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Malkajappa Bhimappa Bennur v. Bhimappa Kashappa Parasannavar
Structured Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (plaintiff in the trial court) filed a suit for recovery of possession of a house and a courtyard (situated to the south of C.T.S. No. 1714 at Ramdurg) against the respondents (defendants). The plaintiff alleged that he owned the suit property and that on 26th February, 1953 he executed an agreement (Exhibit 44) to sell the property to the defendants for Rs. 1,800, receipt of earnest money of Rs. 400 being admitted. The agreement provided that the balance of Rs. 1,400 would be paid within six months and a registered sale deed executed in favour of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were put into possession soon after the agreement, subsequently failed to pay the balance, and despite a notice dated 22nd August, 1953 (Exhibit 46) did not complete payment and registration; the plaintiff accordingly sought possession, three years' compensation at Rs. 60 per year, future mesne profits and costs.
The defendants admitted execution of Exhibit 44 and receipt of Exhibit 46 but alleged intervening claims by the plaintiff's Bhavubands (notice Exhibit 47) and asserted they had taken possession from the Bhavubands after paying Rs. 300 to them; they denied that time was the essence and asserted lawful possession, contending the suit for delivery of possession was not maintainable.
The trial court (Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ramdurg) found the plaintiff blameworthy for non-performance, held time was not the essence, found the plaintiff had delivered possession to the defendants and that the defendants were ready and willing to perform; the trial court directed specific performance by ordering the defendants to pay Rs. 1,400 within a month and execute the sale deed, failing which the plaintiff could recover possession and claim future mesne profits (ascertained under Order 20, Rule 12(1)(c) CPC), and awarded costs.
On appeal the First Additional District Judge, Belgaum, (lower appellate court) inter alia found the plaintiff to be at fault for non-performance and for failing to satisfy the defendants about his title, found the defendants willing to perform and in possession in pursuance of the agreement, held that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act could be availed of, allowed the defendants' cross-objections and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs.
The present opinion arises from the plaintiff's second appeal against that appellate judgment. The appellant advanced two principal contentions on appeal: (i) that the lower appellate court was wrong in holding the respondents were always willing to perform, and (ii) that the appellant was entitled in equity to interest on the unpaid purchase money from the date the respondents were put into possession.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is available to the respondents (defendants) in the circumstances of this case, given the dispute over delivery of possession and assertions regarding willingness to perform the contract.
- Whether the appellant (vendor) is entitled in equity to interest on the unpaid balance of the purchase money from the date the respondents were put into possession, and if so, the period and rate of such interest.
- Whether the findings of fact by the courts below (particularly that the respondents were "all along" willing to perform and that they were put into possession) are open to challenge in this second appeal.
- Whether statutory provisions such as Section 55(4)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act displace the equitable rule that a purchaser put into possession without paying the purchase money is liable for interest.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Sri Mallimath)
- The lower appellate court erred in holding the respondents were always willing to perform; respondents' written statement denied that the plaintiff delivered possession pursuant to Exhibit 44 and stated they took possession from the Bhavubands after paying Rs. 300, which could support an inference that they were not willing to pay the balance.
- Consequently, Section 53-A could not be availed of by the respondents.
- The appellant claimed, in equity, entitlement to interest from the date respondents took possession (though he did not press a claim under Section 55(4)(a)), arguing that in equity the respondents should pay interest on the unpaid purchase money from the date of possession since there was no contrary agreement or circumstances precluding that equitable principle.
Respondents' Arguments
- The lower courts correctly found that the plaintiff failed to remove doubts about his exclusive title and was to be blamed for non-performance; on that basis the plaintiff cannot claim equitable relief such as interest.
- They relied on authorities (cited collectively in the opinion) to support that a vendor who fails to perform or where delay is due to vendor's default may not be entitled to interest.
- It was contended for limitation purposes that Exhibit 44 was dated 26th February, 1958 (a contention addressed in the opinion), which—if accepted—would affect limitation, but the court noted other dates and facts relevant to limitation and damages claimed by the appellant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sobharam v. Totaram | In a suit for specific performance the transferee must prove he was ready and willing to perform the contract; false pleas about performance can show unwillingness and preclude benefit of Section 53-A. | The court agreed with the principle but distinguished the case: here the courts below concurrently found the defendants were ready and willing to perform, so Sobharam v. Totaram was not helpful to the appellant. |
| Nanjedevaru v. H.V. Rama Rao | Section 53-A may be held applicable even if not specifically pleaded; the transferee's willingness to perform must subsist up to the date of hearing; courts may treat general findings as satisfying the requirement of willingness. | The court relied on this decision to support that Section 53-A could be availed of by respondents given the clear findings by the courts below that respondents were willing and that the balance was deposited in court. |
| Narasingerji Gyana Gerji v. Panuganti Parthasarathi (and Puliyadi Navanna Ellarayan v. Kuttuva...) | When a vendor fails to perform and circumstances require the purchaser to keep the purchase money idle, the vendor may not be entitled to interest; if delay in payment is due to vendor's default in showing good title, vendor cannot claim interest. | The court distinguished these decisions on facts: here the respondents were put into possession immediately after the agreement and the purchase money was not shown to be lying idle for the period claimed; thus these authorities did not preclude an award of interest to the appellant. |
| Fludyer v. Cocker (1792) | Equity rule: when purchaser takes possession before conveyance, taking possession is an implied agreement to pay interest on unpaid price — purchaser treats contract as executed and should pay interest while enjoying rents/profits. | The court cited and relied on this foundational equitable principle to hold that the appellant was entitled in equity to interest from the date respondents were put into possession. |
| Bennett v. Stone | Summarises equity position: where purchaser prudently takes possession, purchaser is owner in equity (entitled to rents and profits) and vendor is entitled to purchase-money with interest until payment; conduct can relieve purchaser from liability to pay interest. | The court used this summary to underpin the equitable principle that justified awarding interest, subject to conduct-based exceptions (which the court found did not apply here). |
| Ratanlal v. Bombay Municipal Commissioner | When one party enters into possession of another's property, absent an agreement to the contrary, the date of possession is the proper date from which interest on unpaid price should run. | The court followed this authority in concluding that interest should run from the date respondents took possession (subject to limitation and the period ultimately awarded). |
| Pandurang v. Mahadeo | Applied the principle that a purchaser put into possession without paying the whole price leads to an equitable obligation to pay interest; independent of Transfer of Property Act. | The court cited this case to reinforce that the equitable rule applies where the prospective vendee is put in possession and there is no completed transfer. |
| Rayalamma v. Butchiramayya (citing Viscount Cave, 1925 A.C. 520) | Confirms Chancery practice: purchaser must pay interest from date when he took or might safely have taken possession; this rests on the view that taking possession is an implied agreement to pay interest. | The court relied on this as additional authority for the equitable rule that taking possession implies liability for interest, and applied it to support awarding interest to the appellant. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps, applying findings of fact made by the courts below and established equitable principles and precedents:
- Findings of fact: The court emphasized the clear concurrent findings by the trial and lower appellate courts that (a) the defendants were "all along" ready and willing to perform their part of the contract, and (b) they were put into possession of the suit property immediately after the agreement (Exhibit 44). The court noted that such concurrent factual findings are not to be disturbed in a second appeal.
- Applicability of Section 53-A: Relying on Nanjedevaru v. H.V. Rama Rao, the court held that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act could be availed of by the respondents because both courts had examined the issue and found the respondents entitled to its protection; the court declined to adopt a hyper-technical approach that would deny respondents the section for want of a specific pleading.
- Equitable claim to interest — legal background: The court surveyed an array of authorities (Fludyer v. Cocker; Bennett v. Stone; Ratanlal; Pandurang; Rayalamma) to set out the equitable principle that when a purchaser is put into possession and enjoys use/fruits of the property before completing payment and conveyance, equity implies an agreement to pay interest on the unpaid purchase money from the date of possession, unless conduct of the vendor or purchaser justifies relieving the purchaser.
- Interaction with Section 55(4)(a): The court considered whether Section 55(4)(a) (which allocates rents and profits according to passage of ownership and addresses rights till ownership passes by registered deed) displaces the equitable rule. It concluded that Section 55 applies where there is a completed transfer; where the prospective buyer is put into possession without a completed transfer, Section 55 does not govern that situation, which is therefore governed by the independent equitable principle.
- Application to the present facts: Given the factual findings that respondents were put into possession and were willing to perform, and noting that the respondents deposited the balance purchase money in court on 27th July, 1959 (an admitted fact), the court concluded the equitable principle applied and that the appellant was entitled to interest on the unpaid purchase money. The court rejected respondents' reliance on authorities to deny interest because those cases were distinguishable on their facts (for example, vendor's default in showing title or purchaser having to keep money idle).
- Limitation point and period for interest: The respondents had contended Exhibit 44 was dated 26th February, 1958 (a contention relevant to limitation). The court observed that the suit (filed 8th July, 1957) sought only three years' compensation prior to institution; accordingly, awarding interest up to three years prior to institution did not raise a limitation bar. The court therefore specified the periods for which interest would run.
- Rate and computation of interest: The court found no satisfactory evidence of actual income/profits from the property and, considering all circumstances and authorities, awarded interest at the rate of 3% per annum on the amount due. The interest was to be allowed for the period up to three years prior to institution of the suit (three years prior to 8th July, 1957) and from the date of institution of the suit until the date the balance was deposited in court (27th July, 1959).
- Directions and consequences: The respondents were ordered to deposit the awarded interest amount in the trial court within 60 days from the date of the order; in case of default the appellant would be entitled to recovery of possession. Finally, having considered all circumstances, the court directed that each party should bear their own costs of this appeal.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding: The second appeal was dismissed with modifications: the court upheld the lower courts' findings that the respondents were willing to perform and were put into possession, held that Section 53-A applied in the respondents' favour, and held that the appellant (vendor) was entitled in equity to interest on the unpaid purchase money.
Specific operative consequences:
- The appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of 3% per annum on the balance of the purchase money.
- Interest is allowed for the period up to three years prior to the institution of the suit (i.e., up to three years prior to 8th July, 1957) and from the date of institution of the suit up to 27th July, 1959 (the date on which the respondents deposited the balance in court).
- The respondents must deposit the awarded interest amount in the trial court within 60 days of the order; failing which the appellant will be entitled to recovery of possession.
- Each party is to bear their own costs of this appeal.
Broader implications: The court applied and reaffirmed established equitable principles (as developed in the cited authorities) that possession taken by a purchaser prior to completion implies an obligation to pay interest on unpaid purchase money. The court also clarified that Section 55(4)(a) does not displace that equitable rule where the prospective purchaser is put into possession without a completed transfer. The opinion distinguished decisions relied upon by the respondents and held that, on the facts of this case, those authorities did not preclude an award of interest. The decision does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle but applies existing equitable doctrines to the facts before it.
End of summary based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion.
This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned First Additional District Judge, Belgaum in Civil Appeal No. 51 of 1957 on his file.
The facts relevant to the disposal of this second appeal may be stated briefly as follows: The appellant-plaintiff had filed a suit for recovery of possession of the suit schedule house and a court yard situated to the south of C.T.S No. 1714 at Ramdurg against the defendants who are respondents in this second appeal. The plaintiff's suit was that the suit property belonged to him; a sale transaction with regard to the same was settled between the parties; the plaintiff executed an agreement deed Exhibit 44, dated 26th February, 1953 by which he agreed to sell the property to the defendants for a sum of Rs. 1,800 and in pursuance thereof an earnest money of Rs. 400 was paid by the defendants to the plaintiff. It was stated in the agreement deed that the balance amount, i.e, Rs. 1,400 will be paid within six months from the date of Exhibit 44 and a registered sale deed will be executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendants. It was the case of the plaintiff that the defendants were put into possession of the suit properties soon after the agreement. The plaintiff alleged that he issued a notice to the defendants on 22nd August, 1953 calling upon them to pay the remaining amount of the purchase money and have the sale deed executed in their favour and should they fail to pay the remaining part of the purchase money and have the sale deed executed, the earnest money paid by them will be forfeited and the plaintiff will be entitled to take possession of the suit properties. It was the case of the plaintiff that the defendants failed to pay the remaining purchase amount and take the sale deed of the suit properties as per the terms of the agreement in spite of repeated requests. Therefore he filed the suit in the court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ramdurg for the recovery of possession of the suit property from the defendants and for compensation for wrongful use and occupation of the same for three years at the rate of Rs. 60 per year. He had also prayed for future mesne profits from the date of suit till actual delivery of possession to him together with costs.
The defendants in their written statements admitted execution of the agreement deed Exhibit 44 and also the receipt of notice Exhibit 46 from the plaintiff. But they stated that soon after the receipt of notice Exhibit 46, they had received a notice Exhibit 47 from the Bhavubands of the plaintiff on 26th August, 1953 wherein they had alleged that they have also interest in the suit properties. Thereupon they, i.e, the defendants issued notice Exhibit 45 asking the plaintiff to remove the doubts regarding his title to the suit property. But the plaintiff failed to do the same. They also alleged that the time was not the essence of the contract. They further contended that the plaintiff has not handed over the suit property to them. They alleged that they have paid Rs. 300 to the Bhavubands of the plaintiff and took possession of the same from them. They further contended that their possession to the suit property is lawful and therefore the plaintiff's suit for delivery of possession was unmaintainable. The learned Civil Judge found that the plaintiff was the party to be blamed for the non-performance of the contract, that the time was not the essence of the contract, that the plaintiff delivered the possession of the suit properties to the defendants in pursuance of the agreement and that the defendants on their part were all along ready to perform their part of the contract and they were not to be blamed. On the basis of these findings the learned Civil Judge took an equitable view of the case and ordered specific performance of the contract in the following terms:
“The defendants should pay Rs. 1,400 to the plaintiff within a month and have the sale deed at their costs. If they fail to do so, the plaintiff do recover possession of the suit property forthwith, along with future mesne profits which shall be ascertained under Order 20, Rule 12(1)(c) of the Civil Procedure Code. The defendants shall pay the costs of the plaintiff and bear their own.”
Against this judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge the plaintiff appealed to the First Additional District Judge, Belgaum. The defendants also preferred cross objections to the extent of the order of the learned Civil Judge with regard to costs awarded against them. The learned Additional District Judge inter alia found that the plaintiff was to be blamed for the non-performance of the contract and has failed to satisfy the defendants regarding his exclusive title to the suit property. He further held that the defendants on their part were all along willing to perform their part of the contract and they were not to be blamed. He also found that the defendants got possession of the properties in pursuance of the agreement Exhibit 44. He was also of the view that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act can be availed of in the case. He however allowed the cross objections of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs.
Sri Mallimath, the learned counsel for the, appellant urged two contentions before me. In the first place he contended that the lower appellate court was wrong in holding that the respondents were all along willing to perform their part of the contract. He argued that the defendants—respondents in their written statement denied that the plaintiff had delivered possession of the suit property to them in pursuance of the agreement Exhibit 44 and contended that they paid Rs. 300 to the Bhavubands of the plaintiff and took possession of the suit property from them. He submitted that on the allegations made by the defendants in their written statement, it can reasonably be inferred that they were not willing to pay the balance of the purchase money. He therefore urged that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be availed of by the defendants in this case. In Support of his arguments, he relied on the case of Sobharam v. Totaram(1). It is true in that case, it was held that in a suit for specific performance, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that he was ready and willing to perform the contract as it actually was and not as it is alleged to be by him. Making a false plea that a certain obligation under the contract has been discharged does indeed show an unwillingness on the part of the transferoe to abide strictly by the contract entered into between him and the transferoe. I agree with the principle laid down in that case. But in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case, the ratio of that decision cannot be helpful, in my view, to the appellant. In that case the defendant had alleged that he had paid a sum of Rs. 15 to the vendor plaintiff after execution of the agreement. This allegation of his was found to be false by the Court and on the basis of this finding it was held that it cannot be said that the vendee was ready and willing to perform the contract. Their Lordships observed:
“As regards the transferee's readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, there is, however, no pleading. On the contrary, the respondent's allegation that he paid Rs. 15 to his vendor after the execution of the agreement has been found to be false. Moreover, the respondent has not so far paid the sum of Rs. 10 which, according, to him, was the balance due though under the agreement he had to pay the balance of Rs. 25 to the executant by 2nd September, 1941. ………………………. In the circumstances—it must be held that he was not willing to perform his part of the contract and for that reason he cannot be allowed the benefit of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act.”
But in the instance case as mentioned above, there is the clear concurrent findings of the courts below to the effect that the defendants were all along ready and willing to perform their part of the contract. Hence this case above referred to is distinguishable from the instant case. Moreover the findings of the courts below is a finding of fact which cannot be disputed in second appeal.
In a decision of this Court in Nanjedevaru v. H.V Rama Rao reported in. His Lordship Das Gupta the then Chief Justice observed as follows at Page 175:
“Mr. Krishna Murthi, however appearing on behalf of the respondent in this appeal, strenuously urged before me that Section 53-A cannot be availed of by the appellant in this case. His argument was two fold. In the first place, he contended that it must be shown that the transferee has either performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. He contended that there is no evidence, and it has not been found either, that the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. Mr. Krishnamurthi further urged that there is also no plea that the transferee has performed or was willing to perform his part of the contract.
In my opinion, even though this question, viz., the applicability of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act was not raised by the defendant in his pleading, the same was fully gone into at the hearing by both the courts and both the courts have found that the appellant before me was entitled to avail himself of the provisions of the said section.
I will not be justified, in the circumstances, in taking a too technical view of the matter by holding that in view of the fact that there was no specific averment in his pleadings by the defendant on this question, he should not be allowed to avail himself of the provisions of the said section. On the question as to whether or not the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, it appears that there is a finding of the trial court which, in my opinion, can be taken to be a clear finding of the fact that the defendant was willing to perform his part of the contract. After narrating all the facts relevant to this question, the learned Munsiff says:
“As Shamanna did not execute the sale deed, the defendant deposited the amount in Mysore Government Savings Bank as per the pass book Exhibit XVII. The defendant could not do anything better under those circumstances.”
In my opinion, this should be considered as a finding that the defendant was willing to perform his part of the contract. It is true that there is no such clear finding in the judgment of the lower appellate court. All that the said Court mentioned was that the conditions as laid down in Section 53-A were all fulfilled. The learned Advocate for the appellant contended before us that though put in a general form the said statement implies that the condition, viz., that the transferee was willing to perform his part of the contract, was also fulfilled. Had it been the fact that there is a clear finding on this point by the trial court and the view taken by the trial court as to the applicability of Section 53-A to this case was accepted by the lower appellate court, I would have perhaps sent the case back to the lower appellate court for a finding on this point. But it seems to me that having regard to the fact that there is a clear finding on this point by the lower appellate court and there is a statement, although of a general nature, viz., that the conditions laid down in Section 53-A have been fulfilled in the judgment of the lower appellate court, I do not think it would be right to send the case back to the said court for purposed of coming to a clearer finding on this point.
Apart from this as Mr. Krishnamurthi himself admitted before me, the condition as to willingness must subsist up to the date of hearing of the matter, i.e, even up to the date of hearing of this appeal. I put to the learned advocate for the appellant whether or not he was willing to deposit the sum of Rs. 1,350 in the trial court and he expressed his willingness to do so and gave an undertaking on behalf of his client to that effect.”
In the present case, the court below says:
“Further it has been found that defendants were all along willing to perform their part of the contract. Even at the time of hearing they showed their willingness to abide by the contract.”
It must also be noted here that the remaining balance of the purchase money has been deposited by the respondents in the trial court on 27th July, 1959 and this is an admitted fact in the case. In this view of the matter and in view of the principle laid down in the above mentioned case, I hold that the contention of the learned advocate for the appellant that Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act cannot be availed of by the respondents in this case cannot be accepted.
The next contention of the learned advocate for the appellant is that in view of the finding of the courts below to the effect that the respondents were put into possession of the suit property immediately after the agreement, the appellant is entitled to interest on the remaining amount of the purchase money. Though the learned advocate for the appellant did not press his argument under Section 55(4)(a), Transfer of Property Act he confined his claim to interest only to equity. He contended that in equity the respondents would be liable to pay interest from the date they took possession of the suit property in view of the fact that there was neither a contract to the contrary nor other circumstances which precluded the well recognised principle of equity.
On the other hand, it has been pointed out by the learned Advocate for the respondents, that both the courts below found that the plaintiff failed to clear doubts with regard to his exclusive title to the property and he is only to be blamed for the non-performance of the contract. In view of this finding of the courts below, the plaintiff cannot be held entitled to any equitable relief. The learned advocate for the respondent relied on the following decisions: Narasingerji Gyana Gerji v. Panucanti Parthasarathi and Puliyadi Navanna Ellarayan v. Kuttuva China Kuna Muni Nagandra Iyer(2).
In view of the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it would be opportune to notice the cases recognising the principles of equity laying down its limitations. The earliest case which clearly laid down the rule of equity is found in Fludyer v. Cocker(3). There, in 1792 the defendant entered into contracts for the purchase of estates of the Duke of NEWSCASTLE in three lots. Two of the lots were purchased by private contract on the 7th of May, and the 18th of July: The Duke of NEWSCASTLE covenanting to convey respectively, on or before the 25th of June and 18th of February following: and the defendant covenanting to pay the purchase money at the time of executing the conveyances. The defendant was let into possession of the premises comprised in those lots at MIDSUMMER and CHRISTMAS 1792 respectively. The third lot was purchased by the defendant in July. In 1798, in answer to an application for the residue of the purchase money, with interest, the defendant offered to pay the residue of the purchase money but refused to pay interest. On these facts, the Master of the Rolls made the following observations:
“At law the purchaser could not have the right to the estate, nor the vendor to the money, until the conveyance was executed. But that has nothing to do with the mode, in which this Court executes the agreement. The purchaser might have said, he would not have anything to do with the estate, until he got a conveyance. But that is not the course he took. He enters into possession; an act, that generally amounts to a waiver even of objections to title. He proceeds upon the supposition, that the contract will be executed; and therefore agrees, that from that day he will treat it, as if it was executed. The act of taking possession is an implied agreement to pay interest; for so absurd an agreement, as that the purchaser is to receive the rents and profits, to which he has no legal title, and the vendor is not to have interest, as he has no legal title to the money, can never be implied.”
The aforesaid passage brings out clearly and tersely the principle underlying the rule of equity invoked by the plaintiffs and the implied agreement to pay interest was inferred under the circumstances.
In Bennett v. Stone. Cozens-Hardy L.J summarised the law on the subject at Page 524 as follows:
“The position, of vendor and purchaser under a contract which is silent as to the possession and as to interest does not now admit of doubt. From the time when the purchaser could prudently take possession that is to say, from the time when a good title is first shown—the parties, in the view of a Court of Equity, change characters. The purchaser becomes the owner of the and, and entitled to the rents and profits and bound to discharge outgoings, and the vendor becomes entitled to the purchase-money, with interest until actual payment, and in respect of this right the vendor has a lien open the land for his unpaid purchase-money which the Court will enforce. Whether the interest is greater or less than the rents and profits is wholly immaterial. There may, however, be conduct on the part of the vendor, or of the purchaser, which suffices to relieve the purchaser wholly or in part from the liability to pay interest.”
In India this equitable principle was applied in similar circumstances. In Ratanlal v. Bombay Municipal Commissioner, under the provisions of the Bombay City Improvement Act and the Bombay City Municipal Act, when the appellant submitted a plan for erecting a new building on his property, the Commissioner directed that the line of the new building should be set back which involved a sacrifice to the owner of 28.41 square yards of site. The Municipality had taken possession of the same extent on 30th June, 1909. One of the questions was whether the Municipality was liable to pay interest to the appellant from the date it took possession. The Judicial Committee at Page 134 of A.I.R made the following observations:
“The Board is of opinion that the right to interest depends upon the following broad and clear consideration. Unless there be something in the contract of parties which necessarily imports the opposite, the date when one party enters into possession of the property of another is the proper date from which interest on the unpaid price should run. On the one hand, the new owner has possession, use and fruits; on the other, the former owner, parting with these, has interest on the price. This is sound in the principle, and authority fully warrants it.”
I respectfully follow the above observations.
The Bombay High Court in Pandurang v. Mahadeo, applied the principles laid down in the aforesaid decision of the Judicial Committee to the facts before them. In the Bombay case, in pursuance of a contract for sale of property, the purchaser was let into possession. The vendor sought to recover the balance of the purchase money with interest. The High Court held that he was entitled to recover interest. Macleod C.J, after citing the passage from the decision of the Judicial Committee extracted supra proceeded to state as follows at Page 187:
“That is a principle of equity, and it is quite independent of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. If the ordinary course is followed, the vendor executes the sale-deed the purchaser pays the sale price and gets possession. But if, as happened in this case, the purchaser gets possession without paying the whole of the purchase price, then it follows in equity that he cannot retain money and also enjoy the profits of the property.”
At Page 187. Their Lordships continued to state:
“Now it may very well be that facts can be proved which would disentitle the vendor to receive more than the balance of the purchase money………………………………
The basis of the principle laid by the Privy Council is that the purchaser, in possession and enjoying the fruits of the property should not at the same time be enjoying the use of the unpaid price, unless it can be shown that the parties have contracted to that effect; and admittedly in the case there was no contract that the purchaser should enjoy the interest on his moneys as well as the profits of the property.”
A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Rayalamma v. Butchiramayya, accepted this principle. Venkataramana Rao, J., at Page 437 observed:
“In case of sales and purchases of land, as pointed out by Viscount Cave in 1925 A.C 520 at p. 532 ‘it is the practice of the Court of Chancery to require the purchaser to pay interest on his purchase money from the date when he took, or might safely have taken possession of the land; but this practice rests upon the view that the act of taking possession is an implied agreement to pay interest, and this rule has been extended to cases of compulsory purchase under the statutory enactments’”.
In this connection, the question to be considered is whether this rule of equity displaces the statutory provisions of Section 55(4)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. If it does not, then the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant falls to the ground. It is true that when a situation is governed by a statute equity has no place. But cannot be said that Section 55(4)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to the facts of the present case. This section reads:
“In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immoveable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property sold:
(4) The seller is entitled—
(a) to the rents and profits of the property till the ownership thereof passes to the buyer;
………………………………..”
It will be seen that Section 55 of the Act debars the rights and liabilities between the seller and the buyer. Sub-section 4(a) of Section 55 enacts that till the date the ownership passes to the buyer the Vendor would get the rents and profits of the property and thereafter the vendee gets them. In the case of immoveable property the title passes only after the registered deed is executed. This clause gives the rents and profits of the property upto that date to the vendor and those accruing thereafter to the vendee. If the alienated property is in possession of the tenant, the rule apportions the rent between the vendor and the vendee. So too, if the vendor continues to be in actual possession after the title passes, he would have to pay the rents and profits realised to the vendee.
But this provision in my view has no application to a case where in respect of the transfer of property the prospective buyer is put in possession of the property. In that case there is no completed transfer and therefore the statutory rule has no application. That situation therefore is not provided for by Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. This is governed by the equitable principle laid down in the aforesaid cases on the basis of an implied agreement arising out of taking over possession without paying consideration amount.
The aforesaid principle of equity is independent of the Transfer of Property Act. Having regard to the circumstances, the courts implied an equitable arrangement between the parties. The prospective vendee cannot take possession of the property and at the same time enjoy the use of the unpaid price. Thus an agreement may be negatived by a contract either express or implied. The conduct of the vendor and the purchaser may relieve the purchaser wholly or in part from the liability to pay interest. For instance if the vendor did not take the consideration amount though offered by the purchaser, he may by his conduct preclude himself from claiming the interest.
As mentioned above on the material in record, there is a clear finding of the courts below that immediately after the agreement Exhibit 44 the defendants—respondents were put into possession of the suit property by the plaintiff—appellant. The circumstances that the appellant could not remove the doubts over his title cannot in my opinion be such a conduct on the part of the appellant which suffices to relieve the respondent—purchasers from the liability to pay interest wholly or in part. Therefore the equitable principle would be available to the appellant in this case. As laid down in the above referred cases, he would be entitled to the interest on the unpaid purchase money from the respondents.
In support of his contentions that the appellant vendor cannot be held entitled to any interest in equity, the learned advocate for the respondents relied on the case of Narsingerji Gyana Gerji v. Panuganti Parthasaradhi and Puliyadi Navanna Ellarayan v. Kuttuva Kuna Muni Nangendra Iyen. In the first case, it has been laid down that when a vendor fails to perform his part of the contract and the circumstances are such as to require the purchaser to keep the purchase money lying idle and unproductive, the vendor will not be entitled to interest. Obviously the facts of that case are distinguishable from the present case. The respondents got into possession of the disputed property immediately after the execution of the deed of agreement and there is a clear finding to that effect of the courts below. Further in the instant case it cannot be said that the purchase money was lying idle during the period in which the appellant is held entitled to the interest.
In the latter case, it has been held that:
“In the absence of any express stipulation to the contrary the purchaser is considered as in possession from the date when he completes his contract after the time mentioned for completion and from that moment he takes the rents and profits and pays interest.
In the absence of an express condition in the contract of sale to cover all possible causes of delay, the general rule must prevail according to which if one of two contracting parties causes the other to commit a breach of one of the conditions of the contract the party at fault cannot profit by his own fault and exact the penalty for the breach.
If delay in the payment of purchase—money is due to the vendor's own default in showing a good title, he will not be entitled to take advantage of his own wrong and to claim interest.”
This case also is not helpful to the respondents. In that case the court had declined to award interest on the unpaid purchase money to the vendor on the ground that delay in the payment of the same was due to the vendor's own default in showing a good title. The decision of the court proceeded on the particular facts and circumstances of that case and hence the ratio of that decision cannot have a bearing on the point for determination in this case. That apart in view of the equitable principle as observed above, that decision also cannot be of any help to the respondents.
It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the agreement Exhibit 44 is dated 26th February, 1958. Therefore, even if it is held that the appellant is entitled to interest such a claim is barred by time. It is true that the suit for the recovery of possession in the court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ramdurg was filed on 8th July, 1957, viz., about 4 years after the execution of the agreement deed Exhibit 44. But in that suit the appellant has claimed only 3 years' compensation prior to the institution of the suit along with future mesne-profits. Therefore in awarding interest to the appellant upto 3 years prior to the institution of the suit no question of limitation can arise.
As mentioned above the respondents have deposited in court, the balance of the purchase money on 27th July, 1959. The appellant will therefore be entitled to future interests upto that date only.
The next question is what would be the rate of interest in the circumstances of this case. The appellant has claimed damages at the rate of Rs. 60 per annum. There is no satisfactory evidence on record as to what income and profit is derived by the respondents from the suit property. Therefore the same cannot be a relevant factor for determination of the interest. But taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, I hold that the appellant is entitled in equity to have interest at the rate of 3 per cent per annum on the amount due to him from the respondents having regard to the aforesaid principle. He will be entitled to interest at this rate upto three years prior to the institution of the suit, viz., three years prior to 8th July, 1957 and also from the date of the institution of the suit upto the date on which the balance of the purchase money has been deposited into the court, viz., 27th July, 1959. The respondents should deposit the same in the trial court within 60 days from the date of this order. In case of default the appellant will be entitled to recovery of possession.
Taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, I think it would be just and equitable that the parties should be directed to bear their own costs of this appeal and it is so ordered.
In the result, this appeal is dismissed with the above modifications.
Transfer of Property Act.Alert