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Smt. Yamuna v. A. Rama Amin & Others .
Judgment Summary — Revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner (A. Rama Amin) sought to be impleaded as a party in H.R.C No. 66/71 pending before the Munsiff, Mangalore (South Kanara). The first respondent had instituted the proceeding claiming possession of premises under Clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (h) and (p) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. One ground of the landlord's claim (Clause (f)) was that the tenants had unlawfully sub-let the premises to the present petitioner.
Because the petitioner was not a party to the main proceeding, she filed I.A. IV under Section 22 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act read with Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC, requesting permission to be brought on record as a party-respondent. She alleged that the sub-lease in her favour was lawful and had been created prior to the commencement of the Act and that, under Section 22 of the Act, she would become the tenant if the tenancy of the main tenant were determined.
The Munsiff rejected I.A. IV. The petitioner then filed a revision petition (C.R.P No. 30/77) before the District Judge, Mangalore. By order dated 28-3-1977 the District Judge confirmed the Munsiff's order, relying largely on an unreported decision in Vasu Sapaliga v. J.M. Lobo (C.R.P No. 1533 of 1976).
The petitioner thereafter filed the present revision under Section 115 CPC before this Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person in occupation as a sub-lessee, who claims that the sub-lease was lawfully created before the Act came into force and who is thereby entitled under Section 22 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act to become the tenant upon the determination of the main tenancy, should be permitted to be impleaded as a party-respondent to an eviction proceeding brought under Section 21(1) (including Clause (f)).
- Whether the courts below properly exercised their discretion in refusing to permit such a sub-lessee to be made a party so that she may contest the landlord's claim that the sub-letting was unlawful.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The sub-lease in her favour was valid because it was created prior to the commencement of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961.
- Section 22 of the Act entitles a sub-tenant who lawfully sub-let prior to the Act to be deemed a tenant of the landlord on the same terms if the main tenant's interest is determined; therefore she has a substantive interest that must be allowed to be contested in the eviction proceeding.
- Being a proper and necessary party, she should be permitted to come on record and contest the landlord's allegation that the sub-letting was unlawful; refusing her the opportunity to be heard would condemn her without a hearing.
Contestant / Respondent's Arguments
- Both the Munsiff and the District Judge relied on Vasu Sapaliga v. J.M. Lobo (unreported) to support rejecting impleadment — that a non-party may resist delivery of possession when a decree not binding on him is used to dispossess him, but he cannot be made a party to the suit.
- Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court decision in Rupchand Gupta v. Raghu Vanshi (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1889) — where the law governing the lease did not contain a provision like Section 22, a decree against the main tenant was held to bind the sub-lessee.
- On that basis, respondent contended imposition of party status on the sub-lessee was not warranted in the circumstances of the proceedings below.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vasu Sapaliga v. J.M. Lobo (C.R.P No. 1533 of 1976) (unreported) | Held (by the single judge in that matter) that a non-party can resist delivery of possession when a decree not binding on him is used to dispossess him, but cannot be made a party to the suit; no ground to interfere with the court below. | The District Judge relied on this decision to confirm the Munsiff's refusal to implead the petitioner. The present Court observed that the facts in the instant case were somewhat different and did not treat Vasu Sapaliga as controlling. |
| Rupchand Gupta v. Raghu Vanshi (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1889) | Where the applicable law does not contain a provision like Section 22, on termination of the main tenant's lease the sub-lessee is ipso facto liable to be evicted; a decree obtained against the main tenant would bind the sub-lessee. | Respondent relied on this decision. The Court noted the factual/legal distinction: Rupchand Gupta concerned a regime lacking a Section 22-type protection; the Court used this to distinguish Rupchand Gupta from the present case. |
| South Asia Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. S. Sarup Singh (A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 346) | Under the Rent Control regime considered, while an ejectment order may bind persons in occupation, an assignee or sub-tenant should be treated as a proper party to proceedings under the relevant provision so that they can establish consent (or lack of it) and thus not be condemned without a hearing. Observations by Sarkar, J. emphasise that assignees/sub-tenants have an interest warranting party status. | The Court relied on the observations in this case (particularly those of Sarkar, J.) as having considerable bearing on the instant dispute and used them as a principal authority to conclude that the petitioner should have been allowed to be impleaded and heard. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by identifying the key factual difference between the instant case and some earlier authorities: here the landlord's case specifically pleads unlawful sub-letting in favour of the petitioner, and the petitioner admits occupation as a sub-lessee while asserting that the sub-lease was created prior to the Act.
The Court then examined the relevant statutory provisions appearing in the opinion:
- Section 22 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act — provides that when the interest of a tenant is determined, a sub-tenant who lawfully sub-let before the Act shall be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms (subject to the Act).
- Section 23 — prohibits sub-letting subject to contract (noted by the Court as relevant background).
- Section 30 — binds persons in occupation of premises (except those with an independent title) to an order made in favour of the landlord for recovery of possession.
- Clause (f) of Section 21(1) — permits recovery of possession where the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises; the landlord must show the sub-letting was contrary to law.
Applying these provisions, the Court observed that under Clause (f) the landlord is entitled to recover possession only if the sub-lease had been created contrary to law. Because the petitioner's asserted defence — that the sub-lease was lawfully created prior to the Act and that Section 22 would entitle her to be deemed a tenant — directly bears on whether the clause (f) ground is made out, the petitioner has a direct, substantial interest in the proceeding.
The Court reviewed the precedents relied upon by the parties. It distinguished Rupchand Gupta on the ground that the law in that case lacked a Section 22-type provision and therefore a decree against the main tenant would bind the sub-lessee in those circumstances. It gave particular weight to South Asia Industries, focusing on the observations of Sarkar, J., that an assignee or sub-tenant should be a proper party to proceedings where their status and consent are in issue — otherwise they risk being condemned without being heard.
On this basis the Court concluded that the courts below had not properly applied their discretion. The Munsiff and the District Judge had not sufficiently considered the petitioner's direct interest in contesting the allegation of unlawful sub-letting, nor had they heeded the principle that persons in the sub-lessee's position should have an opportunity to show that consent existed or that the sub-lease was otherwise lawful.
Holding and Implications
Revision allowed.
Direct consequences imposed by the Court:
- The orders of the Munsiff and the District Judge refusing I.A. IV are set aside.
- I.A. IV is allowed. The petitioner in H.R.C No. 66 of 1971 (A. Rama Amin) is directed to implead Smt. Yamuna (the applicant in I.A. IV) as the Sixth Respondent to the petition in H.R.C No. 66/71.
- The Sixth Respondent shall be served with copies of the petition and connected papers by the petitioner.
- The Munsiff shall permit the Sixth Respondent to file her objections and contest the claim; the enquiry shall proceed in accordance with law and the main matter shall be disposed of within six months from the date of the judgment.
- Each party is directed to bear their own costs.
The opinion does not announce any novel legal principle or hold that it is creating a new precedent; rather it applies existing principles (especially the reasoning in South Asia Industries) to the facts and requires the lower court to allow the sub-lessee to be heard. No broader rule beyond the case-specific direction is declared.
Venkatesh, J.:—
The petitioner who has been unsuccessful in the two courts below in getting herself implead as a party to a proceeding pending on the file of the Munsiff, Mangalore, South Kanara, has come up with this revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Proceeding (H.R.C No. 66/71 pending on the file of the Munsiff) is one started by the first respondent against the other respondents herein claiming possession of a premises under Clauses (a), (b), (c), (f), (h), and (p) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (the Act). It may be noted that Clause (f) provides for the eviction of a tenant unlawfully sub-letting the whole or part of the premises. In so far as this part of the claim is concerned, the allegation made in the petition by the landlord is that the premises had been unlawfully sub-let by the tenants in favour of this petitioner.
2. Since this petitioner is not a party to the proceeding, she filed I.A IV under Section 22 of the Act read with Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC requesting the court to permit her to come on record as a party-respondent, contending, inter alia, that the sub-lease in her favour was not unlawful, it having been created prior to the commencement of the Act; that even if the lease in favour of the main tenants is determined for any reason she is entitled to continue in their place as a tenant as provided under Section 22 of the Act; that, in the circumstances, she is entitled to contest the application: and that she, being a proper and necessary party, may be permitted to come on record. The Munsiff rejected this application.
3. She went up in revision before the District Judge, Mangalore, in C.R.P No. 30/77. By his order dated 28-3-1977 the learned District Judge has confirmed the order of the Munsiff. The District Judge in this connection mainly places reliance on an un-reported decision of this Court in Vasu Sapaliga v. J.M Lobo (C.R.P No. 1533 of 1976 decided on 3-9-1976). In that case the facts were;
One J.M Lobo had filed a suit for eviction of a certain Kudupa Sapaliga alleging that he was his tenant in respect of the premises involved in the said suit and was liable to be evicted for the reasons stated in the suit. During the pendency of that suit Vasu Sapaliga made an application to get himself impleaded as a party-respondent alleging that it was he who was in occupation of the premises for over 15 years as a tenant and therefore he should be permitted to come on record and resist the claim. On the 1st Additional Munsiff, Mangalore, rejecting that application, Vasu Sapaliga approached this Court under Section 115 C.P.C The learned single Judge, observing as follows, dismissed that petition:
“It is open to the petitioner to resist delivery of possession in accordance with law when a decree which is not binding on him is used to dispossess him.
His objections if any will have to be considered by the court at the appropriate time after giving notice to the other party.
The petitioner cannot, however, be made a party to the suit.
There is no ground to interfere with the order of the Court below.”
Petition is dismissed.”
4. Facts of the instant case are some what different. One of the grounds urged here for eviction of the main tenants is that there was an unlawful sub-letting of the premises in favour of the petitioner. If that is held proved not merely the lease in favour of the main tenants will be terminated but the sub-lessee in occupation would also be liable for eviction. That she is in possession of the premises as a sub-lessee is a fact admitted by the petitioner, and the contention of Respondent-1 is that sub-letting is unlawful or contrary to law. According to the petitioner, as already stated, the sub-lease was a valid one the same having come into existence prior to the coming into force of the Act. The contentions raised by the sub-lessee are required to be taken note of in the light of Section 22 of the Act. That Section reads as follows:
“22. Sub-tenant to become tenant on determination of Tenancy —— Where the interest of a tenant of any premises is determined for any reason, any sub-tenant to whom the premises or any part thereof has been lawfully sublet before the coming into operation of this Act shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord on the same terms and conditions as he would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued.”
Subject to any contract to the contrary sub-letting is prohibited under Section 23 of the Act. Section 30 binds all persons in occupation of the promises, except those who have an independent title thereto, to the order made by the court in favour of the landlord permitting him to recover possession of the same.
5. Clause (f) of Sub-Section (1) of Sec. 21, provides thus:
“21. PROTECTION OF TENANTS AGAINST EVICTION.———
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court or other authority in favour of the landlord against the tenants:
Provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds, namely:—
(a) …………………………………………………………
(b) ………………………………………………………….
(c) …………………………………………………………
(d) ……………………………………………………………
(e) ……………………………………………………………
(f) that the tenant has unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein and where the subletting, assignment or transfer has been made before the coming into operation of this part (except in respect of sub-letting, assignment or transfer to which the provisions of section 61 are applicable), such sub-letting, assignment or transfer has been made contrary to any provision of law then in force.”
Under clause (f) the landlord is entitled to recover possession only if the sub-lease had been created contrary to law.
6. The learned Counsel for the contesting respondent, while supporting the orders of the courts below, apart from relying on Vasu Sapaliga's case (supra) also places reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Rupchand Gupta v. Raghu Vanshi (Private) Limited . A.I.R 1964 S.C 1889. On the other hand, Counsel for the petitioner contends that these decisions were distinguishable from the facts of this case and that his client, being either necessary or a proper party, should not be shut-out from contesting the claim in question. Doing so, according to him, would amount to condemning his client without hearing her.
7. In Rupchand Gupta's case the subject-matter of dispute was a piece of agricultural land. Without going into other details it may be stated that in that case, in the law governing the lease involved therein, there does not appear to have been any provision similar to Section 22 of the Act. On the termination of the lease of the main tenant, ipso facto, the sub-lessee also was liable to be evicted. In that context the Supreme Court observed that “the decree obtained against the main tenant in such a case would bind the sub-lessee also”.
8. There is a later decision of the Supreme Court in which eviction sought for was under a Rent Control law, it being, the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In that case i.e, South Asia Industries Private Limited v. S. Sarup Singh . A.I.R 1966 S.C 346. the facts were:
Sarup Singh and others were tenants of a premises in Connaught Circus, New Delhi. The premises had been let-out to a Company called Allen Berry and Co., (Karnataka) Ltd., Allen Berry & Co., had transferred the lease in favour of South Asia Industries Private Ltd. The landlords, seeking eviction of Allen Berry & Co., on the ground that they had transferred the lease without their consent, had filed an application under Cl. (b) of Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, not merely making Allen Berry & Co., but also the transferee, South Asia Industries (p) Ltd., as parties to the proceeding. During the pendency of that application for eviction Allen Berry & Co., went into liquidation and, therefore, its name was struck off. The Rent Controller proceeded with the application and granted a decree in favour of the landlords permitting them to recover possession from South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. In the Supreme Court, to which Court the matter had ultimately reached, South Asia Industries (p) Ltd. had taken up the plea that the law provided for eviction of the tenant for unlawfully sub-letting the premises and that since the main tenant was no more on record that ground was not available for the landlords to evict them.
9. While examining the rival contention centered around the contention of the appellant therein certain observations have been made by one of the learned Judges, Sarkar J., at para-9 which have a considerable bearing on the case on hand. That para reads as follows:
“I am not unmindful of the fact that where an order for recovery or possession of any premises is trade under S. 14 against a tenant assigning of sub-letting without the landlord's consent, that order would under S-25 of the Act binding on all persons in occupation of the premises except those who have independent title to them. This section does not however say that an order for recovery of possession against an assignee of a lessee cannot be made. It would not, therefore, support an argument that it was not intended that an order for recovery of possession could be made under S-14 against an assignee or a subtenant. On the other hand, it seems to me that to an application under Cl. (b) of the proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S-14 an assignee or sub-tenant as the case may be, should be a proper party. Under this provision an ejectment order can be made only when the assignment or sub-letting was without the consent of the landlord. “If it was with such consent, the assignee or the sub-tenant would be protected by the Act. An assignee or sub-tenant is, therefore, interested in showing that there was the requisite consent. They should hence be entitled to be made parties to the proceedings. Otherwise, if under S-25 an eviction order obtained against the direct tenant is binding on them, they would be liable to be condemned without a hearing. It is no argument against this view that the direct tenant would protect them, for they cannot be made to depend on him for the protection of their rights. The direct tenant may be negligent or incompetent in his defence; he may even collude with the landlord or he may just not bother. If the assignee or the sub-tenant is thus entitled to be heard to oppose the order for eviction, that would be another reason for saying that an order for eviction could be made against them also; if they could oppose the making of the order it would be unnatural to say that the order could not be made against them. In what I have said in this paragraph, I do not wish to be understood as holding that in view of S-25 an order for eviction against a tenant is in fact binding on his assignee or sub-tenant. Such a decision is not necessary for this case. I wish, however, to point out that if S. 25 does not make the ejectment order so binding, the appellant cannot resort to it for any assistance”.
The other learned Judge. Bachawat, J., while agreeing with Sarkar, J., that the appeal should be dismissed, also observes at para-22 of the judgment that “both the tenant and the assignee were properly parties to the proceedings for possession……………………….”
10. Having examined the contentions raised by the petitioner's Counsel in the light of the above-observations made in South Asia Industries case (Supra) and, in particular, the observations of Sarkar, J. I am of the view that, in the circumstances of this case, the courts below have not properly exercised their discretion in the matter. I may say that both the courts below did not apply themselves properly to the facts and circumstances of the case. The petitioner being interested in showing that the sub-letting was a valid one the courts below should not have rejected her claim to come on record and contest the claim.
11. For the reasons aforesaid, this revision is allowed. The orders of both the courts below on I.A IV filed in the Court of the Munsiff, Mangalore, South Kanara, are hereby set aside. I.A IV allowed. The petitioner in H.R.C No. 66 of 1971 (A. Rama Amin) is directed to implead Smt. Yamuna, the applicant of I.A IV, as the 6th respondent to the petition in H.R.A 66/71. The 6th respondent shall be served with copies of the petition and the connected papers by the petitioner. The Munsiff will permit the 6th respondent to file her objections statement and contest the claim. He will proceed with the enquiry in accordance with law. He will dispose of the main matter within six months from to-day.
12. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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