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Sanna Eranna v. State Of Karnataka
Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.C. No. 58 of 1980 — Appeal by Accused)
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges the Judgment and order dated 4-5-1981 of the Sessions Judge, Raichur (S.C. No. 58 of 1980), in which the appellant, Sanna Eranna Devaramni, was convicted of murder under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment.
The accused was a constable recruited in 1978. He had a documented history of mental illness: he was treated after becoming unwell while on deputation at Gulbarga, was later attached to Yelburga Police Station, absconded from duty in April 1979 and was sent for treatment at the Mental Hospital, Dharwad. After discharge (on 8-9-1979), he was posted on sentry duty (with a 303 rifle and cartridges) at the Sub-Treasury adjacent to Yelburga Police Station.
On 11-9-1979 at about 4 P.M., while a deceased constable (Lingappa) was writing a receipt in the police station, the accused came from the strong room/sentry post and shot Lingappa. Other officers and constables struggled with the accused, some shots were fired (a fragment struck another constable), and the accused was overpowered, disarmed and placed in the lock-up. Lingappa was taken to hospital but died en route.
Investigation followed: complaint recorded (Ex. P-2), F.I.R. registered (Cr. No. 45/1979 for an offence under Section 302 IPC), material exhibits seized (rifle, cartridges, blood-stained clothes, bullet fragments), accused formally arrested and remanded, and bloodstained articles sent to the Chemical Examiner. A charge sheet was filed.
At trial the accused pleaded not guilty and raised the plea of insanity; the Sessions Judge rejected that plea and convicted and sentenced him under Section 302 IPC. The accused appeals this conviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the acts of violence attributed to the accused were committed with the requisite mens rea (intention or knowledge under Section 299 IPC) to constitute murder under Section 302 IPC.
- Whether the accused's plea of legal insanity under Section 84 IPC should have been accepted, particularly in light of the accused's prior history of mental disease and the investigating officers' failure to have him medically examined immediately after arrest.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Smt. Anasuya, counsel for accused)
- It was not disputed that the deceased died from homicidal gunshot wounds inflicted by the accused, but given the accused's admitted history of insanity (known to the police), the investigating officers should have immediately had the accused examined by a Medical Officer upon arrest.
- Immediate medical examination likely would have produced evidence that the acts were committed during an episode of mental insanity; the absence of that immediate medical inquiry disadvantaged the accused.
- The Sessions Judge erred in rejecting the plea of insanity merely because the accused did not adduce positive evidence showing incapacity to know the nature or wrongfulness of his acts; the accused's prior history, lack of motive and the surrounding circumstances should have raised doubt as to mens rea and entitled him to benefit of doubt.
Respondent's Arguments (State — Mr. Devaraju, SPP)
- Absence of motive does not by itself establish unsoundness of mind or incapacity to know the nature/wrongfulness of the act.
- The legal burden to bring the case within the exception of Section 84 IPC is on the accused; the accused failed to adduce evidence of unsoundness of mind at the relevant time.
- The Sessions Judge correctly found the accused guilty, and there were no substantial reasons to interfere with conviction and sentence.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1563 | Principles on burden of proof: prosecution's persistent duty to prove mens rea; Section 84 IPC is an exception and Section 105 Evidence Act places burden on accused to make existence of circumstances bringing case within exception sufficiently probable (prudent man standard). Also explains that evidence placed by accused may raise reasonable doubt as to mens rea even if it does not conclusively prove insanity. | The Court quoted and relied heavily on Dahyabhai to explain the interplay between the prosecution's unshifting burden and the accused's rebuttable burden under Section 84; applied its third proposition (that evidence may raise reasonable doubt as to mens rea) to conclude that prosecution failed to discharge its burden because of investigational failures and available materials indicating prior insanity. |
| Bhikari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 1 | Reiteration of principles governing the burden of proof and the plea of insanity in criminal trials. | Cited as one of the authorities reiterating the same doctrines that guided the Court's assessment of burden and the effect of evidence relating to mental disease. |
| Ratan Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1970 3 SCC 533 | Reiteration of doctrines about burden of proof and the plea of insanity. | Used to support the principles applied in assessing whether accused rebutted the presumption of sanity or raised reasonable doubt on mens rea. |
| S.W. Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra, 1973 4 SCC 79 | Authority reiterating the legal principles concerning insanity pleas and burden of proof. | Cited to reaffirm the legal framework relied upon by the Court when evaluating the accused's insanity plea and evidentiary requirements. |
| Oyami Ayatu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 216 | Another authority restating the principles on burden of proof in insanity cases. | Cited among a group of decisions confirming the principles that the Court applied in assessing whether the prosecution had proved mens rea and whether investigation was adequate regarding mental condition. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court identified the central legal question as whether the accused had the requisite mens rea — specifically, whether the violence was committed with intention to cause death or with knowledge that such injury was likely to cause death. It reiterated the foundational proposition that the prosecution must prove mens rea beyond reasonable doubt and that this burden never shifts.
The Court examined the legal contours of a plea of insanity under Section 84 IPC and the evidentiary framework under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, drawing extensively on Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat. The Dahyabhai principles underscored (i) the prosecution's continuing burden to prove the offence, (ii) the rebuttable presumption of sanity, and (iii) that evidence placed by the accused (or by the prosecution itself) may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to mens rea even if it does not conclusively establish legal insanity.
The Court then applied those principles to the facts:
- The accused had an established prior history of mental disease/lunacy; this fact was within the knowledge of the investigating officers (recorded in the complaint Ex. P-2 and supported by witness accounts such as PW-7).
- Fairness in investigation, the Court held, requires that when such a history is known and the accused is apprehended at or soon after the commission of the offence, the investigating agency should subject the accused immediately to medical examination to ascertain mental condition; such an examination helps rule out or confirm commission due to mental disease and preserves evidence.
- In this case, the investigating officers did not themselves swear to having questioned the accused post-arrest about his mental condition nor to having sent him immediately for medical examination. The first medical/professional psychiatric steps recorded occurred only later (orders for examination appear on 8-10-1979), and the contemporaneous reports or accounts from sub-jail staff purportedly reporting abnormal behaviour were not produced.
- Because the immediate medical examinations and contemporaneous records were lacking, it became impossible for the accused to show his precise mental condition at the time of the offence. The absence of such investigational steps and materials created an infirmity in the prosecution's proof of mens rea.
- Given the accused's prior history of periodic lunacy, the available facts indicated abnormal behaviour at times; in combination with the investigational failure, this raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the acts were committed with the requisite intention for murder.
- Applying the third proposition from Dahyabhai, the Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to discharge the general burden of proving mens rea beyond reasonable doubt because the investigation did not collect and place before the Court all relevant mental-health-related materials that could reasonably have been obtained.
The Court therefore found the Sessions Judge's reliance on the accused's actions at the scene (cleaning and loading the gun, resisting officers, firing shots) insufficient, in these circumstances, to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was of ordinary mind with requisite mens rea at the time of the offence.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on Sanna Eranna Devaramni by the Sessions Judge in S.C. No. 58 of 1980, and acquitted the appellant. The Court directed that he be set at liberty forthwith.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The accused's conviction and life sentence under Section 302 IPC were set aside and he was acquitted and ordered released immediately.
- Investigative implication emphasized by the Court: Where an accused has a known history of mental disease and is apprehended at or shortly after the alleged offence, the investigating agency should, as a matter of fairness and completeness, obtain immediate medical/psychiatric examination and preserve contemporaneous records of the accused's behaviour. Failure to do so can create a substantial infirmity in the prosecution's case and give rise to a reasonable doubt on mens rea.
- No broader or novel legal rule beyond these applications was announced; the Court applied established Supreme Court authorities (notably Dahyabhai) to the facts and remitted to the consequence of acquittal in this case.
This summary is confined to the statements and materials expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that text.
Patil, J.:— In this appeal the accused has sought to challenge the legality and correctness of the Judgment and order dated 4-5-1981 passed by the Sessions Judge, Raichur, in S.C No. 58 of 1980 whereby he has convicted him for the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life thereunder.
2. The Accused, Sanna Eranna Devaramni, being a native of village Janthkal in Gangavathi Taluk was recruited as a constable during the year 1978, when he was deputed to Gulbarga for bandobust duty of Urus of Khaja Bande Navaz, where he was afflicted with mental insanity and sent for treatment to Civil Hospital, Raichur. After some treatment there, when he returned to duty he was attached to Yelburga Police Station. In April 1979, he absconded from the guard duty entrusted to him and ran away from there to village Gadgeri and coming to know that the accused was again showing signs of mental insanity, the P.S.I secured him from Gadgeri and sent him to mental hospital at Dharwad for treatment. After some treatment, when he was discharged from the hospital, on 8-9-1979, PW-2 Abbas Ali, the Station House Officer of Yelburga Police Station deputed him for sentry duty at the Sub-Treasury Office situated close to the Police Station with 303 rifle M.O 1 and 10 live cartridges. There the accused was to do his duty for about a fortnight. On 11-9-1979, at about 4 P.M, when PW-2 was in charge of the Police Station and PW-3 Ramachandra was on sentry duty there, PW-4 Veerabasappa went to the Police Station with Ex. P-3, the order passed by the JMFC., Yelburga, regarding entrustment of the custody of two bullocks seized in C.C No. 39/79 and requested PW-2 to entrust the two bullocks to him. When PW-2 Head Constable Abbas Ali asked him to pass a receipt for having received the custody of bullocks and PW-4 Veerabasappa pleaded his inability to write the receipt PW-2 called the Police Constable Lingappa, the deceased, present in the Police Station, to write a receipt for PW-4. Accordingly, when the deceased Lingappa was engaged in writing the receipt as dictated by PW-2, the accused who was on sentry duty at the strong room in Sub-Treasury suddenly went to the Police Station and standing at the entrance of the hall shot at the deceased. As the deceased fell down with the gun-shot injury, PW-2 hurried towards the accused with a view to snatch away the gun. But the accused however receded back and pushed PW-2 who was trying to snatch the gun, as a result when PW-2 fell down the accused fired another shot and went into the police station. PW-3 Ramachandra who had by then taken position at the table, jumped upon the accused and hold M.O 1, but the accused however pulled the trigger of the gun and fired the third shot towards the eastern wall of the hall, as a result a piece of bullet hit PW-6, Police Constable Ayyanagowda, who was present at the door of the wireless room there, PW-3, who, in the meanwhile, gained control over the accused, snatched the rifle from the hands of the accused with the help of others including PW-5, Hanamesha, PCB. No. 917, who returned from the guard duty and PW-9 Vasudeva Rao, PCB. No. 678, who came there on hearing the reports of the gun-shots. PW-2 also went there and with the help of the others managed to lodge the accused in the male lock-up there. PW-5 and 6 and others took the deceased Lingappa to the General Hospital at Yelburga for examination and treatment. PW-2 who had also sustained injury went to the hospital. PW-13 Dr. Gurubasappa, Medical Officer, who was on duty, got removed the blood stained clothes M.O 3, 4, 5 and 6 worn by the deceased and made over them to PW-5 Police Constable Hanumesba and bandaged the injuries sustained by the deceased. Since the condition of the deceased was serious, he advised to take him to the Civil Hospital at Gadag for better treatment. Accordingly, PW-6 secured a jeep towards Gadag, but on the way near the village Naregal when deceased breathed his last, he went back with the deceased in the same jeep to the police station and made the dead body of the deceased to lie there in the police station. In the meanwhile, when PW-9 Vasudeva Rao, P.C.B No. 678, went to Bevur and informed PW-18 Raja Guru, the P.S.I, and PW-19 Pandu ranga Rao, Dy. S.P, who was then working as the C.P.I and was on casual leave, about the incident, they went to Yelburga Police station. PW-9 also accompanied them. PW-19 went to the General Hospital at Yelburga and questioned PW 2 about the incident and recorded his complaint as per Ex. P-2 and directed P-W 18 to go to the police station and register the case. Accordingly, PW-18 went to the police station and on the basis of Ex. P-2 registered a case in Cr. No. 45/1979 for offence under Section 302 IPC and issued F.I.R to the Court as per Ex. P. 17. As directed by PW-19, PW-18 continued the investigation. He secured panchas including PW-14 Peersab and seized M.Os 3 to 6 produced by PW-5 earlier entrusted to him by the Medical Officer under panchanama Ex. P. 10. Thereafter, he formally arrested the accused who was in the lock-up and took up his personal search and seized five live cartridges M.O 16 along with kaki uniform worn by the accused under Ex. P. 11. He also seized the rifle M.O.I produced by PW-3 under panchanama Ex. P. 12. On 12-9-1979, he sent the accused to the Court for judicial custody remand and held inquest proceedings over the deadbody of the deceased as per Ex. P. 13 noting the condition of the place of the incident there and seized four bullet pieces found near the eastern wall of the lock-up and two bullet ends found behind the chair near the eastern wall of the lock-up, as also three brass pieces. He packed and sealed them all along with the other articles. He thereafter sent the dead-body of the deceased to the Medical Officer for post mortem examination. He also questioned and recorded the statement of PW-4 and PW-9 on 13-9-1979. PW-19 took up investigation and recorded the statements of material witnesses and seized Pyjma M.O 2 worn by PW-2 who was still under treatment, under panchanama Ex. P. 14. He also prepared a separate panchanama of the place of incident as per Ex. P. 15. Later on he sent the bloodstained articles to the Chemical Examiner, Bangalore, and on receipt of the report of the C.E, as per Ex. P. 5, and on completion of the investigation he placed charge sheet against the accused.
3. The accused who pleaded not guilty raised the plea of insanity and contended that he knew he was compelled to do sentry duty on 11-9-79 from 2 P.M to 6 P.M though he was not feeling well in his head and he did not know what all transpired on that day.
4. The Learned Sessions Judge rejected this plea of insanity raised by the accused and accepting the evidence of occurrence held that the accused was guilty of the charge of the offence of murder levelled against him and accordingly convicted and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life.
5. It may be mentioned here that the accused was also charged with the commission of offence of attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 and offence of simple hurt punishable under Section 323 IPC and acquitted of the said two charges giving benefit of doubt. The State has not filed any appeal against the said order of acquittal on the said two charges.
6. Smt. Anasuya, Learned Counsel appearing for the accused-appellant, did not seek to dispute that the deceased died a homicidal death on account of gun shot injuries fired by the accused. She however contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, when the accused admittedly had an history of insanity and was treated for the same to the knowledge of the police as narrated in the complaint Ex. P-2, in all fairness to the accused, the Investigating Officer should have sent the accused immediately for examination by a Medical Officer and had the accused been subjected to medical examination immediately, in all probabilities the evidence could be available to show that the Acts attributed to the accused were committed by him when he was afficted with mental insanity with which he was suffering and the learned Sessions Judge, in the circumstances, was not therefore right in rejecting the plea of insanity raised by the accused, merely because the accused has not led any evidence to show that at the time of commission of the offence by reason of insanity of the mind he was incapable of knowing the nature of the Act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. She also submitted, that the approach of the Sessions Judge in reaching that conclusion was erroneous. Even if there was no positive evidence available regarding the mental disease, having regard to the history of insanity prior to and subsequent to the incident placed on record, the absence of motive for the commission of offence was sufficient to raise a doubt if the accused had or had not the necessary intention of committing the offence of murder levelled against him and that benefit of doubt was to be given to the accused and not to the prosecution and therefore, the order of conviction and sentence as passed on the accused could not be sustained.
7. Mr. Devaraju, Learned State Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, argued that mere absence of motive is not by itself sufficient to conclude that at the material time of the incident the accused was either of unsound mind or incapable of knowing the nature of the acts committed by him or that he was incapable of knowing the acts so being committed by him were wrong or contrary to law. He submitted, the burden of bringing the case within the exception covered by Section 84 IPC being on the accused and the accused having not adduced any evidence regarding unsoundness of mind at the relevant time in regard to the commission of the offence, the Learned Sessions Judge was justified in finding the accused guilty and there are no subtantial reasons to interfere with the order of conviction and sentence passed on the accused.
8. As stated earlier, the deceased died homicidal death on account of gun-shot injuries and it is the accused who had fired 303 rifle M.O 1 and in that deceased having sustained gun-shot injuries and succumed to death. The evidence given by the Medical Officer in this behalf having remained unchallenged, we do not consider it necessary to go into this aspect of the case.
9. In view of the contentions advanced before us, the material point that requires to be considered is whether the, accused had the requisite means rea, that it is to say, whether acts of violence attributed to the accused were committed by him with the requisite intention of causing the death of the deceased or causing such bodily injuries as the accused knew were in all probability likely to cause his death. The burden of proving this beyond reasonable doubt lies heavily on the presecution. It is also well established that this burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. While thus the general burden to bring home the necessary ingredients of the offence of murder rests throughout on the prosecution and the prosecution successfully discharges the burden then the accused has to satisfactorily establish his plea of insanity by placing such material before the Court oral or documentary this may be either by admissions elicited from the witness or the materials placed by the prosecution itself. In the case of Dahyabhai v. State of Gujarat . AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1563., the Supreme Court while enunciating the law on the point has observed as follows:
“It is fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution therefore, in a case of homicide shall prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused caused death with the requisite intention described in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. This general burden never shifts and it always rests on the prosecution. But, Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code provides that nothing is an offence if the accused at the time of doing that act, by reason of unsoundness of mind was incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. This being an exception, under Section 105 of the Evidence Act the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within the said exception lies on the absence of such circumstances. Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, read with the definition of “shall presume” in Section 4 thereof, the Court shall regard the absence of such circumstances as proved unless, after considering the matters before it, it believes that the said circumstances existed or their existence was so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that they did exist. To put it in other words, the accused will have to rebut the presumption that such circumstances did not exist, but placing materials before the Court sufficient to make it consider the existence of the said circumstances so probable that a prudent man would act upon them. The accused has to satisfy the standard of a “prudent man”. If the material placed before the Court, such as, oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even the prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of “prudent man” the accused will have discharged his burden. The evidence so placed may not be sufficient to discharge the burden under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, but it may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a judge as regards one or other of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may, for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge whether the accused has the requisite intention laid down in Section 299 of the Indian Penal Code. If the Judge has such reasonable doubt, he has to acquit the accused, for in that event the prosecution will have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the accused. There is no conflict between the general burden, which is always on the prosecution and which never shifts, and the special burden that rests on the accused to make out his defence of insanity.
Proceeding further, after a review of various decisions expounding the doctrine of burden of proof in the context of plea of insanity, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
“The doctrine of burden of proof in the context to the plea of insanity may be stated in the following propositions: (1) The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed the offence with the requisite mens rea; and the burden of proving that always rests on the prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial. (2) There is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not insane, when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code: the accused may rebut it by placing before the Court all the relevant evidence - oral, documentory or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings. (3) Even if the accused was not able to establish conclusively that he was insane at the time he committed the offence, the evidence placed before the Court by the accused or by the prosecution may raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court as regards one or more of the ingredients of the offence, including mens rea of the accused and in that case the Court would be entitled to acquit the accused on the ground that the general burden of proof resting on the prosecution was not discharged.”
These very principles have been reiterated and re-emphasised in the decisions in the cases of Bhikari v. State Of Uttar Pradesh . AIR 1966 SC 1. Ratan Lal v. State Of Madhya Pradesh. . 1970 3 SCC 533 S.W Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra . 1973 4 SCC 79 and Oyami Ayatu v. State Of Madhya Pradesh . AIR 1972 SC 216..
10. While ordinarily the existence of motive for the commission of an offence alleged and the manner of its commission - the weapons used and the vital parts of the body on which the injuries are inflicted - may themselves be sufficient in a given case to establish that the accused had committed the acts of violence with such intention of causing the death of the person murdered, because every person is presumed to know the natural consequences of his acts; but where the acts of violence are committed by a person apparently for no motive and in an ordinarily ununderstandable manner killing his own kith and kin towards whom he had been all along affectionate or his colleague against whom he had no grouse, a doubt necessarily arises in the mind of the Court as to whether at the relevant point of time the accused was an ordinary person who can be presumed to know the consequences of his acts. The crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind of the accused is the time when the offence was committed, and whether the accused was in such state of mind as to be entitled to the benefit of Section 84 IPC can only be established from the circumstances which preceded, attended and followed the crime.
11. Though there is no burden cast on the prosecution to establish negatively that the accused was not of unsound mind when he committed the acts of violence resulting in the death of the person or persons murdered, yet as under the present circumstances where the accused has a previous history of mental disease or lunacy and it is revealed during the course of investigation that the accused had such previous history of mental disease or lunacy, fairness in investigation does require probing into this aspect with an unbiased approach particularly when the accused cannot in the very nature of things assist in unravelling the necessary facts being in custody and may be being mentally unbalanced. Therefore, it becomes obligatory on the part of the investigating agency, particularly when the accused is apprehended at about the time of the commission of the offence or shortly thereafter, to subject the accused to medical examination, at least to ensure itself that accused was in fact a person of ordinary state of mind. If that is done, it necessarily rules out the possibility of the accused having committed the acts of violence attributed to him on account of mental disease or lunacy. The prosecution must place all such materials that could possibly be had. The failure to subject the accused to such medical examination immediately and to place all evidence that could be available may have, depending on facts and circumstances of a case, a serious consequence on the prosecution case when such plea of insanity is raied by the accused at the trial, as that may give rise to a doubt whether the act or acts of violence were committed with the requisite intention of committing a particular offence and any such failure on the part of the prosecution to collect the evidence and place before the Court on the mental aspect of the accused, creates a serious infirmity in the case of the prosecution and consequently the benefit of doubt will have to be given to the accused.
12. Coming to the facts of the present case, the accused admittedly had previous history of lunacy. In the complaint Ex. P-2 recorded by PW-19, PW-2 the Head Constable, who was in charge of the police station, when the alleged offence was committed, has stated in unequivocal words that
The evidence collected during the course of investigation and as given by PW-7 Prahladarao showed that on the date of the incident when the accused was on duty at strong room in Sub-Treasury, he was found cleaning the gun and when questioned as to why he was doing so, he told that his Saheb is going to come there and, therefore, he was doing so. But as a matter of fact no one was to visit there. After he was afflicted with the mental insanity when he was sent to bando bast duty to Gulbarga during Urus of Khaja Bande Navaz there and treated for the same, he showed similar tendency of lunacy and he ran away from duty and he was again brought and sent to the Mental Hospital at Dharwad for treatment and he was treated there for 15 days and that was in the month of April, 1979. The evidence of PW-19 also, as noticed by the Learned Sessions Judge himself, discloses that on 8-10-1979 the constables on duty at Sub-Jail reported about the abnormal behaviour of the accused and as directed by the J.M.F.C, Yelburga, the accused was examined by the Medical Officer PW-13 on 12-10-1979 and on his advice he was also sent for examination and treated by a Psychiatrist and accordingly the accused was sent to Mental Hospital at Dharwad for examination and treatment. This previous history being within the knowledge of the Investigating Officers, it was their duty to send the accused immediately on taking him to custody to a Medical Officer for examination of his mental condition, particularly when he was allegedly caught while committing the acts of violence and lodged in the lock-up. The Investigating Officers have neither them selves sworn to their having questioned the accused after arresting him to ascertain his mental condition then, nor have they sent the accused to a Medical Officer immediately for examination and ascertained the mental condition of the accused. It is only long after the incident, on 8-10-1979, when the Investigating Officer received report from the constables on sentry duty at the Sub-Jail about the abnormal behaviour of the accused he requested the J.M.F.C, Yelburga, for examination by a Medical Officer. Neither he himself swears as to what was the abnormal behaviour of the accused nor the report received from the constables on duty at the Sub-jail has been produced. Thus, it became impossible for the accused to show anything about his mental condition at the time of the incident. In view of the above, it cannot be said with any amount of certainty that he was an ordinary person presumed to know the consequences of his acts, when he allegedly committed the acts of violence. No doubt the burden to establish the legal insanity lies on the accused. But the burden cannot be as heavy as it lies on the prosecution to establish its case. Even if the accused had failed to establish conclusively the plea raised by him regarding the legal insanity within the meaning of Section 84 IPC, the facts and circumstances, established in the case do show that the accused periodically suffered mental insanity and, when under such influence of insanity, his behaviour was abnormal. Though it is not possible to say on account of insanity to what extent the behaviour of the accused used to be abnormal and if there was or not any homicidal tendency during that period of lunacy, the failure on the part of the Investigating Officers to lead evidence as to the mental condition of the accused when he was in custody and to produce the available records about the nature of insanity, in the given facts and circumstances of the case here, introduces an infirmity in proving the presence of mens rea, the essential ingredient of the offence of murder. This gives rise to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the Court, and hence the third proposition of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Dhayabhai v. State of Gujarath comes into play and, therefore, the accused would be entitled to an acquittal on the ground that the prosecution has failed to discharge the general burden that lies on it and establish the case beyond all reasonable doubt. The Learned Sessions Judge, in our opinion, was not therefore right, in the circumstances of the case here, in his conclusion that the accused was in perfect state of mind when he committed the acts of violence, because he was not only found cleaning the gun, but he had loaded the gun with cartridges and offered resistance when PW-2 tried to catch hold of him or because he had fired the third shot when PW-3 tried to disarm him. The circumstances relied upon by the Learned Sessions Judge to reach that conclusion are not by themselves sufficient to show what was the real state of mind of the accused.
13. In the result, for the reasons stated above, we allow the appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed on the appellant-accused Sanna Eranna son of Kenchappa Davarmani by the Sessions Judge, Raichur, in S.C No. 58 of 1980, and acquit him. We direct that he be set at liberty forthwith.
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