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P. Channappa, v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore And Others,
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash an order of the Regional Transport Authority (R.T.A.), Mandya dated 27-5-1961 (Subject No. 27(d)) suspending the stage carriage permit of bus No. MYU 3355, the confirmation of that suspension (subject to reduction) by the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 209 of 1961 dated 4-9-1961, and the further confirmation (subject to further reduction) by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 956/61 (M.V).
Material facts in the record: on 30-3-1961 the bus No. MYU 3355 (owned by the petitioner) was alleged to have been carrying 84 passengers though its seating capacity was 36. The conductor was prosecuted in C.C. No. 2040/61 before the City Magistrate, Mysore, and was acquitted on 11-7-1961; the Magistrate disbelieved the prosecution evidence as to overloading. Separately, the R.T.A. proceeded against the petitioner and found the overloading allegation true, suspending the bus permit for seven months (1-6-61 to 31-12-61). The petitioner appealed; the State Transport Appellate Tribunal confirmed the finding of overloading but reduced suspension to four months. The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal further agreed on the overloading finding but reduced suspension to three months. The petitioner then filed the present writ petition challenging those orders.
The petition was heard on 23-9-1964. The respondents were not represented. Sri S.J. Srinivasan appeared for the petitioner. The Court requested Sri E.S. Venkataramiah to assist as amicus curiae; he appeared and assisted. After hearing counsel and amicus, the Court concluded that the impugned orders ought to be quashed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, after a criminal court (the City Magistrate) has tried the question of overloading and given a decision of acquittal on the merits (not on technical grounds), Tribunals constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act (such as the R.T.A., the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and the Revenue Appellate Tribunal) may re-open the same question of fact and reach a conclusion contrary to that reached by the criminal court.
- Whether it is just and fair for quasi-judicial tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act to disregard or sit in judgment over findings of criminal courts in relation to the same alleged offence.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner
- The petitioner sought the quashing of the orders passed by (a) the R.T.A. in Subject No. 27(d) of 1961 suspending the permit of bus No. MYU 3355, (b) the State Transport Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 209 of 1961, and (c) the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 956/61 (M.V).
- Sri S.J. Srinivasan appeared and argued for the petitioner; the opinion records that he was heard at length. (The opinion does not set out a detailed point‑by‑point account of the petitioner's specific argumentative submissions.)
Amicus Curiae / Respondents (as recorded)
- Sri E.S. Venkataramiah (appearing as amicus curiae and assisting the Court) argued in support of the orders impugned in the petition and sought to rely on the Supreme Court decision in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Ramarao, AIR 1963 SC 1723.
- The opinion records the amicus's attempt to seek support from that Supreme Court decision but states the Court's view that the cited decision did not bear on the point under consideration in this case.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jerome D'Silva v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1952 Mad 853 (Madras High Court) | That a quasi-judicial tribunal such as the R.T.A. or its Appellate Tribunal cannot ignore findings and orders of competent criminal courts when proceeding to take action on the basis of the commission of that offence; criminal court findings should be treated as conclusive in such proceedings. | The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that the R.T.A. and Appellate Tribunals should not reject a criminal court's finding of acquittal on merits and arrive at a contrary conclusion in proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act. |
| Malabar Roadway Service, Kozhikode v. State of Madras, AIR 1955 Mad 176 | Clarification that an acquittal by the criminal court was a positive conclusion not based on technical grounds (supporting the principle that such an acquittal should be treated as conclusive in other proceedings). | The opinion notes that the position taken in Jerome D'Silva was made clear by this decision; it is cited to underscore that the acquittal in the criminal case before the Magistrate was on merits and not on technical grounds. |
| Ekambaram v. General Manager and Competent Authority, M.G.R.T.D., 1961 Mys LJ 1066 (AIR 1962 Mys 84) | That if a criminal court inquired into and acquitted a person of an offence, it would be improper for a disciplinary authority to re‑enquire into the same charge and hold the person guilty on evidence already disbelieved by the criminal court. | Applied as a binding Bench decision of this Court (Mysore), supporting the conclusion that Tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act should not re‑decide an issue already decided by a criminal court on the merits. |
| Mainuddin Alisab Kazi v. The State of Mysore, 1964 (1) Mys LJ 188 | Reiteration by this Court of the principle that criminal court findings on the merits should not be re‑opened by other tribunals. | The Court cited this case as a further reiteration of the view set out in Ekambaram and treated that bench decision as binding authority. |
| Radhakrishna Mills Ltd. v. Labour Court Coimbatore, AIR 1961 Mad 305 (1960-2 Lab LJ 678) | Examined circumstances where management took action against a workman after criminal proceedings; the Madras High Court held that dismissing an employee after acquittal by a criminal court could be mala fide and reviewed decisions on the point. | The Court cited this decision as an example of the principle that action against a person after acquittal by a criminal court may be improper; it formed part of the body of authority considered by the Court on the present issue. |
| State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Ramarao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 (Supreme Court) | Considered the nature of proof required in a criminal case and that required in a disciplinary enquiry under Article 311 of the Constitution. | The amicus relied on this decision in support of the impugned orders. The Court held that this decision did not bear on the specific point in the present case because it did not decide the question whether tribunals may re‑open matters already decided on merits by criminal courts. |
| Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806 (1960-1 Lab LJ 520) | Addressed the competence of an employer to hold a domestic enquiry on a charge which was also the subject matter of a criminal proceeding. | The Court observed that this Supreme Court decision does not bear on the precise point under consideration and therefore did not support the position advanced on behalf of the impugned orders. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded from the uncontested factual starting point that the City Magistrate, in C.C. No. 2040/61, had tried the overloading allegation and, after weighing the evidence, had acquitted the accused (the acquittal being on merits, not on technical grounds). The central legal question identified by the Court was whether tribunals constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act could re‑open and re‑decide that factual question and reach a conclusion contrary to the criminal court's verdict.
The Court considered prior authority on the point. It relied on the Madras High Court decision in Jerome D'Silva, which held that quasi‑judicial tribunals like the Regional Transport Authority and its appellate tribunals cannot ignore the findings and orders of competent criminal courts when taking action based on the commission of an offence. The Court noted that Malabar Roadway Service reiterated that an acquittal which is a positive conclusion on merits should be treated as conclusive.
The Court further relied on its own bench decision in Ekambaram (AIR 1962 Mys 84) which laid down that where a criminal court inquires into a charge and acquits, it is improper for a disciplinary authority to re‑enquire and hold the person guilty on the same evidence which was disbelieved by the criminal court. The Court treated that bench decision as binding and noted that the view had been reiterated in Mainuddin Alisab Kazi.
The Court examined the submissions of the amicus, who sought to draw support from State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Ramarao and from Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. Kushal Bhan. The Court explained that Sree Ramarao dealt with the nature of proof in criminal proceedings versus disciplinary enquiries under Article 311 and did not address the distinct question in this case; similarly, Delhi Cloth & General Mills concerned the employer's competence to hold a domestic enquiry when related criminal proceedings exist, and was not determinative of the issue before the Court. On that basis the Court found those authorities inapplicable to the question of whether an R.T.A. or appellate tribunal can reach a conclusion contrary to a criminal court's acquittal on the merits.
Applying the binding and persuasive authorities to the facts before it (noting that the Magistrate's acquittal was on merits and not on technical grounds), the Court concluded that the Tribunals under the Motor Vehicles Act should not have re‑opened and reached a conclusion contrary to the criminal court's verdict. Consequently, the Court found that the impugned orders could not stand.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition is allowed and the impugned orders are quashed. Specifically, the Court quashed the orders passed by:
- the 1st respondent in Appeal No. 956/61 (M.V.),
- the 2nd respondent in Appeal No. 209/61, and
- the 3rd respondent in Subject No. 27(d) of 1961.
Implications:
- The direct effect is that the suspensions and confirmations of suspension imposed upon the bus permit in the orders described above have been quashed by this Court.
- The Court made no order as to costs.
- The opinion grounds its decision on existing authority (including a binding bench decision of this Court and Madras High Court authorities). The opinion does not state that it is laying down a new principle of law beyond applying those precedents; it treats the cited precedents as controlling and does not indicate the creation of a new precedent in this judgment.
KI/AKJ/R.G.D
Petition allowed.
1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner prays that this Court may be pleased to quash the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority, Mandya, in Subject No. 27(d) dated 27-5-1961 suspending the stage carriage permit of the bus bearing No. MYU 3355 and the confirmation of that order, subject to reduction of period of suspension, by the Mysore State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore in Appeal No. 209 of 1961 dated 4-9-1961 and the further confirmation of the said order, again subject to further reduction of period of suspension, by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, in Appeal No. 956/61 (M.V).
2. The material facts of the case are as follows: It is alleged that Bus bearing No. MYU 3355, owned by the petitioner, was found carrying on 30-3-1961 as many as 84 passengers, while its seating capacity was only 36. In that connection, the conductor of the bus was prosecued in C.C No. 2040/61 on the file of the City Magistrate, Mysore. The learned Magistrate acquitted him holding that the charge levelled against him was not proved. He disbelieved the prosecution evidence as regards the alleged overloading. The said order of acquittal was made on 11-7-1961. The R.T.A Mandya, proceeded against the petitioner in subject No. 27(d) dated 27-5-61 on its file in respect of the alleged overloading. It came to the conclusion that the allegation of overloading of the bus in question is true. Accordingly, it suspended the permit of the bus in question for a period of seven months (from 1-6-61 to 31-12-61). Aggrieved by that order of the R.T.A the petitioner went up in appeal to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal. In appeal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal confirmed the findings of the R.T.A as regards the alleged overloading, but reduced the period of suspension from 7 months to 4 months. A second appeal was taken to the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, which in its turn agreed with the Tribunals below on the question of overloading, but further reduced the period of suspension to three months. Thereafter, this writ petition was filed challenging the legality of the orders passed by the R.T.A, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and the Revenue Appellate Tribunal.
3. This petition came up for hearing on 23-9-1964. The respondents were not represented in the case. After hearing Sri S.J Srinivasan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, we thought that this case raises an important question, of law and hence we requested Sri E.S Venkataramiah to appear as an amicus curiae and assist us. He was good enough to accede to our request and we are thankful to him for his useful assistance. This day we have heard both Shri S.J Srinivasan and Sri E.S Venkataramiah at length. After hearing them, we have come to the conclusion that the orders impugned in this petition ought to be quashed. We shall presently state our reasons for reaching that conclusion.
4. As mentioned earlier, the question, whether the bus in question was overloaded on 30-3-1961 was a question that had been gone into in C.C No. 2040/61 on the file of the City Magistrate, Mysore. After weighing the evidence adduced in the case, the City Magistrate came to the conclusion that the prosecution case is unacceptable and acquitted the accused. The acquittal in question was not on any technical ground. The question for decision is, whether after that decision, it was open to the Tribunals constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act to go into the question of the truth or otherwise of the charge of overloading over again and reach a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the Criminal Court. Is it just and fair for those Tribunals to sit on judgment over the ordinary courts of the land?
5. A somewhat similar question came up for consideration before a Bench of the Madras High Court, consisting of Rajamannar, C.J and Venkatarama Iyer, J. in Jerome D'Silva v. Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1952 Mad 853. Those eminent Judges came to the conclusion that it was impermissible for the R.T.A to reject the conclusion reached by the Criminal Court and come to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the Criminal Court. This is what their Lordships observed in that case:
“We have no hesitation in making it clear that a quasi judicial tribunal like the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal therefrom cannot ignore the findings and orders of competent criminal courts in respect of an offence when the Tribunal proceeds to take any action on the basis of the commission of that offence. Let us take the instance before us. The offence consists in smuggling food grains. For that same offence, the petitioner was criminally prosecuted. He has also been punished by his permit being suspended for a period of three months. If the criminal case against him ends in discharge or acquittal, it means that the petitioner is not guilty of the offence and therefore did not merit any punishment. It would indeed be a strange predicament when in respect of the same offence, he should be punished by one tribunal on the footing that he was guilty of the offence and that he should be honourably acquitted by another Tribunal of the very same offence. As primarily the criminal courts of the land are entrusted with the enquiry into offences, it is desirable that the findings and orders of the criminal courts should be treated as conclusive in proceedings before quasi judicial tribunals like the Transport Authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act.”
6. It may be noted that in the case before their Lordships, the Criminal Court had come to a positive conclusion that the prosecution case was not made out. The acquittal before the Criminal Court was not on any technical grounds such as want of sanction. This position was made clear by the same High Court in Malabar Roadway Service, Kozhikode v. State of Madras, (S) AIR 1955 Mad 176.
7. The same view was taken by this Court in Ekambaram v. General Manager and Competent Authority, M.G.R.T.D, 1961 Mys LJ 1066 : (AIR 1962 Mys 84). In that case this Court laid down that:
“Normally if a person holding a civil post is found to have committed an offence punishable under the Penal Code, he should in the first instance be prosecuted in a criminal Court for that offence. It may be that it is not always necessary to resort to that course since the disciplinary authority would also have a power to make a departmental enquiry into that charge although it is punishable by a criminal court. But if the Department in which the petitioner was holding the civil post chooses to have that charge enquired into by the criminal Court and the criminal Court enquires into it and acquits the civil servant of the charge which had been framed against him, it would be extremely improper for any disciplinary authority to enquire again into that charge and hold him guilty on the very evidence which was produced before the criminal Court and which is disbelieved.”
8. This view was reiterated again by this Court in Mainuddin Alisab Kazi…* (Plaintiff); v. The State Of Mysore… (Defendant)., 1964 (1) Mys LJ 188. The decision in 1961 Mys LJ 1066 : (AIR 1962 Mys 84) being a Bench decision is binding on us. The position of law has been elaborately considered by the Madras High Court in Radhakrishna Mills Ltd. v. Labour Court Coimbatore, 1960-2 Lab LJ 678 : (AIR 1961 Mad 305). That was a case where a workman was chargesheeted for having assaulted and for causing injuries to an officer of the company. The workman was also prosecuted under S. 324 read with S. 148 of the Indian Penal Code for causing injuries to the officer. The worker was convicted of the offence. The management which held a domestic enquiry came to the conclusion that charge levelled against the workman was proved. But no final action was taken against the concerned workman in view of pendency of some adjudication proceedings before Industrial Tribunal. Subsequently the workman was acquitted in appeal by the criminal Court. After the disposal of the Industrial dispute, without considering the acquittal secured by the workman, the management dismissed him from service for the alleged misconduct mentioned above. The propriety of the action of the management in dismissing the workman was referred to adjudication. The labour Court came to the conclusion that the action of the management was not bona fide. It also held on merits that the charge levelled against the concerned worker was not proved. The decision of the Labour Court was challenged by means of a writ petition in the High Court. Dismissing the writ petition, the High Court held that the action of the management in dismissing the concerned workman after his acquittal by the criminal Court must be considered to be mala fide. In the course of the judgment, the learned Judge examined the various decisions bearing on the point.
9. Sri E.S Venkataramiah, arguing in support of the orders impugned in this petition, tried to seek support from the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sree Ramarao, AIR 1963 SC 1723. In our judgment, this decision does not bear on the point under consideration. Therein, their Lordships only considered the nature of the proof required in a criminal case tried before a criminal Court and that required in a disciplinary enquiry under Article 311 of the Constitution. The decision in question did not consider the question of law presented for our decision in this case.
10. Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, 1960-1 Lab LJ 520 : (AIR 1960 SC 806) does not bear on the point under consideration. Therein the question that fell for decision was, whether the employer was competent to hold a domestic enquiry on a charge, which is also the subject matter of a criminal proceeding. As seen above, it is laid down by high authority that when a particular charge had been enquired into and found against by a competent criminal Court, that charge cannot be again enquired into by Tribunals constituted under other enactments, so long as the acquittal before the Criminal Court is not on any technical ground, but on merits.
11. In the result, we allow this petition and quash the impugned orders, viz: the order passed by the 1st respondent in Appeal No. 956/61 (M.V), of the 2nd respondent in Appeal No. 209/61 and of the 3rd respondent in Subject No. 27(d) of 1961. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
KI/AKJ/R.G.D
Petition allowed.
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