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General Manager, Ksrtc v. Vijayalaxmi
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an award dated 29-3-1984 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, IV, Bangalore City, in M.V.C No. 670 of 1982, which awarded Rs. 60,000/- as compensation in a fatal motor accident case. The deceased, Saravanavelu, aged 42 and employed at B.E.M.L, was killed when the appellant's bus collided from behind with his scooter on Kempegowda Road, Bangalore, on 3-10-1982. The dependants filed a claim for compensation. The Tribunal initially assessed compensation at Rs. 1,00,000/-, deducted Rs. 40,235/- as benefits arising from the death, and awarded the balance of Rs. 60,000/- to the claimants. The General Manager of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) has appealed against this award.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the finding of actionable negligence on the part of the bus driver was correct.
- Whether the quantum of compensation awarded was appropriate.
- Whether the non-joinder of the driver as a party to the proceedings is fatal to the claim, i.e., whether a driver is a necessary party to fasten liability on the owner and insurer.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Challenged the Tribunal’s finding of actionable negligence by the bus driver.
- Contended that the quantum of compensation was excessive, arguing that a larger deduction should have been made for the deceased’s personal and living expenses.
- Asserted that since the driver was initially impleaded but later given up by the claimants, no liability could be fastened on the owner or insurer, implying that the driver is a necessary party to the action.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (14th Edition, 1975) | Defines vicarious liability and joint-tortfeasors; establishes that a master is liable for torts committed by a servant in the course of employment. | The court relied on this to affirm that the owner (master) and driver (servant) are joint-tortfeasors and that the owner’s liability is not negated by non-joinder of the driver. |
| Salmond on Torts (18th Edition, 1981) | Explains that a master is jointly and severally liable for torts committed by a servant during employment, emphasizing the principle of vicarious liability. | Used to reinforce the principle that the owner is liable for the driver’s tortious acts, supporting the rejection of the appellant’s contention regarding driver’s necessity as a party. |
| Jones v. Manchester Corporation (Denning, L.J.) | States that a master is responsible for the servant’s conduct as if it were his own and is never treated as an innocent party when a tort is committed during employment. | Applied to confirm that the master (owner) cannot escape liability by non-joinder of the servant (driver), affirming the Tribunal’s approach. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first examined the finding of actionable negligence by the bus driver. The eye-witness testimony of P.W. 1, corroborated by documentary evidence, established that the bus struck the scooter from behind at high speed on a busy road, causing fatal injuries. The court found this evidence sufficient to prove not only negligence but also recklessness, dismissing the appellant’s challenge to this finding.
Regarding the quantum of compensation, the court acknowledged the appellant’s argument about the deduction for the deceased’s personal expenses but emphasized there is no fixed rule for such deductions. The court explained that the extent of deduction depends on the deceased’s lifestyle, habits, and family circumstances. Given that the deceased was the head of a family with four children and a wife, the Tribunal’s allowance of Rs. 750/- out of Rs. 1,048/- as dependency was reasonable and not subject to interference.
On the issue of non-joinder of the driver, the court analyzed the principle of vicarious liability. It referred to authoritative texts and case law to establish that the master (owner) and servant (driver) are joint-tortfeasors, and the master’s liability is joint and several. The court rejected the contention that the driver is a necessary party, holding that the owner alone can be sued if the tortious act of the driver in the course of employment is established. This reasoning led to the dismissal of the appellant’s third contention.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is rejected at the admission stage.
The court upheld the Tribunal’s award of compensation and confirmed the correctness of the finding of actionable negligence against the bus driver. It also affirmed the quantum of compensation as reasonable under the circumstances. Importantly, the court clarified that the non-joinder of the driver is not fatal to the claim against the owner, reinforcing the principle of vicarious liability and joint and several liability of master and servant. This decision directly affects the parties by maintaining the compensation awarded and does not set any new precedent beyond reaffirming established principles.
Venkatachaliah, J.:—
This appeal is by the General Manager, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC) and is directed against the award dated 29-3-1984, made in M.V.C No. 670 of 1982, on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, IV, Bangalore City, awarding a total compensation of Rs. 60,000/- in a fatal accident's action.
2. Saravanavelu, aged 42 years, working at the B.E.M.L, was killed in a motor-accident which occurred at about 11-30 A.M on 3-10-1982. Saravanavelu was riding his scooter on the Kempegowda Road at Bangalore. The appellant's bus hit the scooter from behind. Saravanavelu succumbed to the injuries. The dependants brought the present action for compensation. The Tribunal on a consideration of the evidence on record determined the total compensation at Rs. 1,00,000/-. It deducted a sum of Rs. 40,235/- towards benefits arising out of the death and awarded the balance of Rs. 59,765/- rounding it off to Rs. 60,000/-.
3. Sri G. Lingappa, Learned Counsel for the appellant has urged three contentions. The first is as to the correctness of the finding of the Tribunal as to actionable-negligence on the part of the driver of the bus. The second is as to the quantum of compensation. The third is that since the driver of the bus who was originally impleaded to the proceedings had later been given-up by the claimants, no liability could be fastened on the owner and consequently on the insurer. This, in substance, means that a driver is a necessary party to the action.
4. On the first question as to the actionable-negligence, P.W 1, the pillion rider on the scooter tendered evidence. He gave an eye-witness account of the occurrence. He stated as to how the Bus came all on a sudden from the rear with a high speed and hit the scooter. In a busy road like the Kempegowda Road in Bangalore the Bus hit the scooter with velocity which dragged the scooter 30 feet further after the impact. The facts speak for themselves. The Tribunal has accepted the evidence of P.W 1, which was found to be corroborated by documentary evidence. In this case it appears not only that actionable-negligence is established but the evidence suggests a degree of recklessness on the part of the Driver also. This reckless act of the driver has snuffed-out a precious life and snatched away the bread-winner of the family. There is absolutely no merit in the contention of Sri Lingappa against this finding of the Tribunal, as to actionable-negligence.
5. As to the quantum of compensation, the grievance of the appellant is that out of the admitted monthly earning of Rs. 1,048/- the Tribunal had taken Rs. 750/- as the value of the dependency lost. His point is that something more than Rs. 298/- should have been allowed for the living and personal expenses of the deceased himself.
There is no hard and fast rule about the extent of the deduction to be made towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In some English cases seventy per cent of the earnings has been suggested as the value of dependency. But it all depends on the extent of income; the size and the standards of living of the family and the habits of the deceased. If the deceased was devoted to the family and had no expensive habits and lead a spartan life, deduction on this score would, relatively, be less. If on the contrary the deceased was a Bohemian and a spend-thrift and had many favourite follies, the deduction towards the expenses of his living—and for his pleasures — should be accommodated by appropriate deductions. That depends on the evidence on record as to the life-style and personal habits of the deceased. No hard and fast rule, applicable to all cases, could be made as to what amount, or what percentage of the income, should be deducted for such living and personal expenses.
6. In the present case, the deceased was the head of a family with 4 children and wife. There is nothing unreasonable in the estimate of the Tribunal which provided Rs. 750/- out of the earnings of Rs. 1,048/- for the maintenance of the family. This estimate does not, in our opinion, suffer from any infirmity, so as to call for interference in appeal. We find no substance in the second contention either.
7. What remains to be considered is the contention that the non-joinder of the Driver is fatal to the action. The owner's liability in this case is the vicarious liability of the Master for the tortious act of the servant in the course of employment. They are both in the position of Joint-Tortfeasors and their liability is joint and several. The position is too well settled to admit of doubt. However, out of deference to the Learned Counsel who seemed to set some store by this contention we might refer to some authorities.
8. In Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (14th Edition, 1975) the statement of the law on the point is this:
“A master is saddled with responsibility to a third party in the event of his servant committing a tort in the course of his employment. The servant himself is also liable, and he and his master are joint-tortfeasors, though in practice it is the master who is sued since he is better able to pay the damages. For vicarious liability to arise three things have to be established: a master-servant relationship; that the servant committed a tort; and that he did so in the course of his employment.”
(vide para 76 at page 43)
(emphasis supplied)
As to who are Joint-Tortfeasors, it is stated:
“Who, then, are joint-tort-feasors? One way of answering the question is to see whether the cause of action against each tort-feasor is the same. If the same evidence would support an action against each, they are joint-tort-feasors. They will be jointly liable for a tort which they both commit….”
(vide: para 201 at page 114)
Where damage is caused to a person by two or more wrongdoers they may either be Joint-Tort-feasors or independent Tort-feasors. A case of Vicarious liability is a case of Joint-Tort-feasors. On the question as to the nature of the Vicarious liability of the Master for the tortious act of the servant, Salmond on ‘Torts’ (18th Edition, 1981) states:
“A Master is jointly and severally liable for any toft committed by his Servant while acting in the course of employment. This is by far the most important of the various cases in which vicarious responsibility or vicarious liability is recognised by the law. Vicarious liability means that one person takes or supplies the place of another so far as liability is concerned……..”
(vide para 172 page 425)
(emphasis supplied)
In Jones v. Manchester Corporation, Denning, L.J said:
“In all these cases it is of importance to remember that when a master employs a servant to do something for him, he is responsible for the servant's conduct as if it were his own. If the servant commits a tort in the course of his employment, them the master is a tort-feasor as well as the servant. The master is never treated as an innocent party………….”
(emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the word ‘Vicarious’ itself lexicographically means one that takes the place of another. Vicarious liability means that one person takes the place of another so far as liability is concerned.
9. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that in an action against the master for the tortious act of the servant, the latter himself is a necessary party and that his non-joinder is fatal to the action. The case being one of Joint and several liability the master alone can be sued; but, of course, in the action the tort of the servant, in the course of the employment, must be established.
10. There is, thus, no merit in this appeal which is, accordingly, rejected at the admission stage.
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