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The Management Of Ki... v. The Workmen Of Kirlo...

Karnataka High Court
Feb 14, 1974
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Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Venkataramiah, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the Management of Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd., Bangalore. An industrial dispute arose in or about 1965 between the petitioner and its workmen concerning the termination of one employee, Jayaramaiah. The matter went before a Conciliation Officer who reported failure of conciliation. By order dated 23rd February 1967, the State Government (acting under the Industrial Disputes Act) declined to refer the dispute for adjudication to a Labour Court. The workmen challenged that refusal in Writ Petition No. 203 of 1968 before this Court; the petitioner (management) was not impleaded in that writ and the State Government alone was the respondent. The Division Bench allowed that writ on 11th January 1972, observing that the State Government had not shown that it had applied its mind when it earlier declined to refer the dispute.

On reconsideration, the State Government concluded that the dispute should be referred and, by Order No. FCL 629 LLD 68 dated 12th February 1973, referred the matter to the Labour Court to decide whether the petitioner was justified in terminating Jayaramaiah. In proceedings before the Labour Court the petitioner contended that the reference was illegal and without jurisdiction because the State Government had not heard the parties before making the reference. The Labour Court rejected that contention by an order dated 26th November 1973. The present writ petition challenges that Labour Court order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the State Government's decision to refer an industrial dispute to a Labour Court (after an earlier refusal to refer) without affording the management an opportunity of hearing violated the rules of natural justice and was therefore illegal.
  2. Whether a prior refusal by the State Government to make a reference exhausts the Government's power so as to preclude a later decision to refer the matter for adjudication.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner, through counsel Shri V.L. Narasimha Murthy, relied primarily on the Supreme Court decision in A.K. Kriapak v. Union of India to contend that the State Government had violated rules of natural justice by referring the dispute without hearing the management.
  • Counsel emphasised the principle in Kriapak that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies must act fairly and, where the exercise of administrative power may have prejudicial civil consequences, there is an implied obligation to give an affected party an opportunity to be heard.
  • The petitioner also relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in K. Abdul Salam and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu which held that where the State Government, having earlier declined to refer a dispute, later refers the dispute after receiving representations, the management must be heard before the reference is made.

Note: The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the State Government's or the Labour Court's separate submissions in this writ petition beyond the description that the Labour Court repelled the petitioner's contention. The Court's own reasoning and the authorities it considered are recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.K. Kriapak v. Union of India The distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial powers; requirement that administrative bodies act fairly; where administrative action may cause civil prejudice to a party, there may be an implied obligation to afford that party an opportunity to be heard. The petitioner relied on Kriapak to argue that the State Government should have heard the management before making the reference. The Court examined Kriapak but concluded that its principles do not, on the facts of this case, mandate that a State Government must hear the management before making a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act where the reference itself does not decide questions of fact or law and where no immediate civil prejudice necessarily follows from the making of a reference.
K. Abdul Salam and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu (Madras High Court) Held that when the State Government initially refuses a reference and later, after receiving representations, refers the dispute to a Labour Court, the management must be heard before the reference is made; applied Kriapak to reach that conclusion. The Court discussed this decision and specifically noted that the Madras High Court relied on Kriapak to conclude there was a failure of natural justice. However, the Court in the present opinion disagreed with that conclusion and declined to follow the Madras High Court's approach for the reasons given in its analysis.
State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei Supports the principle that when an administrative action is likely to produce civil consequences prejudicial to a person, there is an obligation to give that person an opportunity to be heard. The Court treated Binapani Dei as confirming the general rule that hearing is required where administrative action is likely to cause prejudice. The Court then applied this principle to the specific nature of a reference under Section 10(1), finding that such a reference does not itself decide facts or law and therefore does not necessarily create the kind of prejudice that would trigger the obligation to hear.
Western India Watch Co., Ltd. v. Its Workmen The Government's refusal to make a reference is a refusal to exercise its power; the power to refer is not exhausted by an earlier refusal and may be exercised later. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a prior refusal to refer does not prevent the State Government from reconsidering and making a reference later. This principle underpins the Court's conclusion that the earlier refusal did not preclude the subsequent reference and that a party's change of position or lapse of time does not affect the Government's jurisdiction to make the reference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by identifying and applying the legal principles set out in the authorities relied upon by the petitioner and discussed in earlier decisions.

  1. The Court acknowledged the general principle from Kriapak and Binapani Dei that where administrative action is likely to cause civil prejudice to a person, there is an implied obligation to afford that person an opportunity to be heard. The Court accepted this principle as a starting point for analysis.
  2. The Court then analysed the nature of the power exercised by the State Government when it makes a reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It concluded that the act of making a reference is not a determination of questions of fact or law; it is a decision that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, thereby acquiring jurisdiction to refer the dispute to a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal.
  3. Given the limited nature of the decision to refer, the Court held that the mere act of making a reference does not necessarily produce the kind of civil prejudice to a management that would mandate hearing under the Kriapak test. The Court contrasted decisions where clear civil consequences follow from administrative action with the present situation where dispute adjudication would thereafter be carried out by judges with judicial experience.
  4. The Court further relied on Western India Watch to conclude that a prior refusal to refer does not exhaust the Government's power; the Government may reconsider and exercise its power at a later stage. Accordingly, the fact that the State Government had earlier declined to refer did not preclude it from later referring the dispute.
  5. The Court addressed the petitioner's reliance on Sections 33 and 33-A of the Act, observing that these sections do not take away existing rights of management but only require certain actions to be submitted to judicial scrutiny (for permission or approval). The Court found that these provisions did not attract the Kriapak rule so as to require a hearing prior to a reference.
  6. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court found no substance in the writ petition. It concluded that the State Government's reference to the Labour Court without first hearing the management (in the circumstances of this case) did not amount to a violation of natural justice that would warrant judicial interference.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The writ petition fails and is DISMISSED.

Consequences and immediate effects:

  • The Labour Court's order repelling the petitioner's contention that the reference was illegal is upheld.
  • The petition is dismissed with costs; an advocate's fee of Rs. 100 was imposed.

Broader implications as indicated by the Court (limited to the opinion's text):

  • The Court emphasised that a State Government's decision to refer an industrial dispute under Section 10(1) is not a final adjudication of facts or law and does not necessarily produce the civil prejudice that triggers an implied right to be heard under Kriapak.
  • The Court affirmed the proposition in Western India Watch that an earlier refusal to refer does not bar a subsequent valid reference; the power to refer is not exhausted by a prior refusal.
  • The Court expressly disagreed with the Madras High Court's conclusion in K. Abdul Salam and Company (as to the necessity of hearing in the specific circumstances that arose there) and declined to follow it in this case, indicating that no new broad precedent requiring a hearing before every reference was laid down by this judgment beyond the principles discussed.

In short, the direct effect is dismissal of the petition and confirmation of the State Government's power to refer the dispute for adjudication without a prior hearing of the management in the circumstances before the Court; the opinion does not purport to create a new, wider rule beyond the analysis set out above.

Show all summary ...

Venkataramiah, J.:— The petitioner in the above writ petition is the Management of Kirloskar Electric Co. Ltd., Bangalore. It has challenged the validity of the order dated 26th November, 1973 passed by the Labour Court, Bangalore.

2. The facts of the case are briefly these: In or about the year 1965, an industrial dispute arose between the petitioner and its workmen with regard to the termination of services of an employee by name Jayaramaiah. The matter was taken up before the Conciliation Officer who ultimately reported to the Government that the proceedings ended in failure. By its order dated 23rd February, 1967 passed under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the State Government declined to refer the said industrial dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court. The workmen challenged the said order before this Court in Writ Petition No. 203 of 1968. Only the State Government was impleaded as respondent to the said Writ Petition. The present petitioner was not impleaded as a party. The said Writ Petition was allowed by Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 11th January, 1972. In the course of its order, this court observed that the order passed by the State Government declining to make a reference to the Labour Court did not show that the Government had applied its mind to the case and hence it was necessary for the Government to apply its mind to the facts of the case and to take a decision in accordance with law on the question whether the matter should be referred for adjudication to the Labour Court or not. Thereafter, on a reconsideration of the said question, the State Government came to the conclusion that the dispute in question should be referred to the Labour Court. Accordingly, it made a reference by its Order No. FCL 629 LLD 68, dated 12th February, 1973 to the Labour Court to decide the question whether the petitioner was justified in terminating the services of Jayaramaiah. In the course of the proceedings before the Labour Court the petitioner, among others, raised a contention that the reference made by the State Government was illegal and without jurisdiction because the parties to the case had not been heard by the State Government before making the order of reference. The Labour Court repelled the said contention by the order which is impugned in these proceedings. Hence this Writ Petition.

3. Shri V.L Narasimha Murthy, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in A.K Kriapak v. Union of India(1), that the State Government had violated the rules of natural justice in referring the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Labour Court without hearing the petitioner before making such a reference. He depended upon the following observations of the Supreme Court in the above case:—

“The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the frame work of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that, the organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its validity if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power……….

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……………. With the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become necessary to provide guidetines for the just exercise of their power. To prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, Courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matters like these public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. It is neither possible nor desirable to fix the limits of a quasi-judicial power. But for the purpose of the present case we shall assume that the power exercised by the selection board was an administrative power and test the validity of the impugned selections on that basis.”

The Supreme Court was concerned in that case with a selection made by the Indian Forest Service. It found that amongst the members of the selection committee, there was one member who was vitally interested in the recommendations to be made by the said committee because he was a person who had offered himself as a candidate at the said selection. Ultimately, it came to the conclusion that the recommendation made by the committee was vitiated on the ground that there was a reasonable likelihood of bias in deciding the question before the committee. Following the observations of the Supreme Court in the above case, Ramaprasada Rao, J. of the High Court of Madras held in K. Abdul Salam and Company v. State of Tamil Nadu(2), that it was the duty of the State Government to have heard the parties concerned before making a reference of an industrial dispute for adjudication to a Labour Court or Industrail Tribunal when the State Government had earlier declined to make such a reference. The facts of that case were these. The State Government had earlier refused to refer an alleged industrial dispute for adjudication. Later on, the State Government received certain representations made by the some members of the public and representatives of the workmen. After taking into consideration the said representations, the State Government reconsidered the question again and then referred the dispute to a Labour Court. Before making such a reference the State Government did not give any opportunity to the Management concerned to show cause as to why a reference should not be made. In those circumstances, the learned Judge Management was of the opinion that though the power exercised by the State Government in making a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act for adjudication of an industrial dispute to an appropriate court or tribunal, was administrative in character, the action of the State Government in referring the said dispute without hearing the Management concerned, was vitiated as the principles of natural justice had been violated. In coming to that conclusion, he relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case extracted above. He, however, recognised distinction between a case where a reference is made by the State Government after taking into consideration certain representations made to it after it had earlier declined to make a reference and a case where a reference is made by the State Government suo motu. He observed in the course of the said said judgment that if the Government suo motu changed their mind without anyone promoting them to do so and wanted to exercise their inherent power on the same material which was considered by them in the first instance the matters would be different, but the impugned order which was in the nature of a decision made by the Government was made on an extraneous material in the sense that the petitioner in that case did not have a fair opportunity to meet them or even know of them. In that sense, he was of the opinion that there was an apparent error and there was a failure of application of the well known principles of natural justice.

4. A careful reading of the observations of the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case extracted above and in State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei(3), suggests that even when the action taken by the Executive is administrative in character, if such action is likely to lead to certain civil consequences which are prejudicial to any person, there is an implied obligation on the part of the authority taking such a decision to give an opportunity to the person who is likely to be affected to show cause as to why the proposed action should not be taken. The Supreme Court emphasised the fact that it was only when an action taken by the administrative authority is likely to result in any kind of prejudice to a third party that such party should be given an opportunity to be heard. If there is no likelihood of any such prejudice or civil consequences, there may be no necessity to give an opportunity to the party concerned to make his representation in respect of the proposed action unless the statute under which the authority functions, expressly requires that such an opportunity should be given. In Abdul Salam's case referred to above the High Court of Madras was of the opinion that on a reference being made to an Industrial Court or Tribunal, certain unfettered rights which the Management enjoyed in relation to its workmen would get restricted and that was sufficient to attract the observations of the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case. If the said conclusion is right then there could be no distinction between a case where a reference is made to an Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court by the State Government suo moto and a case where a reference is made on a consideration of certain representations received by the State Government after it had once declined to make such a reference. In either case the legal fetters that would be imposed by law on the Management by reason of Section 33 and 33-A of the Act would be the same. With great respect to the learned Judge who decided the said case, I cannot agree with the conclusion reached by him in the said case.

5. The Supreme Court has, in the course of its judgment in Kraipak's case, observed that in order to decide whether an opportunity should be given to a party concerned, it would be necessary to bear in mind the nature of the power that is exercised, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. When the State Government makes a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act of an industrial dispute for adjudication to a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal, it does not decide any question of fact or law. The only condition which the exercise of that power should satisfy is that there should be the existence of an industrial dispute or there should be an apprehension that an industrial dispute exists. When once the State Government is satisfied about the said question, it acquires jurisdiction under the Act to refer to a Labour Court or to an Industrial Tribunal the industrial dispute for adjudication. The fact that at one stage the State Government was of the opinion that there was no need to refer the matter for adjudication, does not preclude it from reconsidering the question and making a reference at a later stage.

6. In Western India Watch Co., Ltd. v. Its workmen(4) it has been held by the Supreme Court that when the Government refuses to make a reference it does not exercise its power; on the other hand, it refuses to exercise its power and it is only when it decides to refer that it exercises its power. Consequently, the power to refer cannot be said to have been exhausted when it has declined to make a reference at an earlier stage. There is thus a considerable body of judicial opinion according to which so long as an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended and the Government is of the opinion that it is so, the fact that it had earlier refused to exercise its power does not preclude it from exercising it at a later stage. In this view, the mere fact there has been a lapse of time or that a party to the dispute was, by the earlier refusal, led to believe that there would be no reference and acts upon such belief does not affect the jurisdiction of the Government to make the reference. It is also seen from the provisions of Sections 33 and 33-A of the Act to which reference was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that those sections do not in any way take away any existing right of the Management. Those Sections only require the Management to submit its action to the scrutiny of the Court either in the form of an application for permission to take disciplinary action against a workman or in the form of an application for approval to an action taken against a workman. A Management which is expected to deal with its workmen in a reasonable way, need not feel shy to approach the Court or the Tribunal and seek its permission to take an action or approval to an action or approval to an action already taken. I do not think that the presence of Sections 33 and 33-A in the Act would attract the enunciation made by the Supreme Court in Kraipak's case. It should also be borne in mind that any decision taken by the State Government under Section 10 of the Act does not lead to any finality in so far as the dispute between the parties is concerned. The dispute has normally presided over by Judges with judicial experience. In that situation, it cannot be said that the Management would suffer any kind of prejudice if the State Government proceeds to make a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act without hearing the parties although it has, on an earlier occasion, declined to do so. I do not, therefore find any substance in this writ petition.

7. The writ petition flails and it is dismissed with costs Advocate's fee Rs. 100.