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Booda Poojary v. Thomu Poojarthy
Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (Full Bench Reference)
Factual and Procedural Background
The reference arises from competing applications under Section 48A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (as amended). Aithu Poojary filed Form No. 7 before the Land Tribunal at Udupi claiming occupancy rights over 20 items of land, asserting he had a chalugeni lease executed in 1961–62. Thomu Poojarthy (a member of the same family) also filed Form No. 7 over the same lands. The Land Tribunal by its order dated 28-9-1987 granted occupancy rights in respect of 14 items in favour of Aithu Poojary and 6 items in favour of Thomu Poojarthy. On appeal, the Appellate Authority by order dated 18-1-1989 granted occupancy rights in respect of all 20 items jointly to Booda Poojary (son of Aithu Poojary, who had died during the appeals) and Thomu Poojarthy as members of an Aliyasanthana family, leaving the precise share of the son-in-law to be decided by a civil court. Booda Poojary challenged the Appellate Authority's order by filing Civil Revision Petitions (C.R.P Nos. 1084/89 and 3438/89) in this Court.
A learned Single Judge referred those Civil Revision Petitions to a Division Bench because of an apparent conflict between prior Division Bench decisions (including Mudukappa's Case and Appi Belchadthi's Case). The Division Bench concluded there was no authoritative pronouncement on the scope of the Land Tribunal's jurisdiction under Form No. 7 applications and referred four specific questions to the Full Bench for consideration and determination.
Legal Issues Presented
- What is the scope of jurisdiction conferred upon the Land Tribunals under Section 112-B(b) of the Act in deciding the claim of occupancy right made under Section 48A of the Act?
- Is it not open to the Land Tribunals to decide all questions that arise while considering Form No. 7 filed for the purpose of granting or refusing the occupancy right claimed therein?
- When a jurisdiction is conferred upon the Land Tribunal to decide whether a person is a tenant or not, does it not take into its fold to decide all the controversies having a bearing upon the claim in order to decide the question whether a person is a tenant or not?
- Which of the Decisions of this Court in Mudukappa's Case [1978 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 459] and Guruvappa's Case (ILR 1985 KAR 386) or the Decisions in Appi Belchadthi's Case [1982 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 565] and Yellappa's Case (R.F.A No. 26 of 1975 D.D. 11-6-1975) lay down the law correctly?
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Sri G.S. Visweswara)
- The Land Tribunal and the Appellate Authority lacked competence to decide whether the leasehold rights were joint family rights or exclusive individual rights; such questions (whether property is joint family or exclusive individual property) fall outside the scope of Section 112-B and must be decided by Civil Courts.
- Once the Tribunal confers occupancy rights on a joint family, an aggrieved party should not be able to contend otherwise in a Civil Court (implied concern about finality and effect of Tribunal orders).
- Relied on certain precedents (listed in the opinion) in support of the limited view of Tribunal jurisdiction.
Respondent's Arguments (Sri K.S. Vyasa Rao for respondent No. 1)
- Submitted that the decisions cited in the order of reference establish principles that clarify the position of law (i.e., argued for clarity of law consistent with the authorities referenced in the referral).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion) |
|---|---|---|
| ILR 1975 KAR 1499 | Where the dispute is whether an item of property is joint family or individual property, such dispute is to be decided by the Civil Court (court looked to substance and held Civil Court should decide). | The Full Bench recorded this authority as taking a restrictive view that certain proprietary disputes are for Civil Courts; the opinion treats it as one of the decisions that must be reconciled with later authorities. |
| 1976 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 3775 | The Tribunal alone has jurisdiction to decide rival tenancy and who among rival claimants is entitled to occupancy rights; exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a person is a tenant. | The opinion cites this as supporting the proposition that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal to decide tenancy questions and to avoid conflicting decisions between Tribunal and Civil Court. |
| 1978 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 459 (Mudukappa / Mudakappa v. Rudrappa) | Where applications under Section 48A are filed by competing claimants, the Tribunal must decide whether tenancy was exclusive to one person or held jointly by several — an incidental question necessary to effective orders under Section 48A. | The Full Bench refers to and adopts this reasoning: the Tribunal has power to determine whether leasehold rights were held exclusively or by the joint family for the purpose of granting occupancy rights. |
| 1979 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 187 | The Tribunal can decide rival claims of tenancy and, where necessary, decide questions such as heirship, succession and existence of joint family for the purpose of granting occupancy rights, but may reserve liberty to other claimants to pursue Civil Court remedies. | Cited as authority that rival claims may be of different kinds and the Tribunal may choose one claimant while preserving other claimants' rights to approach Civil Courts. |
| 1979 (1) Kar. L.J 18 (Dhareppa v. State of Karnataka & Ors.) | Observed that intricate issues of heirship, coparcenary, genuineness of wills, etc., were generally intended by the legislature to be fought out in Civil Courts; the Tribunal, if pressed, should choose one rival claimant for grant of occupancy rights and leave others free to pursue Civil Courts. | The Full Bench agrees with Venkatesh J.'s approach and uses it to support the view that Tribunal must act and may reserve liberty to other claimants to litigate proprietary issues in Civil Courts. |
| 1982 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 565 (Appi Belchadthi's Case) | Agreed with Mudakappa and Dhareppa: Tribunal must decide rival claims and confer occupancy rights on the person entitled, including joint family claims. | Used by the Full Bench to show consistency with Mudakappa and to conclude no conflict between these Division Bench decisions. |
| ILR 1985 KAR 386 (Guruvappa's Case) | Affirmed Mudakappa: the Tribunal has jurisdiction under Section 112(B) to decide who is a tenant; a joint family can be a 'person'/tenant; Tribunal may determine whether a joint family is a tenant. | The Full Bench treats this as reaffirmation that the word "person" includes a joint family and that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide joint family tenancy issues for Section 48A purposes. |
| ILR 1987 KAR 333610 | When an application under Section 48A comes before the Tribunal, it must examine whether the applicant is a tenant; Tribunal may need to consider genuineness or validity of a will where such will is the basis of a tenant's claim. | Cited to support the proposition that Tribunal's fact-finding may include questions that would otherwise be regarded as civil/proprietary (e.g., will genuineness) if necessary to decide tenancy for Section 48A. |
| R.F.A No. 26 of 1970 D.D. 11-6-1975 (Kedari Yellappa Halagekar v. Jyotiba Yellappa Halagekar) | Earlier decision that the question whether leasehold rights belonged to joint family or an individual could not be decided by the Land Tribunal (Court in later decision did not agree with that view because it pre-dated statutory amendments). | The Full Bench notes this earlier position but explains the later decisions and statutory amendments render that earlier view inapplicable to post-amendment disputes; paragraph 11 of Mudakappa clarified its position. |
| 1983 (1) Karnataka Law Journal Short Notes Item No. 618 and 1983 (2) K.L.J. Short Notes Item No. 279 | Short notes: Tribunal has no power to apportion heirs' shares; if Tribunal confers occupancy rights as joint family property aggrieved parties can seek civil remedies to establish exclusivity or shares. | Cited to support the limitation that while Tribunal can decide tenancy and confer occupancy rights, it does not apportion heirs' shares; parties retain access to Civil Courts for proprietary disputes. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by setting out and analysing the relevant statutory provisions and prior authorities cited in the reference. The statutory provisions central to the Court's reasoning were: Section 2 (definitions including "joint family" and Explanation-II deeming cultivation by any member as personal cultivation in joint family), Section 44 (vesting of land in State Government on the appointed day), Section 45 (tenants' entitlement to be registered as occupants subject to Act), Section 48A (procedure for applications for registration as occupant and Section 48A(5) empowering the Tribunal to determine rival claims), Section 112(B) (duties of Tribunal including verification/enquiry and deciding whether a person is a tenant), Section 132 (bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts over matters by or under the Act) and Section 133 (mechanism for staying proceedings and referring tenancy questions to the Tribunal, and making the Tribunal's decision final on those questions). Rule 17(1) (procedure to be followed by Tribunal) was also noted.
The Court analysed prior authorities and reconciled them with the statute. Key steps in the Court's analytical path (as stated in the opinion) were:
- Recognition that the Act and its amendments (notably Karnataka Act No. 1 of 1974) changed the statutory scheme: the Tribunal is empowered to decide who is a tenant for purposes of registration as an occupant under Section 48A.
- Interpretation of the term "person" (by reference to the General Clauses Act) to include a joint family and reference to Explanation-II of Section 2 treating cultivation by any member as personal cultivation for joint families, thus allowing a joint family to be regarded as a tenant in the statutory sense.
- Reading Sections 44, 45, 48A, 112(B), 132 and 133 together to conclude that the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions relating to tenancy and to determine rival claims for occupancy rights; Civil Courts are barred from deciding those tenancy questions and must refer them to the Tribunal where they arise in other proceedings.
- Reviewing precedents (Mudukappa/Mudakappa, Dhareppa, Guruvappa, Appi Belchadthi and others) and concluding that taken together they establish that the Tribunal must decide questions incidental or ancillary to the main question (who is entitled to be registered as occupant) if such matters are necessary for the Tribunal to discharge its duty under Section 48A.
- Explaining the proper procedure when complex proprietary issues (such as heirship, coparcenary, genuineness of wills or apportionment of heirs' shares) arise: the Tribunal can and must determine rival claims for tenancy sufficient to decide the occupancy application (including choosing one rival claimant for the grant), but it need not apportion shares or finally determine all civil proprietary consequences — those remain open to adjudication in a Civil Court where appropriate and the Tribunal may reserve liberty to other claimants to approach Civil Courts.
- Rejecting the petitioner's narrow contention that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine whether leasehold rights were joint family or individual rights for the specific purpose of deciding rival claims of tenancy: the Tribunal in the present case was required only to decide rival tenancy claims and that is what the Tribunal and Appellate Authority did.
The Court emphasised the practical and statutory necessity: without deciding whether tenancy was individual or joint, the Tribunal could not make an effective order under Section 48A; nor does the Tribunal's grant of occupancy rights convert the granted property into a separate personal property of the grantee or extinguish rights of other family members — those family rights can still be pursued in Civil Courts.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
1. The Tribunals have jurisdiction to go into all questions bearing upon whether the applicant is a tenant or not under Section 112(B)(b) of the Act for the purpose of deciding the claim of occupancy rights made under Section 48A of the Act.
2. It is open to the Land Tribunal to decide all questions that arise while considering Form No. 7 for the purpose of granting or refusing occupancy rights claimed therein.
3. The Land Tribunal takes into its jurisdiction all controversies having a bearing upon the claim in order to decide the question whether a person is a tenant or not.
4. There is no conflict among Mudukappa's Case [1978 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 459], Guruvappa's Case (ILR 1985 KAR 386) and Appi Belchadthi's Case [1982 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 565]; the position in Yellappa's Case (R.F.A No. 26 of 1975 D.D. 11-6-1975) is clarified by para-11 of Mudakappa and that clarification holds good.
Implications
- Direct effect: For applications under Section 48A, the Land Tribunal (and the Appellate Authority) have the statutory competence to determine who is a tenant — including deciding whether tenancy belongs to an individual or to a joint family — where that determination is necessary to resolve competing claims for occupancy rights. In the present factual matrix, the Tribunal and Appellate Authority acted within that jurisdiction in deciding rival tenancy claims.
- Procedural consequence: When complex proprietary matters (heirship, apportionment of shares, genuineness of instruments) arise, the Tribunal may decide the immediate question of entitlement to occupancy by choosing one claimant and can reserve liberty to other claimants to pursue their proprietary rights in Civil Courts; the Tribunal is not obliged (and may not have power) to finally apportion heirs' shares.
- On precedent: The Full Bench holds that there is a consistent line of authority (Mudukappa/Mudakappa, Guruvappa, Appi Belchadthi, Dhareppa, and related decisions) supporting the Tribunal's jurisdiction to decide tenancy questions arising under Section 48A; earlier conflicting authority (e.g., Yellappa's Case) is treated as superseded or clarified by later decisions and statutory amendments.
- No novel general rule beyond the statutory scheme: The decision enforces an interpretation of the Act that assigns exclusive responsibility to the Tribunal for tenancy questions relevant to occupancy rights while preserving the role of Civil Courts to adjudicate collateral proprietary claims (such as partition, apportionment of family shares, and other long-term civil rights) where appropriate.
This summary is strictly confined to the matters, statements and holdings contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond that text.
Shivaraj Patil, J.:—
The following Questions are Referred for consideration and determination of the Full Bench:
(1) What is the scope of jurisdiction conferred upon the Land Tribunals under Section 112-B(b) of the Act in deciding the claim of occupancy right made under Section 48A of the Act?
(2) Is it not open to the Land Tribunals to decide all questions that arise while considering Form No. 7 filed for the purpose of granting or refusing the occupancy right claimed therein?
(3) When a jurisdiction is conferred upon the Land Tribunal to decide whether a person is a tenant or not, does it not take into its fold to decide all the controversies having a bearing upon the claim in order to decide the question whether a person is a tenant or not? and
(4) Which of the Decisions of this Court in Mudukappa's Case [1978 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 459] and Guruvappa's Case (ILR 1985 KAR 386) or the Decisions in Appi Belchadthi's Case [1982 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 565] and Yellappa's Case (R.F.A No. 26 of 1975 DD 11-6-1975) lay down the law correctly?
2. The facts which are necessary for the purpose of determination of the Questions Referred are these:
One Thungu Poojarthy held leasehold rights in the lands in question; she had two daughters and a son, namely, Thaniyaru Poojarthy, Thomu Poojarthy and Chandu Poojary; Aithu Poojary was the husband of Thaniyaru Poojarthy and son-in-law of Thungu Poojarthy; Aithu Poojary had a son by name Booda Poojary: on the coming into force of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, as amended by the Karnataka Act No. 1 of 1974 (for short the Act) Aithu Poojary filed Form No. 7 before the Land Tribunal at Udupi claiming occupancy rights in all the 20 items of the lands in question, stating that he had obtained on lease those lands in his individual capacity from one Narayanachari by executing a chalugeni lease in the year 1961-1962; Chandu Poojary did not file Form No. 7, but Thomu Poojarthy filed Form No. 7 before the same Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights over all the lands in question.
The Land Tribunal, on the basis of the evidence on record, by the order dated 28-9-1987, granted occupancy rights in respect of 14 items of lands totally measuring 2 acres 99 cents in favour of Aithu Poojary and granted occupancy rights in respect of the remaining 6 items of lands measuring in all 1 acre 20 cents in favour of Thomu Poojarthy. During the pendency of the appeals before the Appellate Authority Aithu Poojary died. The son Booda Poojary came on record. The Appellate Authority, on appeal, modified the order of the Land Tribunal, by its order dated 18-1-1989, and granted occupancy rights of all the 20 items of lands in favour of Booda Poojary and Thomu Poojarthy jointly as members of Aliyasanthana family, leaving the question as to what would be share of the son-in-law in the lands in question for decision of Civil Court, in a Original Suit said to have been filed and pending adjudication in the Civil Court. The Appellate Authority concluded that the leasehold rights were held by Thaniyaru Poojarthy and Thomu Poojarthy as members of the ‘Aliyasanthana’ and as such ‘Aliyasantha family’ was the tenant of the lands in question. Booda Poojary filed C.R.P Nos. 1084/89 and 3438/89 aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority in this Court.
3. The learned single Judge referred the above said Civil Revision Petitions to a Division Bench, on the ground that there is a conflict between the two Decisions rendered by the two Division Benches of this Court reported in ILR 1985 KAR 3861 and 1982 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 5652. The Division Bench after consideration felt that two Division Benches of this Court have taken different views as to the scope of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Land Tribunal under the Act while considering the application filed in Form No. 7 and that there was no authoritative pronouncement sis to the scope of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Land Tribunal under the Act while considering the application filed in Form No. 7. In this view of the matter, the reference is made for determination of the questions aforesaid by the Full Bench.
4. Sri G.S Visweswara, learned Counsel for the petitioner, contended that the Land Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority were not competent to decide whether the joint family was the tenant of the lands in question. If a question arises as to whether the property was of a joint family or it is an exclusive property of an individual member of the family, the Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority were not competent to decide the same. Consideration of such question falls outside the scope of the jurisdiction under Section 112-B. He also contended that once the Tribunal decides and confers occupancy rights on the joint family, it may not be open to an aggrieved party to contend otherwise in the Civil Court. He drew our attention to:
(1) ILR 1975 KAR 14993;
(2) 1978 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 4594;
(3) 1982 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 565;
(4) ILR 1985 KAR 386.
5. Sri K.S Vyasa Rao, learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, submitted that in view of the Decisions cited in the order of reference, the position of law may be made clear.
6. We think it appropriate and necessary to set out the relevant provisions of the Act and Rules hereunder, which will have bearing on the questions to be considered in this reference.
“Section 2(1): “to cultivate personally” means to cultivate land on one's own account:
(i) to (iii) xxxxxxxxx
Explanation-I: xxxxxxxxx
Explanation-II: In the case of a joint family, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally, if it is cultivated by any member of such family.
(emphasis supplied)
Section 2(17): “joint family” means in the case of persons governed by Hindu Law, an undivided Hindu family, and in the case of other persons, a group or unit the members of which are by custom joint in estate or residence.
Section 2(34): “tenant” means an agriculturist who cultivates personally the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes:
(i) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under Section 4.
The word ‘Person’ is not defined in the Act. Hence, the definition given in the General Clauses Act, which reads as follows, will apply:
“person shall include any Company or Association or Body of individuals, whether incorporated or not”.
Section 44: Vesting of land in the State Government: (1) All lands held by or in the possession of tenants (including tenants against whom a decree or order for eviction or a certificate for resumption is made or issued) immediately prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, other than lands held by them under leases permitted under Section 5, shall, with effect on and from the said date, stand transferred to and vest in the State Government.
(2) Notwithstanding anything in any decree or order of or certificate issued by any Court or authority directing or specifying the lands which may be resumed or in any contract, grant or other instrument or in any other law for the time being in force, with effect on and from the date of vesting and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the following consequences shall ensue, namely:—
(a) all rights, title and interest vesting in the owners of such lands and other persons interested in such lands shall cease and be vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.
xxxxxxxxx
(emphasis supplied)
Section 45: Tenants to be registered as occupants of land on certain conditions:
(1) Subject to the provisions of the succeeding sections of this Chapter, every person who was a permanent tenant, protected tenant, or other tenant or where a tenant has lawfully sublet, such sub-tenant shall with effect on and from the date of vesting be entitled to be registered as an occupant in respect of the lands of which he was a permanent tenant protected tenant or other tenant or sub-tenant before the date of vesting and which he has been cultivating personally.
(2) & (3) xxxxxxxxx
Section 48A: Enquiry by the Tribunal, etc:— (1) Every person entitled to be registered as an occupant under Section 45 may make an application to the Tribunal in this behalf. Every such application shall, save as provided in this Act, be made before the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the commencement of section 1 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act 1978.
(2) On receipt of the application, the Tribunal shall publish or cause to be published a public notice in the village in which the land is situated calling upon the landlord and all other persons having an interest in the land to appear before it on the date specified in the notice. The Tribunal shall also issue individual notices to the persons mentioned in the application and also to such others as may appear to it to be interested in the land.
(3) & (4): xxxxxxxxx
(5) Where an objection is filed disputing the validity of the applicant's claim or setting up a rival claim, the Tribunal shall, after enquiry, determine by order, the person entitled to be registered as occupant and pass orders accordingly.
(emphasis supplied)
Section 112(B): Duties of Tribunal:
(a) to make necessary verification or hold an enquiry including local inspection and pass orders in cases relating to registration of tenant as an occupant under Section 48A.
(b) to decide whether a person is a tenant or not.
(bb) to (bbbbb) xxxxxxxxx
(c) xxxxxxxxxxxx
(d) to perform such other duties and functions as are imposed on the Tribunal under the provisions of this Act or under any rule made thereunder.
(emphasis supplied)
Section 132: Bar of jurisdiction:
(1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Deputy Commissioner, an officer authorised under sub-section (1) of Section 77, the Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed authority under Section 83 the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal or the State Government in exercise of their powers of control.
(2) No order of the Deputy Commissioner, an officer authorised under sub-section (1) of Section 77 the Assistant Commissioner, the prescribed authority under Section 83, the Tribunal, the Tahsildar, the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, or the State Government made under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court.
Section 133: Suits, Proceedings, etc. involving questions required to be decided by the Tribunal:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force:
(i) no Civil or Criminal Court or Officer or authority shall, in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land decide the question whether such land is or not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the land said from prior to 1st March 1974.
(ii) such Court or Officer or Authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question is concerned and refer the same to the Tribunal for decision.
(iii) all interim orders issued or made by such Court, Officer or Authority, whether in the nature of temporary injunction or appointment of a Receiver or otherwise, concerning the land shall stand dissolved or vacated, as the case may be.
(iv) the Tribunal shall decide the question referred to it under clause (1) and communicate its decision to such Court, Officer or Authority. The decision of the Tribunal shall be final.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall preclude the Civil or Criminal Court or the Officer or Authority from proceeding with the suit, case or proceedings in respect of any matter other than that referred to in that sub-section.
(emphasis supplied)
Rule 17(1): Procedure to be followed by the Tribunal: The Tribunal shall in respect of applications made to it follow the same procedure as specified for a summary enquiry under Section 34 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 subject to the condition that the records of the proceedings shall be maintained in a understood by all its members”.
7. We will now refer to and discuss various Decisions touching the questions including the Decisions referred to in the order of reference.
In ILR 1975 KAR 1499 looking to the substance of the matter and having found that it was not a case of rival tenancy at all, the Court held that when the dispute is whether a particular item of the property is a joint family or individual property, it is only the Civil Court that has to decide such dispute.
In 1976 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 3775 the learned Judge keeping in view Sections 48A(5), 112(B)(b) and 133 concluded that the Tribunal alone has the jurisdiction to decide the question of rival tenancy set up by the parties, observing that exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Tribunal to decide whether a person is a tenant or not and also to decide who among the rival claimants, is entitled for grant of occupancy rights. The learned Judge went on to state:
“If the Civil Court is held to have that power, it would lead to conflicting decisions on the same question, one by the Tribunal and another by the Civil Court”.
(emphasis supplied)
In 1978 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 459, the Division Bench of this Court having regard to various provisions of the Act repelled the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, that the question whether the leasehold rights belonged to the joint family or to Virupaxappa - the father of the appellant could not be decided by the Land Tribunal as it was not one of the questions which was required to be decided by the Tribunal under the Act. In the said Decision, the learned Counsel for the appellant placed reliance in support of his argument on the Decision of this Court rendered by a Division Bench in Kedari Yellappa Halagekar v. Jyotiba Yellappa Halagekar . R.F.A No. 26 of 1970 DD 11-6-1975.. But, the Court did not agree with the view taken in that Decision of Kedari Yellappa observing that the question which arose for consideration in that case was not seriously canvassed by either of the parties and the learned Judges who decided the case had not taken into consideration the amendments made in the Act by Karnataka Act No. 1 of 1974. That case arose out of a suit instituted in the year 1967 and it had been disposed of on the basis of the law as it stood then without reference to the change in the law. The Court proceeded to say:
“When, as in this case, one person applies for registration of the lands as an occupant in his individual name and three others apply for registration of the said lands in their name along with the other applicants as joint occupants, it becomes the duty of the Tribunal to decide whether only one of them was the sole tenant of the lands in question before the appointed day or whether all of them were jointly in possession of the lands as tenants. Without deciding the said question, it would not be possible for the Tribunal to make an effective order under Section 48A of the Act. In order to decide the said question, it becomes necessary for the Tribunal to decide whether the tenancy in question was held by one of them exclusively or by all the applicants jointly. We have to hold that under Section 48A, the Tribunal has that power having regard to the scope of that Section”.
(emphasis supplied)
In 1979 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 187, the learned Judge held that where there are rival claims of tenancy they can be decided by the Tribunal by finding out who amongst them was the tenant as defined in the Act. It is stated, broadly speaking rival claims may fall into two categories:
(1) cases where each claims himself to be the tenant as defined in the Act;
(2) rival claims wherein each claims occupancy rights not on the basis that he was a tenant as defined in the Act, but as a successor-in-interest of the original tenant or as a member of a joint family, the leasehold rights being the property of such a family.
The learned Judge having referred to Mudakappa's case, distinguished the same and observed that the rival claims may arise under circumstances different from those indicated in Mudakappa's case. A person may make his clam to a portion of the tenanted land as one of the heirs of the deceased tenant. A person may claim that he has acquired tenancy rights by survivorship. When such rights are denied the issues that arise would be entirely different involving not issues of tenancy, but complicated questions of personal and proprietary rights and any such decision on such questions may have far reaching consequences involving properties other than the tenanted lands also. Having considered various provisions, the Court concluded that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide rival claims of tenancy even where it becomes necessary to decide questions such as heirship, succession and existence of a joint family for the purpose of granting occupancy rights choosing one of the rival claimants and reserving liberty to other claimants to establish their rights, if any, in the land in question in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.
In 1982 (2) Karnataka Law Journal-565, the Division Bench of this Court having referred to the Decision in the cases of Mudakappa and Dhareppa has stated thus in para-20:
“We will now consider the decisions relied upon by the Counsel on both sides. Mr. Acharya strongly relied upon the decision of this Court in Mudakappa v. Rudrappa [1978 (1) Kar. L.J 459]. Therein, one of the members of the family had claimed occupancy rights on the ground that he alone was the tenant of the land in disputes to the exclusion of others. But the other members of the family contended that they were jointly cultivating the land as lessees along with the applicant and the tenancy belonged to the joint family and that was not divided in the partition. The question between the parties therein was therefore, mainly based on the possession and cultivation of the tenanted lands and it was in that context this Court has rightly observed that it was an incidental question the determination of which was within the powers of the Tribunal. It was observed therein that the question whether the tenancy was held by one of the members of the family exclusively or by all the applicants jointly would be a question incidental and ancillary to the main question to be decided, the main question being who was entitled to be registered as occupant. The question involved in the present case is quite different. The crux of the matter herein, as we have noted earlier, is as to the right of the appellants to claim a share in the occupancy right granted in respect of the plaint B Schedule properties. The decision in Mudakappa v. Rudrappa has been exhaustively considered by Venkatesh J. in Dhareppa v. State Of Karnataka & Ors. [1979 (1) Kar. L.J 18] wherein it was observed:
“Is it the intention of the legislature that all such issues like the existence of a joint family or coparcenary, whether a person is a member of a joint family; if he is, had he succeeded by survivorship to the property of such family; to what extent; and whether a person who claims to be an heir of the deceased tenant was in fact the heir; to what quantum of a share in the property of the deceased is he entitled to; and whether the will or the gift set up by a party is genuine or not, etc., should also be decided by the Tribunal? If we look at the broad scheme of the Act that does not appear to be the intention at all. On the other hand, the intention of the legislature was to allow such complicated questions to be fought out by the contesting parties in Civil Courts”.
The learned Judge after summarising the various provisions of the Act and the Rules, continued:
“Now while deciding the rights of rival claimants if it becomes necessary to decide questions such as heirship, succession and existence of a joint family, and the like, how should the Tribunal proceed with the matter? It cannot refer such issues to the Civil Courts. Even if the parties are already litigating in the Civil Court re: their respective rights the Tribunal cannot await the decision from that court keeping the applications pending before it. The only course that it can adopt is to choose one of the rival claimants for conferment of occupancy rights reserving liberty to other claimants claiming occupancy rights before it to establish their rights, if any in the land in question in a civil court of competent jurisdiction”.
We entirely agree with the above view expressed by Venkatesh J., we may only add that a person's right to get a share in the occupancy right does not depend upon the liberty being reserved by the Tribunal to approach the Civil Court, because as seen earlier, such a right is not extinguished by not approaching the Tribunal. It is pertinent to remember that the grant of occupancy right by the Tribunal in the name of a given individual in respect of joint family tenanted lands will not have the effect of converting that into a separate property of that individual. Nor the occupancy right granted in respect of a personal tenancy of that individual would acquire a different character. In both the cases, the antecedent tenancy rights are enlarged into permanent occupancy rights by doing away with the landlord. To put it shortly, the Act converts the leasehold into freehold and does no damage to the existing rights of the occupant's family or any member thereof”.
(emphasis supplied)
In 1983 (1) Karnataka Law Journal Short Notes Item No. 618, the Court has held that the Tribunal has no power to decide the shares of the heirs and apportion. The only course open to the Tribunal is to choose one of the rival claimants for conferring occupancy rights reserving opportunity to the other claimants to establish their rights in Civil Courts.
In 1983 (2) Karnataka Law Journal Short Notes Item No. 279, the Court has stated that if the Tribunal conferred occupancy rights as a joint family property in favour of the joint family, the party aggrieved can establish his exclusive right in the said property in a regular suit.
In ILR 1985 KAR 386, the Division Bench of this Court affirmed the view taken in Mudakappa's case and held that the Tribunal has the necessary jurisdiction and power to decide as to who is a tenant. A joint family can also be a tenant and that the Tribunal has the power to decide as to whether a joint family is a tenant or not under Section 112(B) of the Act.
In ILR 1987 KAR 333610 the Division Bench of this Court has taken the view that when an application filed under Section 48A of the Act comes up before the Tribunal, it has to necessarily examine the question as to whether the applicant is a tenant or not under Section 112(B)(b) and that it is the duty of the Tribunal to decide whether a person is a tenant or not. The Court proceeded to say that, therefore, it may be necessary for Land Tribunal to go into the question of genuineness or the validity of a will whenever such a will is the basis of a claim of a person, claiming to be a tenant.
8. In the light of the various provisions of the Act and the Decisions referred to above, it is clear that a joint family also could be a tenant. Under Section 44, all lands held by or in the possession of tenants immediately prior to the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, other than the lands held by them under leases permitted under Section 5, stood transferred and vested in the State Government. Notwithstanding anything in any decree or order of or certificate issued by any Court, with effect on and from the date of vesting and save as otherwise expressly provided, certain consequences, including all rights, title and interest vesting in the owners of such lands arid other persons interested in such lands, cease and vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Under Section 45 tenants are entitled to be registered as occupants subject to the provisions of the Act. Section 48A enables every person entitled to be registered as an occupant under Section 45 to make an application to the Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights. The Tribunal constituted under Section 48 of the Act, could enquire and determine applicant's claim or rival claim and pass order registering as occupant. The Tribunal under Section 48A has to decide whether the land is a tenanted land and if so, whether a person is a tenant over the said land and in case of rival claims of tenancy among them who is entitled for grant of occupancy rights. Section 112(B) states as to the duties of Tribunal, among others, it has the duty (a) to make necessary verification or hold the enquiry and pass orders relating to registration of tenant as occupant under Section 48A and (b) to decide whether a person is a tenant or not. Under Section 132 a bar of jurisdiction is created stating no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the authorities mentioned in the Section including the Tribunal. Under Section 133 of the Act, no Civil or Criminal Court or Officer or Authority shall in any suit, case or proceedings concerning the land decide the question whether such land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to 1st March, 1974. When such question arises, such Court or Officer or Authority shall stay the proceedings in so far as such question is concerned and refer the same to the Tribunal for decision. The Tribunal shah decide the question referred to it and communicate its decision to such Court, Officer or Authority and that the decision of the Tribunal shall be final. It is also made clear in the said Section that the Civil or Criminal Court or the Officer or Authority is not precluded in respect of any matter other than referred to in sub-section (1) of the said Section. These provisions make the position clear that in the matter of granting occupancy rights to a tenant and of deciding the question or issue relating to tenancy the exclusive jurisdiction is that of the Tribunal.
A combined reading of Sections 48A, 112(B)(b), 132 and 133 of the Act leaves no doubt whatsoever that the Civil Court cannot decide a question or issue relating to the tenancy. In this regard, the jurisdiction is specifically conferred on the Tribunal. In regard to grant of occupancy rights to a tenant, it is the Tribunal alone which is competent to go into the question of tenancy and decide whether the occupancy rights should or should not be granted to an applicant.
This being the position, an application made by a person exclusively claiming grant of occupancy rights as a tenant and another person making a rival claim of tenancy and grant of occupancy rights as a individual or on behalf of a joint family or for the benefit of a joint family can be considered only by the Tribunal and not by the Civil Court. Under Section 48A of the Act the Tribunal after holding enquiry has the jurisdiction to determine as to who is entitled for grant of occupancy rights among the rival claimants.
In the case of Mudakappa, the Division Bench of this Court has in clear terms stated, having regard to the various provisions of the Act mentioned therein and keeping in view the scope of Section 48A of the Act, that it is the duty of the Tribunal to decide whether only one of them was the sole tenant of the lands in question before the appointed day or whether all of them were jointly in possession of the lands as tenants and without deciding the said question it would not be possible for the Tribunal to make an effective order under Section 48A of the Act. It is noted that there is no provision in the Act to refer such an issue for the decision of the Civil Court. Under Section 48A(5) the Tribunal has to hold an enquiry into all rival claims made in respect of registration of the occupancy rights pertaining to agricultural lands. Thus, it is clear that the Land Tribunal is competent to decide for the purpose of disposing of the applications under Section 48A the question whether the lease hold rights were held exclusively by the applicant or by the joint family.
In Guruvappa's Case the Division Bench of this Court agreeing with the view taken by this Court in Mudakappa's case has stated that the word ‘person’ includes a joint family and in view of Explanation-II to Section 2 the Tribunal has the power to decide whether a joint family is or is not a tenant under Section 112(B)(b) of the Act. It was also made clear in that case that if there was any other person who was a member of the joint family, whose name was not included, his rights would not be affected as he could agitate and get his rights settled in a Civil Court claiming share in the property.
The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Appi Belchadthi in para-20 of the Judgment has agreed with the observations made in Mudakappa's case, which case was exhaustively considered by Venkatesh, J. in Dhareppa's case. From the discussion made in paras 10 to 20 of the said Judgment it follows that it becomes necessary for the Tribunal to decide the rival claims and confer occupancy rights to a person whoever is entitled to including the joint family.
In Dhareppa's case, Venkatesh J. expressed the view:
“Now while deciding the rights of rival claimants if it becomes necessary to decide questions such as heirship, succession and existence of a joint family, and the like, how should the Tribunal proceed with the matter? It cannot refer such issues to the Civil Courts. Even if the parties are already litigating in the civil court re: their respective rights the Tribunal cannot await the decision from that court keeping the applications pending before it. The only course that it can adopt is to choose one of the rival claimants for conferment of occupancy rights reserving liberty to other claimants claiming occupancy rights before it to establish their rights, if any in the land in question in a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction”.
The Division Bench in Appi Belchadthi's Case entirely agreed with the said view. Once the occupancy rights are granted, the lease hold rights stand converted into freehold rights without damaging the rights of the occupant's family or any member thereof. It is always open to the member or members of the family to claim their share or rights in Civil Court over the lands on which occupancy rights are granted by establishing their right or interest in the property.
The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Timmakka Kom Venkanna Naik has also taken the similar view as to the scope of Section 48A and the duty of the Tribunal to decide whether a person is a tenant or not.
Thus, looking to the text aid context of the Decisions in the cases of Mudukappa, Appi Belchadthi and Guruvappa, there appears to be no conflict among them. The legal position that emerges is, while deciding the rights of rival claimants, if it becomes necessary to decide questions incidental and or ancillary to the main question to be decided, the main question being who is entitled to be registered as an occupant, the Tribunal has to necessarily examine the question as to whether the applicant is a tenant or not arid without deciding such question it cannot effectively discharge its duty of disposing of the applications filed under Section 48A of the Act. The grant of occupancy rights by the Tribunal to an individual in respect of joint family tenanted lands will not have the effect of converting that into a separate property of that individual nor the occupancy rights granted in respect of personal tenancy of that individual would acquire a different character. After grant of occupancy rights in respect of an agricultural land, the lease hold rights stand converted into freehold rights without damaging the existing rights of the occupant's family or any member thereof. It is open to the parties to get their share, title or interest decided in the Civil Court in the property in respect of which occupancy rights are granted under Section 48A of the Act.
9. The argument of Sri G.S Visveswara, that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide as to whether the lands in question were joint family properties or exclusive properties belonging to the persons, cannot be accepted because the Tribunal was not called upon to decide these rights, but the Tribunal was called upon to decide, only the rival claims of tenancy for the purpose of grant of occupancy rights, which was precisely done by the Tribunal and Appellate Authority in the instant case.
10. In the light of what is stated above, we answer the Questions Referred to us as follows:
(1) The Tribunals have jurisdiction to go into all questions bearing upon whether the applicant is a tenant or not under Section 112(B)(b) of the Act for the purpose of deciding the claim of occupancy rights made under Section 48A of the Act.
(2) It is open to the Land Tribunal to decide all questions that arise while considering Form No. 7 for the purpose of granting or refusing the occupancy rights claimed therein.
(3) In view of the answers to Questions 1 and 2, the Answer to Question No. 3 follows, that the Land Tribunal takes into its jurisdiction all controversies having bearing upon the claim in order to decide the question whether a person is a tenant or not.
(4) In the light of the discussion made above with reference to the cases referred to in Question No. 4, we are of the opinion there is no conflict among Mudukappa's Case [1978 (1) Karnataka Law Journal 459]; Guruvappa's Case (ILR 1985 KAR 386) and Appi Belchadthi's Case [1982 (2) Karnataka Law Journal 565]. As to the Decision in Yellappa's Case (R.F.A No. 26 of 1975 D.D 11-6-1975) the position is made clear in para-11 in the case of Mudukappa, which holds good.
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