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Juggat Pharma P Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner Of Labour, Division-I, Madras
Summary of Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The Petitioner-Management challenged the validity of conciliation proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent (Conciliation Officer) in respect of a dispute raised by respondents 2 to 4 concerning notices of retrenchment served on them. Respondents 2 to 4 were working as sales representatives of the petitioner in Madras. The petitioner terminated their services as surplus to requirements and served the termination notices in Madras (Annexure "E"). On receipt of those notices, the workmen raised a dispute on 11-6-79 before respondent No. 1, the Conciliation Officer. The petitioner contended that the Conciliation Officer in Madras lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner’s establishment was situated in Bangalore and it had no establishment in Madras. The writ petition sought to quash the conciliation proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Conciliation Officer in Madras had jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to initiate conciliation proceedings in respect of the dispute arising from the termination of the workmen who were employed and served with termination notices in Madras, despite the petitioner's establishment being situated in Bangalore.
- Whether the location of the employer's establishment (Bangalore) controls the question of jurisdiction when the termination and the work performed by the employees were in another State (Madras).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- The 1st respondent (Conciliation Officer in Madras) had no jurisdiction because the petitioner’s establishment was situated at Bangalore and the petitioner had no establishment in Madras.
- Only the Conciliation Officer in Bangalore, not the 1st respondent, had jurisdiction over the petitioner under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
- The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Association of Medical Representatives v. Industrial Tribunal ([1966-I L.L.J. 614]) which followed earlier Supreme Court decisions (Lipton Ltd. v. Their Employees [1959-I L.L.J. 431] and Indian Cable Company Ltd., Calcutta v. Their Workmen [1962-I L.L.J. 409]) in support of the contention on jurisdiction.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Association of Medical Representatives v. Industrial Tribunal, [1966-I L.L.J. 614] (Madhya Pradesh High Court) | Supported the contention that jurisdiction depended on location of the employer's establishment; followed earlier Supreme Court decisions. | The court noted this decision supported the petitioner's contention but held it was no longer good law in view of the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Workmen v. Rangavilas Motors (P) Ltd [1967-I L.L.J. 12]. |
| Lipton Ltd. v. Their Employees, [1959-I L.L.J. 431] (Supreme Court) | Cited by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in support of the employer-location-based jurisdiction view. | Referenced as precedent relied on by the Madhya Pradesh decision; the court treated reliance on this line of authority as superseded by later Supreme Court law (Rangavilas Motors). |
| Indian Cable Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen, [1962-I L.L.J. 409] (Supreme Court) | Established that jurisdiction should be determined by where the dispute substantially arises or where the parties reside; tests of jurisdiction apply to determine which State has power to make a reference. | The court quoted this decision for the principle that a tribunal has jurisdiction where the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises, and applied that principle to uphold conciliation proceedings in Madras. |
| Workmen v. Rangavilas Motors (P) Ltd, [1967-I L.L.J. 12] (Supreme Court) | Rejected the contention that jurisdiction is controlled solely by the employer's place of establishment and held that a dispute can arise where the workman was working or where the contract of employment was terminated. | The court relied on this subsequent Supreme Court authority to conclude that the Madras Conciliation Officer could validly initiate conciliation proceedings; it treated earlier contrary High Court authority as no longer good law. |
| Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. v. Vin..., [1956-I L.L.J. 557] (cited, Chagla C.J.) | Under provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, the test was where the dispute substantially arose; a court/tribunal has jurisdiction if parties reside within jurisdiction or if subject-matter substantially arises within jurisdiction. | Quoted by the court as articulating general principles of jurisdiction which are applicable in deciding which State has jurisdiction under the Industrial Disputes Act; used to support conclusion that jurisdiction lay where dispute substantially arose (Madras). |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed jurisdictional competence under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act by focusing on where the dispute "substantially arose" rather than the mere location of the employer's registered establishment. It observed that after the insertion of Section 2(A) of the Act in 1965, espousal of the case by a union or fellow workmen was immaterial to whether an industrial dispute existed or was apprehended. Consequently, the decisive issue was whether a dispute existed or was apprehended between the petitioner and the workmen in Madras.
Applying the facts: the workmen were employed in Madras as sales representatives, their services were terminated in Madras, and the termination notices were served there. The court held these facts established a nexus between the dispute and Madras. It relied on Supreme Court authority (Rangavilas Motors and Indian Cable Company) and earlier jurisdictional principles (as explained by Chagla C.J. in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills) to conclude that a tribunal or conciliation officer has jurisdiction where the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises or where the parties reside.
Accordingly, the court concluded that respondent No. 1 was entitled to initiate conciliation proceedings under Section 12(1) of the Act in Madras and that there was no valid ground to interfere with the impugned notices initiating conciliation.
Holding and Implications
Petition dismissed.
Implications and direct effects:
- The conciliation proceedings initiated by the Conciliation Officer in Madras under Section 12(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, were held to be valid.
- The petition seeking to quash those conciliation proceedings was dismissed, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.
- The decision applies existing Supreme Court principles about jurisdiction being tied to where the dispute substantially arises; the opinion does not announce any new legal precedent beyond applying those authorities.
1. The Petitioner-Management has challenged the validity of the conciliation proceedings initiated by the 1st respondent on a dispute raised by respondents 2 to 4 touching the notices of retrenchment served upon them.
2. Admittedly, respondents 2 to 4 (hereinafter referred to as the workmen) were working as sales representatives of the petitioner in Madras at the relevant time. Under Annexure "E" produced in the writ petition, the petitioner terminated the services of the workmen, as their services in its view, became surplus to the requirements of its business. These notices were served on them in Madras. On receipt of the said notices, they raised a dispute on 11-6-79 before respondent No. 1 Conciliation Officer.
3. The grievance of the petitioner is that the 1st respondent had no jurisdiction to initiate conciliation proceedings since the petitioner's establishment is situated at Bangalore and the workmen were only looking after the work of the petitioner as sales representatives in Madras. The petitioner has no establishment in Madras and, therefore, only the conciliation officer in Bangalore and not the 1st respondent had jurisdiction over the petitioner under S. 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the Act). In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Association of Medical Representatives v. Industrial Tribunal, [1966-I L.L.J. 614] A Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, following the decisions of the Supreme Court in Lipton Ltd. v. Their Employees, [1959-I L.L.J. 431] and Indian Cable Company Ltd., Calcutta v. Their Workmen, [1962-I L.L.J. 409] has taken the view that supports the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. This decision of the Madhya Pradesh is no longer good law in view of the subsequent decision of the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen v. Rangavilas Motors (P) Ltd [1967-I L.L.J. 12]. It should be noted that after S. 2(A) of the Act was incorporated in it in the year 1965, espousal of the case of these workmen by their union or by a substantial numbers of fellow workmen is not relevant for purpose of considering whether an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended between the petitioner and the workmen. Hence, the only point for consideration is whether a dispute existed or was apprehended between the petitioner and the workmen in Madras. Admittedly, these workmen were employed in Madras and they were looking after the petitioner's business there. Their service were terminated in Madras. The fact that the petitioner has no establishment or branch office in Madras does not alter the fact that the termination of the workmen's services is connected with their employment in Madras. Section 2(k) of the Act which defines what an industrial dispute is not controlled by the location of the petitioner's establishment in Bangalore or the absence of such establishment in Madras.
4. The Supreme Court in Shri Ranga Vilas Motor's case to which I have adverted above rejected a similar contention of the petitioner in that case and held that;
"Ordinarily, if there is a separate establishment and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place. As the High Court observed, there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory the State and of the industry concerning which the dispute arose. This Court in Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v. Its Workman, [1962-I L.L.J. 409], held as follows :
The Act contained no provisions bearing on this question, which must, consequently be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of courts to enter ain actions or proceedings Dealing with a similar question under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, Chagla, C.J. observed in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd. v. Vin. [1956-I L.L.J. 557].
"But what we are concerned with to decide is : where did the dispute substantially arise ? Now, the Act does not deal with the causes of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction upon the Labour Court. But applying the well-known tests of jurisdiction, a Court or Tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisdiction or if the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction."
In our opinion, those principles are applicable for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under S. 10 of the Act.
"Applying the above principle to the facts of this case, it is quite clear that the subject-matter of the dispute in this case substantial arose within the jurisdiction of the Mysore Government."
The question in that case related to the validity of the reference made by the appropriate Government, i.e., Government of Karnataka. The above observations will equally apply for deciding the validity of the conciliation proceedings under S. 12 of the Act. If a cause of action could arise where the contract was concluded, a dispute could arise where the contract of employment was terminated. Therefore, it was open to respondent No. 1 to initiate conciliation proceedings under S. 12(1) of the Act. Hence, I find no good ground to interfere with the impugned notices.
5. Accordingly this petition is dismissed.
6. Parties to bear their own costs.
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