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Krishnamurthy v. Bangalore Development Authority

Karnataka High Court
Dec 11, 1995
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order of a learned Single Judge dismissing a writ petition that attacked the acquisition of land comprised in Sy. No. 150/1P (2 acres 02 guntas) in Doddigunta Village, K.R. Puram Taluk, Bangalore District.

The Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) published a Preliminary Notification on 2.6.1978 (Gazette publication 29.6.1978) for formation of a layout; a Final Notification was issued on 30.9.1980 (Gazette publication 9.10.1980). The Award in respect of the acquisition was passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA on 3.5.1990.

The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches, accepting the respondents' submission that the petitioner-appellant had notice of the acquisition proceedings in 1981 but did not approach the Court for nearly 12 years. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the acquisition proceedings lapsed under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act because the award was not passed within two years from the date of publication of the Final Notification.
  2. Whether the Scheme under the Bangalore Development Authority Act had lapsed under Section 27 due to failure to complete the scheme within the prescribed period.
  3. Whether taking possession (after the award) without notice and without delivery procedures violated Article 300A of the Constitution and rendered the taking of possession illegal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The award was not passed within two years of the Final Notification and therefore acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act.
  • The Scheme has lapsed under Section 27 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act because the respondents did not complete the scheme in the prescribed period.
  • The appellant did not receive notice after making the award or for delivery of possession; taking possession of the land for formation of layout is illegal and violative of Article 300A.
  • In the appeal the appellant clarified he was primarily alleging non-compliance with Section 27 and the effect of Section 11A read with Section 36 of the BDA Act; he also relied on the timing of actual possession (taken only shortly before he approached the Court) to explain delay in challenging earlier.

Respondents' Arguments

  • There are laches on the part of the appellant: the Final Notification was issued on 30.9.1980, the appellant had notice in 1981, but did not approach the Court for nearly 12 years.
  • Because of the delay and inaction by the appellant, the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
WA 321-322/1989 disposed of on 6.10.1989 Held that Section 36 of the BDA Act does not enable application of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act (introduced in 1984) to acquisitions under the BDA Act. The Court relied on this decision to reject the appellant's contention that Section 11A governed the acquisition under the BDA Act; accordingly Section 11A was held inapplicable on these facts.
State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh. AIR 1995 SC 2188 Rule that the plea of lapse of notification under a State Act by operation of Section 11A of the Central Act is not tenable where the State Legislature did not amend its Act to incorporate the Central Act amendment; the Legislature's omission indicates no intention to apply the later amendment. The Court cited this Supreme Court authority as an identical view and applied its rationale to hold that Section 11A (Central Act amendment) did not operate to lapse the acquisition under the State/BDA framework.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two principal veins of analysis: (A) the question of laches and Section 27 of the BDA Act; and (B) the applicability of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act to acquisitions under the BDA Act.

A. Section 27 and laches:

  • The Court recited the Division Bench approach to Section 27: for a scheme to lapse under that provision, there must be dereliction of statutory duty or failure to execute the scheme specifically within five years from the date of publication in the Official Gazette and a declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act.
  • Two conditions to attract Section 27 are identified in the opinion: (1) failure to execute the scheme amounting to dereliction of duty (not merely delay); and (2) whether there has been substantial execution depends on the magnitude and nature of the scheme.
  • The burden: the BDA must furnish material to show substantial execution; the appellant must place material to show dereliction of duty rather than mere delay.
  • In this case the appellant had not laid the necessary foundation to show dereliction — only pointed to delay. The five-year period expired in 1985 and the Court found no satisfactory explanation for the appellant remaining inactive for seven years thereafter.
  • The appellant's explanation that there was no immediate threat of dispossession was rejected: the Court noted there was acquisition and steps taken by the BDA, and the appellant should have attacked the acquisition within a reasonable time after the five-year lapse. The Court concluded that a seven-year delay was unreasonable and amounted to laches; dismissal on laches alone was justified.

B. Applicability of Section 11A:

  • The Court held the appellant's contention that Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act applied was untenable in view of the earlier decision WA 321-322/1989 and the Supreme Court decision in State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh (AIR 1995 SC 2188).
  • The Court adopted the rationale that where a State enactment incorporates specific provisions of the Central Act, the State Legislature's omission to adopt subsequent amendments indicates an intention not to incorporate those subsequent amendments; therefore Section 11A (a 1984 amendment to the Central Act) cannot be read into the BDA Act via Section 36.
  • Accordingly, the plea that the notification would be deemed to have lapsed by operation of Section 11A was rejected as not tenable on the statutory and precedential basis outlined above.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Holding: The Division Bench upheld the learned Single Judge's dismissal of the writ petition. The Court concluded the appeal could be dismissed on the ground of laches alone and found no material to show dereliction of duty under Section 27 of the BDA Act. The contention based on Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act was held untenable in light of prior decisions.

Implications: The direct effect is that the appellant's challenge to the acquisition and related reliefs have failed and the Order dismissing the writ petition stands. The Court applied existing precedents to deny application of Section 11A to acquisitions under the BDA Act and did not announce any new legal principle beyond applying those authorities. No new precedent was set by this decision.

Show all summary ...

Rajendra Babu, J.:— This Appeal is directed against an order made by the learned Single Judge in a Writ Petition challenging the acquisition of land comprised in Sy. No. 150/1P measuring 2 acres 02 guntas situate in Doddigunta Village, Kasaba Hobli, K.R Puram Taluk, Bangalore District. The Preliminary Notification was published on 2.6.1978 in the Karnataka Gazette on 29.6.1978 by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) for formation of a layout for further expansion of scheme between Old Madras Road and Banaswadi Road. A Final Notification was issued on 30th September 1980 which was published in the Gazette on 9.10.1980 The Award in respect of the acquisition of land was passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, BDA on 3.5.1990 Three contentions were urged by the petitioner - appellant that the award having not been passed within two years from the date of the publication of the Final Notification, the entire acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act. Secondly, the Scheme has lapsed in view of Section 27 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act inasmuch as the respondents have not completed the Scheme in the period prescribed thereto. Thirdly, it was contended that the appellant has not received any notice after making the award or for delivering of possession and inasmuch as taking possession of land for formation of layout is illegal and violative of Article 300A of the Constitution.

2. Learned Counsel for the respondents urged before the learned Single Judge that there are laches on the part of the appellant in approaching the Court inasmuch as Final Notification had been issued on 30th September, 1980 and the appellant had notice of those proceedings in the year 1981 itself. He had not approached this Court for nearly 12 years and there is laches on his part. This contention on behalf of the respondents was accepted by the learned Single Judge who dismissed the Writ Petition. Hence, this Appeal.

3. In this Appeal, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was not challenging the land acquisition as such but non-compliance of Section 27 of the Act and effect of Section 11A of Land Acquisition Act read with Section 36 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act. It is the submission of the learned Counsel that the possession of the lands were not taken till late, a couple of months before the appellant approached this Court and when there was total inaction on the part of the BDA in implementing the Scheme, the appellant need not approach this Court earlier when there was no threat of dispossession of the land. It is therefore, contended that the Learned Judge has misdirected himself in dealing with this matter only with reference to laches on the part of the petitioner-appellant in challenging the acquisition of the land.

4. On the scope of Section 27 BDA Act, a Division Bench of this Court has considered the same and explained to the effect that for the scheme to lapse under Section 27, there must be dereliction of duty or failure on the part of the authority to execute the scheme specifically within 5 years from the date of publication in the official Gazette and a declaration under Section 19(1) of the Act. The two conditions to be fulfilled to attract the provisions of this Section are, there must be failure to execute the scheme i.e, there must be dereliction of statutory duties without justification and not a mere delay in execution of the scheme. Secondly, substantial execution in the context depends on the magnitude of the scheme and the nature of the work to be executed. Though burden is upon the BDA to furnish material to the Court to show that there is substantial execution on the matter, it is for the appellant to place necessary material before the Court to show that there has been dereliction of statutory duties and not mere delay in implementing the scheme. No such foundation has been laid out on that aspect except to point out there is delay on the part of the BDA.

5. More over, that period of 5 years lapsed in the year 1985. As to why the petitioner-appellant kept quiet for 7 years is un-understandable. However, the learned Counsel for the appellant sought to urge that there being no immediate threat of dispossession of the land, he did not approach this Court. That explanation will not carry the appellant far because there was acquisition of the land and steps were being taken in that regard. Appellant cannot merely state that the acquisition Notification issued seeking to acquire the land in question can be wished away by urging that by lapse of time it will disappear while he should have attacked the same within a reasonable time after the lapse of 5 years. We do not think 7 years delay in that regard would be appropriate or reasonable. Therefore, the view taken by leaned Single Judge in our opinion, is perfectly justified. Therefore, this Appeal could be dismissed on laches alone. Apart from that, we have pointed out that there is no material forthcoming in this case to show that there is dereliction of duty on the part of the BDA in not implementing the scheme to attract the provisions of Section 27 of the Act. The next ground urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act is applicable to the facts of the case is not at all tenable in view of the Decision of this Court in WA 321-322/1989 disposed of on 6.10.19891 wherein it was held that Section 36 does not enable to hold that Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act which was introduced into that Act in 1984 would govern the acquisition under the BDA Act. Identical view has been taken by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh . AIR 1995 SC 2188.. It is stated therein that the plea that since the award has not been made within 2 years from the date of publication under the Maharashtra Act under Section 126(2) thereof by operation of Section 11A of the Central Act, the Notification published under Section 125 of the Act shall be deemed to have been lapsed and the authorities are devoid of jurisdiction to proceed further is not tenable. The rationale adopted by Their Lordships is that wherever the Legislature intended to apply specific procedure or the fetters in exercising the power under the Central Act, it did no specifically. After the Central Act 68/1984 came into force no steps had been taken by the State Legislature to amend the Act introducing or incorporating Section 11A of the Central Act as part of the Act. Since the Legislature has incorporated specific provisions of the Central Act, the necessary conclusion is that Legislature did not intend to unspecify the provisions of the Central Act for exercise of power under the Act. If the Legislature would have merely adopted the Central Act, subsequent amendment to that Act made under 68/1984 Act would have been applicable per se. That is not the position in this case. In that view of the matter, we find the other contentions also untenable. We find absolutely no merit in this Appeal.

Appeal is Dismissed.