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Vijayakumar v. State

Karnataka High Court
Dec 1, 1993
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Structured Summary of Judicial Opinion (Hiremath, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC, sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 (with default sentence). He appealed that conviction.

The basic factual narrative in the record is as follows (as presented in the opinion): On the night of 27.9.91 the deceased, Basavaradhya (employed at the Telephone Factory), was found in a pool of blood near Hotel Shameer in Mahadevapura and later died. P.W.13 filed a complaint at Mahadevapura Police Station at 11:15 p.m. on 27.9.91. P.W.21, the A.S.I., received the complaint (recorded at 11 p.m.), registered a case under Section 302 IPC and P.W.22 (the C.P.I.) took over the investigation. The investigating officer conducted an inquest, examined witnesses, arrested the accused on 10.10.91, seized a knife alleged to be used in the offence and filed a charge-sheet. P.W.4 was identified by the prosecution as an eyewitness but did not support the prosecution at trial. The Trial Court convicted the accused relying on various circumstances; the accused appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence on record—particularly circumstantial evidence, testimony about the accused and deceased being last seen together, eyewitness testimony and recovery of incriminating material—was legally sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC.
  2. Whether the information said to have been given by the accused at the police station that led to discovery of the incriminating material (referred to in the opinion as Ex. P.17) could be used as substantive evidence without independent substantive testimony from the investigating officer, in the context of Section 27 of the Evidence Act and its relation to Sections 25 & 26.
  3. Whether discrepancies and contradictions in recording and seizure (timing and manner of seizure of blood-stained clothing and knife) undermined the reliability of the prosecution’s case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Trial Court erred in convicting where "practically there is no evidence" on points relied upon by the prosecution.
  • The purported eyewitness (P.W.4) did not support the prosecution; testimony about being "last seen together" lacked reliable proof and was not a sufficient circumstance on its own.
  • There were material inconsistencies and contradictions concerning the F.I.R., the timing of its giving, the seizure of blood-stained clothes and the involvement of the panch, which undermined the recovery evidence.
  • The Trial Court improperly relied on an exhibit (Ex. P.17) under Section 27 of the Evidence Act without requiring substantive testimony from the Investigating Officer to prove the discovery; recording practice by the Sessions Court was defective and could not substitute for oral substantive evidence about the discovery.

Prosecution's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence including witnesses who placed the accused and deceased together around the time of the incident (notably P.W.7 and P.W.3), motive evidence (debts and threats described by P.W.6, the deceased's wife) and recovery of a purportedly blood-stained knife and clothing.
  • The prosecution relied on the information said to have been given by the accused (Ex. P.17) leading to discovery of incriminating material as permitted by Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

The opinion cited statutory provisions but did not cite any case law precedents.

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the evidence and the recording of evidence in several discrete steps:

  1. Relevance of the F.I.R.: The court observed controversy in accounts of when and where the F.I.R. was handed over (P.W.13 and P.W.22 say it was handed at the spot; P.W.21 says it was given at the police station at 11 p.m.). The court held that the F.I.R. in this case was not of great relevance or importance because no one was specifically named or suspected in the F.I.R.
  2. Weakness of eyewitness and "last seen together" evidence: The court noted that P.W.4 (the supposed eyewitness) did not support the prosecution. Statements by other witnesses (P.W.7 and P.W.3) were recounted by the court, but the court found the "last seen together" inference weak—especially where there was darkness at the time and conflicting testimony about the deceased’s whereabouts (P.W.1 stated the deceased was at the factory at 10 p.m.). The court applied the established principle that being last seen together cannot by itself complete a chain of circumstances sufficient to convict unless supported by other strong circumstances.
  3. Motive evidence: The court summarised testimony of P.W.6 (wife of the deceased) about financial dealings and an alleged threat by the accused to kill if money was not paid. The court observed that aspects of this testimony (the threat) were not mentioned to the C.P.I. and appeared to be an improvement in evidence. The court held that even accepting that some money was due, that by itself could not constitute a strong motive for murder.
  4. Reliability of recovery/seizure evidence: The court identified material discrepancies about the timing and manner of seizure of blood-stained clothes and the pant. The panch’s evidence said the shirt was seized on 27.9.91 from the person of the accused, whereas the Investigating Officer said it was seized on 10.10.91 (when the accused was arrested). The Investigating Officer also stated the pant was recovered from P.W.11’s house. The court found it unthinkable that the accused would have preserved a blood-stained pant for more than 12 days to hand it over later, and concluded that these inconsistencies undermined confidence in the seizure and in the alleged blood stains on the pant and knife.
  5. Admissibility and proof under Section 27 of the Evidence Act: The court carefully analysed the use of Ex. P.17 (the accused's statement said to have led to discovery). It emphasised that Section 27 makes admissible only such part of information that distinctly leads to the discovery of a fact and that this is an exception to Sections 25 & 26. The court stressed that information leading to discovery must be proved like any other fact by substantive evidence. The Trial Court's record, as quoted by the appellate court, showed that the Investigating Officer (P.W.22) did not give substantive oral evidence about the information and the discovery, but instead the Trial Court recorded only a brief note referring to exhibits. The appellate court held that Ex. P.17, taken alone, could not be admitted in substantive evidence without corroborating substantive testimony from the witness who recorded or received that information.
  6. Recording practice and procedural criticism: The court criticised a practice observed in Sessions Courts where depositions are taken down by reference to exhibits rather than recording what witnesses actually deposed. The court said such practice can obstruct proper appreciation of evidence and may fatally affect even good cases. The court urged lower courts to discontinue the practice and insisted that facts incorporated in mahazars and other records must be spoken to by witnesses to amount to substantive evidence.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Given the weaknesses identified—the unsupported eyewitness testimony, the insufficiency of the "last seen together" circumstance, doubtful motive amplification during testimony, material discrepancies in seizure/ recovery evidence, and the absence of proper substantive testimony to establish discovery under Section 27—the appellate court found that the circumstances were wholly inadequate for the Trial Court to conclude that the accused committed the murder.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED; the judgment of conviction and sentence of the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC are set aside and the accused is acquitted and to be set at liberty forthwith.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The accused's conviction and sentence were quashed and he was ordered to be released immediately.
  • Procedural and evidentiary guidance: The court issued a clear admonition to lower courts about proper recording of witness testimony, particularly in cases involving discovery statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The opinion emphasises that discovery information must be proved by substantive oral evidence and cannot be replaced by mere reference to exhibits or records in the deposition. This is expressed as a direction to discontinue the criticised practice; it is part of the court's reasoning rather than the creation of a novel legal principle.
  • On precedent: The opinion did not cite prior reported case law precedents; it resolved the appeal by applying statutory provisions (Section 27 and the relationship with Sections 25 & 26 of the Evidence Act) and principles of evaluation of circumstantial evidence and proof of recovery.

A copy of this judgment was ordered to be forwarded to the learned Trial Judge (as recorded in the opinion).

Show all summary ...

Hiremath, J.:— The accused was convicted by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- with default sentence. He has challenged this judgment of conviction in this Appeal.

2. The facts are brief and simple. It was P.W 13 who set the law in motion by filing a complaint at the Mahadevapura Police Station at 11.15 p.m on 27.9.91 that on the night of 27.9.91 when he was sleeping in his house, his acquaintances Ramachandra and Muniraju approached him at 10.45 P.M and told that the deceased Basavaradhya employed in the Telephone Factory was lying in a pool of blood near a certain Hotel Shameer in Mahadevapura and having gone there he saw the injured Basavaradhya struggling for life. Even before he could be shifted for treatment, he breathed his last. He complained that some unknown persons had stabbed him and escaped. This was received by P.W 21 the A.S.I in charge of the police station at 11 P.M on which he registered a case under Section 302 IPC, C.P.I, P.W 22 took over investigation, held inquest over the dead body, examined some of the witnesses, arrested the accused on 10.10.91, seized the knife said to have been used for the commission of the offence and on completion of due investigation, filed charge sheet against the accused. P.W 4 turned out to be an eye witness to the incident but he did not support the prosecution. The Trial Court relying on various circumstances found the accused guilty, convicted and sentenced him as aforesaid.

3. On behalf of the appellant, it is contended that the Trial Court has grossly erred in finding the accused guilty where practically there is no evidence at all on any of the points relied upon by the prosecution. Eye witness did not support the prosecution case. There is no evidence worthy of reliance that the accused and the deceased were last seen together and even on the point of recovery there is no uniform evidence.

4. The very coming into being of the F.I.R at a particular point of time is controversial while it is in the evidence of the C.P.I, P.W 22 and also P.W 13 that it was handed over to the C.P.I at the spot itself, P.W 21 maintains that it was given to him in the police station at 11 P.M The fact however remains that F.I.R in the instant case is not of great relevance or importance as no one was suspected in the F.I.R The prosecution appears to have relied heavily on the evidence of the accused and the deceased having been seen together round about the time of incident. P.W 7 working in Doorvani Cables Private Limited deposed that about 10.30 at night he saw both the accused and the deceased talking together standing near Mahadevapura Gate. When one Manju came there he went with him to his sector. 10 minutes later he came back to the same spot. He saw the deceased lying screaming with pain. Ramachandra and Surender Singh were present. Thereafter he and Ramachandra went to the house of P.W 13 to take a van from him to enable him to carry the injured to the hospital. However he did not bring the van but the police came to the spot. However when they came to the spot police had already arrived there. It then becomes necessary to know who had given information to the police earlier and how they came to the spot. P.W 3 runs a hotel in Mahadevapura Gate called Military Hotel. He knew the deceased Basavaradhya as he was visiting his hotel occasionally and at about 9.15 P.M he had seen three persons including the deceased taking food in his hotel. It was after 9.45 P.M that they went away and at 10.45 P.M he heard some voice and the people had gathered near his hotel itself and he found Basavaradhya dead with injuries. He admitted that he did not tell before police about the deceased going to his hotel at 9.15 P.M He admitted in the cross-examination that it was dark when he went to the spot and there were already 5 or 6 persons at the spot where the deceased was lying. Police came to the spot and then went to his hotel and people were trying to know whose body it was in the headlight of a scooter. By the time he went there a constable was already there. He then stated that a certain constable phoned from his hotel to the police station about the murder. It was then the C.I and other police officials came to the spot. He told the police that he did not know what had happened but still the police asked him again and again and threatened him that he must be knowing the fact. It was then that he revealed about 3 persons staying in his hotel to take food. P.W 4 Kannappa was to give eye witness account according to the prosecution. But none of the aforesaid witnesses speaks about his presence in the vicinity when they went there and even this P.W 4 did not support the prosecution and was cross-examined with permission of Court. Thus ultimately prosecution had to rely only on motive evidence and the evidence of recovery.

5. The wife of the deceased, P.W 6 Sulochana deposed that her husband was doing business in Chit Fund in Benniganahally and accused had also joined it as a member. The accused was a friend of her husband. He had taken two memberships. He was not able to pay the money due to her husband and used to visit their house. Her husband was also doing money lending business in addition to Chit Fund. The accused owed some money taken from her husband as a hand-loan. Her husband asked the accused to pay all the money due to him but the accused was demanding Rs. 20,000/- from her husband. About 10 or 15 days prior to her going to her mother's house, the accused again approached them and insisted for payment of Rs. 20,000/- but her husband did not give. Her husband asked him to repay the earlier loan amount, settle his account and then asked for further advances. At that the accused threatened him that he would kill him if amount is not paid. She went to her mother's house about 10 or 12 days later and about 20 days later this incident occurred. Her statement came to be recorded 4 months after her delivery. She admitted that there were 20 members in the Chit started by her husband and her husband was running two Chits of Rs. 9000/- each. No one was complaining that the rate of interest was high but she could not tell exact number of persons who took loan from her husband. She admitted that she did not state before C.P.I about the accused thereatening her husband to kill him if he did not pay Rs. 20,000/-. Thus this theory of the accused threatening with danger to her life appears only to be an improvement during evidence. Even if it is assumed that some amount was due from the accused to the deceased, that alone cannot be a strong motive to commit the murder of the deceased. As we have already pointed out the evidence with regard to the accused and the deceased being last seen together cannot be accepted for the reason that even at 10 P.M the deceased was working in the factory according to P.W 1. There was pitch darkness at the time alleged by the prosecution and the Trial Court surmised that in the star lit night the accused and the deceased might have been identified. That again cannot be a strong circumstance because being last seen together cannot be a strong ground to hold that chain of circumstances is complete unless there are other circumstances strong enough to find the accused guilty. Regarding recovery of the weapon it was pointed out in the evidence of panch that on 27.9.91 itself according to him blood stained shirt was seized from the person of the accused whereas according to the Investigating Officer it was seized on 10.10.91 Such discrepancy could not have occurred if really the assistance of the panch was taken to seize the weapon in question. Even according to the Investigating Officer the pant was recovered from somebody else's house i.e P.W 11 and it is rather unthinkable that for more than 12 days the accused could have kept the blood stained pant intact only to be produced before the Investigating Officer. Therefore the evidence of seizure does not inspire confidence and much less stains of blood said to be present on the pant and the knife. In our view, the circumstances were wholly inadequate for the Trial Court to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the murder of the deceased.

6. Our attention was drawn by the Counsel for the appellant to the manner of recording evidence by the Sessions Court, particularly with regard to most material circumstance of the accused giving information under Section 27 of the Evidence Act leading to the discovery of fact. Our attention was particularly drawn to that part of the testimony recorded by the Trial Court which shows that practically no evidence was given in this behalf by the Investigating Officer. The learned Judge has recorded the evidence as follows:—

“The accused was present in the police station as produced by P.C 3286 & 2004. I recorded the voluntary statement of the accused, as per Ex. P. 17. I arrested the accused and then seized the blood stained shirt and subjected it to P.F No. 71/91 and under Mahazar Ex. P-3.”

It was rightly urged on behalf of the appellant that taken by itself, Ex. P. 17 cannot go in substantive evidence as Ex. P. 17 would provide corroboration to the substantive evidence that should be given in Court by the witness speaking about this information. The Trial Court ought to have insisted on the prosecution to lead substantive evidence in this behalf before making use of Ex. P. 17. Thus practically the Investigating Officer P.W 22 did not state anything regarding the information said to have been given to him by the accused. Section 27 says that so much of the information that distinctly leads to the discovery of a fact alone is admissible in evidence and it is exception to Sections 25 & 26 of the Evidence Act. Therefore so much of the information as leads to discovery of a fact must be proved like any other fact and recording in the deposition or the prosecution leading evidence of an Investigating Officer that he recorded a particular statement as per certain record made by him and exhibited cannot take place of substantive evidence. Similarly we have come across certain contradictions being recorded only by referring to exhibits without reproducing exactly what is the contradiction or omission stated by a particular witness or Investigating Officer. Likewise, unless facts incorporated in the mahazar are spoken to by a particular witness in order to marking of a mahazar it does not amount to substantive evidence. It is unfortunate that many of the Sessions Judges have not understood this distinction and it has become a practice to take down depositions in the manner stated above thus unnecessarily creating complications in the matter of acceptance or rejection of the evidence so given. It may also sometimes happen that even if a witness states what exactly was recorded in his own words, the Sessions Judges may find it a short cut to take down only as stated as per certain exhibits without taking down what exactly was the information given by the accused which could fall under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Such a practice is wholly deprecable as even evidence given by witnesses according to law might sometimes not be reduced to writing while taking depositions only as a matter of convenience. We impress upon Courts below that such a practice of not taking down in the evidence of material witnesses what they actually deposed to in such situations would come in the way of proper appreciation of evidence and even good cases may be seriously affected by such casual and perfunctory recording. Such practice should be discontinued. With these observations, we find that practically there was no evidence for the Trial Court to find accused guilty. Appeal has to be allowed and it is allowed. Judgment of conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court are set aside and the accused is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC. He shall be set at liberty forthwith. A copy of this Judgment shall be forwarded to the learned Trial Judge wherever he is.