V.S Malimath, J.:— These Appeals are by Abdul Basheer challenging the order of the learned single Judge dated 4-2-1981 (Reported in AIR 1981 Kant 148) allowing writ petitions Nos. 23775 & 23776 of 1980 presented by T. Veeranna and B. Thippeswamy respectively. The undisputed facts of the case may briefly be stated as follows:—

2. The State Transport Undertaking which is the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, Bangalore, (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation), prepared and published a draft scheme popularly known as Davanagere Draft Scheme under Sec. 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the 9th of Aug. 1973. Though the draft scheme has been published in Aug. 1973, it is interesting to note that the same has not yet achieved finality in that the approved scheme has not been finalised and published as required by Sec. 68-D(2) of the Act. On the 9th of May 1980, the appellant Abdul Basheer applied to the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the RTA’), under Sec. 68-F(1-C) of the Act for grant of a temporary permit for the route Davanagere to Chitradurga and back, consisting of two round trips, proposing to operate the service as Non-Stop or Express Service. The Corporation opposed the said application contending that there was no need. To the same effect were the objections of Veeranna and Thippeswamy who are the existing operators on the route. The RTA after considering the objections and the material collected by it passed a resolution on 28th of Oct. 1980 granting a temporary permit in favour of Abdul Basheer on the route Davanagere to Chitradurga viz. Anagodu Bharamasagar and Katral consisting of Express Non-Stop service of two round trips daily till the implementation of Davanagere Draft Scheme. The Secretary of the RTA was directed to fix suitable timings without affecting the existing Services. In pursuance of the said Resolution of the RTA, a temporary permit was in fact granted to the appellant on the 26th of Dec. 1980 from which date it is said that he commenced operating the services. Veeranna and Thippeswamy, the existing operators on the route, challenged the Resolution of the RTA dated 28th of Oct. 1980 in Writ Petitions Nos. 23775 & 23776 of 1980. We are informed that after Rule was issued, an ad interim stay was granted on the 29th of Dec. 1980 and consequently the appellant stopped his services from 2nd of Jan. 1981. The learned single Judge allowed both the Writ petitions, quashed the Resolution of the RTA and remitted the case for fresh disposal to the RTA. The learned single Judge has come to the conclusion that the RTA has not determined the number of additional permits to be granted on the route Davanagere to Chitradurga before granting the permit to the appellant. The learned single Judge has also observed that opportunity was not afforded to the Corporation for applying for a temporary permit. The learned single Judge has also held that the purpose for which temporary permit was asked for was only for meeting the temporary need whereas the permit granted is for a different purpose. It is the said order of the learned single Judge that is challenged in these two appeals.

3. As we noticed that the Corporation has not been impleaded as a party in the two writ petitions and consequently in these appeals, we heard the learned counsel for all the parties and made an order on 13th of Sept. 1983 holding that the corporation was a necessary party and should have been impleaded in the writ petitions. On the oral applications made by the concerned parties, we permitted them to implead the Corporation as a party. The Corporation has since entered appearance through the counsel Sri B.M Chandrashekharaiah.

4. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned single Judge was not right in taking the view that after receipt of the appellant's application under Sec. 68-F(1-C) of the Act, the RTA should have, in the first instance, determined as to the number of vehicles that is required to be increased on the route, having regard to the public interest. It was submitted that it is enough for the RTA to be satisfied that there is no application for temporary permit made under Sec. 68-F(1-A) by the Corporation and that there is adequate need to grant the permit prayed for.

5. Section 68-F of the Act contains several provisions in regard to issue of permits to the State Transport Undertaking. Sec. 68-F(1) provides for issue of permits to the State Transport Undertaking in pursuance of an approved scheme published under Sec. 68-D of the Act. Sub-secs. (1-A) to (1-C) contain provisions in regard to grant of temporary permits for the period between the date of publication of the draft scheme under Sec. 68-C and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme under Sec. 68-D of the Act. The same may be extracted as follows for the sake of convenience:—

“68-F. (1-A) Where any scheme has been published by a State Transport Undertaking under Sec. 68-C, that undertaking may apply for a temporary permit, in respect of any area or route or portion thereof specified in the said scheme, for the period intervening between the date of publication of the scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme, and where such application is made, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be shall, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to increase, in the public interest, the number of vehicles, operating in such area or route or portion thereof, issue the temporary permit prayed for by the State Transport undertaking.

(1-B) A Temporary permit issued in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (1-A) shall be effective.—

(1) if the scheme is published under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 68-D, until the grant of the permit to the State Transport Undertaking under sub-sec. (i) or (ii), if the scheme is not published under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 68-D, until the expiration of the one week from the date on which the order under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 68-D is made.

(1-C) If no application for a temporary permit is made under sub-section (1-A), the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be may grant, subject to such conditions as it may think fit temporary permit to any person in respect of the area or route or portion thereof specified in the scheme and the permit so granted shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of that area or route or portion thereof.”

Sub-sec. (1-A) of Sec. 68-F enables the State Transport Undertaking to obtain temporary permits for the period intervening between the date of publication of the draft scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme. The RTA who is approached for this purpose, is required to be satisfied that it is necessary to increase, in the public interest, the number of vehicles operating in such area or route or portion thereof, before deciding as to whether the application of the State Transport Undertaking for grant of a temporary permit should be granted or not. Sub-sec. (1-B) of Sec. 68-F speaks of the duration of the temporary permit granted under sub-sec. (1-A). Sub-section (1-C) thereof enables persons other than the State Transport Undertaking to obtain temporary permits in respect of an area, route or portion thereof specified in the draft scheme. Grant can be made in respect of a person other than the State Transport Undertaking under sub-sec. (1-C) only if no application for a temporary permit is made under sub-sec. (1-A) in respect of the concerned route. It further provides that the permit granted under sub-sec. (1-C) shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of that area or route nr portion thereof. It is clear from the scheme of sub-secs. (1-A) and (1-C) of Sec. 68-F that they deal with the subject of grant of temporary permits for the period intervening between the date of publication of the draft scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme either in favour of the State Transport Undertaking or in favour of other persons. The object of these provisions is to ensure that the interests of the travelling public are properly taken care of during the period between the date of publication of the draft scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme. The essential condition to be satisfied, as expressly provided in sub-sec. (1-A) for the grant of a temporary permit in favour of the State Transport Undertaking, is that the public interest will justify the increase in the number of vehicles to be operated in the area or the route or portion thereof concerned. It is of the essence of the matter that the State or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be should, in the first instance, examine under sub-sec. (1-A), the need having regard to the interests of the travelling public. It is only if the Authority is satisfied that the existing vehicles operating on the area or route or portion thereof, are not adequate and that it is necessary to increase the number of vehicles, that the Question of considering the request of the State Transport Undertaking arises. If the Authority comes to the conclusion that there is no need to increase the number of vehicles, the application made under sub-sec. (1-A) has to be rejected. The application of the State Transport Undertaking under sub-sec. (1-A) can only be granted to meet the additional requirements found by the Authority after assessing the relevant materials. In other words, temporary permits can be granted under sub-sec. (1-A) only to meet the additional requirements of the travelling public on the area or the route concerned. Sub-sec. (1-C) can be invoked by persons other than the State Transport Undertaking for obtaining temporary permits only if no application for a temporary permit is made under sub-section (1-A) of Sec. 68-F by the State Transport Undertaking. In other words, if the State Transport Undertaking does not come forward to meet the requirements of the area or the route by obtaining a permit under sub-sec. (1-A), that may be fulfilled by any other person obtaining a temporary permit under sub-sec. (1-C). It therefore follows that when an application is made under sub-sec. (1-C) by a person other than the State Transport Undertaking, the State or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be having regard to the public interest, is required to assess the increase in the number of vehicles that is required to be put on the area or route concerned. It is only after being satisfied that there is need to increase the number of vehicles, that the Authority can proceed to make a grant under sub-sec. (1-C), if no application for grant of a temporary permit is made by the State Transport Undertaking under sub-sec. (1-A) in respect of the very same area or route concerned. The requirements regarding need which are expressly incorporated in sub-sec. (1-A), have necessarily to be satisfied when an application under Section 68-F(1-C) is required to be considered by the State or the Regional Transport Authority. The learned single Judge has in our opinion, rightly come to the conclusion that for the purpose of considering the application under sub-sec. (1-C), the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority has in the first instance, to determine having regard to the public interest the number of vehicles that are necessary to be increased for operating in the area or route concerned. It appears to us that further discussion on this question is not called for as the matter is not res integra the question having been fully considered by the Supreme Court in (1980) 4 SCC 503 : AIR 1981 SC 516 between Smt. Praveen Ansari v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Lucknow. That was a case in which the appellants had applied for temporary permits under Section 68-F(1-C) for plying passenger vehicles on Khurja-Pahasu-Chhatari-Dabai-Rajghat-Rambhat-Atrauli route. Their applications were rejected by the State Transport Authority and their appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the writ petition to the High Court of Allahabad were also dismissed. The State Transport Authority had come to the conclusion that there was need to increase the number of vehicles by granting seven additional temporary permits. The State Transport Undertaking had applied under Section 68-F(1-A) for grant of only three temporary permits. The State Transport Authority granted the application for three temporary permits. The applications of the appellants before the Supreme Court were rejected on the ground that the State Transport Undertaking having made applications for grant of three permits, the essential condition, prescribed by sub-sec. (1-C), of there being no application for temporary permit under sub-sec. (1-A) by the State Transport Undertaking, is not fulfilled. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in these circumstances, that it was incumbent on the State Transport Authority to consider the applications of the appellants for the remaining four permits and that it was not justified in rejecting their applications, having regard to the finding recorded by it that there was in fact, need to increase the number of vehicles by granting seven additional temporary permits. Examining the scheme of the provisions of sub-sec. (1-A) of S. 68-F, this is what the Supreme Court has laid down in paragraph-9 of the judgment:—

“The correct approach would be that keeping in view the strength of the vehicles fixed by the competent authority, the authority should first examine the application for number of temporary permits made by the Corporation. If the Corporation has made application for temporary permits covering all the vacancies the matter ends there. But if the Corporation does not apply for all the permits but only for some, the inescapable conclusion is that for the remaining strength the Corporation has made no application for the temporary permits and Sec. 68-F(1-C) would be squarely attracted. In that event the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may be will have to examine the applications for temporary permits made by persons other than the Corporation and if they are found to be competent, eligible and qualified, they may have to be granted permits for the benefit of the large travelling public. That is why power to increase strength of fleet operating on the route is conferred and has to be exercised in public interest meaning transport facility to travelling public”.

6. The Supreme Court has indicated the correct procedure to be followed in the matter of deciding applications for grant of permits under sub-secs. (1A) and (1C) of the Act. It has been laid down that the State Transport Authority. Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be has in the first instance, to fix or increase the number of vehicles that may operate on the route. The next stage would be to examine the application for number of temporary permits made by the Corporation. If the Corporation has made applications for temporary permits covering all the vacancies. The matter should end there by granting all the temporary permits in favour of the Corporation. The question of considering applications of persons other than the Corporation and the State Transport Undertaking arises only if the Corporation does not apply for all the permits, but only for some. In that event, in so far as the remaining strength for which the Corporation has not made any application for temporary permits, permits can be granted under sub-sec. (1C) of S. 68-F in favour of persons other than the Corporation, if after examining their applications, the Authority is satisfied that they are competent, eligible and qualified for grant of permits for the benefit of the travelling public. Having regard to this authoritative pronouncement the learned single Judge was right in holding that the first step to be taken by the RTA was to determine the number of vehicles which are required to be increased having regard to the interest of the travelling public.

7. It was, however, contended by Sri Venkatanarasimhachar, learned counsel for the appellant, that the learned single Judge was not justified in quashing the entire resolution of the RTA on the ground that no determination was made in regard to the number of vehicles which are required to be increased having regard to the interest of the travelling public. He submitted that there is substantial compliance with the requirement and therefore interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution was not called for. He further submitted that if the resolution of the RTA is read in its entirety it will indicate that it has applied its mind to the material before it in regard to the need and has recorded a positive finding that there is in fact need to increase the number of vehicles on the route in question. For the sake of convenience, we propose to extract the relevant portion of the resolution of the RTA which reads as follows:

“The applicant is seeking temporary permit from Devanagere to Chitradurga. The proposed timings leaving Davanagere at 8.00 a.m will be convenient to the people who are coming for District Offices. Courts, etc. and also it will be convenient to reach Davanagere in the evening hours. Chitradurga is a District Headquarters and an industrial place attracting a number of tourists and there will be floating population. It is seen from the report of the Inspector of Motor Vehicles that most of the buses are shuttle services and there is need for an express service.

In view of the above facts, this RTA comes to the conclusion to introduce an express service leaving Davanagere in the morning hours to provide better travelling facilities. Hence a temporary permits is granted on route Davan to Chitradurga via Angodu, Bharmasagar and Kathral (two round trips daily express non-stop services) till the implementation of Davanagere Draft Scheme in the interest of the travelling public. The Secretary RTA is directed to fix suitable timings without affecting the existing services”.

8. It is clear from the discussion in the resolution of the RTA that it came to the conclusion having regard to the interests of the travelling public that there is need for an express service between Davanagere and Chitradurga. One of the reasons given for this conclusion is that most of the buses are shuttle services and that therefore there is need for an express service. The use of the word “an” positively indicates that the RTA came to the conclusion that there is need for one express service. Another reason given by the RTA for coming to the conclusion that there is need is that Chitradurga is an important district-headquarters whereas Davanagere is a taluk-headquarters in the district and that if the bus leaves in the morning at 8. a.m from Davanagere it would be very convenient for the people to attend the district offices and courts at the district-headquarters at Chitradurga. It is further stated that it would be convenient for those who have come from Davanagere to Chitradurga to attend to the office work etc., to return back in the evening to Davanagere if there is a return-service from Chitradurga to Davanagere in the evening. It is therefore, clear that the RTA did apply its mind and came to the conclusion that there is need for one express service to leave Davanagere in the morning for Chitradurga and for a return express service from Chitradurga to Davanagere in the evening. We have, therefore, no hesitation in understanding the resolution of the RTA as recording a positive finding that the existing services are not sufficient and that there is need to increase the number of vehicles by one by introducing an express service between Devanagere and Chitradurga the bus leaving Davanagere in the morning so as to take the passengers to Chitradurga to be in time to attend the offices, courts etc., and for a return trip from Chittradurga to Davanagere in the evening after office hours. It is therefore clear that the first step indicated in the decision of the Supreme Court which has to be followed in dealing with such applications has in fact been followed. The RTA has in fact recorded a positive finding to the effect that there is need to increase one round trip between Davanagere and Chitradurga. That being the position, it is not possible to agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the first condition of determining the increase in the number of vehicles not having been followed by the RTA the entire matter is required to be remitted to it for fresh disposal. The resolution of the RTA satisfactorily establishes that it has recorded a positive finding that there is need for one express service between Davanagere and Chitradurga. But while ultimately deciding the number of trips the RTA has stated as follows in the brackets:—

“(Two round trips daily express non-stop service)”.

9. In the Resolution, not a single reason is given as to why the RTA has granted two round trips daily. We have already pointed out that the RTA has come to the conclusion that there is need for one express-service. When the RTA comes to the conclusion that there is need for one express-service between Davanagere and Chitradurga and it also indicates that the need is for the morning service from Davanagere to Chitradurga and the evening service from Chitradurga to Davanagere we fail to see how it could make a direction quite contrary to its own finding that a permit for two round trips should be granted in favour of the appellant Abdul Basheer. Sri Venkatanarasimhachar, learned Counsel for the appellant, rightly and fairly conceded that having regard to the resolution of the RTA the only reasonable inference possible is that it has recorded a categorical finding only to the effect that there is need to increase the number of vehicles by granting one round trip express-service between Davanagere and Chittradurga. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that the resolution of the RTA, in so far as it directs grant of two round trips daily, is not sustainable. The resolution of the RTA can only be sustained consistent with its own finding for the grant of only one round trip daily as a non-stop express service.

10. The Corporation had not applied for grant of temporary permit on the route in question at the time on the RTA granted temporary permit in favour of the appellant. It is clear from S. 68F(IC) of the Act that the RTA cannot grant a temporary permit in respect of a particular route in favour of a person other than the Corporation if there is an application of the Corporation for grant of temporary permit for that route under S. 68F(1A) of the Act. As it is not disputed that there was no such application of the Corporation on the date of the grant of permit in favour of the appellant, the RTA had jurisdiction to make the grant in favour of the appellant. We however come to the conclusion that the grant of permit can be sustained only in respect of one round trip daily and not two round trips as directed by the RTA.

11. The learned single Judge has observed that the purpose for which the temporary permit is granted to the appellant is different from the one sought for by him. In the application filed by the appellant he has stated as against column No. 6 which requires to state the purpose of journey that it is to meet the seasonal demands under S. 68F(IC) of the Act. Though the use of the expression ‘seasonal demands’ is not very appropriate, it is clear that he has expressly invoked the provisions of S. 68F(IC). It is also necessary to note that in column No. 8 requiring to specify the date of expiry of the permit sought, he has stated “from 26-12-1980 till the implementation of Davanagere Draft Scheme”. This makes it clear that the permit was not sought to meet the seasonal demands which would be of a really temporary character, but it was sought under S. 68F(IC). If the application is read as a whole it would not be reasonable to construe the said application as indicating that the purpose of seeking a temporary permit was for meeting the seasonal demands as such. The resolution of the RTA is to the effect that the permit granted in favour of the appellant shall be in force till the implementation of the Davanagere Draft Scheme. It is obvious that the period of permit granted in favour of the appellant is governed by the provisions of S. 68F(IC) of the Act which provides that the permit granted under that provision shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of that area or route or portion thereof. It was contended by Sri Chandrashekharaiah appearing for the corporation that the temporary permit granted under S. 68F(IC) shall cease to be effective on the issue of even a temporary permit to the corporation under S. 68F(1A) in respect of the very same route. He submitted that such an inference clearly flows from the language of sub-sec. (1C) which provides that the temporary permit granted under that provision shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the state Transport undertaking in respect of that route or area or portion thereof. He submitted that after the grant of temporary permit in favour of a private operator under S. 68F(IC) it is possible for the corporation at a subsequent stage to make an application for grant of temporary permit under S. 68F(1A.) in respect of the very same route, and if a permit is granted in favour of the corporation the temporary permit granted earlier in favour of a private operator under S. 68F (IC) would cease to have effect. Having regard to the decisions of the Supreme court in Pravin Ansari's case ((1980) 4 SCC 503 : AIR 1981 SC 516) there is really no scope for such an argument. At the end of paragraph 5 of the judgment of the Supreme Court it is observed that the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority as the case may be in exercise of power conferred specifically upon it by S. 68F(IC) can grant temporary permits to persons other than the corporation to operate vehicles on the route for which the scheme is published till modified or approved scheme is published. This observation makes it clear that the power of granting the temporary permit under S. 68F(IC) cannot be exercised after the modified or approved scheme is published under S. 68D(2) of the Act. This observation has no reference to the period of temporary permit actually granted under S. 68F (1C). Paragraph-9 of the judgment which we have extracted earlier makes it clear that once increase in the number of vehicles is determined by the STA or the RTA in respect of a particular route it has to consider the applications of the corporation in the first instance. If the corporation has made applications for temporary permits covering all the vacancies the matter ends there. But if the corporation has not applied for all the vacancies but has applied only for some of them, for the remaining vacancies if the corporation has made no application for temporary permits S. 68F(IC) would get attracted and persons other than the corporation can be granted permits in respect of the remaining vacancies. Once that happens, the question of the corporation making a subsequent application under S. 68F(1A) in respect of the earlier increase in the number of vacancies determined by the RTA does not at all arise. If after following the procedure prescribed temporary permit is granted under S. 68F(1C) in favour of a person other than the Corporation, the permit so granted shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the corporation in respect of that route. If on the application made by a person other than the corporation for grant of a temporary permit under S. 68F(1C) the RTA determines that there is need to increase ten round trips, after considering the applications made under S. 68F(1A) by the corporation, the applications of the persons other than the corporation can be considered only for the remaining vacancies. If the corporation had applied under S. 68F(1A) for three permits and there were seven applications by persons other than the corporation, it follows that the three temporary permits have to be granted in the first instance in favour of the corporation and then the applications of the private operators have to be considered in respect of the remaining vacancies. But if on consideration of the remaining seven applications the RTA comes to the conclusion that only six applicants are fit and suitable for grant of permits, it is obvious that the RTA can grant only six permits in favour of six private operators. In that event, there would be one vacancy which remains unutilised. It is obvious that if such a situation arises, the corporation would be entitled to make a fresh application under S. 68F(1A) to take advantage of that vacancy. If the corporation does not take advantage of that vacancy the advantage of the same can be taken by any other private operator. Therefore, if all the ten vacancies are filled up by the RTA Granting Three permits in favour of the corporation and seven in favour of private operators, the question of the subsequent stage in respect of the seven vacancies which have already been filled up in favour of the private operators does not arise at all. The question of the corporation seeking and obtaining temporary permits at subsequent stages under S. 68F(1A) would arise only if there is found further increase in the traffic potentiality making it necessary for the RTA to fix the further increase in the number of vehicles that is called for. Once that is done, the procedure indicated by the Supreme Court in Para-9 of the judgment has to be followed once again. The question of disturbing the temporary permits obtained under S. 68F(1C) by private operators on the corporation obtaining temporary permits at subsequent stage does not at all arise. As indicated in S. 68F(1C), a temporary permit granted under that provision shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit on the corporation.

12. The expression “issue of a permit” used in sub-sec. (1C) of S. 68F is very significant. It provides that the temporary permit granted in favour of a private operator shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the corporation. It does not speak of the grant of a permit to the corporation. S. 68F(1) speaks of issue of permits to the corporation. Issue of a permit to the corporation under Sec. 68F(1) arises only after the approved scheme is published under S. 68D. We have therefore, no hesitation in taking the view that the expression “issue of a permit” used in sub-sec. (1C) of S. 68F is referable to the issue of permit under sub-sec. (1) of S. 68F. It is also necessary to point out that in the earlier part of S. 68F(1C) there is an express provision for making an application for a temporary permit and the grant of temporary permit. It is only when the provision speaks of the duration of the temporary permit granted under S. 68F(1C) that it is provided that is shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the corporation. If the intention of the Parliament was to make the temporary permit granted under S. 68F(1C) cease to be effective on the issue of a temporary permit in favour of the corporation it would have certainly used the similar expression namely, ‘temporary permit’ as it is used in the remaining part of S. 68F(1C). Hence, the context, in our opinion, makes it very clear that the expression ‘issue of a permit’ has reference to the issue of a permit under S. 68F(1) and not grant of a temporary permit under S. 68F(1A). This inference of ours gets further support from what is contained in sub-sec. (1B) of Sec. 68F. It provides that a temporary permit issued in pursuance of the provisions of sub-sec. (1A) shall be effective—

(i) If the scheme is published under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 68D until the grant of the permit to the state transport undertaking under Sub-sec. (1), or

(ii) If the scheme is not published under sub-sec. (3) of S. 68D, until the expiration of the one week from the date on which the order under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 68D is made.

13. It is obvious that the life of a temporary permit granted to private operator under S. 68F(1C) which can only be granted if there is no application for such permit under S. 68F(1A) by the corporation, cannot be longer than the life of a temporary permit that the corporation would be entitled to get under S. 68F(1A). It is provided in S. 68F(1B) that if the scheme is published under S. 68D(3) the permit issued under S. 68F(1A) shall remain in force until the permit is given to the State Transport Undertaking under S. 68F(1). The same has to be the position in respect of a temporary permit granted to a Private operator under S. 68F(1C). For the same reason, we are of the opinion that if the scheme is not published under S. 68D(3) the temporary permit granted under S. 68F(1C) shall be effective until the expiration of one week from the date on which the order under S. 68D(2) is made, as the life of the temporary permit granted in favour of the corporation under S. 68F(1A) comes to an end on the expiry of one week from the date on which the order under S. 68D(2) is made as provided in S. 68F(1B)(ii). It is obvious that the resolution of the RTA has to be understood in the light of the elucidation which we have made in regard to the date on which the temporary permit granted in favour of the appellant will cease to be effective.

14. It is however necessary to advert to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sudhir Sharma v. S.T.A (AIR 1980 All 352) relied upon by Sri. Chandrashekharaiah. The observations in the said judgment on which reliance is placed occur in paragraph-5 which reads as follows:—

“5. The Scheme as envisaged by the four sub-sections of S. 68-F(1) is clear that on the publication of a notification under S. 68-C of the Act, the Transport Authorities constituted under the Act have power to issue temporary permits to the State Transport Undertaking if it makes application for the purpose. The life of such a permit is to last till the finalisation of the scheme under S. 68-D(3) or till the order is passed by the State Government under sub-sec. (2) of S. 68-D of the Act disapproving the Scheme. If however, the State Transport Undertaking does not make any application for temporary permit, it is open to the transport authorities to grant temporary permit to any private operator for plying his vehicles on the route or area or portion thereof which may be the subject-matter of the scheme published under S. 68-C of the Act. The life of such a permit comes to an end by operation of law under S. 68F(1C) of the Act on the issue of a permit to the State Undertaking under S. 68F(1A) of the Act. Thus where the corporation does not make any application for the grant of a temporary permit, transport authorities may grant temporary permit to private operators but if at any stage the State Transport Undertaking makes application and temporary permits are granted to it any permit issued to private operators earlier would cease to be effective as provided by sub-sec. (1C). No specific order of cancellation need be passed as by operation of law any permit issued to a private operator shall cease to be effective. Sub-secs. (1-A) and (1-C) of S. 68-F are mutually exclusive to each other, therefore, the moment permits are granted to the State Transport Undertaking, the permits granted to private operators would cease to be effective by operation of law as contemplated by Sec. 68-F(1C) of the Act.”

15. No reasons have been given for the general inference drawn to the effect that if at any stage the State Transport undertaking makes an application and temporary permits are granted to it any permit issued to the private operators earlier would cease to be effective. The language of sub-sec. (1C) of Sec. 68F which we have analysed above does not permit such an inference to be drawn. Hence, with great respect, it is not possible to agree with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the said decision.

16. Sri. Venkatanarasimhachar, learned counsel for the appellant, relied upon the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sayed Jeelam v. S.T.A.T (AIR 1982 Andh Pra 220). The relevant observations occur in Paragraph-10 of the judgment which reads as follows:—

“……In these cases the question for consideration is whether a temporary permit granted to a private operator under S. 68-F(1C) is valid until a Pucca permit is granted to the State Transport Undertaking or whether it ceases to be effective even if a temporary permit is granted to the State Transport Undertaking. Under the last part of S. 68F(1C) it is provided that the permit shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of that area or route or portion thereof. Jeevan Reddy, J. took the view that the expression ‘permit’ in this part of the section means a Pucca permit and will not include a temporary permit. The contention of the State Transport Undertaking on the other hand is that even on the grant of temporary permit to the undertaking, the temporary permit granted to the private operator under S. 68F(1C) would cease to be effective. It is argued that the general expression ‘permit’ is wide enough to include a temporary permit. Reliance is placed upon the decision in G. Mahadeva Rao v. R.T Authority, AIR 1970 Andh Pra 419. It is true that the expression used in S. 68F(1C) is ‘permit’ but having regard to the object and purpose of S. 68F(1C) of the Act, we are of the view that the expression should be understood in a restricted sense as meaning only a Pucca permit. As Jeevan Reddy, J. has pointed out that S. 68F(1C) is intended to cover a case where there is delay between the publication of the draft scheme and the publication of the approved or modified scheme; and in such a case if an application for a temporary permit is made by the State Transport Undertaking, the authority grants the temporary permit to the undertaking if it is satisfied that it is necessary to increase in the public interest the number of vehicles operating on such route. If the undertaking does not make any such application, a temporary permit may be granted to a private operator. This provision is therefore made to meet and serve public interest. If the expression permit is construed as referring also to a temporary permit granted under sub-sec. (1A), the State Transport Undertaking would be entitled to obtain a temporary permit and displace the private operator within a short time after the grant of the temporary permit to the private operator under sub-sec. (1C). This would enable the State Transport Undertaking to lie low without applying for a permit under S. 68F(1A) and come on the scene after a private operator is given a temporary permit under Section 68F(1-C) and apply for a temporary permit under Sec. 68-F(1-C). In such an event, if the temporary permit granted to the private operator under Sec. 68-F(1-C) is rendered ineffective, it would place the private operator who has incurred considerable expense and put a bus on the route as the State Transport Undertaking had not chosen to apply for a permit, in a very disadvantageous position and he will be left to the mercy of the State Transport Undertaking. We do not think that this could have been the intention of the framers of the Act. On the other hand, as pointed out by Sri. G. Suryanarayana, the Act has used the expression ‘temporary permit’ whenever it wanted to refer to a temporary permit. Jeevan Reddy, J. has also referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in Praveen Ansar v. S.T.A Tribunal Lucknow ((1980) 4 SCC 503 : AIR 1981 SC 516) (supra) which lends some support to this view. We are also in agreement with him in holding that the view expressed by the Kerala High Court in Sankaran Nair v. R.T.A, Kottayam, 1978 Ker LT 410 is not correct.”

17. The view taken by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court accords with the view which we have taken: We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the permit granted to the appellant shall cease to be effective by the operation of law in the light of the elucidation which we have made in the course of this order.

18. For the reasons stated above, these appeals are allowed, the order of the learned single Judge made in Writ Petitions Nos. 23775 and 23776/80 is set aside, and the portion namely “(Two round trips daily express non-stop service)” occurring in the Resolution of the Regional Transport Authority, Chitradurga, in Sub. No. 33/80-81 dated 28-10-1980, is quashed.

19. We direct the secretary of the RTA to assign suitable timings to the appellant in respect of only one round trip daily as non-stop express service between Davanagere and Chitradurga, after hearing all the parties and bearing in mind the directions contained in the Resolution of the RTA that the departure from Davanagere should be in the morning to carry passengers to Chitradurga so as to be in time to attend offices courts etc., and the departure from Chitradurga in the evening should be after the office hours so as to enable the passengers to return to Davangere, and without affecting services. Until fresh timings are assigned to the appellant, the appellant shall operate the service on the timings assigned for the first trip in the morning from Davangere and on the timings assigned for the second trip in respect of the return journey from Chitradurga.

20. Appeals allowed.