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K. Anantharajaiah v. Shivaramaiah
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal (Original Suit No. 853 of 1961)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (original plaintiff in Original Suit No. 853 of 1961) alleged that the defendant borrowed Rs. 1,000 on terms to repay with interest at 1% per mensem. On the same day the defendant executed a consideration receipt and a promissory note. The plaint did not refer to the promissory note; the plaintiff expressly based the suit on the original cause of action (the loan) rather than on the promissory note.
The learned Munsiff found that the advance of Rs. 1,000 and the execution of the promissory note were parts of the same transaction and that the plaintiff did not depose that the loan was independent of the promissory note; accordingly the trial court dismissed the suit. The Civil Judge, Mandya (in Regular Appeal No. 85 of 1963), concurred, observing that Exhibit P-1 (the consideration receipt) showed that the payment was made with reference to the promissory note executed that day and that the promissory note was insufficiently stamped and inadmissible in evidence. Both courts held the suit not maintainable. The plaintiff appealed in this Second Appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, where a promissory note executed contemporaneously with the advancement of money embodies the terms of the transaction and is inadmissible in evidence for want of proper stamp, the creditor may nonetheless sue on the original cause of action (the loan) and prove it by evidence aliunde.
- Whether Section 91 of the Evidence Act bars admission of evidence aliunde when the terms of the contract between the parties have been reduced to writing in an instrument (here, a promissory note) executed contemporaneously with the loan.
- Whether the advance of money and execution of a promissory note that form part of the same transaction can be treated as separable (i.e., loan as an independent cause of action) as contended by the appellant.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant's counsel (Sri Balagopal) argued that although the courts below found that the advance of money and the execution of the promissory note formed one transaction, it was still possible to treat the advance as a loan (an independent cause of action) and to regard the promissory note merely as evidence indicating that the loan was advanced.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced by the respondent/defendant in this appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| (1881) ILR 7 Cal 256 — Sheikh Akbar v. Sheikh Khan | Where the original cause of action is the bill/note itself and does not exist independently, and the note is inadmissible (e.g., for want of stamp), the creditor cannot prove the claim by evidence independent of the note; the creditor loses his money. This principle aligns with Section 91 of the Evidence Act. | The court relied on this as a basic decision supporting the view that when terms are contained in the promissory note and the note is inadmissible, no independent cause of action exists to be proved by evidence aliunde. |
| (1928) 6 Mys LJ 157 — (Chief Court of Mysore reference to Sheikh Akbar) | Adopts the reasoning of Sheikh Akbar regarding the bar created by Section 91 when the original cause of action is contained in the note and is not independent of it. | Referenced to support the proposition that when money is lent on terms contained in a note given at the time of the loan, the lender must prove the terms of the note and cannot fall back on an independent case if the note is inadmissible. |
| AIR 1946 All 150 — Ram Nath v. Bhagawath Prasad | Distinguishes two situations: (a) if the promissory note does not contain substantially all terms of the contract, the plaintiff may prove the loan by other evidence even if the note is inadmissible; (b) if the promissory note contains substantially all the terms, and is inadmissible, the plaintiff cannot fall back on an independent cause of action. | The court used this authority to explain the recognized distinction and to find that in the present case the promissory note contained the contract terms (i.e., the situation in which Section 91 prevents proof by evidence aliunde). |
| AIR 1957 Mad 715 — Rangaswami Reddy v. Doraiswami Reddy | Held that where all terms of the contract are embodied in the promissory note and payment was simultaneous with execution, Section 91 bars admission of evidence aliunde to prove the passing of consideration under the promissory note. | Applied to show that once a transaction is evidenced by an instrument in writing (the pronote), Section 91 operates as a bar to proving terms otherwise; the present case was treated as analogous. |
| AIR 1938 Bom 286 — Sombhai v. Kalyanbhai | Held (in the Bombay High Court) that a case on the original consideration was maintainable because the loan created a cause of action independently of the promissory note; i.e., the loan could be proved independently of the note. | The court in the present opinion considered and rejected this proposition on the facts, concluding that where the pronote contains all terms and was contemporaneous with the loan, the Bombay decision was not persuasive for the facts at hand and conflicted with Section 91 as interpreted by other authorities. |
| Section 91, Indian Evidence Act (statutory provision cited) | Provides that when the terms of a contract have been reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms except the document itself (or secondary evidence where admissible). | The court held that because the contract between the parties was contained in the promissory note, Section 91 required proof by the note itself (or admissible secondary evidence), and evidence aliunde was barred where the note was inadmissible for being insufficiently stamped. |
| Section 4, Negotiable Instruments Act (definition of promissory note) | Defines a promissory note as an instrument in writing containing an unconditional undertaking to pay a certain sum; constrains what a promissory note can contain. | The court used this statutory definition to support the conclusion that the promissory note necessarily embodied the terms of the contract and hence the transaction was within the ambit of Section 91. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reviewed the findings of the two courts below: both found that the advance of money and the execution of the promissory note were contemporaneous and formed one inseparable transaction. The promissory note was executed on the same day the loan was advanced. Exhibit P-1 (the consideration receipt) recited that the defendant had received Rs. 1,000 "being the amount due in respect of the promissory note executed on that day," which the lower courts treated as indicating that the loan was not separable from the promissory note.
The promissory note was insufficiently stamped and therefore inadmissible in evidence. The court applied Section 91 of the Evidence Act, which bars evidence of the terms of a contract that have been reduced to writing except by the document itself (or admissible secondary evidence). The court concluded that where the contract terms are contained in the promissory note and the note is inadmissible, evidence aliunde to prove the same transactions is barred.
The court considered precedent law. It accepted the principle from ILR 7 Cal 256 (Sheikh Akbar) and subsequent authorities that when the original cause of action is the note itself and does not exist independently, the creditor cannot fall back on an independent cause of action if the note is inadmissible. The court also considered Ram Nath v. Bhagawath Prasad, which distinguishes cases where the promissory note does not contain substantially all terms (permitting proof by other evidence) from those where it does (barring such proof). Finding that, on the facts, the promissory note contained the contract terms, the court placed the present matter within the latter category.
The court addressed the appellant's reliance on the Bombay High Court decision (Sombhai v. Kalyanbhai) that suggested the loan is always an independent cause of action; the court rejected that view for the present facts because the promissory note here embodied the terms of the contract and Section 91 therefore operated as a bar.
On this basis the court concluded that the case fell within the second proposition of ILR 7 Cal 256 (i.e., where the note is the contract and no independent cause of action exists apart from it). Because the promissory note was inadmissible, the plaintiff could not prove the contract terms by evidence aliunde.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appeal is dismissed and the judgment and decree of the lower Courts are confirmed.
Disposition (explicit from the opinion): Appeal dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.
Implications: The direct effect of the decision is that the plaintiff (appellant) remains without a remedy in this suit because the promissory note that embodied the contract terms was inadmissible in evidence and the plaintiff could not rely on independent evidence of the loan. The opinion does not describe any broader legal consequences beyond upholding the lower courts' dismissal on these facts or purport to lay down a novel precedent distinct from the authorities discussed.
1. The plaintiff in Original Suit No. 853 of 1961 is the appellant in this Second Appeal. The plaint allegations are that the defendant borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,000 agreeing to pay the same back with interest thereof at the rate of 1 per cent per mensem. It is undisputed that on that very day the defendant not merely executed a consideration receipt as mentioned in paragraph 1 of the plaint but also executed a promissory note. There is no reference to the promissory note in the plaint and it has been made clear by the plaintiff that the suit is based on the original cause of action and not on the basis of the promissory note executes on that day. The learned Munsiff held that the plaintiff had advanced a sum of Rs. 1,000 as a loan to the defendant but the loan and the execution of the promissory note were part of the same transaction. The learned Munsiff also states in his judgment that even the plaintiff has not deposed in his evidence that the amount borrowed is independent of the execution of the promissory note in his favour. In view of this, the learned Munsiff held that the plaintiff cannot fall back on the original cause of action. Therefore he dismissed the suit. On appeal, the learned Civil Judge Mandya, in Regular Appeal No. 85 of 1963 came to the same conclusion. Referring to the evidence of P.W 2, the learned Judge holds that the loan referred to by the plaintiff is contemporaneous with the execution of the promissory note and the consideration receipt and they form one transaction. Exhibit P-1 is the consideration receipt produced by the plaintiff. It recites that the defendant had received a sum of Rs. 1,000 being the amount due in respect of the promissory note executed on that day. This document clearly indicates that the payment of the amount referred to in it is made with reference to the promissory note executed by the defendant on that very day and thus there is clear indication that the loan referred to by the plaintiff is not separable from the promissory note, being in any manner antecedent to the document or otherwise a separate transaction. The learned Judge, therefore concurred with the finding of the trial Court that the advance of money and the execution of promissory note constituted one transaction and inseparable. This promissory note is insufficiently stamped and has not been put in evidence and the plaintiff has tried to bypass the promissory note by basing the suit on the original cause of action. Admittedly the transaction is evidenced by writing which is inadmissible in evidence. The plaintiff's suit is dismissed as not maintainable by both the Courts. It is against this judgment and decree that the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal.
2. Sri Balagopal, the learned counsel for the appellant, contends that though the findings of the courts below are that the advance of money by the plaintiff and the execution of the promissory note form one and the same transaction it is yet possible to treat the advance of money as loan and the execution of the promissory note as a mere piece of evidence to indicate that the loan was advanced.
3. The question as to whether the holder of the promissory note which is inadmissible in evidence on account of its being insufficiently stamped or otherwise inadmissible, can file a suit on the original cause of action has been the subject matter of consideration in several decisions. The basic decision in this connection is the one reported in (1881) ILR 7 Cal 256, Sheikh Akbar v. Sheikh Khan. This decision is relied upon by the Chief Court of Mysore in (1928) 6 Mys LJ 157 and it is observed as follows:
“But where the original cause of action is the bill or note itself and does not exist independently of it and if for want of stamp or some other reason the note is not admissible in evidence the creditor must lose his money. When therefore money is lent on terms contained in a note given at the time of the loan the lender suing for the money must prove the terms of the note and if for want of stamp or any other reason the note is inadmissible the creditor is not entitled to set up a case independent of the note. This principle is in accordance with Section 91 of the Evidence Act.”
4. This is what has been laid down in a decision in AIR 1946 All 150, Ram Nath v. Bhagawath Prasad. It is observed therein as follows.
“Where as is usually the case the pronote in suit does not contain substantially all the terms of the contract of loan between the parties and the pronote is found inadmissible in evidence for want of proper stamp under Section 35 it is open to the plaintiff to prove the loan by such evidence oral or documentary as may be available to him. Under such circumstances the bar of Section 91, Evidence Act, does not apply. But if the pronote in suit contains substantially all the terms of the contract of loan between the parties and the pronote is found inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 the plaintiff cannot fall hack upon an independent cause of action to recover the loan and prove the same by independent evidence for the simple reason that there is no cause of action independent of and apart from the promissory note”
5. In this case, as found by the courts below the transaction referred to in the plaint is contained in the promissory note. It is executed on the date when the loan is advanced and that document is inadmissible in evidence as it is insufficiently stamped. The other decision to which a reference may be made is AIR 1957 Mad 715, Rangaswaml Reddy v. Doraiswami Reddy. It was held therein that all the terms of the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant in respect of the loan were reduced to writing and embodied in the promissory note as in this case. The learned Judges held that the payment of the amount as loan being simultaneous with the execution of the promissory note Section 91 of the Evidence Act would be an obvious bar to the admission of any evidence aliunde to prove the passing of consideration under the promissory note. This indicates that once a transaction is evidenced by an instrument in writing, Section 91 would be a bar to prove the terms of the contract otherwise. Section 91 of the Evidence Act reads as follows:
“91 When the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have beer reduced to the form of a document and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property or of such matter except the document itself or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.
ILLUSTRATIONS
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(b) If a contract is contained in a bill of exchange the bill of exchange must be proved.”
6. In this case the findings of the Courts below are that the contract between the parties is contained in the promissory note and therefore under Section 91 the document must be proved. No other evidence is admissible unless it is by secondary evidence under the provisions of the Evidence Act.
7. The appellant's counsel drew my attention to the decision of the Bombay High Court in AIR 1938 Bom 286, Sombhai v. Kalyanbhai. In this case the Bombay High Court held that the case on the original consideration is maintainable for the reason that the transaction of loan created a cause of action independently of the pronote and therefore the suit is based otherwise than on the promissory note i.e, the loan being the term of the contract contained in the promissory note. With great respect it must be pointed out that the terms of the contract are fully embodied in the promissory note itself. The definition of the promissory note is given under S. 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is defined as follows:
“4. A ‘promissory note’ is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker to pay a certain sum of money only to or to the order of a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument.”
8. Several illustrations are also given to show what a promissory note is. On the facts of this case, the document that was executed by the defendant was a promissory note. A promissory note cannot contain anything more than what is permissible under Section 4. Therefore in this case, it cannot be doubted that the promissory note contained all the terms of the contract between the parties. If the holder of the promissory note is permitted to adduce any evidence in respect of the loan under the promissory note, it would be transgressing the provision of Section 91 of the Evidence Act. It is difficult to accept the observation of the Bombay High Court expressed in the following terms while referring to the second proposition by Garth C.J set out in (1881) ILR 7 Cal 256.
“…… The case of a Loan of money falls under the first proposition. It is said that the independent cause of action must be antecedent in time to the note and this principle has been laid down because the word ‘then’ in the first proposition in 7 Cal 256. In my opinion however the principle is unsustainable. If there is a loan it does not matter whether the promissory note is taken at the time or at some later time. It is the loan which constitutes the cause of action and gives rise to it and it is separate from the note itself and the fact of a loan can never be a term of the contract contained in the promissory note and therefore it is open to a person to prove that there was a loan independently of S. 91 of the Evidence Act”
9. This proposition cannot be accepted. No exception however can be taken to the further observation that if the cause of action. Is antecedent to the making of promissory note, then there is nothing to prevent the creditor from maintaining a suit on the original cause of action. The difficulty really arises as the transaction of loan and the execution of the promissory note are contemporaneous and form part of the same transaction. In this connection the two propositions laid down in ILR 7 Cal 256 may also be referred to the said case being the leading case on the question. The first proposition is as under:—
“When a cause of action for money is once complete in itself, whether for goods sold or for money lent or for any other claim, and the debtor then gives a bill or note to the creditor for payment of that money at a future time the creditor, if the bill or note is not paid at maturity, may always, as a rule sue for the original consideration provided that he has not endorsed or lost or parted with the bill or note under such circumstances as to make the debtor liable upon it to some third person. In such cases, the bill or note is said to be taken by the creditor on account of the debt, and if it is not paid at maturity the creditor may disregard the bill or note and sue for the original consideration.”
10. The second proposition is:
“But when the original cause of action is the bill or note itself and does not exist independently of it, as for instance, when in consideration of A depositing money with B, B contracts by a promissory note to repay it with interest at six month's date here there is no cause of action for money lent, or otherwise than upon the note itself, because the deposit is made upon the terms contained in the note and no other. In such a case the note is the only contract between the parties and if for want of a proper stamp or some other reason the note is not admissible in evidence the creditor must lose his money”.
11. I have no hesitation with great respect, to accept the second proposition as being in accordance with the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act. In the view I take that this case falls within the 2nd proposition the judgment and decree of the lower Courts are confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case I direct the parties to bear their own costs.
SAP/D.V.C
Appeal dismissed.
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