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Syed Hassan Ali v. The State Of Mysore And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Order of the Court by Santhosh, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner was a Sub-Inspector of Police at Gogi in Gulbarga District. He faced two separate memos of charges: the first memo dated 20 November 1957 (alleging, among other things, taking illegal gratification from villagers, specifically counts including acceptance of Rs. 35 from Ningappa and demanding Rs. 100 from Rangappa) and a second memo dated 26 June 1958 (alleging gross negligence and an allegation that he demanded and received Rs. 325 from Rayappa, who had to sell bullocks and a cart to raise it). While those charges were pending, the petitioner had earlier been dismissed on another charge by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police; that dismissal was reduced on appeal by the Inspector-General of Police to a reduction in time-scale.
Multiple enquiry officers were involved. An initial Enquiry Officer (Sri Billimoria) was objected to by the petitioner; another officer (Sri Mallappa) conducted an ex parte enquiry as the petitioner did not appear; on appeal, the Inspector-General remanded for a fresh enquiry and directed a new enquiry by a Deputy Superintendent of Police (Gulbarga Division). Because of transfers, Sri Dhruva Rao, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Yadgir, ultimately conducted the enquiry (around October–November 1959). Thirty prosecution witnesses and five defence witnesses were examined. The Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty on counts 3 and 4 of the first memo and on all nine counts of the second memo.
Under the Hyderabad Civil Services (C.C.A.) Rules, the Inspector-General of Police was the authority competent to impose punishment. After receiving the enquiry report, the Inspector-General issued a show cause notice (23 April 1960), heard the petitioner personally (24 November 1960), and after considering written representations, by order dated 17 December 1960 dismissed the petitioner from service. The petitioner appealed to the Government of Mysore, which, by order dated 21 March 1962, confirmed the dismissal. The petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash both the Inspector-General's order and the Government's confirming order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Enquiry Officer and the Inspector-General/disciplinary authority properly considered and discussed the defence evidence such that the departmental proceedings complied with the requirements of Article 311 and principles of fair hearing.
- Whether examination of two witnesses not named in the charge-sheet vitiated the enquiry.
- Whether the Enquiry Officer was validly nominated/appointed in accordance with applicable Hyderabad Civil Service rules (including Rule 22(1)(c)), and whether any defect in nomination vitiates the enquiry.
- Whether the appellate order of the Government (confirming dismissal) was legally defective for being laconic or not conforming to the requirements applicable to departmental appeals (including alleged non-compliance with Rule 25 of the Mysore C.C.A. Rules or Rule 35 of the Hyderabad C.C.A. Rules).
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Sri S.K. Venkataranga Iyengar)
- The Enquiry Officer failed to properly discuss or appreciate the defence evidence and gave no reasons for rejecting the petitioner's defence witnesses.
- Two additional witnesses were examined who were not referred to in the memo of charges; this procedural irregularity vitiated the enquiry.
- The Enquiry Officer was not nominated by the proper authority under the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules; the nomination by the District Superintendent of Police (rather than the Deputy Inspector-General or Inspector-General) rendered the enquiry void.
- The appellate order of the Government does not conform to legal requirements (alleged failure to marshal evidence and absence of reasons), and therefore ought to be struck down. The petitioner relied also on an authority in Basu's Shorter Constitution of India to argue the need for speaking orders.
Respondent / State's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)
- The Enquiry Officer's brief statement that the defence was "a weak-defence" is not a ground for interference; the Inspector-General conducted a departmental appellate process (show cause notice, personal hearing, consideration of written representations) and the court should not reappraise evidence under Article 226.
- No rule was cited that prohibits an Enquiry Officer from examining witnesses not mentioned in the charge-sheet; moreover, those two witnesses were examined in the petitioner's presence and he had an opportunity to cross-examine them (but did not seek time to do so). Even if the count involving those witnesses were ignored, the petitioner was found guilty on ten other counts.
- Under Rule 22(1)(c) of the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the authority to order an enquiry or appoint an Enquiry Officer can be the head of the office or appointing authority; the Superintendent of Police is the head of the district and competent to appoint the Enquiry Officer for a Sub-Inspector. Further, the Inspector-General had nominated an officer earlier and, due to transfer, another officer had to conduct the enquiry.
- The Government, as appellate authority, examined the records and was satisfied that charges were proved and there were no procedural irregularities that vitiated the proceedings; departmental appellate orders need not be as elaborate as judicial judgments so long as the appellate authority has acted impartially and given reasonable opportunity to the parties.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Pannalal v. Union of India | Principle that acquiescence in the jurisdiction of an authority disentitles a petitioner to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction (i.e., cannot later complain of jurisdictional defect after participating). | The Court applied this principle to hold that the petitioner, having submitted to and participated in the enquiry without raising the nomination objection at the proper time, cannot now challenge the competence of the Enquiry Officer. |
| C.R. Gowda v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal | Doctrine that a petitioner who was aware of a defect in constitution of a tribunal but did not raise it is precluded from later challenging the constitutionality of the tribunal. | The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that the petitioner, knowing or able to know of the alleged defect, and having taken part in proceedings, is barred from objecting now. |
| M.U.M. Services Ltd. v. R.T.A. Malabar | Failure to object to jurisdiction before the lower forum is a bar to seeking certiorari later, whether the objection is a pure point of law or concerns facts within the petitioner's knowledge during proceedings. | The Court used this precedent to reinforce the position that the petitioner's delay/failure to object to the Enquiry Officer's competence during proceedings prevents relief under Article 226. |
| G.M.T. Society v. Bombay State | Observation that a litigant who "sat on the fence" and took a chance before a tribunal cannot afterwards ask the Court for a writ on the ground that the tribunal was improperly constituted. | The Court quoted this passage and applied it to deny the petitioner's attempt to challenge the enquiry officer's competence after having participated in the enquiry. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through the contentions sequentially and applied both procedural law and the authorities cited:
- On the adequacy of discussion of defence evidence: The Court emphasized the distinction between judicial proceedings and departmental enquiries. It noted that an Enquiry Officer's role is to collect evidence, record findings and submit them to the competent authority. The competent authority (Inspector-General) thereafter conducted a show cause process, gave the petitioner a personal hearing and accepted further written representations before imposing punishment. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court stated it is not its function to reappraise evidence or require the detailed discussion expected in judicial judgments. The relevant legal protection to check for is compliance with Article 311 (protection in disciplinary proceedings) and whether reasonable opportunity to be heard was given. The petitioner did not contend there was a total lack of evidence; hence, mere brevity in discussion of defence evidence in the enquiry report was not a ground for interference.
- On two witnesses not mentioned in the charge-sheet: The Court observed that no provision of law was pointed out which forbids the Enquiry Officer from examining additional witnesses he considered necessary. These witnesses were examined in the presence of the petitioner and he had the opportunity to cross-examine them (and could have sought time to do so). The petitioner did not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from their examination. The Court also noted that the additional evidence related only to count 9 of the second memo and, even if that count were disregarded, there remained findings of guilt on ten other counts.
- On the nomination/competence of the Enquiry Officer: The Court examined the petitioner's claim that Rule provisions required nomination by the Deputy Inspector-General or Inspector-General. The Court found the Inspector-General had in fact directed the enquiry to be conducted by a Deputy Superintendent (Gulbarga Division) and, due to transfers, another Deputy Superintendent (Sri Dhruva Rao) conducted it. The State relied on Rule 22(1)(c) (Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules) which permits the head of the office or appointing authority to order an enquiry or appoint an Enquiry Officer. The Court interpreted "head of the office" in a non-restrictive manner, holding that the Superintendent of Police (as head of the District) could be treated as the head of the office for a Sub-Inspector. Crucially, the Court stressed that the petitioner participated in the enquiry, did not raise the competence objection at the appropriate stage (he only objected earlier to a different Enquiry Officer), and having acquiesced, could not at this late stage challenge the competence of the officer who conducted the enquiry. The Court relied on precedent to support the doctrine that failure to object timely to jurisdiction/competence precludes later relief.
- On the appellate order being laconic and non-speaking: The Court distinguished departmental appellate orders from judicial judgments, observing that while judicial decisions must set out points, findings and reasons in detail, departmental appellate orders do not always require such detailed exposition. The Court required that the appellate authority act impartially, hear the parties and give reasonable opportunity — requirements which were satisfied here. Although the Government's order was described as laconic and not entirely satisfactory, the Court accepted the State's position that the Government had carefully reviewed the record, found no procedural irregularity and concluded that charges were proved. Therefore, the Court found no legal fault warranting interference with the appellate order.
Holding and Implications
Disposition: The writ petition was dismissed.
Direct consequences: The orders challenged by the petitioner — the Inspector-General of Police's order dated 17 December 1960 dismissing the petitioner and the Government of Mysore's order dated 21 March 1962 confirming that dismissal — were upheld. The petition thus failed and was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs.
Broader implications: The Court did not lay down any new legal precedent. The decision reaffirms established principles: courts exercising Article 226 will not reassess evidence or require the formality of judicial judgments in departmental proceedings so long as Article 311 protections and fair hearing requirements are respected; failure to raise objections to jurisdiction/competence at the proper stage and participation in proceedings will generally preclude later challenges to the tribunal/enquiry's constitution. The opinion therefore upholds settled doctrines rather than creating new law.
This summary strictly reflects the contents of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond what the opinion itself contains.
Order of the Court was made by Santhosh, J.:—
In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays that this Court may be pleased to quash by the issue of a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order, as the case may be, the orders of the Inspector-General of Police (Respondent-2), dated 17th December 1960 dismissing the petitioner from service and the order of the Government (Respondent-1), dated 21st March 1962 confirming the said order of dismissal.
The petitioner was a Sub-Inspector of Police at Gogi in Gulbarga District. On 20th November 1957 a memo of charges was given to the petitioner alleging that he had obtained illegal gratification from villagers. The petitioner is alleged to have taken illegal gratification from the five persons mentioned in the said charge-memo. On 26th June 1958 a second memo of charges was issued against the petitioner alleging gross negligence in the discharge of his duties and accepting illegal gratification. The first 8 counts related to gross negligence of duty and the 9 counts was that he demanded and received illegal gratification of Rs. 325 from one Rayappa. When these charges were pending enquiry, the petitioner was dismissed from service by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on an earlier charge framed against him for having behaved in a high-handed and unmannerly way against one Veeraiswamy. In the appeal filed by the petitioner, the Inspector-General of Police, however, altered the punishment from dismissal to one of reduction by two stages in the time-scale for a period of two years with adverse effect on future increments. Thereafter, the enquiry in respect of the two memos of charges mentioned above, was taken up against the petitioner and Sri Billimoria, Deputy Superintendent of Police was appointed Enquiry Officer. The petitioner objected to the enquiry by Sri Billimoria on the ground that he was prejudiced against him. Then another Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sri Mallappa, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. As the petitioner did not appear before him, the enquiry was proceeded and with ex parte. On an appeal filed by the petitioner to the Inspector-General of Police, the Inspector-General of Police remanded the matter for fresh enquiry and directed that all the witnesses should be examined in the presence of the petitioner and he should be given an opportunity to cross-examine them. He directed that the enquiry should be conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gulbarga Division. As this latter officer was transferred, the enquiry was conducted by Sri Dhruva Rao, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Yadgir. Thirty prosecution witnesses were examined before the Enquiry Officer and the petitioner examined five defence witnesses. The Enquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty of counts 3 and 4 in the memo of charges, dated 20th November 1957: Count 3 related to accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 35 from one Ningappa. Count 4 referred to demanding illegal gratification of Rs. 100 from Rangappa. With regard to the memo of charges dated 26th June 1956, he found the petitioner guilty of all the 9 counts: Counts 1 to 8 related to gross negligence of duty. Count 9, which was held proved, was that he kept Harijan Rayappa in custody and would not release him unless he paid him Rs. 325; Rayappa had to raise this amount and pay the petitioner by selling his two bullocks and his cart.
Under the Hyderabad Civil Services (C.C.A) Rules, 1955, the Inspector-General of Police, being the authority competent to dismiss the petitioner, the papers were submitted to the Inspector-General of Police. After going through the papers, the Inspector-General of Police, on 23rd April 1960, issued a show cause notice to the petitioner as to why he should not be dismissed from service. The petitioner submitted his explanation and demanded a personal hearing. The Inspector-General of Police gave him a personal hearing on 24th November 1960. The petitioner also presented a further written representation. The Inspector-General of Police, after going through the papers, by his order dated 17th December 1960, found the petitioner guilty on counts 3 and 4 in the memo of charges dated 20th November 1957 and on all the 9 counts in the charge-memo dated 26th June 1958. He dismissed the petitioner from service. The petitioner went up in appeal to the Government and the Government of Mysore, by its order dated 21st March 1962 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of dismissal of the petitioner. The petitioner has filed this writ petition challenging the said order passed by the Inspector-General of Police dismissing him from service and the order of the Government confirming the same, and prays that the said two orders may be quashed.
Sri S.K Venkataranga Iyengar, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged before us four contentions, viz., (1) there is no proper discussion at all of the defence evidence let in by the petitioner, by the Enquiry Officer; (2) there were only 28 witnesses referred to in the memo of charges; two more witnesses, who were not mentioned in the charge-sheet were examined and this has vitiated the enquiry; (3) Under the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the Enquiry Officer should be nominated by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police or the Inspector-General of Police. As the District Superintendent of Police had nominated the Enquiry Officer the entire enquiry held by the said officer is vitiated; and (4) the order of the appellate authority (State Government) does not conform to the requirements of law and hence should be struck down.
Taking the first contention, Sri Venkataranga Iyengar contends that the Enquiry Officer has not marshalled the evidence properly and there is absolutely no discussion of the defence evidence let in by the petitioner. Referring to the defence witnesses, the Enquiry Officer has merely stated as follows:—
“No doubt the delinquent has Examined 5 D.Ws It is a weak-defence.”
Sri Venkataranga Iyengar contends that the Enquiry Officer should have discussed properly the defence evidence and should have given reasons for rejecting their evidence. Sri Venkataranga Iyengar also submits that there is also no proper discussion of the defence evidence in the order of the Inspector-General of Police. It has to be remembered that this is not a judgment delivered by a Court of law, but only orders passed in a departmental enquiry. The Enquiry Officer only collects the evidence, records his findings and submits them to the authority which is competent to impose punishment. After receiving the records and the report of the Enquiry Officer, the Inspector-General of Police gave a show cause notice to the petitioner and the petitioner gave an elaborate statement urging all the points in his favour and thereafter, the Inspector-General of Police gave him a personal hearing and permitted him to file another additional written statement, and after going through all these records, passed the impugned order. It is not the function of the Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to go into questions of appreciation of evidence. The Court has to see whether Article 311 of the Constitution has been contravened and whether the petitioner had reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges framed against him. Unless it is a case of total lack of evidence, the Court will not be justified in interfering in departmental enquiries, on question of appreciation or discussion of evidence. It is not the contention of Sri Venkataranga Iyengar that in this case, there is total lack of evidence in support of the charges framed against the petitioner.
Taking next the contention that two witnesses not mentioned in the charge have been examined, Sri Venkataranga Iyengar has not brought to our notice any provision of law or rule prohibiting an Enquiry Officer from examining witnesses not mentioned in the charge-sheet if he considers that it is necessary to do so. These witnesses have been examined in the presence of the petitioner and he has been given an opportunity to cross-examine them. If the petitioner wanted, he could have asked for some time, to cross-examine the witnesses. The petitioner does not seem to have done so. Hence, it cannot be said that he is in any way prejudiced. It may also be mentioned that these two additional witnesses were examined only with regard to count No. 9 of the charge-memo dated 26th June 1958. As stated earlier, even if this count is ignored, the petitioner has been found guilty of 10 other counts.
Taking the third contention that the Enquiry Officer has not been nominated by the proper authority, the contention of Sri Venkataranga Iyengar is that as per the Hyderabad Civil Service Rules, only the Deputy Inspector-General or the Inspector-General of Police should have nominated the Enquiry Officer. In Paragraph 6 of his affidavit, the petitioner, referring to the Inspector-General setting aside the ex parte order passed by the previous Enquiry Officer, has stated as follows:—
“In the circumstances I had to complain to the Inspector-General of Police who referred that the enquiry against me should be conducted by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Gulbarga Division. As this latter office was transferred ultimately the enquiry was conducted by Sri Dhruva Rao, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Yadgir, between October 1959 and November 1959.”
It is clear from this that the Inspector-General of Police had nominated the Enquiry Officer, but since that officer was transferred, the Enquiry had to be held by another Officer. The contention on behalf of the State is that according to Rule 22 (1)(c) of the Hyderabad Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, the authority to order an enquiry or to appoint the Enquiry Officer is the head of the office or the appointing authority or any higher authority. The learned High Court Government Pleader contends that so far as the petitioner is concerned, the Superintendent of Police is the head of the office and as such, he is competent to appoint the Enquiry Officer. He contends that so far as a district is concerned, the Superintendent of Police is the head of the Police force and such, competent to appoint an Enquiry Officer. Sri Iyengar's contention is that ‘head of the office’ refers only to persons working in the clerical department, and so far as a Sub-Inspector of Police is concerned, he is a Station House Officer and he is himself the head of his office and the Superintendent of Police is not the head of his office. We are of opinion that the words referred to above cannot be given such a narrow and restricted meaning which Sri Venkataranga Iyengar wants us to give them. The Superintendent of Police who is the head of the District, can be held to be the head of the office of Sub-Inspector of Police is concerned, he is a Station House Officer has not been properly nominated, we are of opinion that the petitioner having acquiesced and submitted to the jurisdiction and having taken part in the enquiry without objecting to the same, should not be permitted, at the stage, to turn round and contend that the Enquiry Officer was not competent to hold the enquiry. When the enquiry started, the petitioner should have raised this point and objected to the enquiry being held by the said officer. The petitioner has not done so. The records show that the petitioner objected to the enquiry being held by Sri Billimoria. He never contended that the Enquiry Officer was not competent to hold the enquiry. At his request another Enquiry Officer was nominated. The petitioner willingly went through the enquiry without any objection. Thirty witnesses were examined for the prosecution and the petitioner himself examined 5 D.Ws It is not open to the petitioner, after the whole enquiry is over and after the Enquiry Officer has found against him, to now turn round and contend that the officer was not competent to hold the enquiry. The Supreme Court, in Pannalal v. Union of India(1) has stated as follows:—
“If they (Petitioners) acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Income-Tax Officers to whom their cases were transferred they were certainly not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32. It is well settled that such conduct of the petitioners would disentitle them to any relief at the hands of this Court.”
A Division Bench of this Court in C.R Gowda v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal has also held that where the petitioner who must have been aware of the defect in the constitution of the Tribunal did not raise any objection on that score, but took a chance of succeeding in the proceeding before it, he is precluded by his own conduct from putting forward the contention that the tribunal had not been properly constituted. In M.U.M Services Ltd. v. R.T.A Malabar(2) Subba Rao, J., has stated that failure to object to jurisdiction before the lower Court is a bar to obtaining a writ of certiorari, whether the objection to jurisdiction is based on a pure point of law or based on facts which were or should have been within the knowledge of the petitioners during the proceedings in the lower Court. We are of opinion that the observations made by Chagla, C.J in G.M.T Society v. Bombay State(3) apply with full force to the facts of this case and they are as follows:—
“The Court must tell the petitioner: ‘It was open to you to raise that point before the tribunal whose order you are challenging. You have sat on the fence, you have taken a chance of the tribunal deciding in your favour, and it is not open to you now to come to us and ask for a writ’.”
Taking the last contention of the petitioner that the appellate order of the Government is not in conformity with law, we must remember, as stated earlier, that these are orders passed in a departmental enquiry. To apply to these orders the standards laid down as to how a judgment of a Court of Law should be, would not be correct. In the case of judicial orders, law prescribes that there should be a detailed discussion of the evidence. It must state the points for determination, findings thereon and the reasons for the findings. Sri Iyengar contends that the Government has not marshalled the evidence nor has it given any reasons for accepting the findings of the Inspector-General of Police. His contention is that the order does not conform to either Rule 25 of the Mysore Civil Services (C.C.A) Rules or Rule 35 of the Hyderabad Civil Services (C.C.A) Rules. He also relies on a passage in Page 447 of Basu's Shorter Constitution of India (4th Edition). He contends that the order is not a speaking order. But, the passage relied on by him also states what the other requirements are. The administrative authority exercising appellate powers must hear in an objective manner, must be impartial and must give reasonable opportunity to the parties to the dispute to place their respective cases before it. It is not disputed that those requirements have been complied with. There is no doubt the Government order is laconic and not quite satisfactory. If there had been more detailed and better discussion of the evidence, it would not have given room for the criticism made by Sri Iyengar. The contention of the learned High Court Government Pleader is that the Government after carefully going through all the records and the grounds urged, was satisfied that the charges levelled against the petitioner were proved. He contends that in departmental proceedings, it is not necessary to give elaborate reasons in disposing of appeals. We are of opinion that there is no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the Government order is illegal and should be struck down. The Government, after going through the records, has held that there is no procedural irregularity as would have vitiated the proceedings. The Government also came to the conclusion that the charges framed against the petitioner have been properly proved. It has held, after going through all the materials placed before it, that there are no adequate grounds to interfere with the order passed by the Inspector-General of Police. Hence, we are of opinion that there is no merit in this contention.
In the result, for the reasons stated above, this writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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