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Dodda Thimma Naika v. V. Lakshmaiah And Others

Karnataka High Court
Sep 20, 1978
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (High Court Second Appeal)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is the plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31 January 1972 of the Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore District (R.A. No. 135 of 1966), which confirmed the judgment and decree dated 6 July 1966 of the Additional II Munsiff, Bangalore (O.S. No. 420 of 1962). The trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's suit seeking to set aside an alienation of property effected by his guardian during his minority.

The plaintiff's case (summarised from the opinion) is that while he was a minor the suit property was alienated by sale deed Ex. D-1 on 6 November 1952 to defendants 2 to 5; the deed recorded "pressure" and asserted legal necessity. The plaintiff stated the property came to him under a Will (Ex. P-1 dated 12 May 1945 from his maternal grandfather) and that his mother had no right to sell it; he alleged there was no legal necessity and that defendants 2 to 7 defrauded his parents to obtain execution of the sale deed. He prayed for setting aside the sale and recovery of possession.

The defendants contended that the sale was effected for legal necessity and that the plaintiff's suit was barred by Article 44 of the Limitation Act. After trial, the trial court found the sale was for legal necessity and that the suit was time-barred under Article 44, and dismissed the suit. The first appellate court (Additional Civil Judge) affirmed that decision on 31 January 1972. The plaintiff filed the present second appeal to the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the finding of the courts below that the suit is barred by time (under Article 44 of the Limitation Act) is legal and proper; and
  2. Whether the finding of the courts below that the sale transaction was for legal necessity can be re-opened or gone into by this Court sitting in second appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The sale was effected by showing the mother as guardian during the plaintiff's minority; the appellant challenged the applicability of Article 44 and argued it was not necessary for the plaintiff to sue within three years of attaining majority to set aside that sale.
  • The sale did not fall within the scope of Article 44 of the Limitation Act "as it then existed" (i.e., the appellant argued Article 44 was not attracted to sales by a de facto guardian).
  • The sale was void because it was not brought about by the natural guardian (the father), implying absence of lawful authority.
  • The sale appeared to have been effected as if the property belonged to defendants 6 and 7 and also to the minor and his brother and the grandmother (Chinnamma), suggesting misrepresentation of ownership and invalidity.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents supported the findings and reasoning of the courts below, urging the High Court to accept the conclusion that the sale was for legal necessity and that the suit was barred by Article 44 of the Limitation Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thomman Parakkal v. Madhavan Arakaparambil (Travancore-Cochin High Court) The decision (as relied on by appellant) held that when property is sold by a de facto guardian Article 44 would not be attracted and that Article 144 (or Article 142/144 as described) would govern an action to set aside such a sale; the ward could treat the alienation as a nullity and sue for possession. The court explicitly said it was not persuaded by this decision. It found the reasoning (that a de facto guardian's sale falls outside Article 44) to be in error, especially given the view elsewhere that such sales are voidable rather than void. The court declined to follow Thomman Parakkal on that point.
Kasturi Lakshmibayamma v. Sabnivis Venkoba Rao & Others (Andhra Pradesh High Court, Division Bench) The Division Bench held that Article 44 makes no distinction between de facto and lawful guardians; a de facto guardian can, in certain circumstances, convey the ward's estate, and alienations by such guardians are voidable (not void) and thus within Article 44. The court accepted and relied on this reasoning. It used the authority to support the proposition that Article 44 applies to alienations by de facto guardians as much as to natural or lawful guardians, thereby supporting the conclusion that the plaintiff’s suit was time-barred.
Chennappa v. Onkarappa, ILR 1940 Mad 358 : AIR 1940 Mad 33 (Full Bench) The case relates to the power of acknowledgement of a debt; the opinion states this type of case rests on a different basis and is not an acceptable analogy for the guardian-sale issue. The court observed that reliance on Chennappa in support of Thomman Parakkal was not apposite; it treated Chennappa as distinguishable and not persuasive for the point that Article 44 would not apply to a de facto guardian's sale.
Sriramulu v. Pundarikashayya, 1950-1 Mad LJ 586 : AIR 1949 FC 218 (Federal Court) The Federal Court observed that dealings of a de facto guardian with regard to an infant's estate are not regarded as void altogether but voidable only; de facto guardians are to be treated to that extent like de jure guardians in Hindu law. The court cited this authority (as quoted in the Andhra Pradesh decision) to support the proposition that de facto guardians have competence to deal with a minor's property in cases of necessity and that such alienations are voidable and therefore within Article 44's scope.
Hanuman Pershad's case (earlier decision; cited in the opinion) Referenced as an early decision recognizing the validity (or competence) of alienations by a de facto guardian in certain circumstances. The opinion refers to the "long and unbroken current of authority" including Hanuman Pershad to support the proposition that de facto guardians may validly (or voidably) deal with a minor's property in cases of necessity, reinforcing applicability of Article 44.
Afsar Shaik v. Soleman Bibi (Supreme Court) The Supreme Court discussed the scope of powers of the High Court to interfere in a second appeal under Sections 100, 101 and 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, holding broadly that a second appeal is competent only on grounds of law or procedure and not merely on errors of fact. The court relied on this authority to state that a second appeal is not the forum to reassess facts; therefore the question of whether the sale was one of legal necessity (a factual issue) could not be re-evaluated by the High Court in second appeal and the findings of fact in the courts below stood.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner, applying evidential review and precedent-based legal analysis:

  • Documentary review: The court examined Ex. D-1 (the sale deed) and the judgments of the courts below. It noted that Ex. D-1 did not state that the property sold belonged to all persons named as vendors; there was no dispute that the property had come to the plaintiff by his grandfather's will. The court accepted that the joining of all concerned persons as vendors could be explained as a precautionary or abundant‑caution measure; accordingly the appellant's contention that all vendors sold as if they were owners lacked substance.
  • De facto guardian issue and applicability of Article 44: The appellant relied on Thomman Parakkal (Travancore‑Cochin High Court) to argue that Article 44 would not apply to sales by a de facto guardian. The court examined that authority but found its reasoning unpersuasive, particularly because Thomman Parakkal appeared to treat such sales as void rather than voidable, an approach the court considered erroneous in light of other authorities.
  • The court adopted the reasoning of the Andhra Pradesh Division Bench in Kasturi Lakshmibayamma, which held that Article 44 makes no distinction between de facto and lawful (de jure) guardians and that alienations by de facto guardians are voidable and therefore fall within Article 44. The court also relied on the Federal Court's observations in Sriramulu v. Pundarikashayya and earlier authorities (including Hanuman Pershad) indicating that de facto guardians can have competence to deal with a minor’s property in cases of necessity.
  • On that basis the court concluded that Article 44 of the Limitation Act would be attracted to the present case where the sale had been effected by a guardian shown in the deed (the mother) who was in effect a de facto guardian; consequently the limitation period under Article 44 applied and the suit, brought three years after the plaintiff attained majority, was time‑barred.
  • On the question whether the sale was for legal necessity: the court treated that as a pure question of fact and appreciation of evidence. Citing Afsar Shaik v. Soleman Bibi and the limits of second appeals under Sections 100, 101 and 103 CPC, the court emphasised that a High Court in second appeal cannot reassess findings of fact. Therefore the court declined to re-evaluate the factual finding of the courts below that the sale was for legal necessity.
  • Resulting procedural conclusion: Because Article 44 applied and the factual finding of legal necessity was one for the courts below (which the High Court in second appeal would not overturn), the appeal was held to be without merit.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The appeal is dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The High Court dismissed the plaintiff's second appeal, thereby leaving in place the judgments and decree of the courts below which had dismissed the plaintiff's suit to set aside the guardian's alienation. The plaintiff's challenge to the sale (including the contention regarding de facto guardianship and alleged misrepresentation of ownership) failed.
  • Limitation consequence: The court concluded that Article 44 of the Limitation Act applied to alienations by de facto guardians (as well as lawful guardians), and since the suit was brought three years after the plaintiff attained majority it was time‑barred.
  • Scope of appellate review: The court reaffirmed that, in a second appeal, it will not re-appreciate factual findings on issues such as legal necessity of a sale; it is limited to points of law or jurisdiction as indicated by Sections 100, 101 and 103 CPC and the cited authority Afsar Shaik v. Soleman Bibi.
  • Precedential note: The opinion applies and discusses existing authorities on the legal competence of de facto guardians and the application of Article 44. The court rejected the contrary reasoning in Thomman Parakkal and followed the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Federal Court observations that de facto guardians' alienations are voidable and fall within Article 44. The decision thus resolves the issues in this case by reference to established authorities; the opinion does not state that it creates a new legal precedent beyond its application of cited authorities.
  • Costs: On the peculiar facts and circumstances the court made no order as to costs.

All content in this summary derives exclusively from the provided opinion text; no information has been invented or inferred beyond what the opinion itself states.

Show all summary ...

Sabhahit, J.:— This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31st January 1972 passed by the Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore District in R.A No. 135 of 1966 on his file dismissing the appeal confirming the judgment and decree dated 6th July 1966 passed by the Additional II Munsiff, Bangalore, in O.S No. 420 of 1962 on his file dismissing the suit of the plaintiff for setting aside the alienation done by his guardian during his minority.

2. It is the case of the plaintiff that when he was a minor, the suit property was alienated under Ex. D-1 to defendants 2 to 5 on 6th November 1952 stating that there was pressure and it was necessitated by legal necessity. It is the case of the plaintiff that it was a property got by him under a Will Ex. P-1, dated 12th May 1945 from his maternal grand-father and that his mother had no right to sell that property. He submitted that there was absolutely no legal necessity to sell the property and defendants 2 to 7 defrauded his parents in getting the sale deed executed. So, he prayed for setting aside the sale and possession of the property. Defendants resisted the suit. According to them, the sale was for legal necessity. They also stated that the suit was barred by Article 44 of the Limitation Act. After hearing the learned counsel and on appreciation of evidence, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the sale was for legal necessity and that the suit v/as barred by time under Article 44 of the Limitation Act and thus, dismissed the suit. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff went up in appeal before the learned Civil Judge and as stated above, the Learned Civil Judge by his judgment and decree dated 31st January 1972 dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff has come up in Second Appeal before this Court.

3. The learned advocate, appearing for the appellant, vehemently contended that the suit sale was effected by showing the mother of the plaintiff as guardian during his minority; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to sue within three years on attaining majority to set aside the sale and that it did not fall within the scope of Article 44 of the Limitation Act, as it then existed. He further contended that the sale was void as it was not brought about by the natural guardian—the father. He also contended that the sale was effected as if the property belonged to defendants 6 and 7 as also the minor and his brother in addition to Chinnamma—the grand-mother of the plaintiff. As against this, the learned counsel appearing for respondents urged strenuously to accept the reasoning and the final decree of the courts below.

4. The points that arise for my consideration are:

(i) Whether the finding of the Courts below that the suit is barred by time is legal and proper; and

(ii) Whether the finding of the Courts below that the sale transaction was for legal necessity, can be gone into by this Court.

5. I was taken through Ex. D-1, the sale deed, and the judgments of the Courts below. It is nowhere stated in Ex. D-1 that the property sold belonged to all those persons shown there as vendors. They have not disputed that the property came to the, plaintiff, who was minor then, through his grandfather. As rightly put by the learned counsel for the respondent by way of abundant caution all concerned persons have joined as vendors. Hence, there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel that all the vendors including defendants 6 and 7 have sold the property as if it is their own and hence, the sale is void.

6. Adverting to the second contention of the learned counsel, it is true that the mother is shown as guardian of the minor in the sale deed and the father is also one of the vendors shown in the sale deed. The learned counsel submitted relying on a decision of Travancore-Cochin High Court in the case of Thomman Parakkal v. Madhavan Arakaparambil(1). that when the property is sold by a de facto guardian, Article 44 of the Limitation Act would not be attracted. It is true that in that decision His Lordship Kumara Pillai, J., has held relying on a Madras decision that it is Article 144 that comes into play and not Article 44 when the suit is brought for setting aside such a sale. This is what His Lordship has observed in the course of his judgment.

“Hence, the setting aside of the transaction is not a condition precedent to the ward recovering the property from the alienee. The ward can treat the alienation as a nullity and simply sue for possession of the property. Such a suit will be governed not by this Article but by Article 142 of Article 144.”

With great respect I am not persuaded by this observation of His Lordship. The reason is not far to seek. In the para preceeding, His Lordship has observed quoting other decisions that the sale is merely void and not voidable. If that be so, his further reasoning that the ward can treat the sale as void is apparently an error by inadvertance. Hence, I am not persuaded by the reasoning of the decision. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents invited my attention to a Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Kasturi Lakshmibayamma… v. Sabnivis Venkoba Rao & Others…(2). Therein, their Lordships have discussed this aspect and have observed at paras 18 and 19 which read:

“The learned Judge was not unmindful of the language of Article 44 which provides for the setting aside of alienations by guardians. No distinction is made in Article 44 between de facto or lawful guardians. There is no warrant for reading the provisions of Article 44 so as to restrict its operation to transfers effected only by lawful guardians other than de facto ones. The expression used by the legislature is ‘guardian’ simpliciter. It admits of no doubt that a de facto guardian has competence, in certain circumstances to convey the ward's estate. Ever since the early decision in Hanuman Pershad's case, Courts have always recognised the validity of alienations made by a de facto guardian. We are unable to accept the reasoning of the learned Judge in support of his observation that a de facto guardian's sale is outside the purview of Article 44. Nor are we persuaded that the reliance placed by him on the decision in Chennappa v. Onkarappa, ILR 1940 Mad 358 : (AIR 1940 Mad 33) (FB) is apposite. Cases relating to the power of acknowledgement of a debt, rest on a different basis and do not furnish an acceptable analogy. The observations of the Federal Courts in Sriramulu v. Pundarikashayya, 1950-1, Mad LJ 586 : (AIR 1949 FC 218) go to show that the reasoning of Satyanarayana Rao, J. in his obiter dicta, runs counter to the settled proposition as to legal competence of a de facto guardian. At pages 604-605, the Federal Court observed:

“The dealings of such a guardian with regard to the estate of the infant would, in Hindu Law, be not regarded as void altogether but would be voidable only; and the same tests would be applied in determining the validity of such acts as are applied in the case of a de jure guardian. To this extent and this extent only, a de facto guardian is to be treated as having the same position as a de jure guardian in Hindu Law”.

“19. There is a long and unbroken current of authority to sustain the view that the Hindu Law recognises the power of a de facto guardian to deal with the property of a minor in cases of necessity. Courts have repeatedly held that alienations by such guardians are only voidable in the same manner as alienations made by a de jure guardian.”

Thus, when once it is not in dispute that the de, facto guardian can also sell the property of a minor ward for legal necessity just as a natural guardian, it is obvious that Article 44 of the Limitation Act would be attracted, as is pointed out by their Lordships of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, Article 44 of the Limitation Act speaks of a suit to set aside the alienation by a guardian. It does not speak of any suit to set aside the alienation by a ‘natural guardian’. A de facto guardian is as much a guardian as a natural guardian and the powers of the de facto guardian also include the power to sell a minor's property for legal necessity and hence, there is no substance in the submission made by the learned counsel that Article 44 of the Limitation Act, as it stood then, is mot attracted to set aside the sale brought about by a de facto guardian of a minor. If that be so, the two Courts below are perfectly justified in holding that the suit is barred by time as it is brought three years after the plaintiff attained majority.

7. Adverting to the other point raised before me, namely, that the sale transaction was not for legal necessity, it may at once be stated that it is purely a question of fact and appreciation of evidence. This Court sitting in Second Appeal is not expected to re-assess the evidence on record. The Supreme Court in the case of Afsar Shaik v. Soleman Bibi(3) has observed in para 18 of the judgment thus:

“…….. The scope of the powers of the High Court to interfere in second appeal with judgments and decrees of courts below is indicated in Sections 100, 101 and 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Broadly, the effect of Sections 100 and 101, read together, is that a second appeal is competent only on the ground of an error in law or procedure, and not merely on the ground of an error on a question of fact. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the “ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be”.

That being so, I am constrained to observe that the appeal has no merits and is liable to be dismissed and I dismiss the, same. On the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.