Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Second Income-Tax Of... v. Stumpp, Schuele And ...

Karnataka High Court
Jul 3, 1975
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Srinivasa Iyengar, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals arose from a common High Court judgment (dated 13 September 1974) quashing notices issued under sections 8 and 16 of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. The facts being materially identical across several writ petitions, the opinion states facts relevant to W.P. No. 3578 of 1973.

M/s Stumpp, Schuele & Somappa Private Ltd., a company and an assessee under the Surtax Act, had its income-tax assessment for the assessment year 1971-72 completed on 31 December 1971 showing total income of Rs. 26,16,490. The Income-tax Officer later modified that assessment by an order dated 12 September 1972, computing total income at Rs. 26,07,560. The surtax assessment was correspondingly modified on 25 September 1972, producing a refund of Rs. 892.

The Commissioner issued a notice dated 19 November 1973 under section 16(1) of the Surtax Act, and, after cancelling and reissuing a corrected notice dated 27 November 1973 (served 29 November 1973), proposed to pass orders to enable diminution of the capital base under rule 4 of the Second Schedule to reflect deductions allowed under Chapter VI-A (sections 80-I and 80J) of the Income-tax Act. The proposed action was challenged by the assessee by writ petition, and the High Court quashed the notice. The Revenue appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Commissioner had jurisdiction under section 16(1) of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 to issue notices proposing diminution of the capital base under rule 4 of the Second Schedule to account for reliefs allowed under sections 80‑I and 80‑J of the Income‑tax Act.
  2. Whether the High Court should have declined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 because the assessee had alternative remedies (appeal to the Tribunal or reference to the court) against any order the Commissioner might make.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's / Writ-Petitioner's Arguments

  • The proposed action under section 16(1) was without jurisdiction and not warranted by rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Surtax Act.
  • The deductions/reliefs allowed under sections 80‑I and 80‑J of the Income‑tax Act are not amounts "not includible in the total income" for the purposes of rule 4 and therefore do not permit diminution of the capital base under that rule.
  • Because similar departmental practice existed and in an earlier year the Income‑tax Officer had completed assessment notwithstanding objections, the alternative remedies would not be adequate.

Revenue / Commissioner's Arguments

  • The reliefs allowed under Chapter VI‑A (sections 80‑I and 80‑J) should be treated as amounts of income, profits and gains "not includible in the total income" and therefore rule 4 requires a proportionate diminution of capital so that the statutory deduction is correctly computed.
  • The High Court should have refrained from intervening under Article 226 because the assessee had alternative statutory remedies (appeal to the Tribunal and reference to the court).
  • The change in the Income‑tax Act (substitution of Chapter VI‑A by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1967) and the definition of "gross total income" (section 80B) were submitted to have relevance to the construction of rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Surtax Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Champalal Binani v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1970] 76 ITR 692 (SC) Principle that certiorari (or writ) may lie where the order is on the face of it erroneous or raises the question of jurisdiction or infringement of fundamental rights. The court relied on this principle to hold that existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to relief under Article 226 where the matter raises a jurisdictional question arising from statutory interpretation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by addressing the two main points (jurisdiction/alternative remedy; and interpretation of rule 4) seriatim.

On alternative remedy and scope for writ relief

  1. The court observed that the question raised in the writ petitions was one of jurisdiction dependent on statutory interpretation rather than disputed facts.
  2. It reiterated the well‑settled proposition (citing Champalal Binani) that a writ may lie where an order is on its face erroneous or raises a question of jurisdiction; hence the existence of alternative remedies does not automatically preclude relief under Article 226.
  3. The court took into account allegations and admitted facts that the department had taken a similar view in other cases and that an earlier year's assessment for the assessee had been completed despite objections—factors rendering the alternative statutory remedies inadequate in the circumstances.
  4. On this basis the court concluded the assessee was justified in invoking Article 226 and that the High Court need not refuse relief solely because of alternative remedies.

On the proper construction of rule 4 of the Second Schedule

  1. The court analysed statutory definitions: "chargeable profits" (section 2(5) of the Surtax Act) derives from "total income" computed under the Income‑tax Act; "statutory deduction" (section 2(8) of the Surtax Act) is ten per cent of capital computed under the Second Schedule (or Rs. 200,000 whichever is greater).
  2. Rule 4 of the Second Schedule was quoted and its operative language emphasised: it diminishes the capital ascertained under rules 1–3 by an amount bearing the same proportion as the part of income not includible in total income bears to total income.
  3. The Commissioner’s contention was that deductions under sections 80‑I and 80‑J of the Income‑tax Act fall within "income, profits and gains not includible in the total income" and therefore rule 4 required diminution of capital in proportion to such deductions.
  4. The court rejected this contention. It explained that expressions and concepts in the Surtax Act that are defined in the Income‑tax Act must be read consistently (citing section 2(9) of the Surtax Act). The court analysed the meaning of "total income" and related Income‑tax Act chapters (Chapter III: "Incomes which do not form part of total income"; Chapter IV: computation of total income; Chapter VI‑A: deductions/reliefs) to show that the phrase "income, profits and gains not includible in the total income" has a specific connotation and is not apt to include deductions or allowances granted in computing total income under the Income‑tax Act.
  5. The court reasoned that if every deduction or allowance under the Income‑tax Act were treated as "income not includible in the total income" for purposes of rule 4, that would subvert the Surtax Act's scheme because it would effectively discard the Income‑tax Act's computed total income as the basic material for surtax computation.
  6. The court considered but did not accept the Revenue's submissions based on the substitution of Chapter VI‑A (Finance (No. 2) Act, 1967) or on the definition of "gross total income" in section 80B, holding those changes did not alter the character of the items or support the department's interpretation of rule 4.
  7. The court noted the prescribed Surtax Rules form (Part III, item 13(a)) and its Notes 8 and 9 which exemplify the kinds of income regarded as "not includible in the total income" (e.g., agricultural income, income accruing outside India for a non‑resident company) and thereby supported the narrower construction of rule 4 advanced by the assessee.
  8. The court observed that rule 2 of Schedule II (diminishing capital in relation to assets whose incomes are to be excluded) is complementary to rule 4 and reinforced the interpretation that rule 4 applies to incomes objectively excluded from total income (e.g., agricultural income), not to statutory reliefs/deductions under Chapter VI‑A.

Based on the foregoing statutory construction and contextual analysis, the court concluded that deductions under sections 80‑I and 80‑J are not "income, profits and gains not includible in the total income" for the purposes of rule 4 and therefore rule 4 could not be invoked to diminish capital on that account.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the notices issued under sections 8 and 16 of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 were without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. The appeals were dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The notices proposing diminution of the capital base under rule 4 insofar as they sought to account for reliefs under sections 80‑I and 80‑J were quashed and cannot be acted upon as proposed.
  • The appeals by the Revenue failed and were dismissed with costs (one set) and an advocate's fee of Rs. 250 was recorded.

Broader implications: The opinion confines its reasoning to statutory construction of rule 4 and the circumstances of jurisdictional challenge; it does not purport to establish a sweeping new principle beyond holding that statutory reliefs under sections 80‑I and 80‑J are not "incomes not includible in the total income" for the purpose of rule 4. The court expressly treated the matter as one of interpretation and jurisdiction; it did not pronounce that the department's contrary practice in other cases was lawful. No new principle of general application beyond the statutory interpretation reached is proclaimed in the text of the opinion.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in that text.

Show all summary ...

Srinivasa Iyengar, J.:— These appeals are against the common judgment in W. Ps. Nos. 3447, 3448 and 3578 of 1973 and 1121, 2551 and 2552 of 1974, dated 13th September, 1974, by which the notices issued under sections 8/16 of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), by the appellants, were quashed. The facts and circumstances in which the notices had been issued being the same in all the cases, it is sufficient to state the facts relating to W.P No. 3578 of 1973.

2. M/s. Stumpp, Schuele & Somappa Private Ltd. is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, and an assessee under the Act. For the assessment year 1971-72 (previous year ending December 31, 1970), assessment was made under the Income-tax Act, 1961, after due enquiry, on December 31, 1971, on a total income of Rs. 26,16,490. Based on this assessment, surtax was computed on December 13, 1971. The Income-tax Officer modified the income-tax assessment by an order dated September 12, 1972, the total income being computed at Rs. 26,07,560. Consequent on this, the surtax assessment was also modified on September 25, 1972, which resulted in a small refund of Rs. 892 in the surtax that had been paid in the meanwhile.

3. Subsequently, the Commissioner issued a notice dated November 19, 1973, under section 16(1) of the Act. Apparently, as this notice contained some mistakes, he issued a fresh notice in cancellation of the former dated November 27, 1973. which was served on the assessee on November 29, 1973. This notice, marked as exhibit “F” in the writ petition, was impugned in the writ petition. The relevant portion in the said notice, viz., paras. 2 and 3, are as follows:

“2. While completing the surtax assessment, the capital base has been computed at Rs. 76,71,176 and statutory deduction at 10% thereof amounting to Rs. 7,67,118 has been given. It is seen from the income-tax assessment order that under Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act, the Income-tax Officer while completing the assessment has allowed the following deductions, in all amounting to 3,45,282:

Rs. 80-I Deduction in respect of profits of priority industries 2,14,249 80-J Deduction in respect of newly established undertakings 1,31,033 3,45,282

Therefore, under rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Surtax Act, the Income-tax Officer should have proportionately reduced the capital base which had not been done while completing the assessment. This has resulted in a larger statutory deduction from chargeable profits than admissible under the law.

3. It is, therefore, proposed to pass such order under section 16(1) of the Surtax Act, 1964, as the circumstances of the case warrant, to enable the Income-tax Officer to diminish the capital proportionate to the deduction under Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, allowed in the income-tax assessment under rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Surtax Act and work out your surtax liability for the assessment year 1971-72.”

4. Therefore, the Commissioner was of the opinion that the assessment under the Act was erroneous in so far as it was prejudicial to the interests of the revenue and proposed to take action accordingly to enable the Income-tax Officer to diminish the capital proportionate to the deduction under Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and to work out the surtax liability for the assessment year 1971-72. The assessee was called upon to file his objections, if any, on or before December 3, 1973, and the hearing was also fixed for that date.

5. Contending that the proposed action was without jurisdiction and not warranted by the provisions of rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Act, the writ petition (W.P No. 3578 of 1973) was filed. The learned judge, upholding the contention of the assessee, quashed the notice.

6. In these appeals it is urged that the assessee had an alternative remedy by way of an appeal, against the order that may be made by the Commissioner, to the Tribunal and had also a remedy by way of a reference to this court and, therefore, the learned judge should not have interfered under article 226 of the Constitution., It is further urged that the interpretation placed by the learned judge on rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Act is not correct. We will consider these points seriatim.

Point No. 1.— That the assessee was entitled to relief under sections 80-I and 80J of the Income-tax Act and the quantum of relief allowed is not in dispute. The assessment under the Income-tax Act has become final and, therefore, the total income computed thereunder is not in dispute. The action proposed under section 16(1) of the Act was only on the ground that under rule 4 of Schedule II of the Act, there should have been a proportionate deduction in the computation of the capital base in respect of the relief allowed under sections 80-I and 80-J of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, jurisdiction was invoked only on the interpretation sought to be placed on the said rule. If the interpretation sought to be placed on that rule is not warranted by law, then the authority had no jurisdiction to take action as proposed under section 16(1) of the Act and such action would be without and in excess of jurisdiction. The authority functioning under a statute has to act in accordance with the provisions of the statute and if he exceeds the jurisdiction thereunder his action can be questioned by way of a writ under article 226 of the Constitution and the High Court is entitled to interfere in exercise of its powers under article 226 of the Constitution. The existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar for such interference. This principle is well-settled. In Champalal Binani v. Commissioner of Income-tax, [1970] 76 ITR 692, 696 (SC), the Supreme Court observed:

“A petition for a writ of certiorari may lie to the High Court, where the order is on the face of it erroneous or raises the question of jurisdiction or of infringement of fundamental rights of the petitioner.”

7. In the instant cases no disputed questions of fact arise. The question raised was one of jurisdiction which depended upon the interpretation of the provisions of a statute. An authority cannot by placing a wrong interpretation on the statutory provision assume jurisdiction. It had also been alleged in the writ petitions that in certain other cases the Commissioner had taken a similar view and that departmental instructions had also been issued to that effect, and, therefore, no useful purpose would be served in pursuing the matter before the authorities and the alternative remedy would not be an adequate remedy. It has not been denied that in other cases, a similar view had been taken by the authorities and in the case of the assessee for an earlier year the Income-tax Officer had completed the assessment under the Act in spite of it being pointed out that it was without jurisdiction. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the assessee was justified in invoking the jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the Constitution and the court would not refuse relief merely on the ground that there was an alternative remedy.

Point No. 2.— Under the Act, surtax is charged on every company in respect of so much of its chargeable profits of the previous year as exceed the statutory deduction at the rate specified in the Third Schedule. “Chargeable profits” is defined in section 2(5) of the Act as follows:

“‘Chargeable profits’ means the total income of an assessee computed under the Income-tax Act, 1961 (XLIII of 1961), for any previous year or years, as the case may be, and adjusted in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule.” “Statutory deduction” is also defined under section 2(8) as follows:

“‘Statutory deduction’ means an amount equal to ten per cent of the capital of the company as computed in accordance with the provisions of the Second Schedule, or an amount of two hundred thousand rupees, whichever is greater.” (Provisos omitted as unnecessary)

8. The basic factor in the computation of the surtax is the income as computed under the Income-tax Act for the previous year. The first step is to make adjustments in the income as computed under the Income-tax Act, in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule to the Act which mentions specific items which are to be excluded by way of adjustment. The relief granted under sections 80-I and 80J of the Income-tax Act are not among those specified items. The next step is the computation of the capital of the company in accordance with the Second Schedule and thereafter determine the statutory deduction which would be an amount equal to ten per cent of the capital as computed or an amount of two hundred thousand rupees, whichever is greater. The Second Schedule consists of four rules. There is no dispute about the computation of the capital so far as the provisions of rules 1 to 3 are concerned in the instant cases. Rule 4 is as follows:

“Where a part of the income, profits and gains of a company is not includible in its total income as computed under the Income-tax Act, its capital shall be the sum ascertained in accordance with rules 1, 2 and 3, diminished by an amount which bears to that sum the same proportion as the amount of the aforesaid income, profits and gains bears to the total amount of its income, profits and gains.”

9. According to the Commissioner, the amount of relief allowed under sections 80-I and 80J of the Income-tax Act must be treated as income, profits or gains which is not includible in its total income and, therefore, the capital ascertained in accordance with rules 1, 2 and 3 should be diminished by an amount in the proportion as mentioned in the rule. The learned judge has held that the deductions allowed under sections 80-I and 80J cannot be said to be amounts not includible in the total income and, therefore, no deduction in this behalf can be made in the capital as computed under rules 1, 2 and 3. He has held that the expression “income, profits and gains” not includible in the total income has a specific connotation and would mean items such as agricultural income, income of non-resident company, income from property held for charitable or religious purposes as coming within the purview of Chapter III of the Income-tax Act.

10. Section 2(45) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, defines “total income” as meaning:

“………total amount of income referred to in section. 5, computed in the manner laid down in this Act.”

11. Section 5 provides what the total income in a previous year of a person shall include. The heading of Chapter III of the Income-tax Act is “Incomes which do not form part of total income”. Chapter IV deals with the computation of total income. It classifies the income under different heads and the deductions to be made in respect of the different heads of income. Chapter V bears the heading “Income of other persons included in assessee's total income” and the sections in that Chapter make provision in this behalf. In the Income-tax Act, the expression “income includible in the total income” has a definite connotation. The expression “deductions and allowances” have also particular connotations. Income connotes what comes in and in general receipts by an assessee. Receipts are classified as capital or revenue, and receipts of revenue nature are treated as income. Capital receipts except in so far as they are liable for capital gains, and deemed to be income for that purpose, are not treated as income. Section 2(9) of the Act provides that the words and expressions used in the Act but not defined in it and defined in the Income-tax Act shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act (Income-tax Act). Therefore, when rule 4 of the Second Schedule refers to part of the income, profits and gains of a company not includible in its total income as computed under the Income-tax Act, the expression ‘not includible’ should be understood and interpreted in the light of the provisions in the Income-tax Act. Relief granted under sections 80-I and 80J cannot be said to be income, profits or gains not includible in the total income. As noticed earlier the basic material for the computation of surtax is the total income as computed under the Income-tax Act. Adjustments in that total income have to be made as specified in Schedule I. There is no specific provision for making any adjustment in respect of relief under sections 80-I and 80J in Schedule I. The expression “part of income, profits and gains not includible in the total income” in rule 4 of the Second Schedule cannot be construed or understood as referring to deductions, allowances, etc., made under the Income-tax Act for purposes of computation of the total income. In our opinion it is impossible to put such a construction. If the contention for the appellants is to be accepted as correct then every kind of deduction or allowance for expenses made in the computation of the total income under the Income-tax Act would have to be treated as income not includible in the total income and deductions would have to be made in that behalf also under rule 4. It is not the case of the appellants that such other deductions and allowances come within the ambit of rule 4. Exception sought to be made in respect of the relief under sections 80-I and 80J of the Income-tax Act is quite understandable. We asked the learned standing counsel as to what is that income that is not includible in the total income as computed under the Income-tax Act. When the expression used is “total income”, such a proposition would be really meaningless. The learned counsel suggested that the expression “total income” should be construed as gross total income. Acceptance of such construction would dislodge and destroy the basis on which surtax is to be charged. The basic factor, viz., the total income as computed under the Income-tax Act, would then have to be ignored and fresh computation made on the basis of the gross receipts. That is not the scheme of the Surtax Act.

12. The learned standing counsel submitted that a new Chapter VI-A was substituted by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1967, and some of the provisions of Chapter VII were omitted by that Act with effect from April 1, 1968, and the change so effected has an impact on rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Act and this change is of some significance. The heading of Chapter VII is “Incomes forming part of total income on which no income-tax is payable”. Therefore, it is implicit that the incomes contemplated therein are incomes forming part of total income though income-tax was not payable on that part. Merely because some of the provisions therein were omitted and made part of the new Chapter VI-A in order to give similar relief, the character and nature of the items do not get changed. It is pertinent to note that even though some of the provisions of Chapter VII were deleted and Chapter VI-A was substituted, no amendment was effected under the Surtax Act. The change in the arrangement of the sections in the Income-tax Act brought about by the introduction of Chapter VI-A does not in any way support the interpretation sought to be put by the department on rule 4 of the Second Schedule.

13. The learned standing counsel submitted that the expression “gross total income” had been defined under section 80B of the Income-tax Act which occurs in Chapter VI-A and rule 4 of the Second Schedule of the Act should be construed in that light. It is difficult to discern any connection between the definition of “gross total income” in section 80B and rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Act. That definition is only for purposes of Chapter VI-A of the Income-tax Act and has no bearing at all on the interpretation to be placed on rule 4 of the Second Schedule. The learned counsel for the assessee invited our attention to the form prescribed in the Surtax Rules, 1964, in respect of the return of chargeable profits to be filed under section 5 of the Act. Part III of the form bears the heading, “Computation of statutory deduction”. Item No. 13(a) refers to “amount of income, profits and gains, if any, not includible in the total income as computed under the Income-tax Act, 1961”. In respect of this item, Note No. 8 is as follows:

“Instances of income, profits and gains not includible in the total income as computed under the Income-tax Act, 1961, are agricultural income in India, and in the case of a non-resident company, its income accruing or arising outside India.”

14. Note No. 9 is as follows:

“Item No. 13 is to be filled in only in the case of a company, a part of the income, profits and gains of which is not includible in its total income as computed under the Income-tax Act, 1961.”

15. These notings fully support the contention urged on behalf of the assessee that rule 4 of the Second Schedule only refers to such income, profits and gains which are not includible in the total income as computed under the Income-tax Act and not at all to items of deductions or reliefs granted under section 80-I or 80J. This construction stands to reason also. If a company carrying on business having an industrial undertaking derives agricultural income besides income from business, the income from agriculture is not includible in the total income as computed under the Income-tax Act. The capital employed by the company may include capital investment in activities of agriculture, the income from which is not includible in the total income under the Income-tax Act. Surtax being a tax imposed upon companies in respect of the income, profits or gains from business based upon the total income as adjusted and the excess over the statutory deduction which is based upon the capital of the company as computed under Schedule II, the capital employed in respect of the agricultural activities would have to be deducted so as to confine the two items to similar activities. Chargeable profits being of industrial undertaking or business, capital to be considered is also that employed in that undertaking or business. Rule 4 makes provision for such a contingency where a company has income not includible in the total income under the Income-tax Act so that the capital employed in respect of such income which is not includible gets excluded in the computation of the chargeable profits. The formula prescribed is for a ready computation.

16. We may also notice rule 2 of Schedule II to the Act which provides for diminishing the capital in relation to assets of a company, the income from which are to be excluded from the total income in computing its chargeable profits. Rule 4 is in a way complementary to this so that further deduction in proportion as specified may be made in relation to the income, profits and gains not includible in the total income as computed under the Income-tax Act. The provision in rule 4 of the Second Schedule cannot be interpreted and invoked so as to make deduction in respect of the relief granted under sections 80-I and 80J of the Income-tax Act.

17. Therefore, the notices issued under sections 8/16 of the Act were without jurisdiction and were liable to be quashed. For the reasons stated above, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs, one set.

18. Advocate's fee Rs. 250.

19. Appeals dismissed.