M.P Ananthadevaraja Urs v. State Of Karnataka

K.A Swami, J.:—

In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has sought for the following reliefs:

“The petitioner therefore, prays that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, direction order:

a) declaring the order No. FD 50 CRC 86 Bangalore dated 25-11-86 (Annexure-M) passed by the first respondent as illegal, unconstitutional and ultravires of provisions of Section 4 of the Mysore Race Course Licensing Act, 1952;

b) directing the first respondent not to enforce the conditions stipulated in order dated 25-11-86;

c) declaring that the provisions of Section 8 of the Mysore Race Couse Licensing Act, 1952 are void, unconstitutional and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; and grant

d) any other reliefs that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case including an order as to costs in the interests of justice and equity.”

Annexure-M as it stood at the time of filing of the Writ Petition was as follows:

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Mysore Race Course Licensing Act, 1952 (Karnataka Act 8 of 1952) the Government of Karnataka are pleased to stipulate the following additional condition to the licenses granted to the Bangalore Turf Club in Forms II and III under the Mysore Race Course Licensing Rules, 1952, namely:—

“The licensee shall obtain prior approal of the Government for the appointment or removal of the Racing consultant-cum-Senior Stipendiary Steward-cum-Advisor, Kunigal Stud Farm/cum-Chief Executive Officer and Secretary, Bangalore Races.”

The Order Annexure-M has been subsequently modified by the Order bearing No. FD 16 CRC 87 dated 18-8-1987. The modified Order reads thus:

“The licensee shall obtain prior approval of the Government for the appointment or removal of the Racing Consuitant-cum-Senior Stipendiary Steward-cum-Advisor, Kunigal Stud Farm and Secretary, Bangalore Races.”

Consequently, the following words ‘cum-Chief Executive Officer’ are deleted from the order. As a result thereof the main grievance of the petitioner as to the appointment of Sri M. Arshad Ali Khan as Chief Executive Officer does not survive.

2. Several contentions are raised in the petition and are also urged at the time of arguments. However, in view of the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General, it appears to me that it is not necessary to refer to the various contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner.

3. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the State by the learned Advocate General is that the petitioner is a Member of the Club known as “Bangalore Turf Club Ltd.’ The Club is a Company registered under the Companies Act though it is not having any share capital.

4. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that the impugned order, at the most, can affect the managerial right of the Club about which when the Club itself is not aggrieved, it cannot be held to affect the right of the petitioner as a Member of the Club nor it can be held to affect his personal interest involved in the Club.

5. Sri R.N Narasimhamurthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submits that the petitioner being a member of the Club, he is also entitled to elect the Managing Committee of the Club and as such he is also entitled to see that the powers of the Club are not affected in any manner; that even if the Club does not come forward to challenge the same, as a member of the Club he is entitled to see that the managerial powers of the Club are not affected.

6. The matter does not appear to be res integra. The learned Advocate General has placed reliance in support of his contention a decision of the Supreme Court in Daman Singh v. State of Punjab. In Daman Singh's case, a member of a Co-operative Society challenged the amalgamation of the Co-operative Society. While considering the same, the Supreme Court observed thus:

“11. The next submission of the learned Counsel was that Section 13(8), (9) and (10) did not make express provision for the issue of notice to the members of the concerned co-operative societies and were, therefore, violative of the principles of natural justice. He argued that in the absence of any provision, the rules of natural justice may be read into the provisions and notice to the members of the affected societies was imperative. Otherwise; he argued, members of one society would be forced against their will and without being heard to associate themselves with members of another society. We have no hesitation in rejecting this submission also. Once a person becomes a member of a co-operative society, he loses his individuality qua the society and he has no independent rights except those given to him by the statute and the bye-laws. He must act and speak through the society or rather, the society alone can act and speak for him qua rights or duties of the society as a body. So if the statute which authorises compulsory amalgamation of co-operative societies provides for notice to the societies concerned the requirement of natural justice is fully satisfied. The notice to the society will be deemed as notice to all its members. That is why Section 13(9)(a) provides for the issue of notice to the societies and not to individual members. Section 13(9)(b), however, provides the members also with an opportunity to be heard if they desire to be heard. Notice to individual members of a co-operative society in our opinion, is opposed to the very status of a co-operative society as a body corporate and is therefore, unnecessary. We do not consider it necessary to further elaborate the matter except to point out that a member who objects to the proposed amalgamation within the prescribed time is given by Section 31(11), the option to walk out, as it were, by withdrawing his share, deposits or loans as the case may be.”

(Emphasis supplied)

7. That being the position, a member of the Club loses his individuality qua the Club and he has no independent right except those given to him by the Statutes and Bye-laws of the Club and he must speak through the Club only.

8. In the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioner that the impugned Order affects his personal interest in the Club for the right of the petitioner as a Member of the Club is affected. Only the authority of the Committee of Management to appoint the Secretary of the Club is affected in as much as such an appointment has to take place with the prior approval of the State Government. The Club is not aggrieved by the impugned Order. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the petitioner is entitled to maintain this Writ Petition.

9. Since the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain this petition, the other contentions raised in the Writ Petition need not be gone into and the same are left open.

10. For the reasons stated above, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the State is upheld and the Writ Petition is dismissed.