Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Karnataka Leasing And Commercial Corporation Ltd. And Another v. Smt. Lalitha Holla

Karnataka High Court
Feb 4, 1993
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was instituted by the company and its managing director challenging an order of the learned company judge directing the issue of an advertisement of a company petition for winding up. The company petition, filed under section 433(e) and (f) of the Companies Act, was admitted on August 28, 1992.

Proceedings began on June 18, 1992, when notice regarding admission was ordered and the learned company judge restrained the respondents from alienating any assets of the company. The petition alleged inability to pay debts, that several depositors were due refunds which the company had failed to make, that cheques issued for refunds were not encashed for want of funds, that there were over 3,500 unsecured creditors, and that the company had borrowed in excess of Rs. 4.50 crores.

Supporting documents included board minutes of February 28, 1992, recording a poor financial position and a board resolution to move the High Court for winding up. One of the directors separately filed a company petition (No. 31 of 1992) with an affidavit describing the company's financial predicament.

Objections by a respondent were filed on August 14, 1992. On August 28, 1992, after hearing, the petition was admitted and the matter was posted for further order. Subsequent interim orders included an order of September 22, 1992 directing that rents payable by tenants be deposited in court. On November 16, 1992 the learned company judge made the impugned order that there was "sufficient prima facie case to issue advertisement" and directed the first petitioner to publish the advertisement by November 30, 1992 fixing a hearing on December 15, 1992.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned company judge erred in directing advertisement of the company petition for winding up (i.e., whether the advertisement order was justified on the facts and law presented).
  2. Whether the impugned advertisement order was a non-speaking order and, if so, whether that defect invalidated the order.
  3. Whether the court should have exercised its discretion to postpone the actual publication of the advertisement and, if so, for how long.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Company and Managing Director) Arguments

  • The order directing advertisement is a non-speaking order and therefore vulnerable to being set aside on appeal; a speaking order is required where an order is likely to be appealed (relying on Vasudeo Vishwanath Saraf v. New Education Institute).
  • An order for advertisement is discretionary and, on the facts of this case, the circumstances did not justify making such an order at that stage.
  • The learned company judge ought at least to have granted more time and postponed the advertisement to allow the company to produce a concrete settlement proposal or to arrange funds (the company sought six months' time).
  • Reliance was placed on two decisions (Surindra Packers v. Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. and Dubai Dry Docks Co. Ltd. v. Hede Navigation Ltd.) to support the contention that, if advertisement is ordered, actual publication may still properly be postponed.
  • The company’s statement of objection asserted that the company's assets exceeded its liabilities (assets more than Rs. 15.25 crores while liabilities about Rs. 10 crores), suggesting that winding up or advertisement was not justified.

Respondents' / Other Points Raised

  • The petitioners (creditors) relied on facts that matured amounts had not been refunded, cheques had bounced, and that there were large numbers of unsecured creditors and substantial borrowings.
  • Mr. A.G. Holla (appearing for respondents/interested parties) pointed out that the directors were primarily indebted to the company and suggested that amounts should be paid by the directors into court before any indulgence with respect to advertisement was granted.
  • At an earlier stage, respondents' counsel gave an undertaking that no rent would be collected till a specified Friday; subsequently rents were ordered to be deposited in court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vasudeo Vishwanath Saraf v. New Education Institute, (1986) 4 SCC 31; AIR 1986 SC 2105 Need to make a speaking order when an order is liable to be tested on appeal. The court acknowledged the general requirement for a speaking order but held that the nature and detail of the order depend on the admitted facts. On the facts and the record in this case the court did not find the impugned order fatally defective for not being elaborate.
Madhnsudan Gordhandas & Co. v. Madhu Woollen Industries Pvt. Ltd., (1971) 3 SCC 632; AIR 1971 SC 2600; [1972] 42 Comp Cas 125 Principles concerning winding up petitions by creditors: treatment of undisputed debts, handling of disputed amounts, the tests for company defences, and consideration of creditors' wishes (including section 557 of the Companies Act, 1956). The court applied these principles to explain that where a prima facie case is made out a petitioner-creditor is normally entitled to winding up relief subject to discretionary considerations; the court emphasized consideration of creditors' wishes and the tests for defences as outlined in this precedent.
A Company, In re, [1894] 2 Ch 349 (Ch D) Illustration that where debt is undisputed, the court will not accept a defence that the company can pay but chooses not to pay that particular debt. Quoted within the Madhnsudan Gordhandas exposition to support the principle that undisputed debts entitle the creditor to relief; used as supporting authority for the court’s approach to prima facie cases.
Tweeds Garages Ltd., In re, [1962] Ch 406 If exact amount of the debt is disputed, the court may make a winding up order without requiring precise quantification where entitlement is clear. Referred to as part of the principles from Madhnsudan Gordhandas explaining the court's stance where the amount is disputed but liability exists.
P. and J. Macrae Ltd., In re, [1961] 1 All ER 302 That the court will consider the wishes of creditors and may decline a winding up order if the majority in value of creditors oppose it for good reason. Referred to for the proposition that the court must weigh creditors' wishes and the reasonableness of grounds advanced by those opposing winding up.
Sri Shanmugar Mills Ltd. v. S.K. Dharmaraja Nadar, [1969] 39 Comp Cas 297; AIR 1970 Mad 203 Test of inability to pay under section 434(1)(c): the assessment is in a commercial sense, not a theoretical conversion of all assets into cash; if paying debts requires sale of machinery/buildings so the company cannot operate, winding up may be appropriate. The court relied on this reasoning to affirm that capacity to pay is a commercial test and applied it in concluding that the company's indebtedness could not be resolved in a commercial running state, supporting the prima facie case for advertisement.
Surindra Packers v. Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., [1989] 66 Comp Cas 883 (Punjab & Haryana HC) Authority cited by appellants to support the contention that even when advertisement is ordered, the court may postpone actual publication. The court acknowledged that a company court has power to postpone advertisement and considered appellants' reliance on this authority but declined lengthy postponement beyond the limited delay imposed by the court.
Dubai Dry Docks Co. Ltd. v. Hede Navigation Ltd., [1988] 64 Comp Cas 1 (Bombay HC) Authority cited by appellants for the proposition that actual advertisement can be postponed despite an order directing advertisement. The court accepted the general power to postpone publication but refused the long postponement sought by the company, instead dismissing the appeal subject to a short postponement of publication to July 1993.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a stepwise analysis grounded in the admitted facts and the legal principles cited in the record:

  1. The nature of the impugned order (direction to issue advertisement) requires that the order "speak for itself" to the extent appropriate to the subject matter; a speaking order is desirable where an order is likely to be appealed (Vasudeo Saraf). However, the court emphasized that the required detail depends on the admitted facts before the court and the entries on the order sheet.
  2. On the facts adduced before the learned company judge — a produced balance-sheet showing strained circumstances, board minutes recording a dire financial position and a resolution to move the High Court for winding up, allegations of matured unpaid deposits and dishonoured cheques, and a large number of unsecured creditors — the court found that a prima facie case for advertising the petition had been made out.
  3. The court applied the principles from Madhnsudan Gordhandas which govern creditor petitions for winding up: where debt is undisputed a winding up order will not be frustrated by a defence that the company can pay but chooses not to; where amounts are disputed, the court may still proceed if the defence is not of substance or likely to succeed. The court observed that discretionary considerations relevant to a final winding up order (including the wishes of creditors under section 557) are matters for fuller consideration at final hearing, not at the interim stage of ordering advertisement.
  4. The court noted the commercial test for inability to pay (Sri Shanmugar Mills): ability to pay is assessed in a commercial sense while the company runs, not on a theoretical liquidation of all assets. Taking this into account, the court agreed with the view that the company's position, viewed commercially, prima facie showed inability to meet debts.
  5. The court recognized that ordering advertisement is a serious step affecting business reputation and shareholders, and is not routine. Nonetheless, refusing advertisement where a prima facie case is established would deny the statutory remedy to creditors. Accordingly, the court furnishes the company adequate opportunity to be heard after advertisement and at the hearing that follows publication.
  6. The company court retains a power to postpone giving effect to an advertisement order. The court evaluated the company's request for six months' postponement and the circumstances protecting creditors' interests in the interim (immovable property holdings, rent ordered into court, prohibition on alienation without leave). Balancing interests, the bench concluded that postponement for an extended period was not appropriate, but a limited postponement would protect parties' interests and allow the company a chance to arrange funds subject to court supervision.
  7. The court also noted the contention that directors were themselves indebted to the company and had been asked to deposit amounts before any indulgence; while noting the point, the court ultimately imposed a limited, court-directed postponement rather than suspend advertisement on the condition of prior deposits by directors.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was DISMISSED insofar as it challenged the order directing advertisement of the company petition for winding up, but the court allowed a limited postponement of the actual publication.

Direct consequences and specific directions given in the judgment:

  • The learned company judge's order that there was sufficient prima facie case to issue advertisement was upheld.
  • The actual publication of the advertisement was to be postponed and effected during the first week of July, 1993, fixing the date of hearing as July 26, 1993.
  • Parties remain at liberty to seek working arrangements or other relief before the learned company judge; interim protections already in place included an order for rent to be deposited in court and a bar on alienation without leave of the court.

Broader implications: The court applied established principles concerning prima facie entitlement to winding up relief on creditor petitions and the commercial test for inability to pay. The decision does not purport to set a new legal precedent; it applies existing authorities to the admitted facts and balances the competing interests by allowing a short postponement of publication.

Show all summary ...

K. Shivashankar Bhat, J.:— This appeal is by the company and its managing director against which an order was made by the learned company judge to issue advertisement of the company petition for winding up. The petition was admitted earlier on August 28, 1992.

2. The proceedings were started on June 18, 1992, on which date notice regarding admission was ordered. On the same day, the learned company judge also restrained the respondents from alienating any assets of the company. The petition was filed for winding up under section 433(e) and (f) of the Companies Act, mainly asserting that the company is unable to pay its debts to the creditors. In the petition it is averred that there are several depositors who deposited amounts in the company and some of the depositors were due for refund on maturity. But, the company has failed to pay the same to the depositors. The petition was filed by two different petitioners. The petition further states that several cheques issued by the company pertaining to refund of deposits were not encashed, because the company had no requisite funds in the bank. The petition also points out that there are more than 3,500 unsecured creditors who have deposited their hard earned money in the company and that the company had borrowed more than Rs. 4.50 crores. Along with the company petition, a few documents were filed including the proceedings of the company's board meeting held on February 28, 1992. In these proceedings itself, there is a statement that the financial position of the company is in a very bad condition and that the company could not realise good prices by sale of the properties and the company was not able to collect loans lent by the company and, therefore, the board resolved to move the High Court for winding up the company. There is also no dispute that one of the directors filed Company Petition No. 31 of 1992 seeking winding up of the company. In support of the said petition, the said director filed his affidavit pointing out the financial predicament of the company and sought the winding up of the company.

3. In the present proceedings, the notice was ordered on June 18, 1992, and it seems that objections were filed by the fifth respondent on August 14, 1992. On the said date, learned counsel for the company sought a short time to come up with a concrete proposal regarding the settlement of the claims. On August 28, 1992, the petition was admitted. The order sheet reads as follows:

“KJSJ: 28-8-1992

Admitted.

Call these cases on 2.30 p.m

KJSJ: 28-8-1992

Heard.

Company application is moved by the petitioner. Respondent's counsel appeared and opposed it. However, he submitted that he would give the concrete proposal to settle the matter within a week. If some time is granted to him till Friday, he will file a concrete proposal for settlement of all the claims. Respondents and counsel Mr. Vedavyasachar has given an undertaking that no rent will be collected till Friday.

Post these cases along with Co. P. No. 104 of 1992 on Friday, the 4th September, 1992, for further order.”

4. On September 22, 1992, the learned company judge ordered that the rents payable by the tenants shall be deposited in this court in the interest of the creditors. It is unnecessary to refer to the order made on October 21, 1992. On November 16, 1992, the order under appeal was made. The learned company judge observed that there is sufficient prima facie case to issue advertisement. His order reads as follows:

“SRBJ: 16-11-1992

There is sufficient prima facie case to issue advertisement. Whatever objections respondents may have they shall raise all such objections after the advertisement is issued.

The first petitioner shall take out such advertisement in one issue of Deccan Herald and Indian Express petitioners may join the proceedings as creditors later.

The first petitioner shall take out such advertisement on or before November 30, 1992, fixing the date of hearing as December 15, 1992.”

5. Mr. Raghavan, learned counsel for the appellants, questions the correctness of the above order firstly on the ground that it is a non-speaking order; secondly it was contended that an order directing advertisement of the petition for winding up is a discretionary order and the circumstances of the case did not justify making such an order in the instant case. Learned counsel further contended that at least the learned company judge should have granted some time and postponed the advertisement in spite of the fact that the case calls for an advertisement of the petition.

6. Mr. Raghavan referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Vasudeo Vishwanath Saraf v. New Education Institute, (1986) 4 SCC 31 : AIR 1986 SC 2105, wherein the Supreme Court pointed out the need to make a speaking order when the said order is liable to be tested in appeal. We have no doubt about the need to have a speaking order as and when an order is likely to be appealed from. But the nature of the order to be made depends upon the admitted facts before the court. An order directing advertisement admittedly is liable to be appealed from to a Division Bench of this court and, therefore, the requirement of a speaking order as contended by Mr. Raghavan certainly exists. But, we are not impressed by the contention of the learned counsel that the order is liable to be set at naught only on the ground that the above order does not satisfy the test of a speaking order having regard to the admitted position as revealed from the records of the case read in the light of the entire order sheet. The nature of the order which should speak for itself depends upon the subject matter involved. The question is whether the company petition should be advertised. The order, therefore, necessarily should indicate why the advertisement should be ordered. It is fairly settled that a petition for winding up could be advertised if a prima facie case is made out by the petitioner.

7. In the instant case, the balance-sheet of the company has been produced which itself indicates that the company is in strained circumstances. Further, the order sheet reveals that the company made an attempt to file a concrete proposal to clear the claims of the petitioners and sufficient time was granted by the court. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned company judge erred in not writing an elaborate order.

8. We have already referred to the company petition filed by one of the directors and the affidavit filed by the said director in support of the said petition. According to learned counsel for the company, the assets of the company are more than Rs. 15.25 crores while the liabilities will be about Rs. 10 crores. This is the assertion made in the statement of objection filed by the company before the learned company judge. In the very nature of things, the valuation of the assets is only an estimate while the figure pertaining to the liability must have been revealed from the books of the company. The petitioners' assertions that the amounts matured have not been refunded and the cheques have bounced have also not been disputed by the company.

9. In these circumstances, we are not impressed by the first contention advanced by Mr. Raghavan.

10. The appeal is against the order directing advertisement of the petition. At this stage an in-depth examination of the merits of the case is not called for. If a prima facie case for winding up is made, normally, a creditor is entitled to an order of winding up under section 433(e) of the Companies Act, subject to other considerations governing the exercise of the discretion. But those considerations are relevant at the time of considering the making of the final order. Even there, the test applied by the Supreme Court in Madhnsudan Gordhandas and Co. v. Madhu Woollen Industries Private Ltd., (1971) 3 SCC 632 : AIR 1971 SC 2600; [1972] 42 Comp Cas 125 at paragraphs 21 and 22, it is observed thus (at pages 131-32 of 42 Comp Cas):

“Where the debt is undisputed the court will not act upon a defence that the company has the ability to pay the debt but the company chooses not to pay that particular debt (see A Company, In re, [1894] 94 SJ 369; [1894] 2 Ch 349 (Ch D)). Where, however, there is no doubt that the company owes the creditor a debt entitling him to a winding up order but the exact amount of the debt is disputed the court will make a winding up order without requiring the creditor to quantify the debt precisely (see Tweeds Garages Ltd., In re, [1962] Ch 406; [1962] 32 Comp Cas 795 (Ch D)). The principles on which the court acts are first that the defence of the company is in good faith and one of substance, secondly, the defence is likely to succeed in point of law, and, thirdly, the company adduces prima facie proof of the facts on which the defence depends.

Another rule which the court follows is that if there is opposition to the making of the winding up order by the creditors the court will consider their wishes and may decline to make the winding up order.

‘Under section 557 of the Companies Act, 1956, in all matters relating to the winding up of the company the court may ascertain the wishes of the creditors. The wishes of the shareholders are also considered, though, perhaps, the court may attach greater weight to the views of the creditors. The law on this point is stated in Palmer's Company Law, twenty-first edition, page 742, as follows:

This right to a winding up order is, however, qualified by another rule, viz., that the court will regard the wishes of the majority in value of the creditors, and if, for some good reason, they object to a winding up order, the court in its discretion may refuse the order’.

The wishes of the creditors will however be tested by the court on the grounds as to whether the case of the persons opposing the winding up is reasonable; secondly, whether there are matters which should be inquired into and investigated if a winding up order is made. It is also well settled that a winding up order will not be made on a creditor's petition if it would not benefit him or the company's creditors generally. The grounds furnished by the creditors opposing the winding up will have an important bearing on the reasonableness of the case (see P. and J. Macrae Ltd., In re, [1961] 1 All ER 302; [1961] 31 Comp Cas 424 (CA)).”

11. Even if the company has assets, all the assets are not considered as relevant while examining the question of its capacity to pay the debts. The capacity to pay debts is tested in the commercial sense and not theoretically.

12. In Sri Shanmugar Mills Ltd. v. S.K Dharmaraja Nadar, [1969] 39 Comp Cas 297; AIR 1970 Mad 203, the Madras High Court observed, at page 205, thus (at page 299 of 39 Comp Cas):

“‘The test of inability to pay the debt under section 434(1)(c) is not whether the company, if it converts all its assets into cash, could be able to discharge its debts, but whether in a commercial sense the existing liabilities could be paid by the company while it is running as a company. It cannot be said that if the machinery and the building had to be realised for the purpose of paying the existing debts the company could run its business. If such assets are excluded the other assets which amount to about rupees three lakhs (vide market value adopted in the counter-affidavit) would hardly be sufficient to meet the demands.’

The learned judge proceeded to point out that on March 5, 1959, the position was even worse.

We are of the opinion that the learned judge was right in taking into account the position as on October 31, 1957, and that the reasoning on which he ordered the winding up is correct. The essence of the reasoning is that the debts of the company could not be paid without selling its machinery and building and, if the machinery and the building were to be sold, the mills could not run and the company would necessarily have to be wound up. The correctness of this reasoning cannot be questioned and has not been questioned before us by Sri V. Balasubrahmanyan, learned counsel for the appellant.”

13. Advertisement of a petition for winding up, no doubt, is not ordered as a matter of course, because, its effect is drastic on the company's business reputation and the interest of the shareholders.

14. But, when a prima facie case is made out to attract the principle governing the winding up at the instance of a creditor under section 433(e), refusal of such an order would be denying the statutory remedy provided to the creditors of the company. Therefore, the court affords adequate opportunity to the company of being heard, before considering whether advertisement should be ordered. The undisputed facts of this case, prima facie lead to the conclusion that the company is not commercially capable of solving its indebtedness.

15. May be, after advertisement, and after hearing all the concerned persons, different considerations may weigh with the court not to order winding up; but it is too premature for the court at this stage to hold that facts relevant to such considerations exist in favour of the company.

16. Mr. Raghavan, relied on two decisions—one of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Surindra Packers v. Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd., [1989] 66 Comp Cas 883 and another of the Bombay High Court in Dubai Dry Docks Co. Ltd. v. Hede Navigation Ltd., [1988] 64 Comp Cas 1, to contend that even if advertisement is to be ordered, the court should have postponed the actual advertisement.

17. The company court certainly has the power to postpone giving effect to the order directing advertisement. In the instant case, the company has valuable immovable properties at Bangalore and Mysore; the rental income is ordered to be deposited in the court; alienation is barred without leave of the court; therefore, there is no immediate danger to the assets of the company to the detriment of the interests of the creditors. There is no reason as to why the company should not be allowed to raise funds either by selling or entering into any arrangement (subject to the orders of the court) to clear the claims of the petitioners. The company petition is pending since June, 1992. Mr. Raghavan, seeks six months' time for this purpose and seeks postponement of the advertisement.

18. Mr. A.G Holla pointed out that the directors are also primarily indebted to the company and at least amounts should be paid by them into the court before seeking any indulgence in the matter of advertisement. Having considered the matter in great depth, we are of the view that, the interest of all the parties would be served by upholding the order of the learned company judge, subject to the condition that the actual advertisement shall be effected during the first week of July, 1993, fixing the date of hearing as July 26, 1993.

19. The appeal is accordingly dismissed, subject to the postponement of the advertisement as stated above. For any other working arrangement, etc., parties are at liberty to move the learned company judge.