Mohan Kumar, J.:— These Appeals arise out of a claim preferred by the legal heirs of a workman who died in the course of his employment. M.F.A No. 1155/92 is preferred by the Insurance Company disowning their liability whereas M.F.A No. 1333/92 is preferred by the legal heirs of the deceased workman claiming enhancement.

2. The deceased workman was employed as a Driver by the Employer to drive his vehicle. While he was driving an Alwyn Nisan Vehicle CAK 2839 belonging to the employer on 27-1-1989, it was involved in an accident resulting in his death. This fact is admitted. The legal heirs claimed that he was earning wages at Rs. 1,000/- per month and bata at Rs. 20/- per day. Compensation was claimed on the said basis. The claim petition was preferred on 26-7-1989 before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation. The claimants claimed a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- as compensation.

3. While the employment of the worker was admitted, the main contest was whether the driver was entitled to drive the particular type of vehicle. This contention is raised in this behalf by, of course and as usual, the Insurance Company. What is contended by them is that the worker had only a licence to drive a “Light Motor Vehicle” (L.M.V for short) and the vehicle driven was a “Medium Goods Vehicle” which he was not entitled to drive and, therefore, the workman was not “duly licensed” to drive the vehicle. According to them, Alwyn Nissan Vehicle is a Goods Carriage coming under the category of medium goods vehicle and, therefore, a licensee to drive Light Motor Vehicle cannot drive the said vehicle and that therefore, there is a breach of condition of the Insurance Policy. Hence according to the insurance Company, in view of Section 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, they are not liable to indemnify the amount awarded. The relevant clause in the Insurance Policy reads as follows:

“Persons or classes of person

entitled to drive.

The Insured.

Any other person provided that he is in the insured's Employ and is Driving on his order or with his permission. Provided that the person driving holds valid driving licence at the time of the accident or had held a permanent driving licence (other than a learner's licence) and is not disqualified from holding or obtaining such a licence.”

The entire contentions based on the above clause and as now raised is contained in the pleading in this behalf made by the Insurance Company and is confined to the following statement.

Para-3 of the written arguments, filed by the Insurance Company before the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, reads as under:

“3. It is admitted fact that the deceased Syed Ismail had driving licence for driving only Autorickshaw and later on, he had obtained licence to drive a light motor vehicles. Admittedly, the vehicle which was driven by the deceased at the time of accident was a goods vehicle. The deceased Syed Ismail had no driving licence to drive a goods vehicle.”

The contention, referred to above, is elaborated in the grounds of appeal preferred before this Court as also at the time of arguments.

4. The Commissioner referred to the contention and over-ruled the same. He held that the Insurance Company is liable. The Commissioner held that the salary of a Driver as notified under the Shops and Commercial Establishment Act is Rs. 505.25 + Rs. 46.80 and on this basis, adopting the factor of 209.98 (the age of the deceased being 30), he awarded Rs. 45,926-00. The Commissioner also imposed penalty on the Insurance Company under Section 4-A of the Act. In the above appeal M.F.A No. 1155/92, the Insurance Company has challenged the finding regarding their liability as also the imposition of penalty.

5. The learned Counsel appearing for the Insurance Company invited my attention to Section 10 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which deals with various categories of driving licences. He states that sub-section (2) makes it clear that the holder of a driving licence shall be entitled to drive the particular class of vehicle named in the licence. According to him, the deceased worker being a holder of a licence to drive “Light Motor Vehicle”, is not entitled to drive a “Medium Goods Vehicle”

6. Section 2(21) of the 1988 Act defines “Light Motor Vehicle” as follows:

“(21) “Light motor vehicle” means a transport vehicle or omnibus the gross vehicle weight of either of which or a motor car or tractor or road-roller the unladen weight of any of which, does not exceed 6,000 kilograms;”

The learned Counsel invited my attention to Section 2(23) of the M.V Act, which defines “Medium Goods Vehicles”. The definition reads:

“(23) “Medium goods vehicle” means any goods carriage other than a light motor vehicle or a heavy goods vehicle;”

According to him, Exs. R-5 to R-7 show that the vehicle is registered as a medium goods vehicle and hence, by virtue of Section 10(2), the deceased is not entitled to drive the vehicle. At this stage, it is necessary for us to refer to the definition of “Transport vehicle” made mention of in Section 2(21) while defining a “Light motor vehicle”.

7. Transport vehicle is defined in the Act at Section 2(47) as follows:

“(47) “transport vehicle” means a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle.”

Therefore, it can be seen from the combined reading of Section 2(21) and Section 2(47) that a goods carriage with less than 6,000 Kgs. of unladen weight is a light motor vehicle. Admittedly the unladen weight of the vehicle involved in this case is less than 6,000 Kgs., i.e, 5350 Kgs. If that be so, the deceased, a holder of a licence to drive a light motor vehicle was entitled to drive the vehicle involved in the accident. The contention of the Insurance Company has to be rejected on this short ground.

8. That apart according to me, all these investigations in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, hereinafter referred to as the Act, is totally foreign. This legislation was enacted to assuage and remedy the poverty that might befall on the workman who is a victim of an accident. We find the following passage in the Object and Reasons for the legislation published as early as in 1922:

“The general principles of workmen's compensation command almost universal acceptance, and India is now nearly alone amongst civilised countries in being without legislation embodying those principles. For a number of years the more generous employers have been in the habit of giving compensation voluntarily, but this practice is by no means general. The growing complexity of industry in this country, with the increasing use of machinery and consequent danger to workmen, along with the comparative poverty of the workmen themselves, renders it advisable that they should be protected, as far as possible, from hardship arising from accidents.”

The compensation that is being paid is to the workman and not either to driver, skilled artisan or mechanic as the case may be. The accent of the legislation is on the question whether the victim of the accident was a ‘workman’ as defined in the Act. If the legal representatives of the deceased establish that the deceased was a ‘workman’ as defined under Section 2(n) of the Act, then the provision of the Act is attracted. Section 3 holds the employer liable for payment of compensation if such a workman suffers personal injury in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Section 4 quantifies the compensation payable. The legislation thus anchors the claim on three premises, namely:

(i) Workman

(ii) Personal injury/Death

(iii) Accident arising out of and in the course of employment.

If these three requirements exist, then, the employer is liable to pay compensation under the Act. The question whether the worker violated any of the condition of agreement between the employer and the Insurance Company may not be a germane issue. The expression “arising out and in the course of employment” has been Judicially interpreted by various Decisions. In this connection, it may be apposite to refer to the following passage occurring in the Decision reported in AIR 1953 Calcutta 5161:

Reading the reports in the books, it is impossible to avoid the feeling that a desire to assist a workman in distress, who has undoubtedly suffered from causes arising out of his employment, has often led to a stretching of the language of the statute. Even in the cases where the decision was in favour of the workman, the observations of the learned Judges make it perfectly clear that they felt the pressure of reason on the other side and perhaps decided in favour of the workman in pursuance of what they conceived to be the policy of the Act. Mr. Sanyal pointed out, and in my opinion rightly, that with the progress of the times, the conception of the circumstances in which the workman is entitled to compensation has widened and become more and more liberal. Even if, therefore, the view taken by the highest courts in recent times, on facts which are more or less similar to the facts one has to deal with, be a view which only a stretched construction of the Act can bear, it will not be wrong to follow it so long as it is not something violently opposed to fundamental principles.”

This was the view expressed in 1953 and much water had flowed since then under the bridge. In the Decision of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Balawwa* . ILR 1993 KAR 1843., a Division Bench of this Court echoed the same opinion. It was stated as hereunder:

“16. It is well recognised that Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficial social legislation, the object of which is to provide security to certain class of workmen and that the provisions of the Act should be construed in a broad and liberal manner so as to advance the object of the enactment and not in a way which would defeat it.”

Therefore, even if a stretched view is taken in interpreting the statute, it will not be wrong to do so - unless of course, as stated above, it will be opposed to fundamental principles.

9. A scan of various Decisions of the High Court will disclose that where a workman engaged in the employer's business and who was doing the very thing he was employed to do then the mere fact that he was not acting strictly by the letter of law, will not make the accident any the less “arising out of and in the course of accident”. It follows therefore, the owner and Insurance Company are both liable in such an event.

10. Hence, the contention of the Insurance Company that they are not bound to pay the amount awarded cannot be sustained. The compensation under the Act is paid to the worker, and the genesis of the claim, as stated earlier is the existence of employer-employee relationship. The award made is not to the ‘Driver’ of the vehicle but to the worker of the employer as defined under Section 2(n) of the Act. That apart, all that the relevant clause in the Insurance Policy requires is that the person driving the vehicle should have a valid driving licence. That the deceased admittedly had. If so, it is settled principle that the terms of the contract of policy being the language of the Company must be construed contra proferantum. Hence, unless there is clear terms in the contract of insurance excluding their liability, it is not open to this Court to accept the pea of the Insurance Company by a process of Judicial interpretation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

11. As regards the levy of penalty, in view of the settled law as held by this Court that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay penalty, I vacate that part of the award of the Commissioner made in that behalf.

12. As regards the appeal preferred by the claimants, the computation of compensation is clearly wrong. It is in evidence that the worker was paid wages at Rs. 1,000/- per month and daily bata at Rs. 20/-. There is no contra evidence. If that be so, the monthly wages would work out to Rs. 1,600/-. It is not known how the Commissioner fixed the wages at Rs. 505.96 Even ignoring the claim made regarding the payment of bata (which claim may be treated as lightly exaggerated) the wages has to be accepted at Rs. 1,000/- per month. Reckoned on this basis, the total compensation payable would be Rs. 400 × 209.98 Hence, the appeal preferred by the claimant has to be allowed and the compensation awarded has to be enhanced. Therefore, I enhance the award made by the Workmen's Commissioner to Rs. 83,992/-. The enactment compensation will carry interest at 6% from the date of petition payment.

13. Before parting with the case, I am constrained to refer to one of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the Insurance Company, Shri Yoganarasimha. He has submitted that the “philosophy of the Court should not influence the decision” in the case. Plainly, I am at a loss to comprehend the meaning of the submission. The ‘philosophy’ of the Court as I understand, is to do Justice to the aggrieved party however lowly or highly placed he might be. This is aptly expressed in the maxim “Fiat justitia et ruant coeli”. Besides, again I would also invite the attention of the learned Counsel to the following passage occurring in the Statement of Objects and Reasons published in the Gazette when the Act was originally published:

“A consistent endeavour has been made to give as little opportunity for disputes as possible. Throughout the Bill, in the definitions adopted, the scales selected, and the exception permitted the great aim has been precision in order that, in as few cases as possible should the validity of a claim for compensation or the amount of that claim be open to doubt. At the same time, on the unanimous recommendation of the committee, provision has been made for special Tribunal to deal cheaply and expeditiously with any disputes that may arise, and generally to assist the parties in a manner which is not possible for the ordinary Civil Courts.”

If a census of the number of Appeals preferred by the Insurance Companies against the awards passed under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act or similar enactments (on several instances joining the owners as well, as the co-appellant) is taken and the contentions urged by them in those proceedings are adverted to, then one would realise how far have they travelled away from the object of the very enactment. This is highlighted by one simple incident in this particular case. The claimants who are residents of Bangalore sought for the transfer of the case from Tumkur, obviously because it was not convenient for them to prosecute the same at Tumkur. This application is seen opposed by the Insurance Company (to whom no prejudice will be caused by such transfer) by filing a detailed objection. Again, the award was passed by the Commissioner on 26-2-1992. The Appeal was filed on 25-4-1992 by the Insurance Company without complying with the requirement of the 2nd Proviso to Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Then the claimants filed application under Section 31 of the Act to recover the amount on 8-5-1992. The order thereon was passed on 18-6-1992. Still the amount was not paid. One is tempted to think that they vie with the employers and owners with greater enthusiasm to challenge the award passed in every case.

14. While interpreting ameliorative legislation like the one in question, I am of the view that the above ‘philosophy’ should permeate all Decisions of the Court.

15. In the result, M.F.A No. 1155/92 is partly allowed, setting aside the imposition of penalty on the Insurance Company under Section 4 of the Act. M.F.A No. 1333/92 is allowed enhancing the compensation awarded to Rs. 83,992/- which will carry interest at 6% from the date of the award till payment. Claimants will also be entitled to proportionate costs in M.F.A No. 1333/92.