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The Superintendent Of Central Excise v. A. Armugam Pillai And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Nipani Town, challenging the acquittal of six respondents by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chikodi in C.C No. 987 of 1963. Respondents 1 to 5, along with an absconding accused Kabir Maracair, were charged under Section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962, Section 126(2)(ii) of the Defence of India Rules, 1963, and Section 23(1)(A) read with Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, for offences related to smuggling gold. Respondent 6 was charged with aiding and abetting the other accused. The respondents were acquitted by the Magistrate, and the prosecution challenges the legality and correctness of this acquittal.
The prosecution case is that on 17th September 1963, respondents 1 to 5 and Kabir were traveling in a car from Kolhapur side at high speed. At a check post in Nipani, the car was stopped and Kabir fled. Upon search, six cloth jackets containing 5,500 tolas of gold with foreign markings valued at Rs. 7,15,000 were discovered hidden in the footboards of the car. Respondents 1 to 5 had no incriminatory items on their persons. Respondent 6 was arrested later and was the registered owner of the car, though the car was actually purchased benami by Kabir. Trial proceeded against respondents 1 to 6 as Kabir remained absconding.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondents 1 to 5 were in conscious possession of the smuggled gold found in the car.
- Whether the respondents had knowledge or reason to believe that Kabir was transporting smuggled gold.
- Whether respondent 6 aided or abetted the others in the commission of the offences.
- The correctness and legality of the acquittal by the Magistrate.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The respondents had knowledge that Kabir was transporting smuggled gold and were concerned in carrying it.
- All respondents except 3 and 6 traveled with Kabir in the same car to Bombay and back, indicating involvement.
- The number of gold jackets matched the number of occupants, suggesting a connection.
- Respondents referred to Kabir by another name, indicating familiarity, and some admitted knowing the gold belonged to Kabir.
- Section 135(b) of the Customs Act imposes liability on persons who deal with goods known or reasonably believed to be smuggled.
- Section 123 of the Customs Act shifts the burden to the person in possession to prove goods are not smuggled once seized.
- Relied on precedents to establish mens rea and the scope of possession and knowledge necessary for conviction.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' counter-arguments beyond the acquittal reasoning.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hukma v. State of Rajasthan | Establishes that possession of smuggled gold, circumstances of discovery, and quantity can prove knowledge and intention to evade prohibition; prosecution must prove mens rea despite statutory presumptions. | Court noted similarity between Section 178-A of Sea Customs Act and Section 123 of Customs Act, emphasizing prosecution’s duty to prove mens rea despite presumptions. |
| Vallabhdas Liladhar v. Asst. Collector of Customs | Once smuggled gold is proved, anyone dealing with it knowing it is smuggled is guilty of evading duty or prohibition. | Court highlighted necessity of knowledge for guilt; mere presence or dealing without knowledge is insufficient. |
| Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. Seetharam | Defines "in any way concerned" and "in any manner dealing" with prohibited goods broadly, requiring overt acts done knowingly with intent to defraud or evade restrictions. | Court observed that mere knowledge is insufficient; intent and overt act necessary for conviction. |
| Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar | Possession and exclusive control over seized contraband are necessary for conviction; confessional statements inadmissible if improperly recorded. | Court relied on this precedent to distinguish possession and control; acquittal of passengers upheld where evidence of possession was lacking. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined the prosecution evidence and found no proof that respondents 1 to 5 had conscious possession or knowledge of the gold secreted in the car’s footboards. Mere presence as passengers did not establish liability. The Court emphasized that mens rea is an essential element under Section 135 of the Customs Act and that the respondents’ statements consistently denied knowledge of the gold until discovery by authorities. The Court also noted the absence of incriminatory items on respondents’ persons or belongings, which would be expected if they were involved in smuggling valuable gold.
Regarding respondent 6, the Court found that mere registration of the car in his name did not prove aiding or abetting, especially since the car was purchased benami by Kabir. The Court distinguished the present facts from precedents by underscoring lack of exclusive possession or control by respondents over the seized gold.
The Court further held that the presumption under Section 123 of the Customs Act arises only when goods are seized from a person’s possession, which was not the case here. The Court reiterated that an alternate view on evidence is insufficient to overturn an acquittal and found no compelling reason to set aside the Magistrate’s order.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is dismissed.
The Court upheld the acquittal of respondents 1 to 6, finding no evidence of possession, knowledge, or aiding and abetting in the smuggling of gold. The decision directly affects the parties by affirming their acquittal and does not establish any new precedent. The ruling reinforces the principle that mere presence or ownership of a vehicle is insufficient for conviction without proof of conscious possession or knowledge and intent to evade law.
Santhosh, J.:— This is an appeal filed under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Nipani Town, against the order of acquittal of the six respondents, Accused 1 to 6, by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chikodi, in C.C No. 987 of 1963. Respondents 1 to 5 along with the absconding accused Kabir Maracair, were charged with having committed offences under Section 135 of the Customs Act of 1962 and 126(2)(ii) of the Defence of India Rules of 1963, and Section 23(1)(A) read with Section 8(1) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. Respondent 6—Accused 6, was charged with having aided and abeted Accused 3 to 5 and absconding accused Kabir Marcair in committing the said offences. The learned Magistrate acquitted the respondents of all the charges. In this appeal, the legality and the correctness of the said acquittal is questioned by the appellant.
The prosecution case briefly stated is as follows:— On 17th September 1963 at about 11 A.M, respondents 1 to 5 and the absconding accused Kabir Maracair were coming in a car MSX: 367 from Kolhapur side high speed. At the Akol Check Post at Nipani, this car was stopped by P.W 3 Alankhan P.C 827 and Ramachandra P.W 14 a Central Excise Constable. Immediately, the absconding accused Kabir who was driving the car, jumped from the seat and ran away. The car was searched and checked by the Central Excise Authorities. P.W 1A. Farias, Superintendent of Excise, in the presence of Panchas, got removed the bolts fixed on the footboards and inside the footboard he discovered six cloth jackets containing altogether 5,500 tolas of gold valued at Rs. 7,15,000 with foreign markings. These were seized under a mahazar Ex. P-33. Thereafter the respondents 1 to 5 and the articles found in the car were taken to the office of the Assistant Collector of Central Excise. Nothing incriminatory was recovered from either the persons or the belongings of respondents 1 to 5. But, from the suit case belonging to Kabir, which was in the car, a sum of Rs. 13,220 in cash was recovered. The customs authorities recorded on different days at different stages a member of statements of respondents 1 to 5 which have been marked as P. 1 to P. 21.
On 27th September 1963 respondent 6 (A-6) Krishnan was arrested while he was entering a Hotel, Lakshmi Lodge, in Rayapattah Road at Madras. Respondent 6 was the registered owner of the Car MSX: 367. His statement Exhibit P-7 was recorded. A complaint was filed against respondents 1 to 6, as stated earlier in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Chikodi. As Kabir was not apprehended and was absconding, the trial proceeded only against A-1 to A-6.
The learned Magistrate held that the prosecution had not Proved that respondents 1 to 5 were in conscious possession of gold. The mere fact that respondents 1 to 5 travelled in the Excise car from Bombay did not make them liable. No inference could be drawn that they had knowledge of the existence of gold in the cavities in the car. The learned Magistrate also geld that mens rea was an essential ingredient under Section 135 and others of the Sea Customs Act. He also observed that the statements of accused 1 to 5 show that they had no knowledge whatsoever about the presence of the gold in the car. Their statements disclose that they came to know about the existence of gold only when the car was searched. He also held that from the material it was not possible to say that respondents 1 to 5 were in possession of the gold which was found in the car. There was also no evidence to show that respondent 6 either aided or abetted respondents 2 to 5 and Kabir in carrying the gold. The learned Magistrate held that the prosecution has not proved any of the charges against respondents and acquitted them.
Shri Keshava Iyengar, the Central Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the appellant, has contended that the acquittal of the respondents was erroneous. He argues, from the various circumstances in the case, it is clear that the respondents had knowledge that Kabir was transporting smuggled gold and these respondents were actually concerned in carrying the said gold. From the evidence it is clear that the respondents know or had reason to believe that Kabir was smuggling foreign gold. Shri Keshava Iyengar stresses the fact that all the respondents, except respondents 3 and 6, left Madras with Kabir in the same car on 14th September 1963 to Bombay. Thereafter, they all returned with Kabir in the same car from Bombay. Shri Keshava Iyengar also stresses the fact that the evidence discloses that there were six jackets wherein gold was concealed and the number of occupants of the car was also six. Shri Keshava Iyengar also points out that the respondents in their statement gave out the name of Kabir as Karuppiah Pillai. Shri Keshava Iyengar also points out that some of the respondents in their statements have stated that they knew that the gold belonged to Kabir.
Shri Keshava Iyengar has strenuously urged that the language used in Section 135(b) of the Customs Act is very wide. A person who deals in any manner with any goods which he knows or has reason to believe, is smuggled, would be guilty of an offence under Section 135 of the said Act. Shri Keshava Iyengar also strongly relies on Section 123 of the Act wherein if any goods are seized in the reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods, the burden of proving that they are not smuggled goods shall be on the person from whose possession the goods were seized. In suport of his arguments, Shri Keshava Iyengar has relied on (1), (2) and (3).
We will now examine the said authorities cited by Shri Keshava Iyengar. In Hukma v. State Of Rajasthan have observed that once, it is found in consequence of the provisions of Section 178-A that the accused was carrying smuggled gold, the circumstances under which the gold was discovered, the manner in which he was carrying the gold, the considerable quantity of the gold that was being carried and the form in which gold was being carried, namely, blocks and bars, and the fact that the accused was not the person who was expected to carry so much gold, all these circumstances establish beyond a shadow of doubt that the accused was carrying the gold knowingly and with the intention of evading the prohibition that was in force with respect to the import of gold into the country. It may be pointed out that in that case large quantity of gold with foreign markings were found hidden in the trousers of the accused. Their Lordships in para 9 of the judgment have observed as follows:—
“There remains for consideration the last point raised by the learned counsel namely, that even if Lal Singh had authority to seize at the place where the seizure was made and Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act applied, the prosecution had still to prove by further evidence that the accused had the mens rea necessary to constitute the offence. The learned counsel rightly pointed that while Section 178-A has the result of placing the burden of proof that the gold was not smuggled on the accused, it is of no assistance to the prosecution to prove that the accused was carrying the gold knowingly to evade the prohibition which was for the time being in force with respect to the import of gold into India….”.
The words used in Section 178-A of the Sea Customs Act are similar to Section 123 of the Customs Act of 1964. Their Lordships have pointed out that in spite of the presumption under Section 178-A the prosecution had still to prove by further evidence that the accused had mens rea necessary to constitute the offence. In spite of the fact that burden to prove that the goods was not smuggled, was on the accused, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove that the accused was carrying gold knowingly to evade the prohibition which the law imposed.
In Vallabhdas Liladhar v. Asst. Collector of Customs Their Lordships have observed as follows:
“…….. Once it is proved that the gold is smuggled gold, it follows that it was brought into the country without payment of duty or in violation of the prohibition of restriction in force and whosoever brought it and whosoever dealt with it thereafter knowing it to be smuggled in the manner provided in the section must be held to have the intention of evading the payment of duty or violating the prohibition or restriction.”
Here again, their Lordships have pointed out “whosoever brought it and whosoever dealt with it thereafter knowing it to be smuggled” would be guilty. Their Lordships have stressed that the persons dealing with it must know that it is the smuggled gold.
In the Colector of Customs, Calcutta v. Seetharam their Lordships have held “Even attempts to purchase smuggled goods come within the ambit of the words in any way concerned in any manner dealing with prohibited goods in Cl. 81 of the Section and thereafter the clause applies even to a case when a person has negotiated for the purchase of smuggled goods. Their Lordships have observed that “in any way concerned” and “in any manner dealing with the prohibited goods” are of very wide import and it is not desirable to define the meaning of these words. But, their Lordships have further pointed out that when a person does any overt act in relation to prohibited goods which he knows to be such and the act is done in consequence of previous arrangement or agreement he would be doing an act concerned in dealing with prohibited goods. Their Lordships have also pointed out that in order to convict a person under Section 167(81) mere knowledge on his part that the goods are prohibited goods or goods on which duty has not been paid, is not enough. The section further requires that there should also be an intent on his part to defraud the Government of the duty payable or to evade any prohibition or restriction. So, it is clear from this decision that the person must do an overt act in relation to a prohibited goods which he knows to be such. This decision also makes it clear that in order to convict a person mere knowledge on his part that the goods are prohibited, is not sufficient. Further, it is also held that so long as the prohibition or restriction remains or the duty has not been paid even a third person coming into possession of such goods would have the intention either to evade the prohibition or restriction or to defraud the Government.
In Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State Of Bihar as in the instant case, a car was stopped and searched. Four bundles of non-duty paid Ganja were recovered from the luggage boot of the car and one bundle from the leg space in front of the front seat of the car, where the appellant-accused was sitting. Further, the appellant produced the key with which the luggage boot was opened. As in this case, there were altogether six persons in the car when it was stopped and the car belonged to the appellant's brother. All the six persons including the appellant who were in the car were prosecuted. But, the five other persons who were in the car were acquitted. The correctness of the acquittals of these five was not questioned. Only the appellant in that case was convicted. The appellant held also made a confessional statement to the Excise Inspector. Their Lordships in the said decision held that the Confessional statement recorded by the Excise Inspector was inadmissible in evidence. Their Lordships acquitted the appellant on the ground that the prosecution has not proved that the appellant was in exclusive possession of the Ganja found in the Car. As the confessional statement was inadmissible, there was no evidence to show he was in possession of Ganja. As pointed out already, the acquittal of the other five persons who were travelling in the car was not challenged in that case. In the instant case, the contraband goods were not kept in the front leg space and luggage boot but they were hidden in some secret recess of the foot-board which may be not possible for any ordinary passenger of the car to know. Even though, in that case, the car belonged to the appellant's brother and he had the key of the luggage boot of the car and some Ganja was placed near the seat where he was sitting, their Lordships acquitted him on the ground that the proof of possession was not forthcoming. In the instant case, there is no evidence at all to show that any of the respondents were in possession, much less exclusive-possession of the gold seized from the car. On the other hand, the evidence clearly shows that the car was purchased benami by Kabir and it was taken Kabir to Bombay, and when the car was stopped, Kabir ran away from the car. The prosecution case itself is that the gold belonged to Kabir.
After going through the evidence carefully, it is not possible for us to agree with Shri Keshava Iyengar's contention that from the totality of the circumstances in the case, the only inference that can be drawn is that the respondents were concerned in carrying gold or had any knowledge or reason to believe that Kabir was transporting smuggled gold. From the mere fact that they were passengers in the car, no inference can be drawn that they had knowledge or had reason to believe that gold was secreted in the crevises of the foot board. If really they were taken by Kabir to assist him in transporting smuggled gold, which was to be value of Rs. 7,15,000, one would expect to find some substantial amounts either on the person or belongings of respondents 1 to 5. The evidence discloses no such appreciable sum was found with the respondents. Respondents 1 and 2 were employed by Kabir as drivers in his trip to Bombay and back. Respondent 1 in his statement says that Kabir told them that he was buying a new car. It may be that they suspected that Kabir was engaged in some illegal activities. But, unless it is proved that they had knowledge or had reason to believe that Kabir was dealing in smuggled gold, we are of opinion, that they cannot be found guilty of offences with which they were charged. All the respondents have stated that they had no connection with the gold that was seized, which was secreted in the car and that they came to know that there was gold only after it was discovered by the customs authorities on search. We may also point out that so far as respondent No. 3 is concerned, the prosecution case itself is that respondent-5 had met him accidentally in Bombay where he had gone in search of work. As respondent-3 belonged to the same place, i.e, Ramanathapur District, as respondent 5, he was promised a free lift to his place in the car. Shri Keshava Iyengar has pointed out that some of the respondents have stated that they had no connection with the gold statement no inference can be drawn against them. Their statements must be read as a whole. They have specifically stated that they had no knowledge that gold was secreted in the car. They came to know that the gold had been secreted in the car only after the gold was discovered by the customs authorities. As the car was taken by Kabir to Bombay and back and immediately when the car was stopped, Kabir ran away and as the gold did not belong to any of them, the natural inference that they drew was that the secreted gold belonged to Kabir.
After re-assessing the entire evidence in the case, it is not possible to say that the respondents were either in possession or were in any way concerned in carrying smuggled gold. There is no evidence to show that they had any knowledge or had any reason to believe that Kabir was carrying any smuggled gold. In our opinion, the prosecution also cannot rely on Section 123 of the Customs Act as the presumption will arise only when the smuggled goods is seized from the possession of the respondents. From the state of the evidence, it is not possible to say that any of the respondents were in possession of the gold secreted in the car. So far as respondent 6 Krishnan is concerned, he was admittedly not one of the passengers in the car at the time of the seizure. The mere fact that the car had been registered in his name would not be sufficient to hold that he either aided or abetted in the carrying of the smuggled gold in the car. His statement which has been marked on behalf of the prosecution, discloses that the car really belonged to Kabir and that Kabir had purchased the car, and that he had only get it registered in the name of respondent-6.
We may also point out that this is an appeal against the acquittal. The mere fact, on the evidence, another view could be taken is no ground for setting aside the acquittal. It is not possible for us to say that the view taken by the learned Magistrate is either erroneous or unreasonable. There are no compelling reasons for setting aside the order of acquittal of the respondents passed by the learned Magistrate.
In the result, for the reasons stated above, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
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