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Rollatainers Ltd. & Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors.

Karnataka High Court
Jun 11, 1984
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Rollatainers Limited

Factual and Procedural Background

Rollatainers Limited (petitioner-1), a public limited company, manufactures and sells "printed cartons" at factories including one at Makali near Nelamangala, Bangalore District. For the period 1-3-1975 to 28-2-1983, various manufactured articles (including Item No. 13 — "All products of the printing industry including news papers and printed periodicals") were exempted from excise duty by Government notification under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, 1944. On 26-10-1979 the petitioner filed a classification list with the Superintendent of Central Excise, Bangalore, claiming that its printed cartons were exempt under Item No. 13; the superintendent accepted that classification and the petitioner cleared goods without charging excise to customers.

The superintendent initially acted on an earlier Government decision (Allibhoy Sharufally & Co., 1978 E.L.T. 145) which treated printed cartons as products of the printing industry. Subsequently, a later Government decision (In re: Vijaya Flexible Container Limited, 1980 E.L.T. 646) classified printed cartons as products of the packaging industry and not eligible for exemption. On the basis of that later decision, the superintendent issued a communication dated 15-9-1980 calling upon the petitioner to file a fresh classification list, and thereafter issued two show cause notices dated 24-9-1980 seeking excise duty amounts (Rs. 1,70,638.30 and Rs. 4,13,074.01) for specified periods. The petitioner (together with petitioner-2, a shareholder) challenged the 15-9-1980 communication and the show cause notices by filing the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a mandamus and refund of Rs. 18,69,286.70 (the excise duty it had paid for the period when the exemption was in force).

The respondents (Central Government authorities) maintained that printed cartons are products of the packaging industry and dutiable, relying on the later Government decision (Vijaya Flexible Containers). They also contended that the petitioner had alternative statutory remedies (show cause, appeal) and that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay. The Court dealt first with objections of alternative remedy and delay, and with the standing of petitioner-2 to challenge actions directed at the company.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the printed cartons manufactured by the petitioner are "products of the printing industry" (and therefore exempt under Item No. 13 of the exemption notification) or "products of the packaging industry" (and therefore liable to excise duty).
  2. Whether the communication dated 15-9-1980 (Annexure-E) and the show cause notices dated 24-9-1980 (Annexures G & H) issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise are legally valid, having regard to Government decisions and the applicability of the exemption.
  3. Whether the petitioners were precluded from approaching the High Court because of alternative statutory remedies (show cause proceedings and appeals) or because of delay in challenging the notices.
  4. Whether petitioner-2 (a shareholder) had standing to challenge the impugned orders directed at petitioner-1 (the company).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The goods manufactured — "printed cartons" — are products of the printing industry and therefore exempt from excise duty under Item No. 13 of the exemption notification for the period when the exemption was in force.
  • The superintendent had accepted the petitioner's classification and the petitioner cleared goods without charging excise; the subsequent demand and show cause notices were issued contrary to the accepted classification and to relevant legal principles.
  • The petitioner has contested the notices and communicated opposition; the delay in approaching the Court was not contumacious or inordinate.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Printed cartons are products of the packaging industry and are therefore exigible to excise duty; the later Government decision in Vijaya Flexible Container's case correctly treated printed cartons as packaging products.
  • The petitioner had statutory remedies: it could answer the show cause notices and thereafter agitate the matter in appeal under the Act; therefore the High Court should decline to exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.
  • The petition should be dismissed on the ground of delay.
  • Petitioner-2 (a shareholder) cannot challenge actions directed against the company and has no standing to do so on grounds such as alleged violation of Article 19; accordingly any relief as to petitioner-2 should be refused.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dunlop India Limited v. Union of India ((1976) 2 SCC 241 : A.I.R. 1977 SC 597) Principles for interpreting entries in taxing statutes: acceptation by trade and popular/commercial meaning govern; scientific or technical meaning is not decisive. The Court treated Dunlop as concluding authority on interpretive principles and applied those principles in deciding whether printed cartons fall within "products of printing industry".
King v. Planters Nut and Chocolate Company Limited (1951 CLR 122) Taxing statutes should classify substances according to general usage and trade denominations rather than technical or botanical definitions. Referred to and quoted to support the proposition that commercial/popular understanding governs interpretation of taxing entries.
Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer (1962) 1 SCR 279 : AIR 1961 SC 1325 Words in tax/sales statutes must be construed in popular/common parlance, not technical senses; the sense attributed by those conversant with the subject governs. Cited with approval as reinforcing the commercial/popular meaning approach to statutory interpretation.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh (AIR 1967 SC 1454) Sales/tax items should be interpreted by popular or commercial sense rather than technical/scientific meaning. Used to support applying commercial meaning in determining whether an item falls within a schedule entry.
South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1968) 3 SCR 21 : AIR 1968 SC 922 Illustration that a product known in trade by a different name is not to be equated with an item in a taxing schedule simply by chemical composition; commercial identity matters. Referred to for the proposition that commercial recognition, not technical composition, determines inclusion under a tariff item.
Minerals & Metal Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. Union of India ((1972) 2 SCC 620 : AIR 1972 SC 2551) Again endorses commercial meaning over technical definitions in interpreting terms in tax/excise statutes. Cited as further support for applying commercial/trade meaning when construing the exemption entry.
Allibhoy Sharufally & Company (1978 E.L.T. 145) (Government decision) Government had found that "printed cartons" were to be treated as products of the printing industry and entitled to exemption under Item No. 13 of the notification. The superintendent originally accepted the petitioner's classification by following this Government decision; the Court regarded this earlier decision as correct and relied upon it in allowing the petition.
In re: Vijaya Flexible Container Limited, Bombay (1980 E.L.T. 646) (Government decision) Government opined that "printed cartons" are products of the packaging industry and not entitled to exemption under Item No. 13. The superintendent relied on this later decision to issue the communication and show cause notices; the Court considered this later decision flawed because it considered end-use, which the Court found irrelevant under established principles, and therefore rejected that decision for the purposes of the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by first addressing objections of alternative statutory remedy and delay:

  • Communication dated 15-9-1980 (Annexure-E) was held not to be challengeable by an appeal or revision under the Act; hence the objection based on alternative remedy with respect to that communication did not arise.
  • As to the show cause notices, the Court acknowledged that the petitioner could answer those notices and later appeal, but held that this did not oust the High Court's jurisdiction to examine their validity by writ, particularly where the notices were issued on the basis of a later Government decision that the Court found to be bound to follow only if valid.
  • The Court found that any delay in approaching the High Court was not contumacious or inordinate since the petitioner had contested the notices when received.
  • The Court held that petitioner-2 (shareholder) could not challenge actions addressed to the company (petitioner-1) and dismissed the petition so far as it related to petitioner-2.

On the substantive classification question, the Court applied the interpretive principles enunciated in the Supreme Court decisions cited (notably Dunlop India), namely that words in taxing statutes should be given their commercial or popular meaning as understood by the trade rather than a narrow technical meaning. The Court:

  1. Reviewed authoritative treatises and industry literature (extracts from the Encyclopedia of How It's Made; Victor Strauss, "The Printing Industry"; and "Printing Office Procedure") which classify printed cartons as falling within the scope of "printing" or as printed products, and which describe printing processes and finishing operations (die-cutting, binding, package printing) employed in printed carton manufacture.
  2. Noted that many of the processes used to manufacture printed cartons are the same as those used in traditional printing products (books, periodicals), and that printing processes and finishing operations are integral to the manufacture of printed cartons.
  3. Emphasised that the ultimate end-use of a printed article (i.e., as packaging) is irrelevant to classification under the exemption entry, relying on Dunlop India's case which held that "end use" is not decisive for the interpretation of the tariff entry/exemption notification.
  4. Concluded that the later Government decision in Vijaya Flexible Containers (which treated printed cartons as packaging products) wrongly placed weight on the end use of the materials and failed to consider relevant factors; therefore, the earlier Government decision in Allibhoy Sharufally's case (which treated printed cartons as products of the printing industry) was correct and should be followed.
  5. Therefore, the superintendent's subsequent action (communication and show cause notices) taken on the basis of the Vijaya decision was manifestly illegal and required judicial interference under Article 226.

The Court specifically stated that it was unnecessary to examine other grounds raised by the petitioner or defenses by the respondents once the primary classification issue was resolved in the petitioner's favour; those additional grounds were left open without opinion.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The writ petition is allowed in the following respects:

  • The petition is dismissed so far as it relates to petitioner-2 (the shareholder).
  • The Court quashed the communication dated 15-9-1980 (Annexure-E) and the show cause notices No. 130 04/80 dated 24-9-1980 (Annexure-G) and No. C. 1302/80 dated 24-9-1980 (Annexure-H) issued by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Range 'BB' II Division, Bangalore.
  • The Court issued a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to refund the excise duty collected from the petitioner on the printed cartons for the period during which the exemption (Item No. 13) was in force, with all expedition and in any event within four months from receipt of the order. The respondents were permitted to adjust such refunds against any other amounts found due from the petitioner under the Act.
  • The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The specific departmental communication and show cause notices impugned in this petition were set aside and the petitioner is entitled to a refund of excise duties collected for the period of the exemption, subject to statutory adjustments by respondents.
  • Interpretive implication: The Court applied and reaffirmed the principle that interpretation of taxing/exemption entries must follow the commercial/popular meaning and trade usage rather than a strictly technical or end-use based approach; it accepted the earlier Government determination (Allibhoy Sharufally) and rejected the later contrary Government decision (Vijaya Flexible Containers) as being based on considerations (end-use) that were irrelevant under established precedent.
  • Broader precedent: The judgment resolves the classification dispute between the parties in favour of the petitioner in this case and applies established Supreme Court interpretive principles. The opinion does not, in explicit terms, purport to lay down a new general precedent beyond applying existing authorities; its practical consequence is to quash the impugned departmental actions and order refunds in this matter.

This summary is strictly confined to the material and findings contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. Rollatainers Limited, a public limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, petitioner-1 which will be hereafter referred to as the petitioner is engaged in the manufacture and sale of ‘printed cartons’ at its two factories-one situated at Makali near Nelamangala of Bangalore District and the other at Faridabad of Hariyana State. In this petition, we are concerned with the manufacture of ‘printed cartons’ at Makali factory only.

2. For the period from 1-3-1975 to 1-3-1983 the said manufactured goods were exigible to excise duty under Tariff Item No. 68 of the Central Excise and Sal Act of 1944 (Central Act No. 1 of 1944) (here inafrer referred to as the Act). But, Government of India in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules of 1944 (here inaffer referred to as the Rules) made under the Act, by its notification No. 55 of 1975 dated 1-3-1975, amended from time to time, exempted various manufactured articles one of which was Item No. 13—“All produces of the printing industry including new papers and printed periodicals” from the whole of excise duty leviable thereon under the Act, Both sides are agreed that the said exemption of Item No. 13 continued only till 28-2-1983 and not thereafter. 26-10-1979 the petitioner filed a classification list (Annexure-C) in the appropriate form prescribed by the Rules before the superintendent of Control Exercise M.O.R.B, Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as the superintendent) claiming that ‘Printed Cartons’ manufactured by it was exempted from payment of whole of excise duty under the Act in the aforesaid notification, who on its examination accepted the same. On that basis, the petitioner cleared the goods manufactured by it without passing on the excise duty to its customers to which it was entitled to. In accepting the same, the superintendent followed a decision rendered by Government in the matter of Alliboy Shrufally and Company (1978 E.L.T 145) in which it had expressly found that ‘printed cartons’ were to be treated as ‘Products of printing industry’ entitled for exemption under Item No. 13 of the notification dated 5-5-1975.

3. But, Government in a later case decided on 23-5-80 In re: Vijaya Flexible Container Limited, Bombay. (FB) 1980 E.L.T 646 (G.O.I) disagreeing with the earlier decision in Allibhoy Shrufally's case expressed the view that ‘printed cartons’ were ‘products of packaging industry’ and was, therefore, not entitled for evemption from payment of excise duty under the Act and the notifications issued the eunder. Evidently, on the basis of this decision of Government, the superintendent in his notice dated 15-9-1980 (Annexure-E) expressing on the above terms, called upon the petitioner to file fresh classification list for approval with which it complied under protest cleared the goods on payment of excise duty. By two separate but indentical show cause notices dated 24-9-1980 (Annexures G & H) - the first one relating to the period from November, 1979 to Nov. 80 and the relating to the period from March, 1980 to August, 1980 the superintendent has called upon the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 1,70,638-30 and Rs. 4,13-074-01 being the excise duty that should have been otherwise levied but not levied and collected for the aforesaid periods. In this petition under Article 225 of the Constitution, the petitioner and one of its shareholder, who is petitioner-2, have challenged the communication dated 15-9-1980 (Annexure-E) and the show cause notices dated 24-9-1980 of the superintendent (Annexures-G & H) and have sought for a mandamus to the respondents to refund a sum of Rs. 18,69,286-70, being the excise duty paid for the period item No. 13, of the exemption notification was in force.

4. As before the respondents, the petitioner has asserted that what was manufactured was a product of printing industry, and not a ‘product of packaging industry’. On this premise the petitioner has also urged various other grounds to justify its claim before this court.

5. In their return, the respondents while reiterating that the printed cartons manufactured by the petitioner was not a product of printing industry, but was a product of packaging industry, have urged that the same was exigible to excise duty under the Act and that the later decision rendered by Government in Vijaya Flexible Container's case was the correct one.

6. The respondents have urged that, it is open to the petitioner to show cause to the notices on which the competent authority will decide and that decision can be agitated in an appeal under the Act and that before that this court should decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction. Lastly, the respondents have urged that on the ground of delay also, this Court should decline to exercise its extra-ordinary jurisdiction. In the very nature of things, it is appropriate to deal with these two objections urged by the respondents first, as in the event of this Court accepting either of them, the question of examining the merits will not arise. Sri K. Shivashankar Bhat, learned Central Government Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents, has supported both these objections.

7. The communication or demand dated 15-9-1980 (Annexure-E) issued by the Superintendent, evidently on the basis of the decision rendered by Government in Vijaya Flexible Container's case, cannot be challenged in an appeal or a revision under the Act and, therefore, the question of alternative remedy against the same, does not arise.

8. So far as the show cause notices, the petitioner can show cause on the very grounds urged in this writ petition and such other grounds as are available and, thereafter agitate the matter in an appeal; is not and cannot be disputed, But, the same does not touch on the jurisdiction of this Court to examine them and decide their validity also, which is very necessary, when this Court finds that they are really issued with due regard to a later decision rendered by Government, which it is bound to follow and hold against the petitioner. For these reasons, I see no merit in this objection of the respondents and I reject the same.

9. The delay, if any, in challenging the notice dated 15-9-80 (Annexure-E) or the other show cause notices is not contumacious and inordinate. When the petitioner received that demand and notices, it did not accept them and has contested them also see no merit in this objection of the respondents and I reject the same.

10. The demand and notices are addressed to and are sought to be enforced against petitioner-1, which is a legal entity and not against petitioner-2. Whatever may be the interest of petitioner-2 in the affairs of petitioner-1, she cannot challenge the actions initiated against the former. In any event, this is not one of those cases, where a citizen who is a shareholder should be permitted to challenge the law or an action against a company on the ground that it is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. In this view, this petition is so far as it relates to petitioner-2 calls for dismissal, which however cannot affect the rights of petitioner-2.

11. Sri Aeshad Hidayathullah, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously contended that ‘printed cartons’ manufactured by the petitioner were ‘Products of the printing industry’ and was, therefore, entitled for exemption from payment of the whole of excise duty under the Act for the period the exemption was in force.

12. Sri Bhat has urged that the ‘printed cortons’ manufactured by the petitioner was not a product of printing industry, but was a ‘product of packaging industry’ and was, therefore, dutiable to excise duty under the Act.

13. Both sides have relied on a large number of cases in support of their respective cases and those that are relevant will be notices by me at the appropriate stages.

14. On the principles to be applied in the interpretation on entries occuring in the Act or the notification, the matter is concluded by several rulings of the Supreme, Court. In Dunlop India Limited v. Union of India ((1976) 2 SCC 241 : A.I.R 1977 Supreme Court 597), the Supreme Court reviewing the English, American and the earlier cases of the Court, has re-stated those principles in these words:

“31. It is well established that in interpreting the meaning of words in a taxing statute, the acceptation of a particular word by the Trade and its popular meaning should commend itself to the authority.

32. Dealing with the meaning of the term “vegetables” in the Excise tax Act in King v. Planters Nut and Chocolate Company Limited 1951 CLR 122 the Exchequer Court observed as follows;—

“Now the statute affects nearly everyone, the producer or manufacturer, the importer wholesaler and retailer, and finally, the consumer who, in the last analysis, pays the tax. Parliament would not suppose in an Act of this character that manufacturers, producers, importers, consumers, and others who would be affected by the Act, would be botanists. The object of the Excise Tax Act is to raise revenue, and for this purpose toclass substances according to the general usage and known denominations of trade. In my view, therefore, it is not the botanist's conception as to what constitutes a ‘fruit’ or ‘vegetable’ which must govern the interpretation to be placed on the words, but rather what would ordinarily in the matters of commerce in Canada be included therein. Botanically, oranges and lemons are berries, but otherwise no one would consider them as such”

15. The exchesuer Court also referred to appihy sentence from “200 chests of Tea” per Story, J. (1824) 9 Wheaton (US) 435] that “the Legislature does not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists, or botanists”.

33. The above Planters Nut case (supra) was referred to with approval by this Court in Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer (1962) 1 SCR 279 : (AIR 1961 SC 1325). In Ramavatar's case, this, Court was concerned with the meaning of the word ‘vegetables’ occurring in C.P and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. This Court held as follows:—

“But, this word must be construed not in any technical sense nor from the botanical point of view but as understood in common parlance. It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of every day use it must be construed in its popular sense meaning ‘that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would autribute to it’. It is to be cons trued as understood in common language”.

34. Again in the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, AIR 1967 SC 1454 this Court had to deal with the word ‘charcoal’ used in Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. It was contended in that case that ‘charcoal’ would be covered under Entry-I of Part-III of Schedule II to that Act. This Court while holding that charcoal would be included in coal, observed as follows:—

“Now, there can be no dispute that while coal is technically understood as a mineral product, charcoal is manufactured by human agency from products like wood and other things. But it is now well settled that while interpreting items on statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not to the scientific or the technical meaning of such terms but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense.”

16. This Court again referred with approval to the decision in Planters Nut case (supra) and followed the principle laid down in Ramavatar's case (supra). In South Bihar Sugar Mills Limited etc. v. Union of India, (1968) 3 SCR 21 : (AIR 1968 SC 922) the question that was raised related to item 14-H in the Schedule-I to the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, which contained compressed, “liquefied or solidfied gases, inter alia, Corbon acid (carbon dioxide). This Court observed as follows:

“It is also to correct to say that because the sugar manufacturer wants carbon dioxide for carbonation purpose and sets up a kiln for it that he produces carbon dioxide and not kiln gas. In fact what he produces is a mixture know both to trade and science as kiln gas, one of coutitueah of which is, no doubt, carbon dioxide”.

17. This Court finally observed:

“The kiln gas in question therefore, is neither carbon dioxide nor compressed carbon dioxide known as such to the commercial community and therefore, cannot attract Item 4-H in the First Schedule”.

Similary in Minerals & Metal Trading Corportion of India Ltd. v. Union of India (1973) 1 SCR 997 : ((1972) 2 SCC 620 : AIR 1972 SC 2551) this Court dealing with the meaning of the word ‘Vol fram ore’ again approvingly referred “not to the scientific or technical meaning but to the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them in their commercial sense”.

18. Bearing these principles it is necessary to examine whether the ‘printed cortons’ manufactured by the petitioner are products of printing industry or are ‘products of packaging industry’.

19. In ‘the Encyclopedia of How It's Made’, Edited by Donald Clarke, ‘printed cartons’ are held to fall within the meaning of the term ‘printing’. In that treatise, the term ‘printing’ is defined thus:

“Apart from the obvious books, magazines and newspapers, the products of the printing industry are many and diverge. They include posters, banknotes, telephone directoris, postage stamps, record sleeves, wall papers, cartons, plastic containers and many other forms of packaging”.

20. On the same subject Victor Strauss in his treatise “The Printing Industry” in Chapter XI - ‘Art - and - Copy Preparation’ has expressed thus;

“Section-1: Different Kinds of printed products and Their Art-and-Copy Preparation.

The purpose of the printed-product to-be is the first and foremost concern of everybody participating in art-and-copy preparation. This purpose governs practically everything; it is decisive for format and design of the piecs, and it controls not only the printing but also the binding or other finishing operations to which the printed place must be subjected.

The number of printed products is legion; it is hence absolutely impossible to enumerate them all. Nor is this necessary for the understanding of the relations between printed products and the task of art-and copy preparation, particularly not not since the nature of a printed product must be produced. Take, for example, a quarterly journal of interest to a limited number of learned people and a notional magazine read by the millions. Both are classified as magazines, but the first is printed in lots of few thousands and the second may be manufactured by the hundreds of thousands or even in millions. Obviously these two kinds of magazines pose very different problems for art-and-copy preparation inspite of their common classification. The same holds true for many other printed products.

If we want to anive at a kroupina practical for our purposes, we cannot rely on the simple method of generic classification but must look into the different social tasks for which printed products are intended. Suprisingly, we can arrive at such a grouping if we ask the question: Who pays for the printed products? In answer to this question, we can devide printed products into three broad classes; (1) printed products that are completely paid for by the final customer, for example, “consumer goods and packages, (2) printed products that are pertically paid for by the final customer and partially by advertisers, such necessarily inspected individrally; inspection can also be done by a method of planneds ameling. If a job has trouble spots of its own, these are particularly watched during inspection; otherwise inspecting is concerned with the general quality level of the work.

Jecketing: Jecketing can be done either by hand or by a jacketing machine. Depending on the weight of the paper on which they are printed, jackets may need prescoring before they can be put over the ook covers by hand jacketing. In machine jacketing, the books are loading in a hopper and the jackets in a continuous feeder. The machine forms the jacket into the required shape and applies it to the book. Some jaecketing machines can produce upto 4000 units per hour.

In fully automatic book production “jacketing machines may be attached directly to the output of the casing-in and building-in equipment. Books travelling continuosly - through the machine are aplit and the covers opened up in such a manner that the jackets are fed in on top of the opened covers and these two elements are carried through folding belts which fold and crease the jacketsaround the covers, after which the covers are closed and the finished book is delivered.”

XXXXXX

21. Section 10: Miscellaneous Supplementary and Finishing Processes.

22. Binding is by no means the only manufacturing process whereby a printed product receives its final form. As the scope of drinting expanded and as the number of its products multiplied, many supplementary processes became necessary. In this section we will breiefly review some of the more commonly used subsidiary aid finishing processes. Unfortunately, these cannot easily be systematized. Some subsidiary processes result in visible images and therefore resemple printing as defined in this manual. Others take the already printed sheet as their point of departure and merely convert and adapt it as needed for the end product. For our purposes it is expedient to divide the subject into four units: (1) ruling, (2) bronzing, varnishing, ‘and other surface treatments (3) discutting, and (4) various finishing methods.

XXXXXX

23. Die-cutting:

Certain printed products such as displays, labels, and folding paper boxex must be cut do fancy or irregular shapes. Such cutting tasks cannot be performed by guilotine cutters, which can only make straight cuts, but are accomplished by means of cutting dies and a variety of different process or other specialized machines. For our purposes it is convent to divide the subject into three points (1) steel rule die cutting, (2) diecutting with high dies in vertical press, and (3) PMC die cutting. Each of these kinds is now briefly discussed”.

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24. Package printing: Package printin, too, belongs in the class of printed products which are completely paid for by the final customer. To be sure, the final customer of packaged wares is not inforned how much of their price is due to the cost of the printed package, but he, or more freamently she, must still pay for this part of the total cost whenever a box of candy, a carton of frozen food, a can of beer, or a plastic bag of vegetables is bought. Box tops, labels, neatsealed plasties, lithographed metal cams, paper folding boxes, and many similer items belong in this group of package printing which has experienced as unprecedented growth in recent times”.

25. The treatise “Printing Office Procedure” published by the ‘British Industries Federation’, II Edition treeting ‘printed cartons’ as falling within the meaning of the term ‘printing industry’ states thus:

“Although the typical printer haldles a wide variety of work (he is said to be a ‘general’ or jobbing printer) there is a trend towards specialisation. Some firms concentrate on books, and others on periodicals, printed cartoms and stationery, while come undertake services to the trade such as setting type for other printers to use.

xxxxxx

“There are several employers' organisations connected with printing in someway. The Newspaper Publishers' Association represents the national daily newspapers; the Newspaper Society covers provincial daily and evening and all other newspapers, including the London suburben newspapers; and the British Printing Industries Federation can be broadly described as a national association of employers in the general printing industry.

Founded in 1900, the Federation has member firms engaged in book and magazine production, jobbing printing and binding, carton and stationary manufacture”…………”

26. Incidentally, it is stated there in that the manufacturers of printed cartons in Briton are also members of the Federation.

27. An analysis of the above extracts in particular and the treatises in general, suggests that ‘printed cartons’ have to be appropriately treated as ‘products of printing industry’ and not as ‘products of packaging industry’.

28. When ‘printed cartons’ are manufactured, every process that is employed in printing books periodicals or other journals is also employed, if the process or techniques for printing books, periodicals and journals and ‘printed cartons’ is one and the same, then there is hardly any ground to hold that ‘printed cartons’ will cease to be products of ‘printing industry’ only by reason of its end or ultimate use. The end use of the article, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Dunlop India's case, was totally irrelevant in the context of the entry found in the exemption notification or the tariff item also.

29. In Allibhoy sharufall's case Government, however without a full discussion came to the conclusion that' ‘Printed Cartos’ were products of ‘printing industry’ and eligible for exemption. But, is Vijaya Flexible Containers case, Government which was undoubtedly entitled to re-examine, and take a different decision, came to a contrary conclusion. But, in reaching that conclusion, Government has not borne all the relevant factors and has taken into consideration the and use of the material which was totally irrelevant. In there circumstances, the later decision rendered by Government in Vijaya Flexible Container's case cannot be accepted. In my view, the earlier decision rendered by Government in Allibhoy Sharufally's case, for the reasons stated by me, was correct and there was hardly any ground to dissent from the same.

30. On the above discussion, it follows that the claim of the petitioner for exemption from payment of excise duty had been correctly accepted by the Supraintendent and his action to bound the same evidently on the basis of the later decision of Government in Vijaya Flexible Containers' case was manifestly iligal and calls for the interference of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

31. On the above conclusion, it is unnecessary to examine all other grounds urged by the petitioner in rupport of its claim or the defences pleaded against them by the respondents. I, therefore, leave open them without expressing any opinion. In the light of my above discussion, I take the following orders and ciractions:

[a] I discuss this writ petition so far as petitioner-2 only.

[b] I quash the order dated 15-9-1980 (Annexure-E) show cause notices No. 130 04/80 dated 24-9-1980 (Annexure-G) and No. C. 1302/80 dated 24-9-1980 (Annexure-H) issued by the Superintendent of, Central Excise, Range ‘BB’ II Dn., Bangalore.

[c] I issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the respondents to refund the excise duty collected from the petitioner on the ‘printed cartons’ for the period for which the exemption was in force on that manufactured article, with all such expedition as is possible in the circumstances of the case and in any event within a period of 4 months from the date of receipt of the order of this Court. But, in settling such refunds, the respondents are free to adjust the same to any other amounts that are found due by the petitioner to Government, under the Act.

32. Writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.