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State Of Karnataka v. Revanasiddappa
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Two criminal appeals were heard together because they raised identical questions of law. Criminal Appeal No. 593/90 challenged an order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC), Chitradurga, in C.C. No. 23/85 that permitted compounding of an offence under Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code and resulted in an acquittal. Criminal Appeal No. 214/91 challenged an order of the JMFC, Nelamangala, in C.C. No. 111/88 that permitted compounding of an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and resulted in an acquittal.
The State challenged both orders on the ground that the offences charged (Sections 380 and 326 IPC) were non-compoundable and that the Magistrates had no jurisdiction to permit compounding; therefore, the procedure followed, the permissions granted for compounding and the consequent acquittals were asserted to be illegal and liable to be set aside.
The Magistrates had relied on prior judicial decisions (including State of Karnataka v. Basavaraju and Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan) as enabling them to grant permission to compound the offences.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether subordinate criminal courts (or this Court) have jurisdiction to permit compounding of offences that do not appear in either of the tables under Section 320(1) or Section 320(2) Cr.P.C. (i.e., non-compoundable offences such as those under Sections 380 and 326 IPC).
- Whether decisions of higher courts (in particular the Supreme Court decision in Mahesh Chand and the Division Bench decision in State of Karnataka v. Basavaraju) authorize subordinate magistrates to permit compounding of non-compoundable offences, and what is the effect of Article 142 of the Constitution in this context.
Arguments of the Parties
State's Arguments
- The offences under Sections 380 and 326 IPC do not fall in either of the two tables in Section 320(1) or Section 320(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and are therefore non-compoundable.
- Sub-section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. provides that "No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section," so composition of offences not covered by Section 320 is impermissible.
- The learned Magistrates had no jurisdiction to permit compounding of such non-compoundable offences; consequently the procedure followed, the permissions to compound and the consequent acquittals are illegal and should be set aside.
The opinion does not set out detailed counter-arguments advanced by the accused or other parties; it records only that the Magistrates relied on prior judicial decisions in permitting compounding.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan (1990 Supp SCC 681; AIR 1988 S.C. 2111) | Supreme Court used its plenary powers under Article 142 to direct the trial Court to permit compounding in that special case. | The court held that Mahesh Chand rested on the Supreme Court's plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 and therefore cannot be taken as authority that subordinate Criminal Courts have jurisdiction to permit compounding of non-compoundable offences. |
| State of Karnataka v. Basavaraju (Division Bench decision of this Court) | Held that, in peculiar or special circumstances, a trial Court may permit compounding of a non-compoundable offence (in that matrimonial context the trial Court granted permission and the Division Bench upheld it). | The court examined Basavaraju and concluded that the decision did not consider sub‑section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C.; therefore, it was rendered per incuriam and is not a binding precedent. |
| Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India (1986 2 SCC 547) | Explains the scope of the Supreme Court's plenary jurisdiction under Article 142 — power to do "complete justice" and that ordinary statutory prohibitions do not ipso facto limit Article 142. | The court cited this to explain that the Supreme Court can exercise powers under Article 142 beyond statutory restrictions, and that a Supreme Court direction under Article 142 cannot be treated as authority empowering subordinate Courts in general. |
| Biswabahan Das v. Gopen Chandra Hazarika (1967 1 SCR 447) | Principle: If composition of an offence is not provided by law, the law must take its course; composition has legal effect only if authorised by statute. | The court relied on this observation to support the proposition that, unless the law permits compounding, a charged offence must follow the normal course of criminal proceedings and cannot be compounded by subordinate Courts absent statutory provision. |
| Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh (JT 1987 2 SC 362) | Supreme Court granted leave to compound a non-compoundable offence as a special case and explicitly stated the case should not be treated as a precedent. | The court noted that Suresh Babu was treated as a special-case exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court and did not lay down any law about powers of High Courts or subordinate Courts to permit compounding. |
| ILR 1990 KAR 1858 (decision of another Bench of Karnataka High Court) | Authority that a decision rendered per incuriam (where attention was not drawn to relevant authorities or statutes) is not a binding precedent. | The court applied this principle to conclude that Basavaraju was given per incuriam because sub-section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. had not been brought to the attention of the Bench; hence Basavaraju is not binding. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the statutory framework in Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.):
- Section 320(1) lists offences that are compoundable simpliciter (i.e., can be compounded by persons specified in the table).
- Section 320(2) lists offences that are compoundable only with the permission of the Court (i.e., compoundable with permission).
- Section 320(9) provides: "No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section." The Court treated this sub-section as a clear statutory mandate that only offences enumerated under Sections 320(1) or 320(2) may be compounded.
It was undisputed that offences under Sections 380 and 326 IPC do not appear in either table under Sections 320(1) or 320(2) and therefore are ordinarily non‑compoundable. The critical question was whether any judicial decisions permitted subordinate Criminal Courts to allow compounding of such non-compoundable offences in appropriate circumstances.
The Court analysed the precedents relied upon by the Magistrates:
- Mahesh Chand: The Supreme Court had, in that case, directed the trial Court to permit compounding, but the Court here emphasised that the Supreme Court's direction rested on its plenary constitutional power under Article 142 to do "complete justice." The Supreme Court had not considered or decided that subordinate Courts generally have the power to permit compounding of non-compoundable offences; its direction was an exercise of Article 142 in that special case.
- Union Carbide decision (on Article 142): The Court relied on the exposition that Article 142 empowers the Supreme Court to pass such orders as are necessary to do complete justice and that statutory provisions do not ipso facto limit the Court's plenary jurisdiction. From this the Court inferred that a Supreme Court order under Article 142 cannot be treated as establishing a general jurisdiction in subordinate Courts to compound non-compoundable offences.
- Suresh Babu: Noted to be a special-case grant of leave by the Supreme Court to compound an offence under Section 326 IPC and expressly stated to not be precedent; it did not lay down any rule about powers of High Courts or subordinate Courts.
- State of Karnataka v. Basavaraju: A Division Bench of this Court had upheld a trial Court's permission to compound an offence under Section 498-A IPC in matrimonial context, stating that in peculiar or special circumstances permission could be granted. However, the present Court found that Basavaraju had not considered Section 320(9) and therefore was rendered per incuriam.
- Biswabahan Das: The Court used the proposition that unless law provides for composition, the law must take its course, to underscore that compounding requires statutory authority.
- ILR 1990 KAR 1858: The Court relied on the principle that decisions rendered per incuriam—because relevant statutes or authorities were not brought to the attention of the deciding Bench—are not binding precedents.
Synthesising these authorities and the statutory text, the Court concluded that:
- The power exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 142 in Mahesh Chand was a plenary constitutional exercise and does not constitute authority for subordinate Criminal Courts to permit compounding of offences which are not included in Section 320(1) or Section 320(2).
- Basavaraju was rendered per incuriam because sub-section (9) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. was not brought to the notice of the Bench; decisions given per incuriam are not binding.
- Given the explicit enumeration of compoundable offences in Sections 320(1) and 320(2), and the mandate in Section 320(9), subordinate Criminal Courts or the High Court do not have power to permit compounding of offences that do not fall under those provisions.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court set aside the orders of the two Magistrates permitting compounding of the offences under Sections 326 and 380 IPC and the consequent orders of acquittal. The matters were remanded to the respective trial court files for disposal according to law, "ignoring the composition of the offences entered into between the parties." The Appeals were allowed to that extent.
Implications:
- The direct effect on the parties: the permissions to compound and the acquittals granted by the Magistrates in the two cases are quashed and the cases are remitted for further proceedings in accordance with law without regard to the prior composition agreements.
- On the legal position: the Court held that subordinate Criminal Courts and the High Court do not possess jurisdiction to permit compounding of offences unless the offence is expressly provided for in Section 320(1) or Section 320(2) Cr.P.C.; compounding of offences not so listed is impermissible under Section 320(9).
- The Court declared that the Division Bench decision in State of Karnataka v. Basavaraju was rendered per incuriam and therefore is not a binding precedent for enabling subordinate Courts to compound non-compoundable offences.
The opinion does not state that a new general precedent was created beyond the holdings summarised above; it confines its holding to the statutory interpretation and the setting aside of the magistrates' orders in the two appeals before it.
Krishnan, J.:— As identical question of law arises for consideration in these two Appeals, they are being disposed of by this common Judgment.
2. Criminal Appeal No. 593/90 is directed against the permission granted by the JMFC, Chitradurga, in C.C No. 23/85 for compounding an offence under Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code and consequent order of acquittal and Criminal Appeal No. 214/91 is directed against the permission granted by JMFC, Nelamangala, in C.C No. 111/88 for compounding an offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code and the consequent order of acquittal.
3. The State has challenged the orders in these two cases on the ground that the offences with which the accused had been charged in these Cases were non-compoundable ones and the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to accord permission to compound the said offences and therefore, the entire procedure adopted by the learned Magistrates is illegal and the permission granted to compound the offence and the consequent order of acquittal passed are liable to be set aside.
4. In the first Appeal, the learned Magistrate has relied upon a Bench Decision of this Court in State Of Karnataka v. Basavaraju*1 as enabling him to grant permission to compound the offence under Section 380 of the Indian Penal Code. In the second Appeal, the learned Magistrate has relied upon a Decision of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan . 1990 Supp SCC 681. It may be noticed that Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short ‘the Code’) refers to the compounding of offences. There is a table of offences occurring under sub-section (1) of this Section and these are offences which could be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table. These offences could be described as compoundable offences simpliciter. Sub-section (2) of the said Section refers to the offences which are compoundable with the permission of the Court. A table of offences has been given below this sub-section. The offences given under this table could be termed as offences compoundable with the permission of the Court. Sub-section (9) of Section 320 is to the following effect:
“No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section.”
If any offence does not come under any of the two tables referred to above, it is usually called a non-compoundable offence. It is undisputed that the offences under Sections 380 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code do not come under any of the two tables adverted to above. If composition of these offences is not permissible either under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), sub-section (9) mandates that it is an offence which cannot be compounded. It remains to be seen as to whether the two Decisions adverted to above enable the subordinate Criminal Courts to grant permission to compound the two non-compoundable offences.
5. In the Decision in 1990 Supp SCC 681 : AIR 1988 S.C 2111 the accused had been prosecuted for an offence punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and the accused had been acquitted by the trial Court but the High Court had convicted him for the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. After adverting to the plea made before the Supreme Court to treat it as a special case in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, the trial Judge was directed to accord permission to compound the offence. The relevant portion of the Judgment is as hereunder:
“We gave our anxious consideration to the case and also the plea put forward for seeking permission to compound the offence. After examining the nature of the case and the circumstances under which the offence was committed, it may be proper that the trial Court shall permit them to compound the offence.
We therefore, direct the trial Judge to accord permission to compound the offence, after giving an opportunity to the parties and after being satisfied with the compromise agreed upon.”
6. It may be noticed that the Supreme Court, in this Decision, has not considered the aspect whether the subordinate Criminal Courts or High Court have the power to permit the composition of a non-compoundable offence. In the facts and circumstances of the said case, after giving their anxious consideration, Their Lordships felt that the trial Court should be given directions as referred to above.
7. Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court has got the power to pass such decree or to make such orders as is necessary for doing complete Justice in any cause or matter pending before it and the Supreme Court has observed in the Decision reported in Union Carbide Corporation, etc. etc. v. Union of India etc. etc. . 1986 2 SCC 547 about its plenary jurisdiction under this Article to do complete Justice as hereunder:
“It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of serious public importance. The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the apex Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous, in both Garg's as well as Antulay's case the point was one of violation of constitutional provisions and constitutional rights. The observations as to the effect of inconsistency with statutory provision were really unnecessary in those cases as the decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the breach of constitutional rights. We agree with Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under Article 142 in so far as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by Sections 320 or 321=21 or 482 Cr. P.C or all of them put together. The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142. Such prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might embody and reflect the scheme of a particular law, taking into account the nature and status of the authority or the Court on which conferment of powers - limited in some appropriate way - is contemplated. The limitations may not necessarily reflect or be based on any fundamental considerations of public policy.”
“It will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers under Article 142 are subject to such statutory prohibitions. That would convey the idea that statutory provisions override a constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way of expressing the idea is that in exercising powers under Article 142 and in assessing the needs of “complete justice” of a cause or matter, the apex Court will take note of the express prohibitions in any substantive statutory provision based on some fundamental principles of public-policy and regulate the exercise of its power and discretion accordingly. The proposition does not relate to the powers of the Court under Article 142, but only to what is or is not ‘complete justice’ of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise.”
“There is some justification to say that statutory prohibition against compounding of certain class of serious offences, in which larger social interests and social security are involved, is based on broader and fundamental considerations of public policy. But all statutory prohibitions need not necessarily partake of this quality. The attack on the power of the apex Court to quash the crucial proceedings under Article 142(1) is ill-conceived. But the justification for its exercise is another matter.”
This would make it abundantly clear that the power of the Supreme Court under Article 142 is not restricted by Sections 320, 321 or 482 of the Code or all of them put together. It is also clear that the power under this Article is not subject to any statutory prohibition and in particular Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code so far as we are concerned. Therefore, it should be held that the Decision given in Mahesh Chand's case by the Supreme Court rested on the plenary jurisdiction it had under Article 142 of the Constitution and it cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that the Sub-ordinate Criminal Courts have the jurisdiction to grant permission to compound a non-compoundable offence in appropriate cases. The observations of the Supreme Court in the Decision reported in Biswabahan Das v. Gopen Chandra Hazarika . 1967 1 SCR 447 @ 451. read as hereunder:
“If a person is charged with an offence then unless there is some provision for composition of it the law must take its course and the charge enquired into resulting either in conviction or acquittal. If composition of an offence was permissible under the law the effect of such composition would depend on what the law provided for.”
This Decision is very apposite in the present context with reference to the powers of the subordinate Courts for according permission to compound a non-compoundable offence. The Decision of Supreme Court in Suresh Babu v. State of Andhra Pradesh . JT 1987 2 SC 362. was cited before Supreme Court, in Mahesh Chand's case. In this Decision, Supreme Court granted leave to compound the non-compoundable offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code as a special case taking an overall view of the facts and circumstances of that case and further it was also observed as “This case shall not be treated as a precedent”. It may be noted no law regarding Powers of High Court or Sub-ordinate Courts in this regard has been laid down herein. Again except mentioning that it was cited, Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand's case has not followed this Decision. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was not right in holding that the Decision of the Supreme Court enabled him to grant permission to compound a non-compoundable offence.
8. In the Decision in State Of Karnataka v. Basavaraju* the accused had been prosecuted for an offence under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code. The concerned parties sought for permission to compound the said offence and the trial Magistrate found that it was eminently a fit case to grant permission and granted the same. The State challenged the correctness of that order of the learned Magistrate in this case and after referring to the observations of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand's case, the learned Judges of this Court observed as hereunder:
“It may be added at once that unless there are peculiar circumstances and a case can be said to be a special one, permission to compound any non-compoundable offence should not be granted as a matter of course. It all depends on the circumstances under which the compromise petition comes to be filed. The trial Court kept in its view the welfare of the parties in the matrimonial case of this nature and did not want the feelings between the parties be strained for the rest of their life. Keeping this larger interest of the couple and its impact on the society, the trial Court relied on the above Decision and accorded permission. In our view the trial Court did not commit any error in according permission and as a result of compromise acquitting the accused.”
9. The observations are to the effect that if there are special and peculiar circumstances, the trial Magistrate has the power to grant composition of even a non-compoundable offence. It was urged by the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor that this Decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court is a Decision per-incuriam for more than one reason. It was urged that the fact the Decision in the Mahesh Chand's case was given under the plenary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court vested under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, has not been taken note of and the aspect that the Supreme Court has not decided in that case that the subordinate Criminal Courts or this Court have power to permit composition of non-compoundable offence had been lost sight of. It was also pointed out that the provision of law incorporated in Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section has also not been taken note of in this Decision and therefore, it is a decision per-incuriam. A perusal of the Decision in Basavaraju's case makes it clear that Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code was not at all brought to the notice of Their Lordships and there is absolutely no discussion in relation to this sub-section.
10. in the Decision reported in ILR 1990 KAR 1858 at 18686 on the aspect whether a Decision rendered by a single Judge or a Division Bench could constitute a binding precedent, if the attention of the Court had not been drawn to the relevant authorities or statute, this is what has been held by another Bench of this Court:
“It appears to us that the aforesaid decisions either of the learned Single Judge or of the Division Bench cannot be held to constitute a binding precedent as the same are given per-incuriam. The attention of the Court had not been drawn to the relevant law having a bearing on the subject. A decision of the Court is not a binding precedent if given per incuriam i.e, without the Court's attention having been drawn to the relevant authorities or statutes.”
If only this Sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code had been brought to the notice of Their Lordships, the Decision would have been altogether different. Therefore, we must uphold the contention of the learned State Public Prosecutor that the decision given in Basavaraju's case is a Decision per-incuriam and it is not a binding precedent.
11. When our conclusions on the several aspects are as above and when the sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 320 of the Code respectively enumerate the offences compoundable and compoundable with the permission of the Court and sub-section (9) of the said Section mandates that no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section, it is our considered view that the subordinate Criminal Courts or this Court has no power to grant permission to compound a non-compoundable offence i.e, the offence which does not come within either of the two tables occurring under Sections 320(1) and 320(2) of the Code. In that view of the matter, the orders of the trial Court permitting the composition of the offences under Sections. 326 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained and they should be set aside.
In the result, we set aside the orders of the two learned Magistrates in these two Cases permitting composition of the offences and the consequent orders of acquittal passed and remand the cases to their respective files for disposal of the Cases according to law ignoring the composition of the offences entered into between the parties.
The Appeals are allowed only to the extent indicated above.
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