Shivashankar Bhat, J.:—

In these petitions, the petitioners seek the quashing of the Judgment and decree made in LAC. No. 3/1978 on the file of the Civil Judge, Uttara Kannada, Karwar.

2. WP. No. 10415/83 is by Ballarpur Industries Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Company’) which claims that the lands which were the subject matter of the aforesaid decision of the Court of the Civil Judge, were acquired for the benefit of the Company, for the purpose of constructing salt pans for its caustic soda factory at Binaga, in Uttara Kannada. According to the Company, it initiated action through the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’) for the acquisition of these lands under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (shortly called ‘the Act’) after declaring the said lands as an industrial area.

3. The contention of the petitioner is that the Company was not notified of the proceedings before the Civil Court under Section 20(c) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as in force in Karnataka wherever Section 20(c) of L.A Act is referred hereafter, the reference is to the said provision introduced into the L.A Act, 1894 by the Mysore Act 17/1961.

4. The Board is the petitioner in WP. 13976/83. Its contention is similar to the contention of the Company by asserting that the said lands were acquired for its purposes and therefore it ought to have been notified under Section 20(c) of the L.A Act.

5. According to the Board, it initiated action for declaration of certain areas as an industrial area under Sections 1(3) and 3(1) of the Act. Thereafter a Notification under Section 28(1) of the Act was issued by the State Government on 10-5-1970. It is further stated that a declaration under Section 28(4) of the Act was issued on 23-12-1971 and possession of lands was taken under Section 28(7), on 22-12-1973. By a Notification dated 1/3-8-1974 the second respondent - Land Acquisition Officer - was appointed as ‘the Deputy Commissioner’ for the purpose of these proceedings under the Act.

6. The second respondent having made his award under Section 29(4) read with Section 30 of the Act, was requested to make a reference to the Civil Court by the owner of the land (4th respondent) under Section 18 of the L.A Act, 1894. On such a reference, the Court of the Civil Judge passed its judgment and decree, which are impugned in these Writ Petitions.

7. It may be noted that before the Civil Court, the Land Acquisition Officer was the only respondent (shown as opponent) and admittedly no notice of the proceedings was issued to the present petitioners.

8. The petitioners contend that under Section 30 of the Act, provisions of the L.A Act, 1894 (Central Act 1/1894) are applied mutatis mutandis, in respect of the enquiry and award by the Land Acquisition Officer, the reference to the Court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation in respect of the lands acquired, under Part-VII of the Act. Therefore, it is contended that Section 20(c) of the L.A Act got attracted to the proceedings. If so, according to the petitioners, they ought to have been notified of the proceedings. For this purpose the Counsel for the petitioners relied on the principles stated in the decisions of the Supreme Court in Sunderlal v. Paramsukhdas . AIR 1968 SC 366. and in Himalaya Tiles and Marbles (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (dead) by LRs. . 1980 3 SCC 223 and a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Special Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum v. Govindappa Fakirappa Bagai . MFA No. 789/1984 - DD. 13-12-1984..

9. After the Writ Petitions were heard and orders reserved, the Company filed an I.A for re-hearing. Along with this I.A the Company produced copies of (i) a Government Order dated 24-10-1970, (ii) possession certificate dated 5-1-1974 whereunder Company obtained possession of the lands in question from the Board, (iii) a letter dated 23-1-1984 from the Board to the Company stating that the provisional cost in respect of 1849 acres of land allotted to the Company has been received, during the lease period and that question of executing a sale deed will be considered in due course and (iv) a letter dated 27-4-1987 from the Special Deputy Commissioner to the Board seeking deposit of enhanced compensation in view of the increase in the rate of solatium and interest. It also produced a copy of the Judgment dated 13-12-1984 in MFA. 789/1984.

10. The Company seeks to prove from these documents that the lands in question were acquired on its behalf and the Company was interested in the determination of the compensation.

11. Along with the main petition, the Company did not file any document except the copies of Judgment and decree of the Civil Court in the reference proceedings. In the Writ Petition of the Board, the Board was satisfied merely by filing a copy of the aforesaid judgment of the Civil Court.

12. The relevant Notification proposing acquisition of land under Section 28(1) of the Act, the declaration made after considering the objections of those interested in the land under Section 28(4) and the Award of the Deputy Commissioner determining the compensation, are not forthcoming. However, the 4th respondent along with his statement of objections to Writ Petition of the Company, filed a copy of the Notification dated 10-6-1970 issued under Section 28(1) of the Act. The 4th respondent has also filed his statement of objections in the Writ Petition of the Board.

13. The 4th respondent has questioned the locus standi of the petitioners to challenge the decision of the Civil Court. He has also raised several other contentions, substance of which are,—

(i) The decree of the Civil Court cannot be challenged in a Writ Petition and the remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an appeal after obtaining leave of the Court.

(ii) The lands were acquired by the State Government and on acquisition, the lands vested in the State Government; no agreement was entered into either by the Board or by the Company with the State Government for the acquisition of the lands.

(iii) The transfer of the land by the State Government to the Board, is an act subsequent to the acquisition and vesting of lands in the State Government. This transfer is essentially a grant by the State to the Board.

(iv) The award of the Deputy Commissioner (LAO) discloses that compensation to the land owner was payable out of the budget provisions made for his office.

(v) Both the petitioners were perfectly aware of the reference proceedings pending before the Civil Court and none of them made any attempt seeking intervention in the said proceedings to protect their alleged interest.

(vi) The Board is an agency and instrumentality of the State and therefore it was bound by the decree to which the State Government through its officer was a party.

(vii) The purpose of a notice under Section 20(c) of the L.A Act is to attract attention of the concerned person to intervene in the proceedings. When the petitioners were already aware of the pendency of such a proceedings, and did not take any action to intervene, the resultant conduct disentitle them for the relief sought in these Writ Petitions.

(viii) The provisions of Section 20(c) of the L.A Act is inapplicable to a reference proceedings under the Act. The law that is attracted by Section 30 of the Act, is only the Central Act 1/1894, without its amendments by the State.

14. On the last contention of the 4th respondent, his learned Counsel contended that the reference under Section 30 of the Act is confined to ‘Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1/1894)’ without any reference to the amendment made in the State. According to him the State Act which came into force by virtue of Mysore Act 17/1961 is an independent legislation having an independent status and whenever the provisions of the said State Act are to be attracted, the practice of the legislature is to make a specific reference to the said State legislation either by stating it as ‘L.A Act 1894 as in force in Karnataka’ or by stating it as the L.A Act ‘as amended by Mysore Act 17/1961’. He relied on the decision of this Court in M. Subbanna Naik v. State of Mysore . 1965 1 Mys L.J 269. for the proposition that the State Act is an independent law and reference to L.A Act 1894 simplicitor will attract only the provisions of the Central enactment without the amendments or the modifications effected by the State of Karnataka.

15. To appreciate the respective contentions, it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act.

16. The object of the Act is (i) to secure the establishment of industrial areas in the State and (ii) to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein. To effectuate these purposes, the Board is established.

17. It is seen that establishment of an industrial area does not necessarily mean that lands in the said area should vest in the State, or in the Board. It may be, by - reserving certain areas exclusively for establishment of industries or developing certain lands to facilitate the growth of industries therein. For an orderly development of industries, it will be necessary to provide facilities such as power, communication, roads, or even industrial sheds. Provisions may have to be done for allocation of sites or sheds, in which case, lands will have to vest either in the State or in the Board. In a few cases, State may, through the Board, provide for transfer of sites to the industry.

18. An orderly development contemplates regulations. Just as private layouts, in the case of development of a residential area, is permitted, even private layouts of industrial areas is not ruled out. Definition of ‘industrial area’ and ‘industrial estate’ under Section 2(b) and 2(7) are also to the same effect.

19. The scope of the object of the Act is quite wide. An exercise of power under the Act, cannot be attributed to a particular species of the object, unless, that is clearly spelled out from the expressed conduct of the State.

20. ‘Development’ is defined under Section 2(5), as to mean the carrying out of levelling, digging, building, engineering, quarrying or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes re-development. Words ‘to develop’ shall have to be construed accordingly.

21. The Board is established under Section 5, to be a body corporate. At the relevant time it consisted of five members, of whom four are officials of the State Government. Another is a nominated Member from among persons to be qualified as having had experience of and having shown capacity in industry, trade or finance, or who is capable of representing the interest of industry or commerce. Composition of Membership is now altered by an amendment to the Act made in 1987. Members are entitled only to compensatory allowance and their period of office is fixed. As per Section 11, State Government shall appoint one of its Officers as the Executive Member of the Board (who is included in the constitution of the Board as one of the Members referred in Section 5). Other employees are appointed by the Board, but they will be subordinate to the Executive Member. As per Section 17 power is vested in the State Government to issue to the Board such directions of general nature as it may think necessary or expedient for the purpose of carrying out the purposes of the Act and the Board is enjoined to follow and act upon such directions.

22. Budget of the Board shall have to be approved by the State Government. The auditing of its accounts is to be done by the Auditor appointed by the State Government.

23. The Board's functions and powers are enumerated under Sections 13 and 14 which include the function of developing areas declared as such by the State Government. This power includes, power to acquire and hold property both moveable and immovable and to let out on lease any land etc. Chapter-VII provides for acquisition and disposal of lands by the State Government. A Notification bringing into operation of this Chapter specifically, in a particular area, should precede, exercise of the powers under this Chapter. It is necessary to quote the entire Section 28 to appreciate its scope and effect. It reads,—

“28. Acquisition of land:— (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification give notice of its intention to acquire such lands.

(2) On publication of a notification under sub-section (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should not be acquired.

(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.

(4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official gazette, be made to that effect.

(5) On the publication in the official gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.

(6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.

(7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the State Government or any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.

(8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired.”

24. As is clear from Section 28(1), land may be acquired either (i) for the purpose of development by the Board or (ii) for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act.

25. The concept of development is quite wide, as indicated by its definition under Section 2(5). Several activities are contemplated in this definition. To carry out some of the activities, land need not necessarily vest in the Board. It is possible for the Board to carry out a few of the developmental activities, even if the land vests in the State Government. This is also clear from the provisions of Section 32. Under Section 32(1) State Government may place at the disposal of the Board any land vested in the State Government for the furtherance of the objects of the Act. The Board after developing such land, shall deal with the said land in accordance with the regulations made and directions given by the State Government. Under Section 32(3), State Government may at any time require the Board to replace such land at the disposal of the State Government.

26. Going back to Chapter-VII (Sections 27 to 31), it shows that acquisition of land thereunder is by the State Government. Section 28(1) is comparable to Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, and Section 28(4) to Section 6 thereof. But, under Section 28(5), the land vests in the State Government immediately on the making of the declaration under Section 28(4). Provisions such as Sections 8 to 15 of the Land Acquisition Act preceding the vesting of land under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, is not made under the Act. The scheme of the Act in this regard is more akin to the provisions of Section 17 of the L.A Act (minus the notice under Section 9 of L.A Act).

27. Section 28(8) states that where land has been ‘acquired for the Board’, the State Government may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired. This provision, once again, points out that, an acquisition proposed and made under Section 28(1) read with Section 28(4) need not necessarily be for the Board. Further, under Section 28(8) it is within the discretion of the State Government to transfer a land acquired, to the Board or not. The relevant word used is that the State Government ‘may’ transfer the land to the Board.

28. Provisions of Sections 29 and 30 provide for the determination of compensation in respect of the land acquired. Payment of compensation is in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 29(2) contemplates determination of compensation by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated. Before such an agreement is arrived at between the Government and the person to be compensated, the Act does not require the Board to be a party to the negotiations or to the agreement. No provision of the Act contemplates a tripartite discussion or agreement in this regard. Similarly, no other private person like the Company has a say in this matter.

29. It is only when such an agreement cannot be reached, State Government has to refer the case to the ‘Deputy Commissioner’ for determination of the amount of compensation. On receipt of reference, the Deputy Commissioner has to issue notice under Section 29(4) on the owner or occupier of the land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land. Here, again, no provision to notify the Board or the Company is contemplated.

30. It is true that even under L.A Act when land is acquired for a Company, on acquisition, initially land vests in the State Government. Transfer to Company takes place thereafter as per agreement contemplated by Section 41. But Notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of L.A Act will state the purpose of the acquisition from which one can easily gather as to whom the land is acquired, with certainty.

31. Examination of the scheme of the Act reveals that the lands need not be acquired, necessarily, for the Board or for any Company to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The lands may continue to vest in the State Government but still a few of the purposes of the Act can be achieved.

32. Both the petitioners have sought to enforce certain alleged rights in them. They are seeking the nullification of the judgment and decree of the Civil Court on the basis that they should have been heard. For this purpose they have to show that they were concerned with the acquisition proceedings directly. Even if Section 20(c) of the L.A Act applies, the stage of issuing notice by the Court, is, when a reference is made to it under Section 18. Therefore, the records that are placed before the Court at the time of reference under Section 18 should disclose unequivocally an interest in a person as the one liable to pay the compensation. Otherwise, Court cannot contemplate issuance of a notice to such a person.

33. The petitioners have to establish that the acquisition was for the benefit of any one of them who is liable to pay the compensation. If the Notification under Section 28(1) is not capable of showing that land is acquired for the Board or for the Company, it will not be reflected in the declaration under Section 28(4). It is also not essential for the L.A.O to state in his award, as to whether land will be transferred to the Board or the Company. In many cases the said authority may not have any knowledge, as to whether the land would be transferred to the Board, because, either under Section 28(8) or under Section 32, the State Government may decide not to transfer the land to the Board.

34. The interest asserted by the Company is through the Board. The documents filed by the Company with its application for re-hearing of the Writ Petitions, do not show that the Government had agreed to transfer these lands to the Company and that these land were acquired for the said purpose. The letter dated 23-1-1984 (Annexure-D) written by the Board to the Company shows that the Company had executed a lease agreement with the Board and that the Board would consider the question of sale deed in due course. The letter of the Special Deputy Commissioner seeks from the Company deposit of enhanced compensation, due to the enhanced rate of solatium and interest. This is dated 27-4-1987 during the pendency of the Writ Petitions and therefore it cannot be relied upon to trace a right in the Company at the time of reference to the Civil Court under Section 30 of the Act. Another document of the year 1970 (Annexure-B) filed by the Company shows that the Government agreed to provide certain facilities to the Company. It is too general in nature.

35. Company has not placed any Notification of acquisition. Its averments in Writ Petitions are vague. It has stated that after declaration under Section 28(4), possession was taken under Section 28(7). This can only be by the State Government. The nature of its possession obtained on 5-1-1974 seems to be as a lessee, as is clear from the Board's letter dated 23-1-1984 (Annexure-D). The interest asserted by the Company on the question of determination of the compensation is thus, too remote and cannot be countenanced. Nowhere the Company states that it obtained possession of lands as transferee from the State Government.

36. The rate of rent payable by the Company or any consideration payable by it to the Board for the enjoyment of the lands given to it, may have some nexus to the cost of acquisition. That is normally so whenever lands are acquired by the State or its instrumentalities and thereafter allotted to others.

37. If the Company was serious of its alleged rights, it would have been vigilant in following up the proceedings of acquisition and the reference. If it was really particular of participating in the reference proceedings, it would have, without waiting for an invitation from the Court would have applied for permission to participate. It cannot plead ignorance of any of these proceedings. Far earlier to the decree of the Civil Court, the Company had applied to it for certified copies of documents which clearly establishes the knowledge of the Company, of those proceedings. Its case is that, it set the law in motion to acquire the lands. Land owner was divested of possession under Section 28(5) of the Act long ago, even before he was paid the compensation. Company thought it fit, to sit on the fence, watching the subsequent proceedings. It certainly bestowed its confidence in the Land Acquisition Officer who was contesting the claim of the owner before the Civil Court. Having regard to its conduct, its present attempt to stall the payment of compensation to the land owner, by setting at nought the decree obtained by him and trying to have the proceedings started de novo, cannot be appreciated in the Writ Jurisdiction invoked by it. It has to fail for (i) its passivity and inaction, (ii) its failure to establish its right to a notice under Section 20(c) of L.A Act, by placing proper materials before this Court and (iii) for vagueness of its pleadings in the Writ Petition.

38. The pleading of the Board is in no way better. It is not even candid as to when Notification (declaration) under Section 28(4) was issued. Just like the averment made by the Company that possession was taken on 22-12-1973, the averment is not clear as to who took possession. Its Writ Petition does not even disclose that the Company executed a lease deed in its favour and that it obtained the lands from the Government to pass on them to the Company. There is not even an assertion that the compensation for the acquired lands has to be paid by the Board. Except the judgment and decree of the Civil Court, the Board has not placed any other material.

39. The respective stands taken by the petitioners, in a way, contradict each other. It is not their case that some of the lands were acquired for the Board and a few others for the Company. Each asserts that the lands in question were acquired for itself. If the Board is not liable to pay the compensation, question of issuing a notice to it under Section 20(c) does not arise. It has not filed any reply to the statement of objections of the 4th respondent who asserted that the payment of compensation was by the State Government and the Board was asked to pay to the State Government only the establishment charges and audit charges. Board has not disputed the statement of 4th respondent that the Board was fully aware of the proceedings before the Court and nothing prevented it from getting impleaded before the Court.

40. The Board, though, a statutory corporation, is, in fact, an incarnation of the State. If it had moved the State to acquire the lands, it should be knowing the various stages and developments of acquisition proceedings. It cannot deny (and in fact, it is not its case) that it was not aware of the reference made to the Civil Court. The Special Land Acquisition Officer (Deputy Commissioner) was before the Court. His award is treated as an offer on behalf of the acquiring Government - vide Santhosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation . 1986 2 SCC 343. Bonafides of his conduct before the Court, is not in question. If the Board has been sincere in its claim that it was very much interested in the acquisition proceedings and the quantum of compensation would affect it adversely, an attempt would have been made by it to apply for an opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the Civil Court. The land owner has been deprived of his lands as early as 1974 even before the payment of compensation. Now the Board wants the entire matter to be re-opened after the Civil Court determined his claim for enhanced compensation. Neither the Board nor the Company has acted fairly in this regard. While considering the question whether the petitioners are entitled to invoke the Writ Jurisdiction, their conduct is very material.

41. The petitioners rely on the decision in Special Deputy Commissioner, Belgaum v. Govindappa Fakirappa Bagai. Relevant extract of the said decision is thus:—

“…….. Whereas the Government of Karnataka is of the opinion that the lands specified in the Schedule below are required for development by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board for establishment of Industries therein for the Chataprabha Sahakari Sakkere Karkhane Niyamit Gokak, Taluka Gokak”.

(emphasis supplied)

From the reading of this notification and the real purpose of the acquisition discernible therefrom, it would appear that both the ‘Board’ and the ‘Sugar Factory’ are the ‘authority’ and person ‘for whom the acquisition is made’. If the acquisition had been proposed for the benefit of the ‘Board’ alone, it would be sufficient compliance of Section 20(c) if ‘Board’ was alone notified of the proceedings. The further step of enquiring into the identity of and notifying, persons who were intended by the ‘Board’ to be beneficiaries of the acquisition would not be within the strict requirement of Section 20(c) as long as the Board was notified of the proceedings. In such a case, those who might derive interest in or title to the acquired lands from the Board may not, as of right, be entitled to notice under Section 20(c) of the L.A Act.

But, in the present case, the intendment of the preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of the Act and the purpose of the very initiation of the proceedings of acquisition, as made manifest by the notification, is that both the Board and the Sugar factory are the person and authority for whom the acquisition was made and it would, therefore, be proper in the circumstances of the present case, to hold that both the Board as well as the Sugar Factory were entitled to notices under Section 20(c) in the proceedings of reference.

In view of the admitted circumstance that the Board and the Sugar Factory have not been so notified in the proceedings of reference, the determination of market value and the enhancement of compensation made by the Court below in Award under appeal are rendered infirm in law and cannot be supported. The award under appeal would, on that ground alone, require to be set aside and the matter remanded to the Court below for a fresh disposal in accordance with law.”

42. The Notification issued under Section 28(1) extracted in the above decision, shows that the acquisition of land was for the establishment of industries by the named Company (Ghataprabha Sahakari Sakkare Kharkhane Niyamit). The Court assumed that Section 20(c) of the L.A Act was attracted, and upheld the claim of the Board and the Company for a notice. Para-5 of the said decision shows that even according to the claimant for the enhanced compensation, the said Sugar Factory was a necessary party to the proceedings and he sought to implead it before the Civil Court, which was dismissed. There the Land Acquisition Officer opposed the impleading of the Company before the Civil Court. Here the fact,-situation, is altogether different. There is no reference to the Company in the Notification issued under Section 28(1). Neither the claimant nor the State Government admit the locus standi of the petitioners.

43. The lands in this case are acquired for development, for ‘establishment of industries’. The agency to effect the development is the Board. No particular industry was to be established in the lands. Whether lands are to vest in the Board ultimately, is not stated. Neither Section 28(4) Notification nor the award of the Deputy Commissioner is forthcoming. Therefore, we are clearly of the view, that notice under Section 20(c) of the L.A Act was rightly not issued to the petitioners even if it is assumed that the said provision governs the proceedings under Section 30 of the Act.

44. In the view we have taken on the materials placed before us, it is not necessary to decide other questions raised by the Counsel on both sides. We are of the view that acquisition of lands is by the State Government for the purposes of the Act. We may also note here, that the State Government has filed appeal against the judgment and decree of the Civil Court which is pending disposal in this Court. In these Writ Petitions State Government has not supported the claims of the petitioners for a notice under Section 20(c) of L.A Act to any one of them.

45. In the result, for the reasons stated above, these petitions fail and are dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Rule is discharged.