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Ranganna v. Chikkanna
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Hari Nath Tilhari, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
This Revision Petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure was preferred by the defendants challenging the Trial Court's order dated 7.7.1995 which granted leave to file a suit under Section 92 of the Code. The Trial Court's brief order read: "Perused the petition, heard the Counsel. Permitted to sue and office to register the suit and post the same at 3 P.M today." The suit was registered as O.S. No. 1/1995.
The learned Additional District Judge, Tumkur dealt with interlocutory applications I.A. I (under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC) and I.A. II (under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 read with Section 24 CPC) and granted an ex parte injunction restraining defendants 2 and 3 from drawing amounts collected in hundies and from operating an account at Indian Overseas Bank, Madhugiri; I.A. No. 2 was allowed against defendants 2 and 3 and the plaintiffs were directed to comply under Order 39 Rule 3. Summons and notices for the interlocutory applications were ordered.
The defendants challenged the 7.7.1995 order granting leave to sue; they clarified that they were not challenging the interim ex parte injunction in this Revision Petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Trial Court's grant of leave to sue under Section 92 of the Code, made without notice to the proposed defendants, constituted illegality or material irregularity sufficient to attract revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC.
- Whether failure to give notice before granting leave under Section 92 violated principles of natural justice so as to render the order liable to be revised under Section 115 CPC.
- Whether, even if an irregularity is shown, the proviso to Section 115(1) (clauses (a) or (b)) is satisfied so as to permit the High Court to reverse, vary or set aside the impugned order.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners (Defendants) — Principal Submissions
- The order dated 7.7.1995 granting leave under Section 92 CPC is illegal and involves an error of jurisdiction because it was passed without giving notice to the defendants.
- Granting leave without notice violates principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem) and the Trial Court should have given the defendants an opportunity to be heard.
- Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court (The Church of South India Trust Association v. Rev. D.I. Anand, 1980 2 KLJ 469) holding that an order made without notice and without reasons is illegal and revisable; and on R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmi Chettiar (1991 1 SCC 48) to support the contention about notice.
Respondents (Applicants/Plaintiffs) — Principal Submissions
- Giving notice before granting leave under Section 92 is a "rule of caution" and not a statutory requirement under the Code; it is not mandated by any provision of the Code.
- Section 115 CPC prescribes limited and circumscribed revisional jurisdiction; in absence of a statutory requirement for notice, the impugned order cannot be said to be illegal or to involve material irregularity in the sense contemplated by Section 115.
- Even if some irregularity is assumed, the Proviso to Section 115(1) prevents revision unless either proviso clause (a) or (b) applies; neither applies here because no material prejudice or irreparable injury to the defendants is shown and the order does not finally dispose of the suit.
- It remains open to defendants to apply to the Trial Court for revocation of leave; reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court's observations in R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmi Chettiar.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| The Church of South India Trust Association v. Rev. D.I. Anand (1980 2 KLJ 469) | Authority for proposition that an order made without notice to opponents and without reasons is illegal and liable to be revised; held that an order granting leave under Section 92 is a judicial order and revisable. | The petitioners relied on this decision. The Court observed that while that decision found violation of natural justice, it is of no assistance here because subsequent Supreme Court authority treats notice as a rule of caution rather than a statutory requirement. |
| R.M. Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmi Chettiar (1991 1 SCC 48) | Holds that, as a rule of caution, courts should normally give notice to proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 unless impracticable or inconvenient; but notices are not a statutory precondition and leave granted without notice does not render the suit non-maintainable. | The Court treated this Supreme Court authority as controlling: it concluded that notice is not mandatory; a grant of leave without notice is not ipso facto illegal or materially irregular and defendants remain entitled to move for revocation of leave. |
| Venkatagiri Iyengar v. Hindu Religious and Endowment Board, Madras (76 IA 67) | Defines the scope of "acted illegally" and "material irregularity" for the purposes of Section 115 — focuses on jurisdictional defects or material procedural errors (not errors of law or fact) that may have affected the decision. | The Court quoted this Privy Council authority to explain the limited scope of revisional power under Section 115 and to frame the enquiry whether the impugned order involved such jurisdictional illegality or material procedural irregularity. |
| Keshar Deo Chamaria v. Radha Kissen Chamaria (AIR 1953 SC 23) | Approves the Privy Council's exposition and observes that "illegally" and "material irregularity" do not cover errors of fact or law but relate to material defects of procedure. | The Court invoked this Supreme Court decision to reinforce that errors of law or fact are not proper grounds for revision under Section 115; only procedural illegality/material irregularity are relevant. |
| Narayana v. Shetty (AIR 1948 Nagpur 248) | Referred to in Keshar Deo Chamaria; used to illustrate limits on revisional jurisdiction under Section 115. | Referenced as supporting material in the chain of authorities showing that Section 115 is limited to jurisdictional or procedural defects and does not permit reappraisal of factual or legal conclusions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the statutory limits on revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC and set out the conditions that an applicant must establish to invoke that power: (a) the order impugned is the case decided; (b) the order is not appealable to this Court or to any subordinate court; (c) the order suffers from jurisdictional error, i.e., the subordinate Court acted without jurisdiction, refused to exercise jurisdiction vested, acted illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction; and (d) the case must fall within one of the exceptions in the Proviso to Section 115(1) (either the order would finally dispose of the suit in whole or in part, or allowing the order to stand would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury).
The core question for the Court was whether the Trial Court's grant of leave under Section 92 without giving notice to the proposed defendants amounted to illegality or material irregularity within the meaning of Section 115.
The Court examined the Supreme Court's exposition in R.M. Narayana Chettiar which characterises giving notice before granting leave under Section 92 as a "rule of caution" rather than a statutory requirement. The Supreme Court had explained that although notice is normally desirable so defendants can point out frivolous allegations or other reasons why leave should be refused, requiring notice as a statutory precondition would frustrate urgent relief and hinder beneficiaries of public trusts.
Applying that authority, the Court concluded that the absence of notice in the grant of leave did not constitute a breach of a statutory provision or procedural rule such as would amount to "acting illegally" or committing a "material irregularity" for the purposes of Section 115. The Court emphasised the distinction drawn by earlier authorities (Venkatagiri Iyengar; Keshar Deo Chamaria) that "illegality" and "material irregularity" concern breaches of statutory procedure or jurisdictional defects and do not encompass mere errors of law or fact or departures from non-statutory rules of caution.
The Court further observed that the grant of leave without notice does not, in itself, prejudice the rights of the defendants because they retain the ability to move the Trial Court for revocation of the leave and to defend the suit on merits when it proceeds. Because the petitioners had not shown that the impugned order would finally dispose of the suit or cause failure of justice or irreparable injury (the two exceptions in the Proviso to Section 115(1)), revision was not permissible.
On that basis, the Court held that the impugned order did not suffer from jurisdictional error, illegality or material irregularity within the meaning of Section 115 CPC and that the High Court could not interfere with the Trial Court's order in revision.
Holding and Implications
Holding: THE REVISION PETITION IS DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The Trial Court's order dated 7.7.1995 granting leave to sue under Section 92 CPC stands undisturbed by this revision.
- The defendants retain the procedural remedy of applying to the Trial Court for revocation of the leave or otherwise defending the suit on its merits; the Court noted that grant of leave without notice does not amount to granting a decree or recording any finding against the defendants.
- No costs were ordered against the parties ("No order as to costs").
- Broader implication: the opinion applies existing Supreme Court and Privy Council authorities to confirm that notice before granting leave under Section 92 is a rule of caution and not a statutory requirement; the decision does not purport to create a new legal principle or depart from cited precedents. (The opinion does not discuss any novel precedent beyond application of existing authorities.)
Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the opinion itself contains.
Hari Nath Tilhari, J.:—
This Revision Petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been preferred by the defendants challenging the order dated: 7.7.1995, whereby, the Trial Court has granted the leave to file the suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for short, ‘Code’ after having heard the Counsel for the applicants-respondents. The order dated 7.7.95, reads as under:
“Perused the petition, heard the Counsel. Permitted to sue and office to register the suit and post the same at 3 P.M today.”
2. The suit was numbered as O.S No. 1/1995. The learned Additional District Judge, Tumkur, disposed of I.As I & II, that is, application - I.A.I under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code and application - I.A II under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 24 of the Code and granted an exparte injunction order which reads as under:
“Perused the documents filed along with the plaint and heard the Counsel for the plaintiffs.
Defendants 2 and 3 or anybody claiming under them are restrained from drawing the amounts collected in Hundies and also operating the account held in Indian Overseas Bank, Madhugiri, as sought for in I.A II as any delay in granting the above said order may render I.A II infructuous.
Accordingly, I.A No. 2 is allowed against defendant Nos. 2 and 3. Plaintiff to comply under Order 39 Rule 3.
Issue summons to defendants. Issue notice of I.As Call on 17.10.1995”
3. The defendants having felt aggrieved, as mentioned earlier, filed this Revision Petition by which they have challenged the order granting leave to sue under Section 92 of the Code. But, the learned Counsel for the defendants has clarified that now the order that is challenged in the Revision is order dated 7.7.1995, granting the leave and that the interim exparte injunction has not been challenged in this Revision.
4. Appearance has been put up by Sri V.S Gunjal on behalf of all the 13 respondents. I have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners - Sri B. Veerabhadrappa and Sri V.S Gunjal for respondents at length. The learned Counsel for the petitioners-defendants Sri Veerabhadrappa, submitted that the order dated 7.7.1995, whereby, the leave to sue has been granted under Section 92 of the Code suffers from illegality and error of jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the leave which has been granted under Section 92 of the Code has been granted without any notice being given, to the Revisionists-defendants, for hearing or to have their say. That in view of the principles of Natural Justice, the Court below ought to have given an opportunity to have their say in the matter. That the learned Counsel for the Revisionists also invited my attention to a Decision of this Court in the case of The Church of South India Trust Association v. Rev. D.I Anand . 1980 2 KLJ 469. in which it has been laid down that an order made without notice to the opponents and without giving reasons is illegal and is liable to be revised. In it, it has also been laid down that an order granting application seeking leave under Section 92 of the Code is a judicial order and is revisable. The learned Counsel further tried to drive and take certain assistance from the Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of R.M Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmi Chettiar . 1991 1 SCC 48 and specially or particularly the observations, where it has been said that as a Rule of Caution, Court should normally give notice to defendants before granting leave under Section 92 to institute a suit, and submitted that the order granting leave to sue is illegal and bad in law and therefore, institution of suit is also bad and as such, the order suffers from illegality or irregularity in passing the order. The contention made on behalf of the Revisionists - defendants have been opposed on behalf of the opposite parties by Sri V.S Gunjal, learned Counsel by submitting that giving of notice before granting leave was only a Rule of Caution. It is not a Statutory Rule framed under the Code, either under any of the provisions of Sections contained in the Code or under any of the provisions contained in various orders. Sri Gunjal further, submitted that if as a matter of caution, it has been so provided, in some cases ordinarily as a matter of course, the notice should be given, but, that does not make that Rule of Caution, as a Statutory Rule under the provisions of the Code. That jurisdiction of the Court under Section 115 C.P.C is very limited and is circumscribed by the conditions specified in the Section and in the present case, really, when there is no Statutory Rule or statutory provision which may be commanding and directing the issuance of notice, the order impugned cannot be said to be emanating from any illegality or material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 92. Lastly, Sri Gunjal further submitted that even for a moment without conceding if it be taken that there is any irregularity, the order impugned cannot be reversed or set aside in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court in view of Proviso to Section 115(1) of the Code as the Proviso to clause (1) of Section 115 of the Code provides that no order shall be revised, varied or set aside unless it is covered by either Provisos (a) or (b) of Section 151. In the present case, it neither comes under clause (a) nor clause (b), as no material prejudice or injury can be said to have been caused thereby to the Revisionists - petitioners, as even it is always open to them to move application for revocation of that leave by placing the circumstances which defendants think are sufficient for revocation of that leave. Lastly, the learned Counsel for the respondents also placed reliance in this connection on the very Decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of R.M Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar.
5. Section 115 of the Code, as amended upto date limits the exercise of revisional power of this Court. For seeking the exercise of power or jurisdiction under Section 115 of Code following conditions have to be established by the applicants:
(a) That the order impugned means the case decided. (b) That the order impugned is not appealable to this Court or to any Court subordinate to this Court. (c) That the order impugned suffers from jurisdictional error such as exercise of jurisdiction not vested or refusing to exercise the jurisdiction vested or the Courts acting illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction while passing the impugned order and further (d) the party has to establish and prove that the case is one that comes within exceptions either (a) or (c) to the Proviso, because, as per Proviso to Section 115, irrespective of the case satisfying three earlier conditions, it is provided that the Court shall not reverse or modify the order impugned before it under revision nor shall vary, except in the cases, where either the order sought to be made in favour of the applicant in revision would finally dispose of the suit or proceedings either in whole or part or the order impugned if it is allowed to stand would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom order impugned was made and who is approaching this High Court to seek relief under Section 115 of the Code.
6. In the present case, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, as mentioned earlier, has emphasised that the order impugned has been passed without notice to defendants. The learned Counsel emphasised that as order has been passed without notice to the defendants, it suffered from illegality. No doubt, in the case mentioned supra 1980 (2) KAR. L.J 469, the District Judge had passed the order in violation of principles of Natural Justice, that is, principles of audi alteram partem and rules requiring the reasons to be given in support of the order and this Court held that order impugned therein had been passed by the District Judge illegally and with material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. The expressions “acted illegally” and material irregularity have been defined in the context of Section 115 by Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Venkatagiri Iyengar v. Hindu Religious and Endowment Board, Madras . 76 IA 67 as under:
“Section 115 applies only to cases in which no appeal lies and where the legislature has provided no right of appeal. The manifest intention is that the order of the Trial Court, right or wrong, shall be final. The section empowers the High Court to satisfy itself on three matters (a) that the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction (b) that the case is one in which Court ought to have exercised jurisdiction and (c) that in exercising the jurisdiction, the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon these three matters, it has no power to interfere, because it differs however, profoundly from the conclusions of the subordinate Courts on the questions of facts and law.”
7. This Decision of the Privy Council has been quoted with approval later on by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Keshar Deo Chamaria v. Radha Kissen Chamaria . AIR 1953 SC 23., the Supreme Court after having referred to the observations of Hon'ble Bose, J., in the case of Narayana v. Shetty . AIR 1948 Nagpur 248. observed that the words “illegally” and “material irregularity” do not cover either error of fact or of law. They do not refer to the decision arrived at, but, it is in the manner in which it is reached. The errors contemplated relate to material defects of procedure and not to errors of either law or fact.
8. The above quoted observations of Their Lordships of the Privy Council and Their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly reveal that expressions illegality and breach of law relate to breach of provisions of law or Rules of procedure laid down in the form of statutory provisions like Sections or the Rules and not otherwise. That as regards the granting of the leave in the present case is concerned, it has been granted without notice to the defendants - Revisionists, it will be profitable to quote the observations made by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of R.M Narayana Chettiar v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar:
“A plain reading of Section 92 of the Code indicates that leave of the Court is a precondition or a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against a public trust for the reliefs set out in the said section; unless all the beneficiaries join in instituting the suit, if such a suit is instituted without leave, it would not be maintainable at all. Having in mind, the objectives underlying Section 92 and the language thereof, it appears to us that, as a rule of caution, the Court should normally, unless it is impracticable or inconvenient to do so, give a notice to the proposed defendants before granting leave under Section 92 to institute a suit. The defendants could bring to the notice of the Court for instance that the allegations made in the plaint are frivolous or reckless. Apart from this, they could, in a given case, point out that the persons who are applying for leave under Section 92 are doing so merely with a view to harass the trust or have such antecedents that it would be undesirable to grant leave to such persons. The desirability of such notice being given to the defendants, however, cannot be regarded as a statutory requirement to be complied with before leave under Section 92 can be granted as that would lead to unnecessary delay and, in a given case, cause considerable loss to the public trust. Such a construction of the provisions of Section 92 of the Code would render it difficult for the beneficiaries of a public trust to obtain urgent interim orders from the Court even though the circumstances might warrant such relief being granted.”
9. The above quoted paragraph from the Judgment of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court clearly lays it down that the Rule of Caution to the effect that the Court should normally give notice to defendants before granting the leave under the Section to institute the suit, though insistence is not always binding on the Court. Their Lordships further laid it down very clearly that desirability of such notice being given to defendants cannot be regarded a statutory requirement to be complied with before the leave under Section 92 can be granted and further observations of their Lordships are to the effect:
“If a suit is instituted on the basis of such leave granted without notice to defendants, suit would not thereby be rendered bad in law or non-maintainable. The grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even seriously prejudicing any right of the proposed defendants because it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits and according to law.”
10. These observations clearly reveal that whatever has been laid down under Rule of Caution cannot be regarded as Statutory Rule or Statutory provision unless it has been so enacted by the Legislature with reference to Section 92. When this Rule of Caution cannot be regarded as either Statutory Rule or Statutory provision, then, the order that has been passed granting leave even without notice cannot be taken to have been passed illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction, because illegality or material irregularity connote the idea of breach of provisions of Statutory Law or Statutory Rules. That being the position, it cannot be said that the order is one which has been passed illegally or with material irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the applicants insisted, the principles of Natural Justice have got the play. The question of principles of Natural Justice regarding notice would have been applicable, if it could have been shown and provided that by mere grant of leave to sue under Section 92 C.P.C, the right or interest of the defendants, is being adversely affected. No doubt, it is one of the well settled principles of law that when an order prejudicial to the person is passed affecting his right or interest, he should be given opportunity of hearing and showing cause that his right is being affected. But, no right of the petitioner is being prejudiced when during the trial of the suit, material allegation of plaint case and defence case are to be examined, tried and determined after hearing the parties, in my opinion, no prejudice or injury has been caused by simple grant of leave to sue under Section 92 of the Code and so, there is no question of failure or violation of principles of Natural Justice. When I so observe, I find support from the observations of the Lordships of the Supreme Court in para 17 of K.M Narayan Chettiar's case that grant of leave cannot be regarded as defeating or even seriously prejudicing any rights of the proposed defendants and it is always open to them to file an application for revocation of the leave which can be considered on merits according to law. This being the position of law, the order impugned cannot be said to have been causing injustice or injury to the rights of the defendants - applicants and it is open to them to move the Court below for revocation of the leave by placing relevant fact when it is being taken to be proper to challenge the plaint allegations as well, even if the leave should not be taken as granted the decree or recording any finding against the defendants. As I have mentioned earlier that it is observed by the Supreme Court that the leave so granted does not have the leave by placing relevant fact when it is being taken to be proper to challenge the plaint allegations as well, even if the leave is not challenged. Granting of leave should not be taken as granting the decree or recording any finding against the defendants. As I have mentioned earlier that it is observed by the Supreme Court that the leave so granted does not have the prejudicing of the rights if any of the applicants. That order impugned is not appealable and it does not suffer from any error of jurisdiction, illegality or material irregularity, and further, it cannot be reverted or varied under Section 115 of the Code, except, in cases mentioned in Clauses (a) or (b) to the Proviso. As it does not prejudicially affect nor defeat any rights of the proposed defendants or the Revisionists - petitioners, it cannot be said to occasion failure of Justice or to cause any irreparable injury to the defendants-petitioners, as none of the conditions either under (a) or (b) are shown to exist. Therefore in my opinion, this Court cannot interfere with the order impugned, under Section 115 of the Code.
11. In view of the above Supreme Court Decision, in my opinion, the earlier Decision of this Court referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is of no assistance, subject to the above observations that it is always open to the petitioners - Revisionists to move for revocation of the leave. Thus considered, the Revision Petition is misconceived and is hereby dismissed. No order as to cost.
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