learned Counsel for the defendants in this case was to confront a statement made by P.W 1 in his affidavit filed in the probate proceedings. Though the affidavit as such cannot be treated as a substantive evidence, but the contents of the affidavit can be proved through the maker. Obviously, it is for this reason, the learned Counsel appearing for the defendants wanted to confront the affidavit to the maker thereof viz., P.W 1 which has been seriously objected to by the other side and the same has been upheld by the Court-below. It is required to be stated that the party has got a right to place evidence which he could require to substantiate his case before the Court and of course, subject to the law of evidence and of the Code and it is the duty of the Court to receive such evidence unless there are other justifiable factors in law to decline to receive such evidence. The law of evidence enjoins upon the party to prove the fact which he relies on and in that sense, an obligation is case upon the party and if he fails to discharge that obligation, adverse consequences will follow and will have to face the repercussions of the same. This right of the party to adduce evidence gets adjudicated in the interlocutory proceedings. When there is a decline by the Court to permit the party to confront the statement made in the affidavit to the maker thereof, the order certainly disposes of the right claimed by the party to place the requisite evidence in this behalf. The question as to whether a particular order adjudicate some rights or obligations of the parties in controversy will depend upon the nature of the right or obligation and it is not possible to lay down a uniform rule. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the impugned order did not decide any issue or some right or obligation of the parties in controversy. Here, the right of the party to adduce evidence in substantiation of his case has been shut out and the implication of the denial of such right will naturally prejudice the right of the party to adduce evidence on his behalf to substantiate his claim. It is hardly required to be stated that the admission of a party is the best evidence in the case. By this piece of evidence, the endeavour of the learned Counsel for the defendants was to disprove the fact that the executors of the ‘Will’ have attested the same. Shutting out such evidence which a party is entitled to place before Court to substantiate his case, definitely decides the, right of the party, adversely against him and in this view of the matter, the order passed by the Court below is a case decided and apart from that, on merits the order passed by the Court below comes within the mischief of Section 115 of C.P.C Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the view that there has been a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by the Court below to a patent misconception of the position and this obliges me to interfere with the impugned order under revision.
For the reasons stated above, this revision petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The Court below is directed to permit the learned Counsel for the defendants to confront the statements made by P.W 1 in the Affidavit sworn to by him in the Probate Proceedings.
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