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Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax v. S.P.C Murthy

Karnataka High Court
Jan 31, 1991
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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The assessments under the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1973-1974, 1974-1975 and 1975-1976 were originally completed on 28-11-1974, 10-12-1975 and 10-12-1975 respectively. During assessment proceedings for the year 1976-1977, the assessing authority referred the matter of valuation to the Government valuer. The Government valuer produced a report valuing the property with reference to the valuation date of 31-3-1977, showing values materially higher than those accepted in the earlier assessments.

On the basis of that later report the Wealth-tax Officer reopened the earlier assessments (for the three years listed above) under Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act, concluding there had been escapement of wealth. In reopening, the officer did not simply adopt the later valuation: he reduced the Government valuer's figures by certain percentages (examples in the record include a 20% reduction, a 10% reduction, and in one year no reduction) to estimate the values as on the earlier valuation dates and then reassessed the wealth returns upward.

The assessee objected; the assessing authority overruled the objection. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the assessee's contention that a valuation report made with reference to a subsequent date cannot furnish the requisite "information" for reopening earlier assessments, treating such reliance as a mere change of opinion. The Revenue appealed to the Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), which affirmed the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's order. The Revenue then posed a reference question on whether the ITAT was right in law in holding that the Government valuer's report did not constitute "information" under Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act despite the higher values shown in that report.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the report of the Government valuer (which valued the property with reference to a subsequent valuation date) would not constitute "information" for the purposes of Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act, even though the value shown by the Government valuer was much higher than the value shown by the assessee's valuer.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Revenue) — Position as reflected in the opinion

  • The Revenue reopened the earlier assessments under Section 17(1)(b) after obtaining the Government valuer's report prepared during assessment proceedings for 1976-1977, treating that report as information indicating escapement of wealth in the earlier years.
  • The assessing officer relied upon the Government valuer's higher valuations for 31-3-1977 and adjusted those figures (by deducting certain percentages) to derive what he considered to be the values as on the earlier valuation dates, and on that basis reassessed the earlier years.
  • The Revenue referred earlier authorities (for example, Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Karnataka v. M. Ramachandran) in support of its contention, but specifics of its full argumentation beyond reliance on the later valuer's report are not detailed in the opinion excerpt.

Respondent (Assessee) — Position as reflected in the opinion

  • The assessee objected to reopening on the ground that the Government valuer's report referred to a later valuation date and therefore could not constitute the kind of "information" contemplated by Section 17(1)(b) to reopen assessments for earlier years.
  • Mr. Chanderkumar, counsel for the assessee, relied upon this Court's decision in M.S. Vasudev v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, where the Court held a valuer's report to be "information" only because that report valued the property with reference to the relevant valuation date itself (i.e., it was not a report valuing the property as on a subsequent date and then traced back).
  • The Appellate Assistant Commissioner adopted the position that the later report amounted to a mere change of opinion rather than new information and therefore was not a valid basis for reopening.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.S. Vasudev v. Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax, Karnataka (TRC Nos. 18 & 19/1983) (DD: 18-6-1990) The report of an official valuer constituted "information" under Section 17(1)(b) where the valuer's report valued the property with reference to the relevant valuation date (i.e., the report gave a definite expert opinion as to value on the relevant date). The Court distinguished this case from the present facts: in M.S. Vasudev the valuer's report related to the relevant valuation date itself, whereas in the instant case the Government valuer's report related to a later date (31-3-1977) and the assessing officer attempted to trace back values for earlier dates by deducting arbitrary percentages.
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Karnataka v. M. Ramachandran (TRC Nos. 3 to 10 of 1985) (14-1-1991) Reassessment based on material (including valuer's report) where there was detailed investigation and definite material with reference to the relevant valuation dates; where valuation by the valuation cell/District Valuation Officer was with reference to the particular valuation date. The Court held this decision was not applicable de hors its peculiar facts because there the valuation was made with reference to the specific valuation dates and there was detailed investigation; thus the facts differed from the present case where the Government valuer's report was for a subsequent date and the assessing officer himself estimated backward by percentages.
Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax v. V.N. Shankar (8 & 9/1984) (DD: 4-1-1991) Consideration of whether valuation material could be treated as "information" depends on facts and circumstances; recognition that market value is prone to fluctuation; valuation differences often arise from expert opinion variances. This Court relied on the principles discussed in V.N. Shankar, including the proposition that whether material is "information" is fact-specific and that valuation inherently fluctuates, making reliance on later valuations to fix earlier values problematic without supporting material.
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Gujarat-III v. Chhatrshal Sinhji D. Zala (135 ITR 826) Case law regarding treatment of valuation reports as information (considered by the Court). The Gujarat High Court decision was among earlier authorities considered in V.N. Shankar and referred to as part of the broader jurisprudence on valuation and information; the opinion notes it was considered but does not state a direct, distinct application beyond that reflection.
Dr. Kekihormusji Gharda v. B.H. Raisinghani, Wealth Tax Officer, Companies Circle III (Bombay) (135 ITR, p.386) Case law regarding valuation and treatment as information (considered alongside other authorities). Referred to by the Court when discussing the body of case law on valuation differences and the treatment of valuer reports in reassessment proceedings; no separate application beyond consideration is set out in the opinion excerpt.
Amrut Talkies v. Second Income-Tax Officer (150 ITR 386) — (Puttaswamy, J.) Authority concerning valuation and related tax procedure (cited as part of jurisprudence reviewed). Referenced among authorities considered in the Court's review of valuation issues and the legal framework governing valuation differences; the opinion does not elaborate additional specific application beyond noting it was considered.
K.G. Kemptur v. Second Wealth Tax Officer, Hubli (146 ITR 611) — (Puttaswamy, J.) Authority concerning valuation principles and tax procedure (cited as part of jurisprudence reviewed). Included among the authorities the Court reviewed in assessing the question whether later valuation reports can constitute "information" for reopening; the opinion treats it as part of the context without separate, specific application details here.
Income-tax Act, Chapter XX and Section 269 (statutory recognition) Statutory recognition of the possibility of variation in valuations by different valuers and the legislative scheme relevant to valuation differences. The Court considered the scheme of Chapter XX and Section 269 to emphasise that variation in valuation opinions is statutorily acknowledged, supporting the view that differing valuations alone do not automatically amount to information justifying reopening.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by focusing on the factual manner in which the assessing officer sought to reopen the earlier assessments. The key analytical steps recorded in the opinion are:

  1. The Court observed that valuation is not an exact science but an expert estimate and that different valuers can legitimately reach different conclusions. This inherent propensity for fluctuation in market value was emphasized (drawing on previous decisions and the statutory context).
  2. The Government valuer's report was prepared with reference to a later valuation date (31-3-1977). The assessing officer did not have a report giving a definite expert opinion as to the value on the earlier valuation dates; instead, he attempted to estimate earlier values by reducing the 31-3-1977 figures by certain percentages (for example, 20% and 10% in specific years).
  3. The percentage reductions applied by the assessing officer were the officer's own estimates and inferences rather than figures supported by any expert evidence or material demonstrating that prices fluctuated by those particular percentages between the relevant dates. The Court noted there was "absolutely no material" to show that values had changed only by the percentages selected.
  4. The Court drew attention to the practical difficulties and inherent arbitrariness in using later valuations to estimate earlier values without supporting evidence: selecting a percentage to add or deduct is problematic because property prices may change for diverse reasons (development activity, rumours, subjective approaches by valuers), and in a city such as Bangalore prices could change substantially year to year.
  5. Because the matter involved reopening completed assessments, the Court stressed that the burden on the Revenue to justify such reopening is heavy. The information relied on to invoke Section 17(1)(b) must be legally admissible material, not merely a subjective, inferential fact or a change of opinion.
  6. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the Government valuer's report (being for a subsequent date) combined with the assessing officer's own percentage deductions amounted to guesswork rather than the kind of admissible information that would reasonably persuade the assessing authority to reopen the proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The report of the Government valuer would not constitute "information" under Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act in the facts and circumstances of this case.

Implications:

  • The Court answered the reference question in the affirmative and against the Revenue — i.e., the ITAT was right in law in holding that the Government valuer's report did not constitute information justifying reopening under Section 17(1)(b) for the years in question.
  • The direct practical effect is that the reassessments based on tracing back the later valuation by applying arbitrary percentage deductions and treating the later report as information cannot be sustained on these facts.
  • The opinion frames its conclusion as fact-specific: the Court repeatedly notes that whether material amounts to "information" depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Accordingly, this decision is grounded in the particular factual matrix (report dated to a later valuation date and absence of supporting material for the percentage adjustments) rather than announcing an absolute rule that all later valuations can never be information in any circumstance.
  • Because the Court's determination rests on the facts and circumstances of the present case (absence of expert material to support the tracing-back exercise and the subjective nature of the deductions), the broader applicability of the principle to other fact patterns will turn on their own evidential details.
Show all summary ...

1. Under the provisions of the Wealth-tax, the following question is referred for our opinion:

“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the ITAT is right in law in holding that the report of the Government valuer would not constitute information for Section 17(1)(b) of the W.T Act even though the value shown is much higher than the value shown by the assessee's valuer?”

2. The assessment years in question are 1973-1974, 1974-1975 and 1975-1976. The wealth-tax assessments were completed on 28-11-1974, 10-12-1975 and 10-12-1975 respectively. However, in the course of assessment proceedings for the year 1976-1977 the matter of valuation was referred to the Government valuer. On the basis of the report obtained for the year 1976-1977, the Wealth-tax Officer opined that the properties in question were undervalued during the earlier three years referred to above. Consequently he reopened those assessments under Section 17(1)(b) of the Wealth-tax Act. The objection of the assessee was overruled by the assessing authority. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted the contention of the assessee holding that the report of the valuer for the subsequent year cannot be a valid information to reopen the assessments in respect of the earlier years. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the earlier assessments were made on the basis of the report of the approved valuer and therefore, the subsequent report was nothing but a change of opinion which cannot be treated as an ‘information’ for the purpose of Section 17 of the Wealth-tax Act. The Revenue went up in appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal affirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The reasoning of the Appellate Tribunal is very relevant which also brings about the salient facts necessary to appreciate the case. The Tribunal observes:

“The Wealth-tax Officer had completed the assessment on the basis of this valuation report. Later the Wealth-tax Officer referred the matter to the Government valuer during the course of the assessment proceedings for the year 1976-1977. The valuation report as on 31-3-1977 was made the ‘information’ for purpose of reopening the assessments. From the order of the Wealth-tax Officer, it is seen that he has not accepted the Government valuer's report as it related to a later valuation date. He reduced it by 20%. It is after reducing such a percentage he has come to the conclusion that there has been an escapement of income. For the year 1974-1975 he has reduced it by 10%. He has not made any reduction in the last year. We agree with the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that no new fact or information has come on record. Valuation is not an exact science. Valuation is necessarily an estimate made by experts and two different valuers have made two different estimates. It cannot, therefore, be said that the valuation report of the Government valuer is a definite information with reference to the value of the property.”

3. From the above, it is clear that the assessing authority estimated the value of the properties as on the valuation dates of the previous years by tracing back from the value given by the valuer with reference to 31-3-1977. For this purpose, certain percentage from the valuation furnished by the valuer was reduced and after this reduction, the figure arrived at is taken as the value of the properties for the purpose of reopening the assessments. For example, the wealth return accepted by the assessing authority for the year 1973-1974 was Rs. 4,24,500/-. This was reassessed as Rs. 8,44,000/- by resort to the above method. Similarly for the year 1974-1975 Rs. 6,24,598/- was reassessed as Rs. 9,43,012/- and for the next year 1975-1976 Rs. 6,51,221/- reassessed as Rs. 10,21,400/-. In these circumstances, the aforesaid question was raised by the Revenue for reference in respect of these three years. Mr. Chanderkumar, learned counsel for the assessee, relied upon a decision of this Court in M.S Vasudev v. Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax., Karnataka, TRC Nos. 18 & 19/1983 - DD: 18-6-1990. In the said case during the pendency of the assessment proceedings, the assessing officer called for valuation report of the building involved therein, from the official valuer. But without waiting for the report, he completed the assessment. Subsequently the valuation report was received and on that basis the assessment was reopened. This Court held that the report of the valuer was an ‘information’ and therefore proceedings for reassessment could be under Section 17(1)(b). It is to be noticed here that the report of the official valuer therein, valued the property in question with reference to the valuation date itself. The report was not to value the property on a subsequent date. Therefore, the Wealth-tax Officer had a definite expert opinion as to the value of the property as on the relevant valuation date. It was not a case of the valuation report being of a subsequent year which was relied upon as an information and while reassessing the valuation, certain percentage from the value of the subsequent date was reduced. TRC Nos. 3 to 10 of 1985, Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Karnataka v. M. Ramachandran was also referred by the learned counsel for the revenue. This was decided on 14-1-1991. In the said cases for the assessment years 1964-1965 to 1971-1972, assessments were made in March, 1973. They were reopened under Section 17 because certain deductions were not allowable while computing the value. In the reassessment proceedings, the Wealth-tax Officer referred the matter for valuation to the valuation cell. No doubt, the valuer's report dated 12-1-1973 in respect of the assessment year 1972-1973 was also relied therein. Question No. 2 referred therein was not quite accurate and it was reformulated and thereafter the answer given was based entirely on the facts and circumstances of the said case. The assessment order therein shows that there was a detailed investigation before the reassessment was effected and there was definite material with the assessing authority regarding the valuation of the properties in question with reference to the relevant valuation dates. Therefore, the said decision cannot be applied to the facts of the present case, de hors the peculiar facts of the said case. The District Valuation Officer of the Income-tax Department had valued the properties therein with reference to the particular valuation date applicable to the relevant assessment year. Therefore, it was not a case where the assessing authority himself formed an opinion about the valuation of the property.

4. This Court had an occasion to consider this question in detail in The Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax v. V.N Shankar.. 8 & 9/1984, DD: 4-1-1991. In the said decision this Court considered a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Gujarath-III v. Chhatrshal Sinhji D. Zala, 135 ITR 826 and of Bombay High Court reported in the same volume at p. 386, Dr. Kekihormusji Gharda v. B.H Raisinghani, Wealth Tax Officer, Companies Circle III (2), Bombay, in addition to referring to two decisions of Puttaswamy, J. in Amrut Talkies v. Second Income-Tax Officer., 150 ITR 386 and in K.G Kemptur v. Second Wealth Tax Officer, Hubli Circle, Hubli, 146 ITR 611. Further, this Court also considered the scheme of Chapter XX of the Income-tax Act and the statutory recognition found in Section 269 of the said Act, about the possibility of variation in the valuations in respect of the same property by different valuers. The other factors referred to therein are found at paras 3 and 4, thus:

“Propensity to fluctuate is inherent in the market value due to several factors. Therefore, it is not a safe rule to estimate the market value as on a particular day, with reference to the market value available on a much later date; one difficulty is the selection of the percentage, as to, what is to be added or deducted.

A sudden spurt in demand for property in a particular locality due to actual developmental activities or because of rumour as to a possible development of the locality cannot be ruled out. In another case, the valuation done by one valuer may depend upon his subjective approach to some facts of valuation only.”

5. Thereafter at para-10 it was observed thus:

“Whether a particular material could be used as an information depends upon the facts of each case. Theoretically, the valuation of a particular property by the valuation officer cannot be brushed aside as not an information at all; though the said valuation is essentially the result of the opinion of the valuer. The said opinion is yet to be used in evidence to arrive at the market value of the property. But the question posed for our answer is not dependent upon the theoretical aspect of the question. The answer to the question depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The purpose of the information should be such that it should reasonably persuade the assessing authority to reopen the proceedings.”

6. In the said case the difference was found to be marginal and it was held that the same cannot be treated as an information for the purpose of Section 17(1)(b) of the Act.

7. In the instant case, the reopening is done not just by applying the valuation of the property furnished by the valuer. The said valuation given by the valuer was with reference to a subsequent date. From this valuation the Wealth-tax Officer deducted certain percentages to estimate the value as on the earlier valuation dates. There is absolutely no material that the value of the property fluctuated only by 10% or 20% as the case may be; the percentage for deduction selected by the Wealth-tax Officer was an entirely his own estimate and inference. It was not based on any expert opinion. It cannot be said that the value of the property was just about 20% less than the subsequent year. This again depends upon the developmental activity that took place in the locality and various other unidentifiable factors. In a developed City like Bangalore the prices of the immoveable property may shoot up year to year not by a few percentages only.

8. Since it is a case of reopening the assessment, the burden is quite heavy on the revenue to establish the factors that warrants the exercise of the power. The information that has to be the basis for an action under Section 17(1)(b) should be a legally admissible material and cannot be just a subjective inferential fact. In the absence of any material to indicate the percentage of fluctuation in the prices of the immoveable property, it will be an entirely guess work to deduct a few percentage from the subsequent year's valuation to arrive at the valuation for the previous years. In these circumstances, it is not possible for us to uphold the contention of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the report of the Government valuer would not constitute information under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act.

9. The answer to the question referred to us therefore is in the affirmative and against the revenue.