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Dyamappa Butti, v. Somappa .

Karnataka High Court
Dec 14, 1967
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Summary of Opinion — Tenant's Petition under S.26, Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlord filed a petition for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. The tenant (the petitioner before this Court) contended, among other grounds, that there was no tenancy because he was the owner; he claimed to have purchased the property from the landlord's mother and asserted an understanding that his rights would be relinquished in return for repayment of Rs. 300, which he says was not made, and therefore he continued in possession. The original Rent Controller (Asst. Commissioner and Rent Controller, Koppal) dismissed the landlord's eviction petition on 25-11-1964 on the ground that tenancy had not been proved (File No. 8.RC/58-59). The landlord appealed; the learned District Judge, Raichur, allowed the appeal by order dated 30-10-1965 (CMA No. 1/5 of 1965), finding that tenancy had been proved and directing eviction. The tenant challenged that appellate order before this Court under S.26 of the Hyderabad Houses Act. The tenant did not assail the appellate court's finding of fact that tenancy had been proved before this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an eviction petition under the Hyderabad Houses Act is maintainable in the absence of a prior and proper notice to quit issued in accordance with S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act (i.e., whether the tenancy must first be determined by notice to quit before eviction proceedings can be validly instituted).
  2. Whether (as contended by the respondent-landlord) the tenancy was a statutory tenancy such that no notice under S.106 was necessary.
  3. Whether the tenant's setting up of title in himself (denial of the landlord's title) operated to determine the lease by forfeiture under S.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, thereby obviating the need for service of a notice under S.106.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • The eviction petition was not maintainable because no notice determining the tenancy had been issued under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act; termination of the tenancy by a valid notice to quit is a prerequisite to an eviction petition under the Rent Control Act relied upon by the landlord.
  • Relied on two decisions of this Court (Md. Abdul Rahaman v. Md. Osman Ali Saheb, 1964-2 Mys LJ 465 and Bipathumma v. Mariam Bibi, 1966-1 Mys LJ 162) to support the contention that eviction proceedings cannot be maintained until the tenancy has been legally determined by notice or other appropriate mode.

Respondent's (Landlord's) Arguments

  • The tenant should not be permitted to raise the absence of a notice at this late stage because it was not a ground taken in the tenant's objections before the Rent Controller (i.e., the point was not pleaded earlier and is belated).
  • Substantively, two contentions were urged: (a) the tenancy was in the nature of a statutory tenancy so that no notice under S.106 was necessary; (b) the tenant had set up title in himself (thereby denying the landlord's title), which—so the respondent contended—amounted to forfeiture under S.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act and thus terminated the lease without the need for a S.106 notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Md. Abdul Rahaman v. Md. Osman Ali Saheb, 1964-2 Mys LJ 465 Held that an application for eviction under S.10(1) of the Hyderabad Act could not be maintained before the tenancy has been determined by a notice to quit under S.111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court treated this authority as clearly supporting the tenant's contention that a notice under S.106 (for termination of tenancy) is required before eviction proceedings can be maintained under the Hyderabad Act.
Bipathumma v. Mariam Bibi, 1966-1 Mys LJ 162 Held that before initiating proceedings under S.21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act the lease must have been determined either by notice or by some other appropriate mode. The Court relied on this decision as additional support for the proposition that eviction proceedings require prior determination of the lease by an appropriate mode (e.g., notice to quit).
Gangadutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das, AIR 1961 SC 1067 Distinguishes between subsisting contractual tenancy and statutory tenancy: where contractual tenancy has expired/determined, the tenant may continue in possession by statutory protection; whether a fresh contractual tenancy arises depends on facts and conduct of parties. The Court examined this authority but concluded it was of limited assistance because the landlord's case in the instant matter pleaded a month-to-month contractual tenancy, which (the Court held) requires determination by notice under S.106 rather than being treated as falling within the statutory-tenancy category described in Gangadutt Murarka.
Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad, AIR 1963 SC 120 (1962-40 Mys LJ 712) Explains that a tenant under a lease cannot be evicted while the tenancy subsists by contract; after determination of tenancy, the Rent Control provision gives extra protection and landlord must serve notice determining tenancy and the notice required by s.12(2) when tenant's conduct removes statutory bar. The Court relied on these observations to reinforce that a landlord needs to determine tenancy in accordance with law (i.e., through notice) before obtaining possession, and that the Rent Control provisions operate after the tenancy has been determined.
Mangilal v. Suganchand, AIR 1965 SC 101 Holds that S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires 15 days' notice expiring with the end of a month to terminate a month-to-month lease; such notice is essential to bring the landlord-tenant relationship to an end. The Court applied this principle to reject the respondent's contention and to hold that a month-to-month contractual tenancy in the instant case required termination by the notice prescribed under S.106 before eviction proceedings could succeed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Admissibility of the late objection: The Court first addressed the procedural objection that the tenant had not raised the absence of a S.106 notice before the Rent Controller. The Court allowed the belated objection, reasoning that the point goes to the very root of the maintainability of the eviction petition — the landlord's right to possession depends on termination of the tenancy in accordance with law — and thus it was proper to consider the contention even if not earlier pleaded.
  2. Characterisation of the tenancy: The Court examined whether the tenancy in the case was of the statutory type (where statutory protection allows continuation of possession after termination of a contractual tenancy) or a subsisting contractual (month-to-month) tenancy. The landlord had pleaded a month-to-month contractual tenancy; the Court accepted that characterisation as a factual basis pleaded by the landlord.
  3. Application of authority on notice requirement: The Court reviewed relevant decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court. It found that the decisions in Md. Abdul Rahaman and Bipathumma supported the tenant's contention that eviction proceedings under the relevant Rent Control provisions cannot be maintained until the tenancy has been determined in accordance with law (i.e., by a proper notice to quit). The Supreme Court decisions (including Punjalal and Mangilal) were cited to establish the legal position that S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act requires a specified notice to terminate a month-to-month lease and that such termination is essential before a landlord may obtain possession.
  4. Assessment of respondent's reliance on Gangadutt Murarka: The Court considered Gangadutt Murarka, which analyses situations where statutory protection allows a tenant to remain in possession after termination of a contractual tenancy and where the inference of a fresh contractual tenancy may arise from conduct. The Court concluded Gangadutt Murarka did not assist the respondent because the pleaded case was of a subsisting contractual month-to-month tenancy, which, in the Court's view, required termination by notice under S.106.
  5. On forfeiture under S.111(g): The Court analysed the respondent's contention that the tenant's claim of title in himself amounted to a renunciation of the lessee character and thus operated to determine the lease by forfeiture under S.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court observed that S.111(g) contains two conditions for forfeiture to be effective, one relating to the conduct of the lessee (claiming title) and the other relating to notice. The Court concluded that merely claiming title does not ipso facto terminate the lease; it confers on the lessor the right, if he elects, to determine the lease by serving the requisite notice under the statute. Therefore the S.111(g) argument did not dispense with the notice requirement.
  6. Conclusion of law applied to the case facts: Because the landlord's case was based on a contractual month-to-month tenancy which had not been determined in accordance with S.106, and because the alleged denial of title by the tenant did not automatically terminate the lease without notice, the eviction petition was not maintainable. Accordingly, the Court allowed the tenant's petition and dismissed the original eviction application.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE ORIGINAL APPLICATION FOR EVICTION IS DISMISSED. The tenant's petition under S.26 succeeds (Petition allowed).

Implications and direct consequences (as stated or necessarily deriving from the Court's reasoning in the opinion):

  • The Court held that where the landlord's case is founded on a subsisting contractual (month-to-month) tenancy, the tenancy must be determined in accordance with law — specifically by the notice prescribed under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act — before eviction proceedings under the Rent Control legislation can be maintained.
  • The Court held that a tenant's assertion of title in himself does not automatically terminate the lease by operation of S.111(g); instead, such conduct gives the lessor the option to elect to determine the lease by service of the notice required by law. Thus, the landlord cannot rely on a bare denial of title by the tenant to avoid the need for a notice under S.106.
  • The opinion resulted in the dismissal of the landlord's eviction application and the upholding of the tenant's petition; no costs were awarded.
  • No broader or novel precedent beyond application of the cited authorities was announced in the opinion; the Court applied existing Supreme Court and earlier decisions to the facts before it and resolved the dispute on that basis.

Order in the opinion: "No costs. Petition allowed." (LGC/D.V.C)

Show all summary ...

1. This is a tenant's petition under S. 26 of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. It is directed against an order in appeal made by the learned District Judge Raichur, in CMA No. 1/5 of 1965, on 30-10-1965. The said appeal had been preferred by the Respondent-landlord against an order of the Asst. Commissioner and Rent Controller, Koppal, in File No. 8.RC/58-59, made on 25-11-1964.

2. The petition for eviction was filed by the landlord on the ground of arrears of rent. The tenant, the petitioner before this Court, among other grounds, had raised the objection that there was no tenancy and, in fact, he was the owner of the premises in question. He has claimed ownership on the ground that he had purchased the property from the mother of the petitioner and that owing to subsequent differences an understanding was arrived at that he should relinquish his rights in favour of the vendor on her repaying him a sum of Rs. 300. Since this sum was not paid, he continued to be in possession. This is denied by the original petitioner. It is unnecessary to set out the other facts and circumstances alleged by the parties as they are not necessary for the purpose of disposal of the present petition. The Controller dismissed the petition on the ground that tenancy alleged by the landlord had not been proved. In appeal, the learned District Judge, Raichur, came to the conclusion that the tenancy had been proved and consequently directed eviction by his order which is impugned herein. This finding of fact is not assailed before this Court by the petitioner.

3. Sri S.R Kagalkar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged only one contention relating to the right of the landlord to evict him pursuant to the provisions of the concerned Rent Control Act. He submitted that the petition for eviction would not be maintainable in the absence of a proper notice to quit under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, thus determining the tenancy, in accordance with law. In support of his submission he relied on two decisions of this Court reported in Md. Abdul Rahaman v. Md. Osman Ali Saheb, 1964-2 Mys LJ 465 and Bipathumma v. Mariam Bibi, 1966-1 Mys LJ 162.

4. Before adverting to these decisions, one relevant fact has to be noticed. It is not disputed that no such notice determining the tenancy had been issued before lodging the petition for eviction. Sri V.H Ron, appearing on behalf of the present respondent, submitted that the tenant could not be permitted to raise this objection at this highly belated stage, not having made it a ground in the objections filed by him before the Controller. Put this objection is met by Sri Kagalkar by a reference to the case reported in 1964-2 Mys LJ 465. In that case also a similar objection was allowed to be taken by this Court for the first time in revision. Since it goes to the very root of the maintainability of the petition for eviction as his very right to obtain possession depends on the termination of tenancy in accordance with law, and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be just or proper to prevent the petitioner from urging this ground. Hence, the argument of Sri Ron in this behalf cannot be accepted.

5. In Mohamed Abdul Rahman's case, 1964-2 Mys LJ 465 this Court was directly concerned with a case arising under the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954. It was held therein that an application for eviction under S. 10(1) of the Hyderabad Act could not be maintained before the tenancy has been determined by a notice to quit under S. 111(h) of the T.P Act. The case of Bipathumma, 1966-1 Mys LJ 162 has reference to a case of eviction under S. 21 of the Mysore Rent Control Act. Here also it is held that before a landlord could initiate proceedings under S. 21 of the Act, it is necessary that the lease should have been determined either by notice or by other mode appropriate to the nature of the lease. Hence, in my opinion, these decisions clearly support the contention urged by Sri Kagalkar.

6. But, Sri V.H Ron urged two contentions for consideration: (1) That the tenancy in question was in the nature of statutory tenancy and therefore no notice was necessary; (2) That, in any event, the tenant had set up title in himself and consequently has denied the title of the landlord and as such the lease stood determined by forfeiture under S. 111(g) of the T.P Act and therefore the issue of notice under S. 106 of the T.P Act would become unnecessary.

7. In support of the first contention he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Gangadutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das, AIR 1961 SC 1067. At page 1069 of the said decision their Lordships observe thus:

“It is however, well settled that where a contractual tenancy to which the rent control legislation applies has expired by efflux of time or by determination by notice to quit and the tenant continues in possession of the premises, acceptance of rent from the tenant by the landlord after the expiration or determination of the contractual tenancy will not afford ground for holding that the landlord has assented to a new contractual tenancy.”

8. Again, at page 1070, it is observed as follows:

“Of course, there is no prohibition against a landlord entering into a fresh contract of tenancy with a tenant whose right of occupation is determined and who remains in occupation by virtue of the statutory immunity. Apart from an express contract, conduct of the parties may undoubtedly justify an inference that after determination of the contractual tenancy, the landlord had entered into a fresh contract with the tenant, but whether the conduct justifies such an inference must always depend upon the facts of each case.

Occupation of premises by a tenant whose tenancy is determined is by virtue of the protection granted by the statute and not because of any right arising from the contract which is determined. The statute protects his possession so long as the conditions which justify a lessor in obtaining an order of eviction against him do not exist. Once the prohibition against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court is removed, the right to obtain possession by the lessor under the ordinary law springs into action and the exercise of the lessor's right to evict the tenant will not, unless the statute provides otherwise, be conditioned.”

9. This aspect of determination of tenancy and continuance of tenancy by virtue of statutory protection has not, it would seem, been directly dealt with in the two decisions of this Court relied on by Sri Kagalkar and referred to earlier. But the question still remains to be determined whether the present case falls under one or the other category referred to in the above decision of the Supreme Court. The case of the landlord in the instant case is that there was a month to month tenancy and the present petitioner was a tenant of the premises belonging to him. Hence, in my view, such a plea amounts to a case of subsisting contractual tenancy requiring a notice to quit to be issued under S. 106 of the T.P Act. Thus, I am clearly of the opinion that this decision of the Supreme Court cannot be of much assistance to the respondent in this context it may be useful to refer to two other decisions of the Supreme Court, touching the question of notice to quit for the purpose of determination of a lease.

10. In Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad, AIR 1963 SC 120 at p. 123 : 1962-40 Mys LJ 712 it is observed thus:

“….A tenant stood in no need of protection against eviction by the landlord so long as he had the necessary protection under the terms of the contract between him and his landlord. He could not be evicted till his tenancy was determined according to law and therefore there was no necessity for providing any further protection in the Act against his eviction so long as his tenancy continued to exist under the contract.”

11. Again in para 9 of the same page the following passage occurs:

“… Ordinarily, the landlord will have a right to recover possession from the tenant when the tenancy had determined. The provisions of this section therefore will operate against the landlord after the determination of the tenancy by any of the modes referred to in S. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. What this section of the Act provides is that even after the determination of the tenancy, a landlord will not be entitled to recover possession, though a right to recover possession gets vested in him, so long as the tenant complies with what he is required to do by this section. It is this extra protection given by this section which will be useful to the tenant after his tenancy has determined.…”

12. Further on in the same paragraph it is observed thus:

“We are, therefore of opinion that where a tenant is in possession under a lease from the landlord, he is not to be evicted for a cause which would give rise to a suit for recovery of possession under S. 12 if his tenancy has not been determined already. It follows that whenever a tenant acts in a way which would remove the bar on the landlord's right to evict him, it is necessary for the landlord to serve him with a notice determining his tenancy and also serve him with a notice under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act.”

13. In Mangilal v. Suganchand, AIR 1965 SC 101 at p. 103 it is observed thus:

“….The requirement of S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is that a lease from month to month can be terminated only after giving fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy either by the landlord to the tenant or by the tenant to the landlord. Such a notice is essential for bringing to an end the relationship of landlord and tenant. Unless the relationship is validly terminated the landlord does not get the right to obtain possession of the premises by evicting the tenant. S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act does not provide for the satisfaction of any additional requirements…..”

14. In view of the above enunciation of the position by the Supreme Court on the question of requirement of notice under S. 106 of the T.P Act for the purpose of effectually terminating a tenancy for a landlord to earn the right to obtain possession of a leased premises, the contention of Sri Ron deserves to be rejected. As already observed the very case of the landlord is based on a contractual tenancy and as such required to be determined by a notice to quit issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the T.P Act.

15. The second contention of Sri Ron was that there was a denial of the title of the landlord by the tenant thus attracting the provisions of S. 111(g) of the T.P Act, resulting in a termination of tenancy by operation of law. This section no doubt lays down, among other modes of determination of leases, that a lease of immoveable property determines by forfeiture in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up title in a third person or by claiming title in himself. On a bare perusal of the section it will be seen that it is only one of two conditions prescribed therein for a forfeiture to be effective. The other condition clearly relates to notice. It may be observed that under S. 111 of the T.P Act the requirement regarding notice has not been imposed in case of conditions for determination of lease specified in clauses (a) to (g) of that section. It would therefore, be clear that such a conduct of claiming title in himself on the part of the lessee would not ipso facto put an end to the lease thus enabling the landlord to obtain possession. On the other hand, it would confer a right on the lessor, if he so elects, to determine the lease by a notice as required by S. 111(g) of the T.P Act. Indeed, the section expressly lays this down as a condition for the forfeiture to be effective. Hence this contention of Sri V.H Ron should also fail. No other question was raised and argued by either party. In the result, the petition succeeds. The original application for eviction, therefore, stands dismissed.

16. No costs.

LGC/D.V.C
Petition allowed.