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Shivadeviamma And Others, v. Sumanji And Others,

Karnataka High Court
Aug 4, 1972
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a reference to a Full Bench under Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961. A Division Bench (Honniah and Venkataramiah, JJ.) referred a question to a Full Bench by order dated 23-6-1972. The underlying substantive dispute in the appeal concerned whether a female member of an Aliyasanthana family (a Nissanthathi Kavaru) could dispose of by will her share in the Kutumba of which she was a member. The appellant contended that although Section 36(3) of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 gave only a life interest, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 enlarged that life interest into an absolute estate. This contention was opposed by an earlier Division Bench decision in Amba Shedthi v. Paddakke Shedthi ((1969) 2 Mys LJ 377), which held that Section 14 was not intended to apply to such females.

The referring Division Bench formulated three specific legal questions (set out in the opinion) concerning the application of Section 14(1) to Nissanthathi Kavarus and their power to bequeath property. Those three questions were referred to a Full Bench. A Full Bench (Govinda Bhat, Venkataramiah and Datar, JJ.) considered the reference. By majority (Govinda Bhat, J., with Datar, J., agreeing) the Full Bench considered the order of reference deficient because it did not state reasons for doubting the earlier decision and returned the matter to the Division Bench for a clearer order of reference. Venkataramiah, J., dissented, holding that the Full Bench should hear and decide the questions even if the referral lacked reasons.

The Division Bench, on reconsideration, maintained that the Full Bench had no power to direct the Division Bench to do what the Full Bench had requested, and again referred the case to a Full Bench. This opinion (authored by Chandrashekhar, J.) addresses whether a Full Bench can decline to answer questions referred under Section 7 merely because the order of reference lacks stated reasons, and whether the Full Bench can send back the case to the referring Bench with a direction to give reasons.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether it is open to a Full Bench to decline to answer questions referred to it under Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961, and to send back the case to the referring Division Bench without answering the questions, but with a direction to give reasons in support of the order of reference.
  2. Whether Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applies to the case of life interest acquired under Sections 35 and 36 of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 by a female who has completed fifty years of age (a Nissanthathi Kavaru), such that the female holds the property absolutely rather than as a life-interest holder.
  3. Whether provisions of Section 36(3), (4) and (5) of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 are inconsistent with Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in relation to females governed by Aliyasanthana law and whether those provisions cease to apply to such females who have completed fifty years of age.
  4. Whether a female governed by Aliyasanthana law who has completed fifty years of age has the power to bequeath by will her divided interest in property acquired at a partition under Section 35 of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that although Section 36(3) of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 conferred only a life interest on such a female member, that life interest is enlarged into an absolute estate by Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments in the text provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Amba Shedthi v. Paddakke Shedthi ((1969) 2 Mys LJ 377) Held that Parliament did not intend Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act to apply to Aliyasanthana females who were Nissanthathi Kavarus under the Aliyasanthana Act. The earlier decision was the subject of doubt by the referring Division Bench; the Full Bench considered whether that decision required re-consideration and whether the order of reference adequately stated reasons for doubting it.
Mallawwa v. Kallappa (1966 (2) Mys LJ 633) Cited as a decision relevant to whether the earlier ruling required re-examination. The Division Bench relied on this decision (along with two Supreme Court decisions) as part of its justification for a Full Bench reference; the Full Bench noted its relevance in assessing the importance of re-considering Amba Shedthi.
Gourishanker v. Raja Azamshah Contains observations (by Hidayatullah, J.) that a Bench referring a question should, where it doubts an earlier decision, state the reasons for its doubt so as to assist the Bench called upon to re-examine the question. The opinion quotes these observations to illustrate the desirability of stating reasons in an order of reference and to discuss the comity-of-court considerations implicated by an unexplained reference.
Two decisions of the Supreme Court (unnamed in the provided text) Referred to by the Division Bench as part of the context supporting re-consideration of the earlier Division Bench decision. The opinion notes that the Division Bench relied, in part, on these Supreme Court decisions in deciding that the question was fit for Full Bench consideration; the Full Bench considered the importance of the questions in that light.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with a textual and structural analysis of Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961. It identified subsection (1) as having two parts: (a) a discretionary power permitting a Bench of not less than two Judges to refer a question of law or usage having the force of law to a Full Bench, and (b) a mandatory duty to refer where the Bench "differs from the view taken by a similar Bench" on the same question. Subsection (2) provides that the decision of the majority of a Full Bench shall be the decision of the High Court.

The Court observed that Section 7 does not expressly prescribe what an order of reference must contain, nor does it expressly say what a Full Bench must do upon receipt of a reference. There is no express provision stating that a Full Bench must hear and decide the question referred, nor an express provision authorising the Full Bench to send the matter back to the referring Bench for reasons or clarification.

The Court drew a necessary implication from subsection (2) that a Full Bench, when a question is referred to it, should hear and decide the question so that the referring Bench can decide the case in accordance with the Full Bench's decision. From that implication the Court concluded that a Full Bench cannot decline to hear and answer the questions referred to it merely because the referring Bench did not include reasons or a reasoned criticism of an earlier decision.

Addressing whether the referring Bench is under a legal obligation to formulate reasons for doubting an earlier similar Bench's decision, the Court distinguished between what is desirable and what is legally obligatory. While acknowledging the desirability and propriety of including reasons (quoting Gourishanker v. Raja Azamshah on comity and assistance to the reconsidering Bench), the Court held that Section 7 does not impose a legal duty on the referring Bench to set out a reasoned criticism or alternative view. Thus, the absence of such reasons does not invalidate the reference.

The Court concluded that, as a result, the Full Bench lacks the power to decline to answer on the sole ground that the order of reference omits reasons, and it lacks the power to send the case back to the referring Bench with a direction that reasons be stated. The Court limited its conclusion, however, by noting that it was unnecessary for the purposes of this reference to decide whether a Full Bench may send back a case without answering where the question is not a question of law or usage having the force of law, or where the question is unintelligible or ambiguous and requires clarification.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court answered the referred procedural question in the negative: it is not open to a Full Bench to decline to answer the questions referred to it by a Division Bench under Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961, on the ground that the order of reference contains no reasons, nor can the Full Bench send the matter back to the referring Bench with a direction to state reasons in support of the order of reference.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Full Bench must hear and decide questions referred under Section 7 even if the order of reference does not state reasons for doubting an earlier decision; a reference is valid despite omission of such reasons.
  • On judicial practice: While it remains desirable and proper for a referring Bench to state reasons when it doubts an earlier decision (to assist the Full Bench and preserve comity), the failure to do so does not legally preclude the Full Bench from answering the question.
  • Limits of the ruling: The Court explicitly confined its conclusion to references where the only deficiency is omission of reasons. It did not decide whether a Full Bench may return a reference without answering when the question referred is not a question of law or usage having the force of law, or is unintelligible or ambiguous; those situations were left open.
  • Precedential effect: The decision establishes the legal position (as applied in this Court) that a Full Bench should not refuse to decide a valid reference under Section 7 merely because the referring order lacks stated reasons; this governs how references under Section 7 are to be treated in future within the scope described above.

Answer accordingly.

Show all summary ...

Chandrashekhar, J.:— A Division Bench of this Court consisting of Honniah and Venkataramiah, JJ., has, by its order dated 23-6-1972, referred to a Full Bench the following questions:

“Whether it is open to a Full Bench to decline to answer the questions referred to it under Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961, and to send back the case to the Division Bench, without answering the questions referred to it, but with a direction to give reasons in support of the order of reference?”

2. We shall briefly narrate how the above question came to be referred to this Full Bench. In the present appeal (in which the above question has been referred to this Full Bench), one of the questions that arose for determination was whether a female member of an Aliyasanthana family constituting a Nissanthathi Kavaru, can dispose of by a will her share in the Kutumba of which she is a member. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that though under Section 36(3) of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949, such a member has only a life interest in the properties allotted to her, such life interest gets enlarged into an absolute estate by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The above contention runs counter to the ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in Amba Shedthi v. Paddakke Shedthi, (1969) 2 Mys LJ 377 in which it was held that it was never intended by Parliament to apply the provision of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act to Aliyasanthana females who were Nissanthathi Kavarus under the Aliyasanthana Act. After considering the aforesaid contention of the appellant's counsel, the Division Bench, by its order dated 3-11-1970, formulated the following three questions of law and referred them to a Full Bench under Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961.

(1) Does Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, apply to the case of life interest acquired before or after the commencement of the said Act, under Sections 35 and 36 of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 (Madras Act No. IX of 1949), by a female who has completed fifty years of age (a Nissanthathi Kavaru) and possessed by her and does such female hold such property absolutely and not as a holder of life interest?

(2) Are provisions of Section 36(3), (4) and (5) of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 (Madras Act IX of 1949) inconsistent with Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, in so far as they relate to females governed by Aliyasanthana Law and do those provisions cease to apply to such females even though they may have completed fifty years of age by virtue of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956?

(3) Has a female, governed by Aliyasanthana Law who has completed fifty years of age, the power to bequeath under a Will her divided interest in the property acquired by her at a partition under Section 35 of the Madras Aliyasanthana Act, 1949 (Madras Act IX of 1949)?

3. The material portion of the order of reference reads:

“We find that the several questions argued before us have not been examined in the decision in Amba Shedthi's case. We, therefore, feel that the question decided in that case required to be re-considered by a larger Bench, in view of the decision of this Court in Mallawwa v. Kallappa, 1966 (2) Mys LJ 633 mentioned earlier and the two decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. Having regard to the importance of the questions involved, we think that this is a fit case to be decided by a Full Bench.”

4. Accordingly, the aforesaid three questions came up for consideration before a Full Bench (consisting of Govinda Bhat, Venkataramiah and Datar, JJ.) Govinda Bhat, J., (with whom Datar J., agreed) was of the opinion that the case should be referred back to the Division Bench for a clear order of reference, as his Lordship felt that the order of reference did not contain the reasons for casting a doubt on the correctness of the decision in Amba Shedthi's case (1969) 2 Mys LJ 377 or a reasoned criticism of the view accepted therein. His Lordship observed thus in the course of his opinion:

“The order of reference does neither state that the Bench of two Judges differs from the view taken by the earlier Division Bench in Amba Shedthi's case (1969) 2 Mys LJ 377 nor do they formulate a reasoned criticism of the view accepted therein. They do not also state in express words that they doubt the correctness of the decision in Amba Shedthi's case (1969) 2 Mys LJ 377. The order of reference does not state that there are decisions of other High Courts in India which are strongly persuasive and take a different view from the view which prevails in this High Court.”

5. In his dissenting opinion, Venkataramiah, J., took the view that even if an order of reference by a Division Bench does not contain the grounds on which it disagrees with an earlier decision, the Full Bench cannot refuse to hear and decide the questions referred to it. His Lordship observed that though it would be better if the order of reference contains the grounds on which a Division Bench differs from the view expressed by another Division Bench, the Full Bench would be failing to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under Section 7 of the Act if it (the Full Bench) does not answer the questions referred to it. His Lordship was of the view that the case had to be heard by the Full Bench and that the questions referred to it must be decided by it without sending back the case to the Division Bench for reconsidering the matter.

6. In view of the decision of the majority of Judges comprising that Full Bend, the matter was referred back to the Division Bench for a clear order of reference in the light of the interpretation of Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act by the majority of Judges.

7. When the matter came up before the Division Bench, it took the view that the Full Bench had no power to direct the Division Bench to do what the former wanted the latter to do. In that view, the Division Bench again referred the case to a Full Bench to answer the question which we have already set out in para 1 supra. That is how the case has come up before this Full Bench.

8. In deciding the question referred to this Full Bench, the opinion of other High Courts on that or similar question, do not appear to us to be of much assistance, because a reference to a Full Bench of this Court, is governed by an express statutory provision, namely, Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, whereas it has not been shown that there are corresponding statutory provisions, governing such reference in other High Courts. In those High Courts a reference to a Full Bench appears to be governed by precedents, conventions and/or rules made by the concerned High Courts regarding the powers of the Chief Justice to constitute Benches and to direct the posting of cases before them (such Benches). Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act reads:

“S. 7. Reference to Full Bench:—(1) Where in any proceeding pending before it, any question of law or usage having the force of law arises, a Bench consisting of not less than two Judges of the High Court may, if it thinks fit, and shall, if it differs from the view taken by a similar Bench of the High Court on the said question refer to a Full Bench of the High Court the question of law or usage having the force of law.

(2) The decision of the majority of Judges comprising a Full Bench of the High Court shall be the decision of the High Court.”

9. sub-section (1) of Section 7 consists of two parts. The first part provides that if in any proceeding pending before a Bench of not less than two Judges, any question of law or usage having the force of law arises, such Bench may, if it thinks fit, refer such question to a Full Bench. The second part of that sub-section provides that if in any proceeding pending before it a Bench consisting of not less than two Judges differs from the view taken by a similar Bench of this Court on such question, the former Bench shall refer such question to a Full Bench.

10. Whether a reference to a Full Bench comes within the first or the second part of sub-section (1) of Section 7, there is nothing in that sub-section which expressly provides what an order of reference to a Full Bench should contain.

11. Sub-section (2) of Section 7 does not also expressly provide what the Full Bench should do when a question is referred to it by a Division Bench under sub-sec. (1) of that Section. It is nowhere expressly stated in that Section that the Full Bench shall hear and decide the question referred to it by a Division Bench. Nor does that section expressly state whether the Full Bench can send back the case to the referring Bench, either for modifying or clarifying such question or for making a clear order of reference.

12. However, the necessary implication from the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 7 is, in our opinion, that when a question is referred to a Full Bench, it (the Full Bench) should hear and decide such question so that the referring Bench may decide the case in accordance with the decision of the Full Bench on that question.

13. If a Division Bench refers to a Full Bench a question of law on which there is an earlier decision of a similar Bench, can it be said that there is, by necessary implication from the provisions of Section 7, a duty cast on the referring Bench to formulate in its order of reference to the Full Bench a reasoned criticism of the view taken by the other Bench or to offer an alternative to that view? Nextly, does the power of the Full Bench to hear and decide the questions referred to it, carry with it an implied or ancillary power to send back a case to the referring Bench if the order of reference does not contain such reasoned criticism or an alternative to the view of the earlier Bench?

14. Where there is already a decision of a Division Bench of this Court on a question of law and a similar Bench doubts its correctness and refers such question to a Full Bench, there can be no doubt that it is desirable that the order of reference should contain the reasons which persuaded the referring Bench to doubt the correctness of the other similar Bench. The following observations of Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was), who spoke for the Division Bench in Gourishanker v. Raja Azamshah, which have been quoted by Govinda Bhat, J., who delivered the majority opinion of the Full Bench in this case are apposite.

“It is hardly fair to the Bench called upon to consider the correctness of a decision that they should not be made aware of the reasons which impelled the referring Judge, to doubt its correctness. We venture to state, with all due respect, that, in the absence of conflict of authority, a reference, casting a doubt on the correctness of a reported decision of the Court, but not formulating a reasoned criticism of the view accepted therein or offering an alternative to it, disturbs the comity of the Court, but not formulating a reasoned criticism of the view accepted therein or offering an alternative to it, disturbs the comity of the Court. This would only lead to an uncertainty of the law and with all due respect should be avoided.”

15. As stated earlier, even Venkataramiah, J., has not, in his minority opinion, doubted the desirability of formulation of such reasoned criticism or offering an alternative to the view the correctness of which has been doubted by the referring Bench. But the question is whether there is a legal obligation on the referring Bench, to do so. It is well known that not everything that is desirable to be done or to be refrained from being done, necessarily creates a legal obligation to do it or to refrain from doing it. There are many things which are merely in the region of desirability, expediency or propriety, but outside the sphere of legal rights and obligations. We find it difficult to say that where a Bench doubts the correctness of an earlier decision of a similar Bench or feels that it is desirable that the question decided in such earlier decision, should be re-examined and refers such question to a Full Bench, the referring Bench is under a legal obligation to formulate the reasons for doubting the correctness of the earlier decision or for saying that a question decided earlier by a similar Bench required re-examination. As stated earlier, sub-section (1) of Section 7 does not expressly state that the referring Bench should do so; nor can such an obligation be, in our opinion, said to be necessarily implied from the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 7.

16. In spite of the omission by a referring Bench to formulate such reasons or to indicate such alternative view, the order of reference made by such Bench to a Full Bench, is, in our opinion, a valid reference. It follows that the Full Bench cannot decline to hear and answer the questions so referred to it by a Division Bench merely on the ground that the order of reference does not contain such reasons or indicate an alternative view. It also follows that the Full Bench cannot send back the case to the referring Bench, with a direction to give the reasons for doubting the correctness of an earlier decision of a similar Bench or for saying that a question decided by a similar Bench requires re-examination. For the purpose of this reference, it is not necessary to express any opinion on the question whether a Full Bench has or has no power to send back a case to the referring Bench without answering the questions referred to it (Full Bench), where such question is not a question of law or usage having the force of law at all or where such question is not intelligible or suffers from ambiguity and requires clarification by the referring Bench. For the reasons stated above, our answer to the question referred to us is as follows:—

17. On the ground that no reasons are stated in support of the order of reference, it is not open to a Full Bench to decline to answer the questions referred to it by a Division Bench under Section 7 of the Mysore High Court Act, 1961, and to send back the case to the referring Bench without answering the questions referred to it (Full Bench) and to direct the referring Bench to state reasons in support of the order of reference.

Answer accordingly.