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B.S Viswanath v. Chandikaben J. Mehta

Karnataka High Court
Jul 31, 1989
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rama Jois, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The subject property was originally owned by Nanjamma, who executed a registered usufructuary mortgage in favour of the appellant (mortgagee) dated 22-7-1974 for Rs. 21,500 with a mortgage period of ten years. After the mortgage period expired, Nanjamma filed O.S. No. 3189/87 seeking redemption. According to the respondents, Nanjamma sold the property to them by a registered sale deed dated 11-12-1987 and then withdrew that suit.

Thereafter respondents (plaintiffs) filed a suit for redemption on 7-4-1988 and deposited Rs. 21,500 in Court on 1-8-1988. The appellant was initially served but did not appear and was placed ex parte; P.W.1 (the third respondent) was examined on 23-1-1989. The appellant subsequently appeared, was permitted to file a written statement, and in that written statement admitted the mortgage transaction (amount and ten-year period) but asserted entitlement to additional amounts allegedly advanced to Nanjamma, taxes paid, and improvement costs; he also specifically denied that the respondents had become owners by purchase from Nanjamma.

The trial Court framed multiple issues (including whether the plaintiffs proved title and purchase subject to the mortgage, and various contentions of additional sums claimed by the defendant). Relying on the appellant's admission of the mortgage, the trial Court allowed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C. and passed a partial decree for redemption in favour of the respondents. The appellant challenged that order by way of this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the lower Court had jurisdiction to pass a decree under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C. on the basis of the appellant's admission regarding the mortgage deed when the appellant had denied the respondents' title and a specific issue on title had been framed?
  2. Whether the respondents had in fact purchased the property from Nanjamma and thereby acquired title and interest to the property (issue of purchase/title)?
  3. Whether the mortgage deed was genuine and whether the appellant took possession under the usufructuary mortgage (issue of mortgage and possession)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that mere admission of the mortgage transaction was not sufficient to entitle the trial Court to pass a partial decree under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C., because the respondents' title to the property was disputed; hence the trial Court should have recorded a finding on title after hearing evidence from both sides.
  • In support, the appellant relied on the judgment in Janardhan Jog v. Srikrishna, which was interpreted to mean that an admission enabling a partial decree must be absolute and self-sufficient to constitute the basis for the decree.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents argued that a mortgagee cannot impeach the title of the mortgagor (and, by extension, a transferee of the mortgagor's rights cannot impeach the mortgagor's title), so the trial Court could properly pass a decree under Order 12, Rule 6 on the admitted mortgage transaction without determining title.
  • They relied on the decision in C. Krishnamurthy Setty v. Abdul Khadar to support the proposition that a mortgagee who has taken possession under a usufructuary mortgage is estopped from contesting the mortgagor's title; respondents argued therefore it was unnecessary to decide title before granting the redemption order.
  • The respondents also submitted that the appellant's denial of their title was a technical delaying tactic designed to prolong his possession, and that it would be unjust to allow him to continue possession after the deposit of the mortgage money.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Janardhan Jog v. Srikrishna The admission required to give jurisdiction to pass a partial decree under Order 12, Rule 6 must be an absolute admission and sufficient by itself to constitute a basis for the decree. The Court respectfully agreed with this view and applied it to hold that an admission of the mortgage transaction alone was not sufficient to support a partial decree under Order 12, Rule 6 when respondents' title was specifically denied and remained an issue.
C. Krishnamurthy Setty v. Abdul Khadar It is not permissible for a mortgagee (or a transferee of his rights) to impeach the mortgagor's title; a mortgagee who has taken possession under a usufructuary mortgage is estopped from contesting the mortgagor's title. The Court acknowledged this principle (as relied on by the respondents) but noted that the rule applies where purchase/transfer has been proved or admitted. Because there was no admission by the appellant that respondents had acquired title (and respondents had specifically pleaded otherwise), this precedent could not justify passing a partial decree under Order 12, Rule 6 in the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court started from the text of Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C., including the State Amendment, which permits the Court in its discretion to make an order or give judgment having regard to admissions of fact made in pleadings or otherwise, without waiting for determination of other questions between the parties. The Court emphasized that the admissible facts must be "complete and sufficient" to support the partial decree the Court proposes to pass.

Applying that standard, the Court analyzed the factual matrix: the appellant had admitted the mortgage deed, its amount (Rs. 21,500) and the ten-year period; the respondents had deposited that sum in Court. However, the appellant had also specifically pleaded that the respondents had not purchased the property and had not become owners. Because the acquisition of title by the respondents was a distinct, material issue (indeed one of the two real issues identified by the Court below), the Court held that the admission of the mortgage deed alone did not constitute an absolute admission sufficient by itself to authorize the trial Court to pass a partial decree under Order 12, Rule 6.

The Court considered the authority relied upon by the parties. It agreed with Janardhan Jog v. Srikrishna that admissions must be self-sufficient to justify a decree. It also considered the principle from C. Krishnamurthy Setty v. Abdul Khadar that a mortgagee is estopped from impeaching the mortgagor’s title, but noted that the principle requires proof or admission of purchase/transfer where that is in issue. In this case there was no admission (and there was a specific denial) that respondents acquired title from Nanjamma, and therefore that principle could not be invoked to bypass deciding the title issue before granting the redemption decree.

The Court also observed that while the appellant's denial of purchase may have been a delaying tactic to prolong possession, such conduct did not provide jurisdictional authority to the trial Court to grant a decree under Order 12, Rule 6 on the basis of the mortgage admission alone. The proper remedy was to expedite recording of evidence on the ownership/purchase issue and, if purchase was established, then pass the decree.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER UNDER ORDER 12, RULE 6 C.P.C. SET ASIDE.

Direct effects on the parties:

  • The trial Court's order granting a partial decree under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C. (based solely on the appellant's admission of the mortgage deed) was set aside.
  • The matter is remitted to the trial Court, which is directed to dispose of the case most expeditiously, the Court noting that respondents have long since deposited the mortgage money and that the principal material issue remaining is whether the respondents purchased the suit property.

Broader implications:

  • The opinion applies and reiterates existing principles regarding the limits of Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C.—specifically that admissions must be complete and sufficient to constitute a basis for a decree—and endorses the view in Janardhan Jog v. Srikrishna. The Court did not purport to establish any new legal precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not include information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Rama Jois, J.:— This appeal is presented by the appellant/defendant against an order for partial decree made by the Xth Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore in a suit filed by respondents 1 to 3.

2. The facts of the case are these: The house property which is the subject matter, for a decree for redemption belonged to one Nanjamma. She had mortgaged the said property in favour of the appellant, by a Registered Mortgage deed dated 22-7-74. The period of mortgage was 10 years. The amount borrowed was Rs. 21,500/-. After the period of mortgage was over said Nanjamma filed O.S No. 3189/87 seeking redemption of the mortgaged property. Thereafter, according to the respondents, she sold the property in their favour by registered sale deed dated 11-12-1987 and withdrew the suit. After purchasing the house property the respondents/plaintiffs filed the suit for redemption on 7-4-1988. On 1st August, 1988, and they also deposited the mortgage money of Rs. 21,500/- in the Court. Though the defendant/appellant had been served with the notice in the suit, they did not appear before the Court. In the circumstances, the appellant/defendant was placed exparte and on behalf of plaintiffs/respondents the third respondent was examined as P.W 1 on 23-1-1989. Thereafter the appellant appeared and made an application to permit him to file the written statement and to contest the case and his prayer was granted. He then filed his written statement. In the written statement, the appellant admitted the mortgage transaction and also admitted that the mortgage was for a sum of Rs. 21,500/- and the period of mortgage was 10 years. The appellant, however, stated that he was entitled to receive some more amount, which is said to have been advanced by him to Nanjamma and he also claimed to receive the money equal to tax paid to the Corporation and also the amount spent on improvement of the property. But the fact remains, the appellant/defendant did admit the mortgage transaction and according to the mortgage deed, the period of mortgage was 10 years and the amount of mortgage was Rs. 21,500/- and therefore, as the period of mortgage had come to an end, the mortgagor was entitled to seek redemption of the property on depositing a sum of Rs. 21,500/- which is the only amount due under the mortgage deed. But the appellant/defendant took a specific plea in the written statement that the respondents have not purchased the property from Nanjamma and they had not become the owner of the property.

3. In the circumstances, on the basis of the plaint and the written statement, the following issues were framed by Court below:—

1. Do the plaintiffs prove their title to the suit schedule property?

2. Do the plaintiffs prove that they have purchased the suit schedule property subject to the encumbrance of mortgage by their vendor under the usufructuary mortgage deed dated 22-7-1974 for Rs. 21,500/- and entitled for redemption of the same?

3. Do the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled for possession of suit schedule property?

4. Do the plaintiffs prove that the defendant attempted to encumber or otherwise part with possession of their property?

5. Whether the defendant proves that he paid Rs. 31,500/- to Nanjamma under the mortgage Deed dated 22-7-1974?

6. Whether the defendant proves that he has got the charge over the suit property for another Rs. 5,000/- to Nanjamma and another Rs. 5,000/- to Hemanna?

7. Whether the defendant proves that he has spent Rs. 7,000/- for the preservation of the suit property and entitled for the said amount with 21% per annum interest?

8. Whether the defendant proves the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?

9. What reliefs & what order?”

4. Though large number of issues have been framed the real issues were only two, namely (i) whether the respondents had purchased the property from Nanjamma through a registered sale deed and had thereby acquired title and interest to the property and (ii) whether the mortgage deed was true and the appellant took possession of the property in question under the aforesaid usufructuary mortgage?

5. At this stage, as the appellant had admitted the mortgage transaction the respondents filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for partial decree on the basis of the admission. The learned Judge allowed the said application taking the view that the mortgage transaction having been admitted by the appellant and as according to the mortgage deed, the period of mortgage of 10 years was over, and the amount due under the mortgage was only Rs. 21,500/- and as the said amount had been deposited by the respondents in Court, the partial decree should be passed under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C and accordingly passed the decree. As regards the plea of the appellant/defendant that some more money was due from Nanjamma, the Court took the view that once the mortgage deed was admitted the appellant could not resist the prayer for redemption on the plea some more money not mentioned in the mortgage was due to the appellant. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant has presented this appeal.

6. The precise question which arises for consideration in this case is:

Whether the lower Court had the jurisdiction to pass a decree under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C on the basis of the admission made by the appellant regarding the mortgage deed even though the appellant had denied the title of respondents to the suit property and infact a specific issue to that effect had been framed?

7. The provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 including the State Amendment reads:—

“(6)(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such Judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.

State Amendment - 6(2):

The Court may also of its own motion make such order or give such Judgment as it may consider just, having regard to the admissions made by the parties.”

8. As can be seen from the above provision, the Court in its discretion has the jurisdiction to pass partial decree on the basis of the facts admitted, whether such admission is in the pleadings or otherwise. The clear scope of the above provision is, the admission must be such which is complete and sufficient to pass a partial decree, which the Court proposes to pass on the basis of admission. Therefore, in the present case if the title of the respondent was not disputed, in that, the appellant had either admitted that the respondent had purchased the property from Nanjamma or had not denied the specific claim made in the plaint that they had purchased the property under a registered sale deed dated 11-12-1987, the Court would have been within its jurisdiction to pass a decree under Order 12 Rule 6 as the mortgage transaction was admitted and it would have been sufficient to pass partial decree which the Court below has passed in the present case.

9. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the admission of the mortgage transaction was not sufficient to pass the partial decree under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C as the title of the respondent to the property was disputed and therefore, it was necessary for the Court below to record a finding on the said issue after recording evidence adduced by both the parties. In support of the contention, the learned Counsel for the appellant relies on the Judgment of this Court in Janardhan Jog v. Srikrishna.1 In the said Judgment, Shivashankar Bhat, J., interpreting the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6, held that admission for giving jurisdiction to pass a partial decree under the provision should be an absolute admission and it must be such as would be sufficient by itself to pass the decree and that if the admitted facts cannot stand independently so as to constitute a basis for passing a decree, no partial decree under Order 12 Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code would be passed. We respectfully agree with the said view.

10. Learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs however, contended that the mortgagee could not impeach the title of the mortgagor and therefore answering that issue was unnecessary and therefore, the Court was within its jurisdiction to pass partial decree under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of this contention he relied on the Judgment of this Court in C. Krishnamurthy Setty v. Abdul Khadar.2 In the said case this Court held that it was not permissible to a mortgagee or a transferee of his rights, to impeach the title of the mortgagor to the mortgaged property and in the case of usufructuary mortgage when possession of the properties had been obtained from the mortgagor, the mortgagee is estopped from contesting the title of the mortgagor. The ratio of the said decision is, a mortgagee could not impeach the title of his mortgagor to the property mortgaged, even if the latter had no right or title to the property for, having secured the mortgage deed in his favour from the mortgagor and having taken possession of the mortgaged property from him, he cannot turn round and say that the mortgagor had no title to the mortgaged property. This position holds good even to the purchaser of the property from the mortgagor, but the purchase has to be proved, if disputed. In the present case, if the purchase of the mortgaged property by the respondents had been admitted either in the written statement or in the reply to the suit notice or in any other way, the Court would have been within its jurisdiction to pass partial decree under Order 12. Rule 6 Civil Procedure Code. But there was no such admission and far from that there was specific plea to the effect that respondents had not become the owners of property by purchasing it from Nanjamma. Therefore, in our opinion the Court could not have passed the partial decree under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, only on the basis of the admission by the appellant of the mortgage transaction in the absence of any admission as to the acquisition of title by the respondents to the suit property.

11. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellant, who has no right to remain in possession of the property as the mortgage period had come to an end, was taking a technical plea for dragging the proceedings and it would be unjust to allow him to continue in the property even after the deposit of the entire mortgage amount by the respondents. It appears to be true that the appellant has taken a plea in the written statement that the respondents had not acquired the title only with the object of delaying the passing of decree against him, so that he might continue in possession of the mortgaged house as long as possible, but such conduct of his gives no jurisdiction to the Court to pass a decree under Order 12, Rule 6 C.P.C, for the reasons stated earlier. The only course open to the Court was to expedite the recording of evidence regarding the acquisition of ownership of the property by the respondent and if the finding were to be that the appellant had purchased the property from Nanjamma proceed to pass the decree in favour of the respondents.

12. In the result, we make the following:—

i) The appeal is allowed.

ii) The order passed by the Court below under Order 12, Rule 6 of C.P.C, is set aside.

iii) The Court below is directed to dispose of the case most expeditiously, particularly, having regard to the fact that the respondents have deposited the mortgage money long back and the only material issue to be decided is as to whether the respondents have purchased the suit property.