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Chandrika Apartments (P) Ltd. v. Union Of India

Karnataka High Court
Sep 1, 1993
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Factual and Procedural Background

The third respondent owned property described as No. S-7, 5th Main Road, 4th Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore ("the said property"). On 19.2.1988 she entered into an Agreement of Sale with the petitioner for Rs. 33 lakhs, received an advance of Rs. 2 lakhs and the balance was to be paid within six months. A statement under Section 269UC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was filed in Form No. 37(1) regarding the intended transfer. The Appropriate Authority, Income-tax Department, on 30.5.1988 passed an order under Section 269-UD(1) ordering pre-emptive (compulsory) purchase of the property (the "impugned order").

The petitioner challenged the impugned order and the constitutional validity of Chapter XX-C of the Act by filing this writ petition on 15.6.1988. This Court on 20.6.1988 issued a rule nisi and granted interim relief staying delivery of possession and further proceedings pursuant to the impugned order, and restrained alteration or alienation of the property during pendency.

The third respondent applied for modification of the interim order seeking payment of the balance consideration (Rs. 31 lakhs); that application and subsequent appeals and review were rejected. The third respondent later obtained Special Leave from the Supreme Court (Civil Appeal No. 3305 of 1992) which resulted in remand to this Court in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rajalakshmi Narayan v. Margaret Kathleen Gandhi (reported 201 ITR 681). Separately, the third respondent filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court (W.P No. 5093/1990) which was ultimately dismissed as withdrawn on 12.1.1993.

The Supreme Court's decision in C.B. Gautam v. Union of India (199 ITR 530) treated as a "test case" upheld Chapter XX-C but read down and clarified provisions, holding that an opportunity to show cause must be read into Section 269UD, and orders passed without such opportunity and without recording reasons communicated to affected parties are bad in law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned order of pre-emptive purchase dated 30.5.1988 is valid when it was passed by the Appropriate Authority without affording the affected parties an opportunity to show cause and without recording reasons communicated to them.
  2. Whether the third respondent (the owner) is entitled to interest on the balance sale consideration due to delay caused by the stay and litigation, and if so at what rate and against whom the interest should be awarded (Central Government if purchase upheld, or the intending transferee if sale completes in favour of the purchaser).
  3. What procedural directions should be given to the Appropriate Authority on remand (treatment of Form 37(1), need to issue show cause notice, and conduct of further proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Third Respondent (Owner)

  • Filed I.A. II on 7.1.1993 seeking a direction that either the petitioner or the second respondent pay interest at 24% per annum on the balance consideration from the date of the interim order (20.6.1988) until payment, having regard to directions given by the Supreme Court in her Civil Appeal No. 3305/1992.
  • Asserted hardship caused by the stay which prevented her from obtaining the balance sale consideration and consequently performing her purchase obligations for another property.

Petitioner

  • Counsel Sri K.R.D. Karanth contended that interest charged by financial institutions varied between 22%–24% per annum, noted that Rajalakshmi's case awarded interest at 15% & 20% per annum, and urged that the petitioner (who, he said, was made to suffer for no fault of hers) should get interest on the balance amount at least at the rate of 24% per annum (as recorded in the opinion).
  • Counsel Sri K.R. Prasad (for the petitioner) argued that interest should not be awarded because: (a) Rajalakshmi's case is distinguishable as there possession of a portion of the property had been delivered to the intending purchaser whereas in the instant case the third respondent continued in possession; (b) Rajalakshmi's principles were interim measures and having regard to the final decision in Gautam's case, Gautam prevails, and Gautam contemplated payment of interest only by the Central Government in the event of pre-emptive purchase and did not direct payment of interest by the intending transferee.

Income-tax Department (Appropriate Authority)

  • Learned Standing Counsel Sri H.L. Dattu submitted that this Court should not make any order regarding interest because: (a) the question of payment of interest by the Central Government arises only if an order of purchase is passed, and since the impugned order is being set aside and remitted, there need not be any direction on interest at this stage; and (b) one of the preconditions in Rajalakshmi's case is that the owner should not have obstructed the purchase — the third respondent had filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court challenging the compulsory purchase and therefore was not entitled to interest.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajalakshmi Narayan v. Margaret Kathleen Gandhi (reported 201 ITR 681) Where an owner has not delayed or obstructed compulsory purchase and is prevented from getting the sale price by reason of a stay, interest may be awarded: the Court in that case directed interest at 15% if Government purchase upheld, and 20% if the sale to the intending purchaser completed; interest to be calculated from the date of the impugned interim order. The Court applied the principles in Rajalakshmi to determine entitlement to interest for the third respondent and to guide the rate and manner of awarding interest, while noting factual differences such as continued possession in the instant case.
C.B. Gautam v. Union of India (199 ITR 530) Upheld Chapter XX-C but read down provisions: an opportunity to affected parties to show cause must be read into Chapter XX-C; an order under Section 269UD passed without such opportunity and without recording reasons communicated to affected parties is bad in law. Also directed that if compulsory purchase is made the Central Government shall pay the apparent consideration plus interest (Court quoted a 9% rate in that case). The Court followed Gautam to hold the impugned order bad for lack of opportunity and absence of reasons and therefore quashed it; the Court also relied on Gautam in selecting 9% per annum as the appropriate interest rate to reflect the principles stated by the Supreme Court.
Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore Division (89 1993 STC 265) Observation that the enactment of an Interest Act does not intend to deprive courts of equitable jurisdiction to award interest; interest remains compensatory and the writ court can award interest in appropriate cases. The Court cited these observations to support its power as a writ court to direct payment of interest in equity where a party has been unjustly deprived of money which it was legally entitled to use.
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Deepchand Kishanlal ((1990) 83 ITR 299) Held that interest is compensatory in nature and a person deprived of the use of his money is normally entitled to be compensated by way of interest. The Court referenced this authority to reinforce the compensatory principle underlying awards of interest in equitable writ proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two principal stages: (A) validity of the impugned order, and (B) entitlement to and rate of interest.

A. Validity of the Impugned Order

  • The Court observed that the Supreme Court in Gautam had held that an order under Section 269UD passed without giving affected parties an opportunity to show cause and without recording reasons communicated to them is bad in law.
  • It was undisputed that the impugned order dated 30.5.1988 was passed without affording such an opportunity and the order did not state reasons. Applying Gautam directly, the Court held the impugned order bad in law and quashed it.

B. Entitlement to Interest and Rate

  • The Court addressed the third respondent's claim for interest (she sought 24% per annum from 20.6.1988).
  • The Court reviewed Rajalakshmi's case where interest was awarded because: (a) the owner had not delayed or defeated compulsory purchase; (b) immovable property prices had risen significantly; and (c) the owner had been prevented from getting the sale price because of court stays. The Court found these factual conditions applied in the present case as well: (i) the petitioner obtained the stay by filing the writ petition; (ii) the third respondent did not obstruct the compulsory purchase at the time it was made and had sought payment and relief; and (iii) property prices in Bangalore had risen steeply.
  • The Court rejected the contention that the third respondent's filing of a writ petition in the Madras High Court should deprive her of interest. The Court analyzed the chronology and concluded that the petitioner had first obtained the stay in this Court and the third respondent's subsequent writ petition in Madras was filed out of desperation after repeated refusals in this Court; the limited stay obtained in Madras overlapped only briefly with the stay obtained by the petitioner and could not be held against the third respondent as an obstructive act.
  • The Court considered whether Rajalakshmi's principles were displaced by Gautam. It held that Gautam did not prohibit awarding interest against an intending purchaser where the purchaser's challenge caused delay; rather, Gautam addressed the situation where the Central Government, if it ultimately purchased after delay, should pay interest (Gautam set a 9% rate for Government). Gautam reaffirmed the underlying equitable principle that the owner should not be penalised for delay not attributable to him. Thus Rajalakshmi remained applicable for awarding interest against an intending purchaser in appropriate cases.
  • Balancing factors (including that the third respondent continued in possession of the property, which mitigated the rate) and the precedents, the Court concluded that 9% per annum was the appropriate rate of interest in the present case.
  • The Court also relied on the cited authorities to confirm that the writ court has equitable jurisdiction to award compensatory interest where a person is deprived of the use of his money.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The impugned order dated 30.5.1988 passed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 269-UD(1) is quashed for being passed without affording the affected parties an opportunity to show cause and without recording reasons communicated to them (as required by the Supreme Court's decision in C.B. Gautam v. Union of India). The petition and the related interlocutory application (I.A II) are partly allowed and the matter is remitted to the Appropriate Authority for disposal in accordance with law and the directions below.

Consequential Directions and Direct Effects on the Parties:

  • The statement in Form 37(1) submitted before the Appropriate Authority in relation to the agreement dated 19.2.1988 shall be treated as if submitted on the day of this order.
  • If the Appropriate Authority intends to exercise the right to purchase the property it must issue a show cause notice calling upon the intending transferor, transferee and affected parties to show cause why compulsory purchase should not be made, afford a reasonable opportunity to show cause, and if deemed fit, hold a summary inquiry and pass such order as it deems fit.
  • If the Appropriate Authority decides to pass an order of compulsory purchase under Section 269UD(1) it shall also pay interest at 9% per annum on the balance amount of the apparent consideration from the date of the impugned order to the date of payment (as compensation for escalation in property value).
  • If the Appropriate Authority does not exercise the option to purchase and the third respondent conveys the property to the petitioner, the petitioner shall pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 31 lakhs with interest at 9% per annum from 19.8.1988 (the due date under the Agreement), such interest to be part of the price.
  • The matter is remitted to the Appropriate Authority, Income-tax Department, for disposal in accordance with law and the above observations.

The opinion does not purport to establish any new principle of law beyond application of existing Supreme Court and High Court authorities; the Court applied and reconciled Rajalakshmi and Gautam and issued directions tailored to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

Raveendran, J.:—

The third respondent is the owner of property bearing No. S-7, 5th Main Road, 4th Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said property’). She entered into an Agreement of Sale on 19.2.1988 with the petitioner agreeing to sell the said property for a consideration of Rs. 33 lakhs and received an advance of Rs. 2 lakhs. The balance of sale consideration was to be paid within six months. The petitioner as the intending transferee and the third respondent as intending transferor, filed a statement under Section 269UC of the Income-tax Act 1961 (‘the Act’ for short) in Form No. 37(1) in regard to intended transfer. The Appropriate Authority, Income-tax Department, passed an order on 30.5.1988 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the impugned order’) under Section 269-UD(1) of the Act ordering pre-emptive purchase of the said property.

2. The petitioner challenged the impugned order and the Constitutional validity of Chapter XX-C of the Act by filing this Petition on 15.6.1988 This Court on 20.6.1988, issued rule nisi and an interim order staying the delivery of possession of the said property in pursuance of the impugned order and further proceedings pursuant to the said order. This Court also restrained the petitioner and respondent No. 3 from effecting any change in the nature of the said property or alienating the same during the pendency of the Petition.

3. Thereafter the third respondent sought modification of the said interim order, for a direction either to the petitioner or to respondents 1 and 2 to pay her the balance consideration of Rs. 31 lakhs. In the application for such modification she stated that she had entered into an agreement for sale of the said property as she was in dire need of funds and as she desired to acquire suitable alternative property; that she expected to obtain the entire sale price within the time specified in the agreement; that in view of the stay granted by this Court, neither the petitioner nor the first and second respondents were paying the balance of sale consideration; that consequently she was prevented from performing her part of contract in regard to an agreement entered by her for purchase of another property and she was being put to great hardship. The said application for modification was rejected by order dated 14.9.1988 The Appeal (W.A No. 1667/1988) filed by third respondent against the rejection of her application, was also rejected by order dated 24.11.1988 The third respondent sought review of the appellate order by filing C.P No. 42 of 1989 which also came to be dismissed on 15.3.1989 Thereafter she took up the matter before the Supreme Court in SLP 12951 of 1989. By order dated 14.8.1991, Special Leave was granted and the appeal was numbered as Civil Appeal No. 3305 of 1992 and the same was disposed of on 14.8.1992 by the following order:

“In view of our direction in Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 15036 of 1988 the impugned order is set aside and the application for interim relief is remanded to the High Court for disposal according to law in the light of our decision. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.”

(Note: S.L.P (C) No. 15036 of 1988 referred to in the said order is the case of Rajalakshmi Narayan v. Margaret Kathleen Gandhi subsequently reported in 201 ITR 681)1.

4. The third Respondent thereafter challenged the impugned order by filing a separate Writ Petition in the Madras High Court on 22.4.1990 (W.P No. 5093/1990). An interim order of stay of further proceedings in pursuance of the impugned order, was granted on 24.1.1992 However, on 12.1.1993 the said Writ Petition was dismissed as withdrawn.

5. Subsequently the Constitutional validity of Chapter XXC of the Act was considered by the Supreme Court in C.B Gautam v. Union of India . 199 ITR 530.. That case was treated as a test case in regard to the several petitions wherein the Constitutional validity of the said Chapter was challenged. The Supreme Court upheld the Constitutional validity of the said Chapter but read down certain provisions and clarified certain other provisions of the said Chapter. The Supreme Court held that requirement relating to grant of an opportunity to the affected parties, to show cause against the purchase, before making an order for purchase under the said Section 269 UD of the Act, must be read into the provisions of Chapter XX-C. It was held that where an order under Section 261 UD(1) was passed without giving an opportunity to the affected parties and without recording the reasons in the order that was communicated to the affected parties, the order was bad in law and was liable to be set aside.

6. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the impugned order was passed by the Appropriate Authority without giving an opportunity to the affected parties to show cause against the proposed purchase. The impugned order does not also contain any reason as to why the Appropriate Authority decided to purchase the property. Hence following Gautham's case, the impugned order dated 30.5.1988 has to be held as bad in law. Consequently the impugned order is hereby quashed.

7. The third respondent (owner) filed an application on 7.1.1993 (I.A II) seeking a direction either to the petitioner or the second respondent to pay interest to the third respondent on the balance amount of consideration at the rate of 24% per annum from the date of interim order (20.6.1988) to the date of payment, having regard to the directions given by the Supreme Court in her Civil Appeal No. 3305/1992. Sri K.R.D Karanth, learned Counsel for petitioner contended that interest charged by financial institutions varied between 22% to 24% per annum, that the Supreme Court in Rajalakshmi's Case awarded interest at the rate of 15% & 20% per annum and that petitioner who is made to suffer for no fault of hers, should get interest on the balance amount, at least at the rate of 24% per annum. The question is whether any direction should be given in regard to interest.

In Rajalakshmi's Case, the reasons for holding that the owner of entitled to interest is stated in the following terms:

In our opinion, in this case, some relief should be granted to the appellant because she has neither attempted to delay or defeat the compulsory purchase of the property by the Government nor has she any objection to the completion of the agreement for sale of the property to respondent No. 1 (intending purchaser). However, we are not in a position to direct any amount to be paid to the appellant at this stage because it is not possible to predict whether the order for purchase of the said property made by the appropriate authority will be upheld or it will be set aside and the sale of the property in favour of respondent No. 1 can be completed.

We can safely take judicial notice of the fact that the prices of immoveable properties have shot up continuously for the last few years and today the said property, if sold in the open market would fetch a much larger amount than that for which it was agreed to be sold to respondent No. 1.

Taking into account these circumstances we modify the impugned order and direct that in the event of the aforesaid order of the appropriate authority being upheld, the Government shall pay to the appellant, as the purchase price, the amount stated as the consideration for the sale of the said property in the agreement entered into between the appellant and respondent No. 1 with interest thereon at 15 per cent per annum. In case the order of the appropriate authority is set aside and the transaction of sale in favour of respondent No. 1 is completed, respondent No. 1 shall pay to the appellant interest on the balance amount payable on account of the purchase price by respondent No. 1, interest at 20 per cent per annum. The interest in either eventuality will be calculated right from the day the impugned interim order was made by the Delhi High Court.

We may clarify that whether interest should be paid to the owner of an immoveable property who has entered into an agreement to sell the same which cannot be completed by reason of an order of purchase under Section 269UD of the Income-tax Act and at what rate, will have to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case. All that can be observed by way of general principle is that where such a seller has raised no objection or obstruction either to the purchase of his property by an order under Section 269UD or to the completion to the agreement of sale entered into by him but is unable to get the purchase price by reason of the said order and the stay order or orders passed by a Court, interest at an appropriate rate can, if equity so requires, be paid to him.”

In Gautham's case payment of interest to the owner is dealt with the following manner:

“We realise that if order for compulsory purchases of the property is made hereafter the intending vendor will suffer to some extent by reason of the fact that he will get the purchase amount several years after the time he would have got it had the impugned order been held to be valid. But on the other hand, however, he would have retained the possession of the property in question. Taking into account these factors and taking note of the fact that the immovable properties in urban areas have gone up steeply in value during the last few years, we direct that in case an order for compulsory purchase is made the Central Government shall pay to the intending seller the amount of the apparent consideration plus interest at 9 per cent per annum from the date of impugned order was made.”

8. Sri K.R Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that interest cannot be awarded against the petitioner for the following reasons:

(a) that the principles laid down in Rajalakshmi's case cannot be applied to this case as there was a basic difference between the two cases in so far as possession of a portion of the property had been delivered to the intending purchaser in Rajalakshmi's case, but possession was not delivered to the intending purchaser in this case and the third respondent continues to enjoy the property; (b) the Principles in Rajalakshmi's case were purely an interim measure intended to hold the field till the validity of Chapter XX-C was decided; that having regard to the final decision regarding Constitutional validity in Gautham's case, Gautham's case prevailed over Rajalakshmi's case and Gautham's case contemplated payment of interest only by the Central Government in the event of pre-emptive purchase and did not contemplate or direct payment of interest by the intending transferee under the Agreement of sale.

9. Sri H.L Dattu, learned Standing Counsel for Income-tax Department, on the other hand, contended that this Court should not make any order in regard to interest, in view of the following:

(a) that the question of payment of interest by the Central Government will arise for consideration only in the event of an order of purchase being passed by the Appropriate Authority and as the impugned order is being set aside in pursuance of Gautham's case and the matter is being remitted back, there need not be any direction in regard to payment of interest.

(b) The condition precedent for applicability of Rajalakshmi's case was that the owner should not have raised any objection or obstruction to the purchase of property; in the present case, the third respondent had challenged the order of pre-emptive purchase in the Madras High Court by filing a writ petition and therefore she was not entitled to any interest.

10. In view of these rival contentions, it becomes necessary to consider whether any directions regarding interest have to be issued. It may be true that in Rajalakshmi's case, possession of a portion of the property was given to the intending transferee. But the reason which prompted the Supreme Court to hold that the owner is entitled to interest on the balance sale price were: (a) that the owner had not delayed and defeated the compulsory purchase; (b) that the prices of immoveable properties have shot up continuously for the last few years and if the property is now sold in the open market, it would fetch a much higher price than what was agreed as consideration, and (c) that the owner has been prevented from getting the sale price in terms of the agreement, in view of the stay order granted by the Court. All these conditions apply to the case on hand. The third respondent is prevented from obtaining Rs. 31 lakhs within 19.8.1988 for the following reasons: (a) the petitioner filed this Writ Petition challenging the impugned order of purchase on 15.6.1988 and obtained an order of stay; (b) the third respondent did not obstruct or delay the compulsory purchase; (c) judicial notice can be taken of the fact that prices in Bangalore have gone up steeply in the last five years. Hence applying Rajalakshmi's case, a direction regarding interest should normally follow.

11. The second contention raised on behalf of the Appropriate Authority requires to be dealt with at this juncture. It was contended by the Appropriate Authority and also by the petitioner that the third respondent having filed a Writ Petition in the Madras High Court challenging the compulsory purchase, she should be deemed to have obstructed and delayed the compulsory purchase and therefore, one of the conditions laid down in Rajalakshmi's case for grant of interest was not fulfilled by the third respondent. This is fallacious. When the order of compulsory purchase was made by the Department on 30.5.1988 by the Appropriate Authority, the third respondent did not challenge the said order. It was the petitioner (the intending purchaser) who filed this Writ Petition on 15.6.1988 challenging the impugned order. In fact, immediately after service, the third Respondent filed an application before this Court seeking modification of the interim order of stay making it clear that she was ready to perform her part of contract in favour of the purchaser or deliver the property to the Appropriate Authority in pursuance of the impugned order and requested for payment of the balance of sale price. In spite of the hardship that was pleaded by her, no relief was granted to her, having regard to the legal position then prevailing. When the application was rejected, she filed an appeal against the order rejecting her application for payment and that was also rejected and the Civil Petition filed by her was also rejected. Not being able to get any relief in this Court which had consistently taken the view that stay could not be vacated at the instance of the owner, she filed a Writ Petition in the Madras High Court in April 1990 having regard to the fact the Madras High Court had taken a slightly different view in regard to the interim order of stay. Further proceedings in pursuance of the impugned order was stayed by the Madras High Court between 24.1.1992 and 12.1.1993 at the instance of the third respondent. The order of compulsory purchase was stayed in this proceedings at the instance of intending purchaser on 20.6.1988, and the said order continued to be in force till now. Merely because the third respondent out of desperation, filed a Writ Petition in the Madras High Court and obtained an order of stay for a limited period, cannot be held against the third respondent, particularly in view of the fact that the period of stay obtained by third respondent merely overlaps the period of stay obtained by the petitioner, for a short duration. It would thus be seen that the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner was not with intention to obstruct or object to the order of purchase. Thus her readiness and willingness to deliver the property in response to the impugned order of compulsory purchase is evident. At the same time, her readiness to perform the contract in favour of the petitioner if there was no order of compulsory purchase is also evident. In these circumstances, the third respondent cannot be denied interest on the ground of her having filed a Writ Petition in the Madras High Court.

12. The next question that requires to be considered is whether principles laid down in Rajalakshmi's case in regard to interest, no longer hold good in view of Gautham's case. In Rajalakshmi's case, Supreme Court held that an intending purchaser under the agreement of sale will be liable to pay interest on account of any delay occasioned by any stay order obtained by him and in addition to the agreed sale price when he ultimately purchased the property. In Gautham's case, the Supreme Court noticed the loss that will be caused to an owner, if there is a delay of several years in getting the sale price. Considering several factors, the Supreme Court held that interest at 9% per annum will have to be paid by the Central Government in the event of an order of compulsory purchase being made. Gautham's case neither dealt with nor prohibited award of interest against the intending purchaser, when they had delayed the transaction and the payment of balance price, by challenging the order of compulsory purchase. Hence Rajalakshmi's case continues to be applicable in regard to payment of interest by the intending purchaser as Gautham's case reiterates the principle underlying grant of interest in such cases. Gautam's case holds that if the owner is forced to sell the property after considerable delay, and if the owner is not responsible for such delay, the owner should not be penalised by forcing him to receive only the price that pre ailed at the time of agreement of sale and the owner should also get some benefit by way of increase in the price over the years. This principle is equally applicable whether ultimately the purchaser is the Central Government or the intending purchaser under the Agreement of sale. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, I feel that rate of interest should be 9% per annum. The interest rate should have been higher, but for the fact that third respondent continues to hold possession of the property.

13. In this context, it is also useful to refer to the following observations made by K. Shivashankar Bhat, J. in regard to interest, in a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Mangalore Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore Division . 89 1993 STC 265..

“There is no reason to understand that while enacting Interest Act, 1978, the Parliament intended to deprive the court exercising an equitable jurisdiction, the power to award interest, which it had earlier.

In Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Deepchand Kishanlal (1990) 83 ITR 299 this Court while construing the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, held at page 309 that interest is compensatory in nature and a person deprived of the use of his money, is normally entitled to be compensated for it, by way of interest.

It cannot be denied that writ jurisdiction is an equitable jurisdiction; the width of this jurisdiction should not be limited so as to exclude a power to award interest in appropriate case. To what extent and under which circumstances, interest should be awarded, depends upon the circumstances of each case, to be judicially considered. To deny the power to the writ court to award interest to a person who is unjustly deprived of the money which he is legally entitled to enjoy as he deems fit, will be unduly restricting the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

14. As the impugned order is being set aside and the matter is being remitted back to the Appropriate Authority for reconsideration, it is necessary that clear direction should be given in regard to payment of interest also.

15. As a consequence of quashing of the impugned order of purchase, the following consequential directions are issued having regard to the directions of the Supreme Court in Gautham's case, Rajalakshmi's case and the Civil appeal filed by the third respondent:

(a) The statement in Form 37(I) submitted before the Appropriate Authority in regard to the agreement of sale dated 19.2.1988 shall be treated as if it was submitted this day.

(b) If the Appropriate Authority intends to exercise the right to purchase the property it shall issue a show cause notice calling upon the intending transferor, transferee and the affected parties to show cause why the order of compulsory purchase should not be made and afford a reasonable opportunity to the affected parties to show cause; and if deemed fit hold a summary enquiry and pass such order as it deems fit.

(c) In the event the Appropriate Authority deciding to pass an order of compulsory purchase under Section 269UD(i) of the Act, interest at 9% annum shall also be paid on the balance amount of apparent consideration from the date of impugned order to date of payment (on account of escalation in value of the property, as part of price);

(d) In the event of the Appropriate Authority not exercising the option to purchase the said property and the third respondent conveying the property to the petitioner, the petitioner shall pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 31 lakhs with interest at 9% per annum from 19.8.1988 (the due date for payment under the Agreement), which shall also part of the price.

With these observations, the Petition and I.A II are partly allowed and the matter is remitted to the Appropriate Authority, Income-tax, Department for disposal in accordance with law and the above observations.