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R. Srinivasa v. The Chairman, Select...

Karnataka High Court
Oct 21, 1980
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an applicant for selection and admission to the First Year M.B.B.S. course before the Selection Committee constituted by the State Government, filed this writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Selection Committee to select and admit him during the current academic year.

The petitioner belongs to the Padmasali (Naige) community, one of several communities classified as backward by the State Government under Clause (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution. He passed the Pre-University Examination held in April 1980 with 81.33% in the optional group (Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and Biology) and applied to the Selection Committee claiming entitlement to seats reserved for backward communities.

The basis of the petitioner's claim was that he had been adopted by G.V. Rangappa, who belongs to the Naige community and whose income was below Rs. 10,000 per annum. The petitioner alleged the adoption took place in 1976, but the adoption was evidenced by a registered document dated 8 August 1979. The petitioner was not selected; he alleged that another candidate (respondent-2), who belongs to Naige community and secured fewer marks, was selected. He did not allege that his natural father's income was below Rs. 10,000.

The writ court examined the legal question whether a person who originally belonged to a socially forward class and later became adopted into a backward community could claim reservation benefits. The court discharged the rule and dismissed the writ petition with costs (advocate's fee Rs. 100). The petition was formally dismissed, and the High Court Government Pleader was permitted to file a memo of appearance within two weeks.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether persons who originally belonged to a forward class and who get themselves adopted into a family belonging to an educationally and socially backward class (as classified by the State under Clause (4) of Article 15) can claim the benefits available to the backward classes by virtue of such adoption.
  2. Whether sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Selection Rules (which addresses recognition of adoption for determining eligibility for reservation) requires the Selection Committee to accept the income of the adoptive father for the purpose of determining backward-class eligibility in a case where the applicant and the adoptive father belong to the same backward community.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioner relied on sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Selection Rules (State Government order dated 6 June 1980), arguing that the rules made it obligatory for the Selection Committee to accept the income of the adoptive father for purposes of determining eligibility for reservation when the adoptive father belongs to a backward community.
  • The petitioner contended that because both he and his adoptive father (G.V. Rangappa) belonged to the Naige community and the adoptive father's income was below Rs. 10,000 per annum, he should be treated as belonging to the backward class for selection purposes.
  • The petitioner relied on the timing of adoption (claimed 1976, registered 8 August 1979) in support of his claim.
  • The petitioner also relied on precedents from the Supreme Court (Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao and Sita Bai v. V. Ramachandra) as supporting authority for his position.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
N.M. Nataraja v. Selection Committee, Medical and Dental Colleges (1972 1 Mys LJ 226) Earlier decision of this Court dealing with the entitlement of persons to reservation following adoption into backward classes; treated as concluding the central question in this case. The court stated that the question was concluded by this earlier decision and that it supported the view that a person who did not belong to backward class in the family of birth cannot, by adoption shortly before application, claim backward-class reservation.
B.M. Tarakeshwari v. State of Karnataka (W.P. No. 15375 of 1980, dated 22-9-1980) Another earlier decision of this Court addressing the same or substantially similar issue regarding adoption and reservation entitlement. The court treated this decision together with N.M. Nataraja as concluding the question and as authority for refusing the petitioner's claim based on adoption.
Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao ((1976) 3 SCC 411 : AIR 1976 SC 1904) Principle that the status of a person for caste-based benefits is to be determined on the relevant date; in the cited case the issue concerned re-admittance to caste after conversion and reconversion. The court held that the ratio of this Supreme Court decision was not apposite to the facts before it because that case concerned conversion and acceptance by the caste on the relevant date, whereas the petitioner here had the advantage of a forward-family environment through the period of his education.
Sita Bai v. V. Ramachandra ((1969) 2 SCC 544 : AIR 1970 SC 343) Ratio that adoption severs membership in the family of birth and makes the adoptee a member of the adoptive family (principally in the context of succession and inheritance). The court observed that while the principle of severance of family membership is acknowledged, Sita Bai was not applicable to the reservation question because the issue before the court was not inheritance but whether adoption could render a previously forward-class candidate eligible for backward-class reservation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing the Selection Rules and the Government order identifying backward communities and by referencing prior authority. Its reasoning can be summarised in the following steps, stated in the language of the opinion:

  1. Examination of Rule Texts: The court quoted sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Selection Rules which provides:
    "For determining eligibility for reservation provided in this rule, adoption by a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the Backward Tribes, the Backward Castes, the Backward Communities or the Special Group of persons not belonging to the said caste, tribe or groups shall not be recognised."
    The court interpreted this sub-rule as addressing recognition of an adoption where a member of a protected community is adopted by someone not of that community; it did not explicitly recognise adoption as a means for a forward-class person to claim backward-class status.
  2. Construction of the Government Order (18 March 1977): The court quoted the relevant portion of the Government order that defines eligibility: a candidate must (a) belong to one of the listed backward communities and (b) have family income (candidate and parents; guardian's income only if parents are dead) of Rs. 10,000 or less per annum. The court emphasised that "Family Income" refers to the income of the candidate and his parents, and the guardian's income is relevant only if the parents are dead.
  3. Combined Reading and Legislative Intent: Reading the Government order together with sub-rule (3) of Rule 5, the court concluded that the State's intention was to reserve seats for persons who belong to backward classes "in the family of their birth" rather than persons who choose to be adopted into a lower-income family shortly before applying for admission. The court found no room for construing the rules as permitting a person who had all along belonged to a forward class to become a backward-class beneficiary by adoption.
  4. Distinguishing Authorities Relied on by Petitioner:
    • Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao: The court found the ratio not apposite because that case dealt with reconversion and re-admittance to a Scheduled Caste, with emphasis on acceptance by the caste on the relevant date. By contrast, the petitioner here had the educational and social advantages of a forward family through most of his schooling and (on the court's view of the recorded chronology) until 1979.
    • Sita Bai v. V. Ramachandra: Although that decision recognises that adoption effects severance from the birth family and creates membership of the adoptive family (in the context of inheritance), the court held it was not applicable to the narrow reservation entitlement issue before it; the question here was not inheritance but eligibility for caste-based reservation.
  5. Assessment of Petitioner's Factual Position: The court noted that the petitioner had the environmental advantages of a socially forward family for a substantial portion of his educational career and, even if the date of registration of the adoption deed (8 August 1979) were taken into account, he remained in a forward-class family until 1979. Consequently, adoption did not convert his educational and social status into that of a backward class for the purpose of reservation at the time of application.
  6. Reliance on Earlier Decisions of the High Court: The court stated that the question was concluded by two earlier decisions of the High Court (N.M. Nataraja and B.M. Tarakeshwari), which the court treated as settling that a person who did not belong to a backward class by birth cannot claim backward-class reservation by adoption shortly before application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The Rule was discharged and the petition was dismissed with costs (advocate's fee Rs. 100/-). The court permitted the High Court Government Pleader to file a memo of appearance within two weeks.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the petitioner was not entitled to selection and admission against the seats reserved for backward communities; the Selection Committee was not directed to select or admit him.
  • The court held that adoption of a person who had all along belonged to a socially forward class does not, by itself, convert that person into a member of an educationally and socially backward class for the purpose of reservation if the State's criteria (including family income and family-of-birth considerations) are not met.
  • The opinion expressly distinguished and limited the applicability of cited Supreme Court authorities (Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao; Sita Bai v. V. Ramachandra) to the facts before the court and relied on prior decisions of the same High Court as dispositive. The court indicated that the question was concluded by those earlier High Court decisions; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new or broader precedent beyond its factual and legal analysis.

Order: Rule discharged; writ petition dismissed with costs (advocate's fee Rs. 100). Sri Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader, permitted to file memo of appearance within two weeks.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioner, who was an applicant for selection and admission to the First Year M.B.B.S Course before the Selection Committee constituted by the State Government, has presented this writ petition praying for issue of a writ of mandamus directing the selection committee to select and admit him to the First Year M.B.B.S Course during the current academic year.

2. The petitioner belongs to Padmasali (Naige) community. This is one among the several communities classified as backward class by the State Government by an order made under Cl. (4) of Art. 15 of the Constitution. The petitioner passed the Pre-University Examination held in April 80 securing 81.33% in the optional group consisting of Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and Biology. He applied to the 1st respondent — Selection Committee — for selection and admission to the First Year M.B.B.S course during the current academic year. In the application the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to be selected against seats reserved in favour of backward communities. This claim was made on the basis that the petitioner had been adopted by one G.V Rangappa who also belongs to Naige community and the income of the said Rangappa was below Rs. 10,000/-. He has not been selected. Therefore he has presented this writ petition. The petitioner has also stated that respondent-2 belonging to Naige community who has secured less marks than the petitioner, has been selected. It is not the case of the petitioner that the income of his natural father was less than Rs. 10,000/-. According to the petitioner the adoption took place in the year 1976, but it was evidenced by a registered document dated 8th Aug., 1979.

3. The question, whether persons, who belonged to forward class and who get themselves adopted to a family belonging to educationally and socially backward class, according to the classification made by the Government under Cl. (4) of Art. 15 of the Constitution, could claim that the benefits made available to the socially and educationally backward classes in view of such adoption, is covered by the following two earlier decisions of this Court:

(i) N.M Nataraja v. Selection Committee, Medical and Dental Colleges, (1972 1 Mys LJ 226).

(ii) B.M Tarakeshwari v. State of Karnataka (W.P No. 15375 of 1980, D/- 22-9-1980).*

4. Sri S.K.V Chalapathy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, tried to distinguish the above decisions, on the ground that the selecion rules themselves made it obligatory for the selection committee to accept the income of the adoptive father for purposes of determining as to whether the concerned applicant belongs to backward class. He relied on sub-rule (3) of the R. 5 of the Selection Rules made by the State Government by its order dated 6th June, 1980. It reads—

“5. Reservation of seats in favour of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Tribes, Backward Castes, Backward Communities and Special Groups:

………………

(3) For determining eligibility for reservation provided in this rule, adoption by a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, the Backward Tribes, the Backward Castes, the Backward Communities or the Special Group of persons not belonging to the said caste, tribe or groups shall not be recognised.”

5. He argued that according to the above sub-rule if only the adoption of a person belonging to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe or backward tribe or backward caste was by a person belonging to any caste other than to which the former belonged, such adoption should not be recognised and as in the present case the petitioner belonged to Naige community and the adoptive father also belonged to Naige community, the selection committee was bound to treat the petitioner as belonging to the backward class taking into account the income of the adoptive father.

6. I am unable to agree. Sub-rule (3) of R. 5 only provides that in cases where adoption of a member from one caste or tribe or community to another caste or tribe or community shall not be recognised. The rule is silent on the question as to whether a person, who all along belonged to the forward class, applying the very criteria prescribed to the order of the State Government made under Cl. (4) of Art. 15 of the Constitution, could claim to have become a person belonging to educationally and socially backward class by the device of adoption. In my view, a person, who all along did not belong to socially and educationally backward class cannot by going in adoption to a family whose income is less than Rs. 10,000/- claim to have become backward. Therefore the petitioner cannot compare his case with that of the 2nd respondent, who really belonged to backward class on the basis of the Government order.

7. Government order dated 18th March, 1977 declared the communities and castes which were identified as backward for purposes of Cl. (4) of Art. 15 of the Constitution. The relevant portion of the Government order reads as follows:

“A candidate who belongs to either of the Backward Communities. Backward Castes or Backward Tribes listed below and whose family income from all sources is Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand only) or less per annum, shall be eligible to be considered for seats reserved for these communities, castes or tribes as the case may be.

‘Family Income’ means the income of the candidate and his parents and if the parents are dead the income of his guardian.”

8. From the above portion of the order, it is clear that for purposes of deciding as to whether an applicant belongs to backward class or not, the income of the parents of the applicant has to be taken into account and the income of his guardian could be taken into account only when the parents are dead. The above rule read with Sub-rule (3) of R. 5 of the Selection Rules gives no room for doubt that the intention of the State Government was only to make reservation in favour of persons who belong to backward class in the family of their birth and not in favour of persons who choose to get themselves adopted to a family of a lower income shortly before applying for M.B.B.S course.

9. As stated earlier, the question is concluded by the earlier two decisions. But the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Principal, Guntur Medical College v. Mohan Rao ((1976) 3 SCC 411 : AIR 1976 SC 1904). In my opinion, the ratio of the said decision is not apposite to the facts of this case. In the said case, the question for consideration was whether a person, who originally belonged to scheduled caste and who had got himself converted to Christianity, could again come back to Hindu-fold and claim that he belongs to scheduled caste. The Supreme Court observed that a person in such a position could get himself converted into Hinduism and he could claim to belong to scheduled caste on the relevant date provided the members of the caste had accepted and admitted him to the caste. It is in that context, the Supreme Court observed that the status of a person has to be determined on the date relevant for consideration. The facts of this case are entirely different. The petitioner did not belong to a family which was identified by the state as belonging to the backward class. He had all the environmental advantages of a socially forward family for a substantial portion of his educational career and if the date of registration of adoption deed is taken into account, he was in the family belonging to forward class till the year 1979. Therefore, on account of adoption, the petitioner, who belonged to socially and educationally forward class, cannot be held to have been converted into that of a socially and educationally backward class. Therefore, even on the date when he applied for M.B.B.S course, taking into account the advantages he had in the family of his birth during the period when he was studying in the schools and the college, be could not be considered as belonging to educationally and socially backward class and, therefore, he had no right to claim selection and admission against the seats reserved in favour of the backward communities.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sita Bai v. V. Ramachandra ((1969) 2 SCC 544 : AIR 1970 SC 343). The ratio of the said decision is that adoption of a person from one family to another, brings about severance of membership in the family of his birth and he becomes a member of the family of adoptive father. The said ratio is also not applicable to the facts of this case. Here the question for consideration is not the right to inheritance of an adopted son but the question is as to whether the petitioner, who did not belong to backward class became backward because of the adoption.

11. By the device of adoption he no doubt ceases to be a member of the family of his birth and becomes a member of the family of adoptive father, but the fact remains that throughout his educational career prior to the date of his application before the selection committee, he did not belong to the educationally and socially backward class and by adoption his educational and social status did not get reduced and he did not become a person belonging to educationally and socially backward class. In the circumstances, I do not find any substance in the contention urged for the petitioner.

12. For the reasons aforesaid, I make the following order:

(i) Rule discharged.

(ii) Writ petition dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.

13. Sri Srinivasa Reddy, High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file memo of appearance within two weeks.

14. Petition dismissed.