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Uttam Veranekar v. Shattu Laxman Donkari
Case Summary — Kulkarni, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff instituted a suit for possession of House No. 685, Angol-Mal Extension, Angol, Belgaum, and for future mesne profits, claiming termination of the defendant's tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The defendant resisted the suit. The suit was tried in the Civil Judge's Court, Belgaum, exercising Small Cause jurisdiction (Small Cause Suit No. 30/81). The Trial Court (I Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum) decreed the suit by a judgment and decree dated 18-6-1982. The defendant filed the present revision on 23-9-1982 against that decree. The revision was heard by Kulkarni, J.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a change in substantive law (specifically the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 17 of 1983 and its substituted Schedules) that takes place after institution of a suit but before final disposal should be applied to the pending proceedings, or whether the parties' rights are governed solely by the law as it stood when the suit was instituted.
- Whether the substitution of Schedules in the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 17 of 1983 (and the legislative deeming provision that the Act "shall be deemed to have come into force on the thirty first day of December, 1982") operates retrospectively so as to bring Angol within the limits of Belgaum City Corporation for purposes of the Rent Control Act.
- Whether the trial court decree in Small Cause Suit No. 30/81 should be upheld or set aside in view of the applicability of the amended Rent Control Act to the property in question.
Arguments of the Parties
Submissions of Sri Javali (Senior Counsel)
- When the suit was filed, it was filed in a proper court having jurisdiction, and when the suit was decreed it was decreed by a court having jurisdiction; therefore, a right had become vested in the plaintiff to obtain possession of the property.
- He relied on Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th Ed., pp. 220–221) for the general proposition that, "when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights."
- He relied on Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal (AIR 1928 Allahabad 437) for the proposition that the right to appeal is governed by the law prevailing at the date of institution of the suit and not by subsequent law.
- He specifically referred to sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 17 of 1983, which states "It shall be deemed to have come into force on the Thirty first day of December, 1982," and urged that the replacement of the Schedules came into operation only from 31-12-1982.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of arguments advanced by other parties or the defendant beyond the fact that the defendant resisted the suit and filed the revision.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Ed., pp. 220–221 | General principle cited by counsel: where substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, rights are decided according to law when action began unless new statute clearly intends variation. | The text records counsel's reliance on Maxwell; the court treated this principle as a submission but rejected the contention based on later authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court which govern the matter of changes in law during pendency. |
| Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal, AIR 1928 Allahabad 437 | Proposition relied on by counsel that the right to appeal is governed by law prevailing at date of institution of suit. | Counsel relied on this case; the court considered it but held that subsequent Supreme Court decisions required rejection of the contention that the law at institution exclusively governs pending matters. |
| Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak, 1985 1 SCC 270 | Supreme Court held that the decree which finally disposes of the suit is the operative decree; where law changes during pendency of appeal, the new law can be invoked and will govern; protection extended to tenant during pendency of appeal under Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. | The court relied on and quoted this decision extensively to support the proposition that where an appeal is pending the appellate decree is the final decree and that changes in law during pendency can be applied; this authority was central to rejecting counsel's contention. |
| Ram Sarup v. Munshi, (1963) 3 SCR 858 : AIR 1963 SC 553 | Change in law during pendency of appeal has to be taken into account and will govern the rights of parties. | Referred to by the court as a governing precedent for the proposition that changes in law during pendency affect rights; used to support the court's conclusion. |
| Mula v. Godhu, (1970) 2 SCR 129 : (1969) 2 SCC 653 : AIR 1971 SC 89 | Followed the principle in Ram Sarup that changes in law during pendency govern rights. | Referred to as a subsequent decision following Ram Sarup; the court relied on this line of authority in reaching its conclusion. |
| Dayawati v. Inderjit, (1966) 3 SCR 275 : AIR 1966 SC 1423 | Where new law expressly or by clear intendment takes in pending matters, trial and appellate courts must give effect to it even after judgment of the court of first instance. | Quoted to support the proposition that a statute manifesting clear intention to apply to pending matters must be given effect by the courts; used to bolster the court's reasoning on application of the amended Rent Control Act. |
| Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh, (1975) 1 SCR 605 : (1974) 2 SCC 363 : AIR 1974 SC 2068 | Effect was given to change in law during pendency of appeal; appeal is in nature of a re-hearing and appellate court acquires seisin of the whole case. | Cited by the court to support the re-hearing and seisin proposition and to justify giving effect to a change in law during pendency of appellate proceedings. |
| Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal, (1902) ILR 26 Mad 91 (FB) | Early formulation that under processual law the hearing of an appeal is in the nature of a re-hearing of the suit. | Referred to in support of the proposition that appeals operate as re-hearings and that appellate courts may give effect to changes in law occurring after trial court judgment. |
| Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudbri, 1940 FCR 84 : AIR 1941 FC 5 | Federal Court view that once a decree has been appealed the matter becomes sub-judice and appellate court acquires seisin; for certain purposes the trial court decree may still be regarded as final (e.g., execution). | Referred to as supporting authority for the re-hearing/seisin principle and the court's approach to changes in law during pendency. |
| Shamrao Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay, 1952 SCR 683 | Authority for the view that substitution of Schedules may be treated as though the substituted Schedules were in existence from the inception of the Act. | Relied on by the court to support the proposition that substitution of new Schedules in the Rent Control Act should be treated as operative from the inception of the Act for the purposes discussed. |
| M/S Doddannavar Bros. v. Malathibai, ILR 1985 KAR 3025 | State court decision consistent with the view that substitution of Schedules is to be treated as though in existence from the inception of the Act. | Referred to by the court as a decision taking the same view on substituted Schedules; used to support the conclusion about the effect of substitution. |
| Sadiq Sab v. Akhilandamma, ILR 1985 KAR 1737 | Another State decision adopting the view that substituted Schedules are to be treated as existing from inception of the Act. | Referred to in support of the court's conclusion that the substituted Schedules apply as if they existed from the beginning of the Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by first recording and addressing the submissions of learned Senior Counsel Sri Javali, who argued that the suit had been instituted and decreed by courts having jurisdiction and that a vested right had thereby arisen in favour of the plaintiff. Counsel relied on Maxwell and the decision in Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal to support the contention that the law prevailing at the date of institution should govern the parties' rights.
The court then examined binding authorities of the Supreme Court, most prominently Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak (1985 1 SCC 270), which the court quoted and treated as determinative on the principle that when an appeal is pending the appellate decree is the operative decree and that a change in law during the pendency of proceedings (including appeals) can be invoked and will govern the rights of the parties where applicable. The court further relied on a line of Supreme Court decisions (Ram Sarup v. Munshi; Mula v. Godhu; Dayawati v. Inderjit; Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh) to reinforce the proposition that appeals are in the nature of a re-hearing, that appellate courts acquire seisin of the case, and that changes in law affecting pending matters must be given effect when the statute clearly or by necessary intendment takes in pending matters.
Applying these principles, the court rejected Sri Javali's submission that only the law at the time of institution governs and held instead that the matter is governed by the law as it stands when the matter comes up for final disposal by the court. The court then turned to the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 17 of 1983, noting that by Section 4 the Schedules to the Principal Act were substituted and that, for legislative purposes, the substitution should be treated as though the Schedules were in existence from the inception of the Act. The court explained the legislative history noted in the record: the Karnataka Rent Act had been in force until 31-12-1982; by Act No. 17 of 1983 it was continued and amended; the Amendment received presidential assent on 15-7-1983, and the legislature provided that the amendment "shall be deemed to have come into force on the Thirty first day of December, 1982."
The court analysed the effect of that deeming provision and the substitution of Schedules, relying on state and other authorities (including Shamrao Parulekar and later Karnataka decisions) for the view that substitution of Schedules is to be treated as operative from the inception of the Act. Because under the substituted Schedules Angol was within the limits of Belgaum City Corporation, the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act applied to the building in question. On that basis the court concluded that the trial court's decree could not stand.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court allowed the revision and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on 18-6-1982.
Immediate implications for the parties:
- The trial court decree in Small Cause Suit No. 30/81 is set aside.
- The plaintiff-landlord is at liberty to seek relief under the provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (K.R.C. Act) as applicable; the court specifically notes the plaintiff may have recourse to the K.R.C. Act if he so chooses.
Broader legal implication stated by the court:
- The court followed authoritative Supreme Court jurisprudence holding that changes in law occurring during the pendency of proceedings (including appeals) may govern the parties' rights when the matter comes up for final disposal and where the statute applies to pending matters by express or necessary intendment.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying established authoritative decisions; its effect is limited to the facts before the court—i.e., that the substituted Schedules bring Angol within the Belgaum City Corporation limits and therefore the Rent Control Act applies to the property in question.
This summary is compiled exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer information beyond what the opinion itself contains.
Kulkarni, J.:—
This is a revision by the defendant against the judgment and decree dated 18-6-1982, passed by the I Additional Civil Judge, Belgaum, in Small Cause Suit No. 30/81, decreeing the suit.
2. The parties have been referred to with reference to their position in the Trial Court.
3. The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendant for possession a of House No. 685, situated at Angol-Mal Extension, Angol, Belgaum and for future mesne profits, after terminating the tenancy of the defendant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
4. The defendant resisted the suit.
5. The Trial Court decreed the suit. Hence, the revision.
6. The present suit for possession was instituted in the Civil Judge's Court, Belgaum, exercising the Small Cause jurisdiction. It was decreed on 18-6-1982. The present revision had been filed on 23-9-1982.
7. The learned Senior Counsel Sri Javali, submitted that when the suit was filed, it had been filed in a proper Court having jurisdiction and that when the suit was decreed it was decreed by a Court having jurisdiction and that therefore a right had become vested in the plaintiff to get the possession of the property. He referred me to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edition, page 220 and 221. It reads as:
“In general, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, the rights of the parties are decided according to the law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights.”
The Learned Counsel Sri Javali also relied on a decision rendered in the case of Ram Singha v. Shankar Dayal . AIR 1928 Allahabad 437.. It lays down as:
“That the right to appeal to the Court of the District Judge was governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit, and not by the law that prevailed at the date of its decision, or at the date of the filing of the appeal.”
8. The Supreme Court in Lakshmi Narayan Guin v. Niranjan Modak . 1985 1 SCC 270 has stated in para 6 as:
“The suit was filed on June 12, 1967, and was decreed by the Trial Court on February 17, 1969. During the pendency of the first appeal, the West Bengal Government extended the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 to Memari, in which the property is situate. Section 13 of the Act provides for a qualified protection of the tenant against eviction inasmuch as it injuncts the Court from passing an order or decree in a landlords suit for recovery of possession except on the limited grounds detailed in sub-section (1) thereof. Sub-section (6) provides that no suit or proceeding for the recovery of possession on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-section (1), except the grounds, mentioned in causes (j) and (k), can be filed by the landlord “unless he has given to the tenant one month's notice expiring with a month of tenancy.” There is no dispute that the grounds mentioned in clauses (j) and (k) do not come into play in the instant case. The High Court found that the notice for eviction served by the appellants on the respondent gave notice of less than one month and, therefore, there was no compliance with sub-section (6) of Section 13. Consequently, it held that the suit was incompetent.”
In para No. 7 the Supreme Court held as:
“Does the decree here refer to the decree of the Trial Court or, where an appeal has been preferred, to the appellate decree? Plainly, reference is intended to the decree which disposes of the suit finally. It is well settled that when a Trial Court decrees a suit and the decree is challenged by a competent appeal, the appeal is considered as a continuation of the suit, and when the appellate decree affirms, modifies or reverses the decree on the merits, the Trial Court decree is said in law to merge in the appellate decree, and it is the appellate decree which rules. The object of sub-section (1) of Section 13 is to protect the possession of the tenant, subject to the exceptions specified in the sub-section, and that protection is ensured if we construe the sub-section to mean that, subject to those exceptions, no effective or operative order or decree can be made by the Court in a landlord's suit for possession against a tenant. To our mind, therefore, sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act can be invoked by a tenant during the pendency of an appeal against a Trial Court decree.”
In para No. 9 the Supreme Court has said:
“That a change in the law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will govern the rights of the parties was laid down by this Court in Ram Sarup v. Munshi (1963) 3 SCR 858 : (AIR 1963 SC 553), which was followed by this Court in Mula v. Godhu (1970) 2 SCR 129 : ((1969) 2 SCC 653 : AIR 1971 SC 89). We may point out that in Dayawati v. Inderjit (1966) 3 SCR 275 : (AIR 1966 SC 1423 at p. 1426) this Court observed:
“If the new law speaks in language, which, expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the Court of trial as well as the Court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the Court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the Court of first instance.”
Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh (1975) 1 SCR 605 : ((1974) 2 SCC 363 : AIR 1974 SC 2068) where effect was given to a change in the law during the pendency of an appeal, relying on the proposition formulated as long ago as Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal (1902) ILR 26 Mad 91 (FB) by Bhashyam Iyengar, J., that the hearing of an appeal was, under the processual law of this country, in the natue of re-hearing of the suit. In Amarjit Kaur (supra) this Court referred also to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudbri (1940 FCR 84 : (AIR 1941 FC 5) in which the Federal Court had laid down that once a decree passed by a Court had been appealed against the matter became sub-judice again and thereafter the appellate Court acquired seisin of the whole case, except that for certain purposes, for example execution, the decree was regarded as final and the Court below retained jurisdiction.”
9. Therefore, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the contention urged by the learned Senior Counsel Sri Javali that the law that would be applicable to the matters would be the law which was available only at the time of the institution of the suit, merits to be rejected.
10. There is no question of a right vested in the party in view of the simple principle of law that the matter will be governed by the law as it stands when the matter comes, up for final disposal in the Court. The law that is applicable today is the law mentioned in the Karnataka Rent Control Act as amended by Act No. 17 of 1983. By Act No. 17 of 1983, Angol area has been brought within the limits of Belgaum Corporation to which the provisions of the Rent Control Act apply.
11. Sri Javali referred me to sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 17 of 1983. It reads as:
“It shall be deemed to have come into force on the Thirty first day of December, 1982.”
He urged that the replacement of the Schedules by the now Schedule came into operation only from 31st Day of December, 1982.
12. Karnataka Rent Act was in force till 31-12-1982. By Act No. 17 of 1983, it was continued to be in force till 1992. It received the assent of the President on 15-7-83. Therefore, in order to make the pending proceedings legal it was stated by the legislature that the Amendment Act came into force on 31-12-1982. Therefore, the mention that the Act shall be deemed to have come into force on 31-12-1982 will not make the Act effective only from 31-12-1982.
13. Section 4 of the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, (17 of 1983) reads:
“Substitution of Schedules I, II and III:— For Schedules I, II and III of the Principal Act, the following Schedules shall be substituted, namely:—
“SCHEDULE I
[See Section 2(2)]
A. Areas within the limits of the cities under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 and the areas within a radius of three kilometers from the limits of the said cities.
B. Areas within the limits of the following City Municipalities.
1. Bellary
2. Bidar
3. Bijapur
4. Davanagere
5. Gadag-Betageri
6. Hospet
7. Hassan
8. Mandya
9. Raichur
10. Shimoga
11. Tumkur
C. Areas within the limits of the following town municipalities of:
1. Arasikere
2. Bhadravathi
3. Buntwal
4. Chickmagalur
5. Chitradurga
6. Kundapur
7. Kolar
8. Karwar
9. Karkala
10. Kollegal
11. Malavalli
12. Madikeri
13. Mulki
14. Mudabidri
15. Nippani
16. Puttur
17. Udupi.
D. Area within the limits of Kolar Gold Fields Sanitary Board.
SCHEDULE II
[See Section 2(3)]
I. Areas within the limits of the cities under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 and the area within a radius of three kilometers from the limits of the sad cities.
II. Areas within the limits of City Municipalities, Town Municipalities and notified areas constituted or deemed to be constituted under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964, except the Notified Area Committee, Bhadravathi.
III. Area within the limits of the Notified Area Committee Bhadravathi, excluding New Town and Paper Town.
IV. Area within the limits of Kolar Gold Fields Sanitary Board.
V. Area within the limits of Town Panchayats of.
Bankapur
2. Gokarna.
VI. Areas within the limits of Revenue villages of:
1. Buntwal.
2. Kod.
3. Mudibidri.
4. Mulki.
SCHEDULE III
[See Section 2(4)]
Areas within the limits of cities under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 and the areas within a radius of three kilometers from the limits of the said cities”.
14. The substitution of the new Schedules shall be taken as though the Schedules were in existence from the very inception of the Act. Once Section 4 speaks about the substitution, the said substitution shall be deemed to be on the anvil of the Act since the coming into force of the very Act itself. This is also the view taken in Shamrao v. Parulekar v. The District Magistrate, Thana, Bombay . 1952 SCR 683.. This is also the view taken by this Court in M/S. Doddannavar Bros. v. Malathibai* . ILR 1985 KAR 3025. and in Sadiq Sab v. Akhilandamma . ILR 1985 KAR 1737..
15. It is undisputed that as per the Schedules now substituted, Angol conies within the limits of Belgaum City Corporation. Therefore, the provisions of the Rent Control Act are applicable to the building in question.
16. In the result, the revision is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court are set aside. The plaintiff-landlord is at liberty to have recourse to the provisions of the K.R.C Act if he so chooses.
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