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Gurunath v. Dhakappa Sirsi

Karnataka High Court
Aug 22, 1963
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Legal Opinion Summary — Reference by Income-Appellate Tribunal (Hegde, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a reference made by the Income-Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench "B", under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in I.T.A. No. 2789 of 1961–1962.

The underlying facts, as stated in the opinion, are:

  • A Hindu Undivided Family (H.U.F.) conducted a business dealing in betelnuts, cardamoms, pepper, etc., with its place of business at Sirsi, North Kanara District.
  • Shri Gurunath Venkatrao Dhakappa (the petitioner) had been in managerial charge of the business and, while the business was carried on by the undivided family, was paid remuneration of Rs. 500 per month.
  • In 1957 the H.U.F. was divided and the coparceners entered into a registered partnership deed dated 26 August 1957 (13 partners). Clause 7 of the deed provided that Shri Gurunath V. Dhakappa "shall continue as Manager on a remuneration of Rs. 500" per month; Clause 8 provided for assistant managers at Rs. 200 each; Clause 9 empowered the manager to appoint assistant managers from amongst partners on a salary borne by the manager; other clauses covered accounts, powers, duties, prohibitions, etc.
  • For the assessment year 1960–1961 (previous year ending 3 Oct 1959) the firm was registered and the total share of profit allocated under Section 23(6) was assessed as Rs. 14,734, which included Rs. 6,000 being the annual salary payable under Clause 7.
  • The assessee (H.U.F.) claimed that the Rs. 6,000 paid to Shri G.V. Dhakappa was his individual income and should not be included in the H.U.F.'s assessment. The Income-tax Officer rejected this claim and included the sum in the H.U.F.'s total income. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner upheld that inclusion and relied on the proposition that a partner cannot be an employee, and he cited S. Magnus (33 I.T.R. 538).
  • The Appellate Tribunal also rejected the assessee's claim for two main reasons: (1) a partner in a partnership cannot be the firm's employee so the payment is a share of profit; and (2) Section 16(1)(b) would justify inclusion in the share assessment.
  • The Tribunal referred the following question of law to the High Court: whether, having regard to Section 10(4)(b) and Section 16(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the salary paid per Clause 7 should be excluded from the H.U.F.'s assessment and assessed in the hands of the individual Shri G.V. Dhakappa. Both parties agreed to that formulation; an additional question proposed by the assessee was rejected by the Tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether on the facts of this case, and having regard to Section 10(4)(b) and Section 16(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the salary paid as per Clause 7 of the partnership deed is liable to be excluded from the assessment of the assessee H.U.F. and assessed in the hands of the individual Shri G.V. Dhakappa.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessee's Arguments

  • The assessee contended that the sum of Rs. 6,000 paid to Shri G.V. Dhakappa for his managerial services was his individual income and should not be included in the H.U.F.'s assessment.

Revenue's Arguments

  • The Income-tax Officer and the Revenue argued that a partner cannot be an employee of the partnership; therefore the remuneration is effectively a part of the partner's share of the profits and properly assessable to the H.U.F. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner relied on the Bombay High Court decision in S. Magnus (33 I.T.R. 538).
  • The Tribunal added that if the person receiving the salary was a partner, Section 16(1)(b) would justify inclusion of such receipts in assessing the share income.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S. Magnus (33 I.T.R. 538) Authority relied on by Revenue/Appellate Assistant Commissioner for the proposition that a partner cannot be an employee and remuneration is part of share of profits. The Court noted that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner adopted this decision, but the Court expressed doubt about the correctness of S. Magnus and indicated it may be open to doubt; it did not consider S. Magnus determinative for the present case.
Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co. Decision concerning the English Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897; earlier courts had applied it in partnership contexts. The Court held Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co. was not apposite as it turned on the English Workmen's Compensation Act and therefore did not govern the present Partnership Act questions in India.
R.A. Goodsir & Co., Madras v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax (Madras) Earlier authority on related issues (specific relevance not expanded in the opinion). The Court said that the Goodsir decision was not relevant to the specific question before it.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Darsanram (Patna High Court) Rule concerning when managerial remuneration should be treated as personal income rather than family or firm income. The Court found that the present case fell within the rule laid down by Darsanram and regarded that rule as correctly laid down; the Court applied that rule in deciding that remuneration was the individual's income.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. S.N.N. Sankaralinga Ayyar (Madras) Earlier Madras High Court decision relevant to managerial remuneration issues. The Court said it would have been happy to cite it with approval but noted that its correctness had been doubted by the Supreme Court in Kalu Babu Lal Chand.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal v. Kalu Babu Lal Chand (Supreme Court) Held that managing director's remuneration was income of the joint family where the facts (vested management right, family financing, shares held with family funds, remuneration credited to family books) supported family assessment. The Court acknowledged that Revenue relied strongly on Kalu Babu Lal Chand, but it distinguished the present case from Kalu Babu Lal Chand on the facts and explained why the Supreme Court's reasoning in that case did not require the same result here.
Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi (Supreme Court) Decision interpreting the allocation of managerial remuneration between individual and joint family in particular factual settings; discussed Kalu Babu Lal Chand. The Court stated that Piyare Lal supports the conclusion reached in the present case and relied on the observations in Piyare Lal to distinguish Kalu Babu Lal Chand and to support finding the remuneration was individual income.
Gokul Chand v. Hukan Chand Nath Mal (Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) Legal principle relating to allocation of managerial/earned remuneration vis-à-vis family income adopted in later Supreme Court decisions. The Court noted that the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee was applied by the Supreme Court in Kalu Babu Lal Chand and Piyare Lal, and it applied the same rule to the facts of the present case to conclude in favour of the assessee.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a sequence of fact-oriented and legal steps:

  1. Examination of the partnership deed and factual matrix:
    • The partnership deed (26 August 1957) expressly provided for remuneration to the manager (Clause 7), assistant managers (Clause 8), and empowered the manager to appoint assistant managers from among partners (Clause 9). There were 13 partners; many partners appear to have been capital providers who did not participate actively in management.
  2. Application of partnership law:
    • The Court concluded that the case does not fall under Section 9 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (which addresses certain partnership presumptions), but falls under Section 13(a) of that Act. Section 13(a) permits partners by contract to provide for remuneration contrary to the general rule that a partner is not entitled to remuneration for taking part in conduct of the business. Because there was an explicit contract to remunerate the manager, the Court found it cannot accept the Revenue's contention that the payment was merely a share of profits.
  3. Rejection of inapposite authority:
    • The English decision in Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co. was deemed inapposite because it turned on the English Workmen's Compensation Act, not the Partnership Act as applicable in India.
    • The Court stated it was not concerned with whether the remuneration should be deducted from partnership profits; rather, the sole issue was whether the remuneration is individual income or family income for assessment.
  4. Fact‑centered assessment of the payee's role:
    • The Court emphasized that Shri Gurunath V. Dhakappa had been separately remunerated by the undivided family prior to partition, which indicates that the remuneration was personal in character.
    • The Court noted that while family capital financed the business, capital alone does not generate profit; management skill and direction matter. The partners appear to have allowed remuneration because they expected the manager's skill to benefit the partnership. The manager's selection was likely due to his qualifications and ability, not solely because he was a partner.
    • The Court found no evidence that management involvement exposed Shri Gurunath or his family to the business risk in a manner that would justify treating the remuneration as family income.
  5. Reliance on and distinction from precedents:
    • The Court found guidance in the Patna High Court decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Darsanram and regarded that rule as correctly stated and applicable.
    • The Court acknowledged decisions from Madras and Supreme Court authorities (including S.N.N. Sankaralinga Ayyar, Kalu Babu Lal Chand and Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal) and analyzed them: Kalu Babu Lal Chand was relied upon by the Revenue but was distinguished on facts (vesting of management right, family financing and crediting of remuneration to family books in that case made it different). Piyare Lal was taken as supportive of the Court's conclusion.
    • The Court indicated the judicial principles in Gokul Chand v. Hukan Chand Nath Mal (as applied by higher courts) are relevant and applied the same reasoning to the present facts.
  6. Conclusion of analysis:
    • On the specific facts—prior separate remuneration under the undivided family, partnership deed provisions, predominance of capital-supplying partners, manager’s personal contribution to business success—the Court concluded that the remuneration paid to Shri Gurunath V. Dhakappa should be regarded as his individual income rather than income of the H.U.F.
    • The Court expressly stated that it was answering the referred question in the negative (i.e., the salary should not be excluded from the individual's assessment and included in the family assessment), thereby deciding in favour of the assessee.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court answered the referred question in the negative and held that the inclusion of the salary paid by the firm to Shri Gurunath V. Dhakappa for services rendered by him as manager in the total income of the assessee family was illegal and improper.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect: The Rs. 6,000 annual remuneration paid to Shri Gurunath V. Dhakappa is to be treated as his individual income and not as the income of the H.U.F.; accordingly, it should not have been included in the H.U.F.'s assessment.
  • On precedent: The Court distinguished certain earlier authorities (notably Kalu Babu Lal Chand on its facts) and applied the rule in Darsanram and the reasoning in Piyare Lal and Gokul Chand to the facts. The opinion stated that the decision of the Bombay High Court in S. Magnus is open to doubt, but the Court's ruling arises from the specific facts and contractual arrangement in the partnership deed rather than setting an abstract new legal principle beyond those facts.
  • Costs: The Revenue was ordered to pay the costs. Advocate's fee was fixed at Rs. 250.

Note: This summary is prepared solely from the language and content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or legal inferences beyond what the opinion itself states.

Show all summary ...

Hegde, J.:— This is a reference made by the Income-Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench “B”, under Section 66(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, in I.T.A No. 2789 of 1961–1962 on its file.

Statement of Case:

“The assessment year under reference in 1960–1961, the relevant previous year being the years ended on 3rd October, 1959. The assessee is a Hindu Undivided Family. It was carrying on a business. For services rendered in carrying on the said business, one of the members of the H.U.F Shri G.V Dhakappa was paid remuneration at the rate of Rs. 500 p.m This business was converted into a partnership business. There is a deed, dated 26th August, 1957 constituting the said firm and it is annexed hereto as Annexure “A” and forms part of the case. The then kartha Shri G.V Dhakappa has entered into the agreement of partnership on behalf of the family. Clause 7 of Annexure “A” runs as follows:

“Gurunath Venkatrao Dhakappa, party of the first part and hereto Manager of the partnership business shall continue as a Manager on a remuneration of Rs. 500.”

For the relevant year the firm was registered and the total share of profit allocated under Section 23(6) as per the assessment made on the registered firm is Rs. 14,734 which includes Rs. 6,000 being salary payable as per Clause 7 extracted above at the rate of Rs. 500 p.m It was claimed before the Income-tax Officer that a sum of Rs. 6,000 paid to Shri G.V Dhakappa was his individual income and as such it should not be included in the assessment of the H.U.F under consideration. This claim was rejected by the Income-tax Officer observing as follows:

“Though there are other employees, nothing is discussed in the partnership deed. The appointment of Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa by the firm in Clause 7 of the deed, dated 26th August, 1957 is of Sri Gurunath v. Dhakappa party of the first part, i.e, partner shown at Sl. No. 1 in the partnership deed and no other person. For the assessment year 1957–1958 and 1958–1959 salary income of Rs. 6,000 of Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa was included in the total income of the assessee. On the ground that as permitted by Clause 9 of the partnership deed assessee had employed Sri Triambak G. Dhakappa, the Tribunal has only allowed salary paid to Sri Triambak G. Dhakappa by the assessee family. These circumstances and the fact that by Clause 9 of the partnership deed, the manager (in the present case assessee) has been given power to appoint one or more assistant managers from amongst the partners to assist him on the salary to be borne by the assessee which indicate that the salary to the Manager Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa is in the capacity of a partner (assessee) and not as an outsider. I, therefore hold that the salary of Rs. 6,000 received by Sri Gurunath v. Dhakappa is in his capacity as a partner and not in his individual capacity, and therefore include the salary income of Rs. 6,000 from V.K Dhakappa in the total income.”

A copy of the assessment order is annexed hereto as Annexure “B” and forms part of the case.

There was an appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in which this objection was repealed. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, whose order is annexed as Annexure “C” and forms part of the case, upheld the assessment and in the course of his order observed:

“A partner cannot be an employee of a partnership. The “firm” is only a compendious term used to refer to the partners. Therefore an agreement of partnership in which a partner is to be remunerated for services gets his remuneration by virtue of his membership of the firm. The salary is therefore only as a part of the share of profits received from the firm. This view is supported by the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of S. Magnus (33 I.T.R 538). Since the salary of Rs. 6,000 is part of the share of profits received from the firm of V.K Dhakappa and since such share is admittedly the income of the firm, the action of the Income-tax Officer in including the whole of the share of profits in the assessment of the family was in my opinion, justified.”

On further appeal to the Tribunal it was contended that the sum of Rs. 6,000 was the individual income of Shri G.V Dhakappa. The Tribunal also did not accept the assessee's claim set out in its order (made Annexure “D” and forming part of the case) mainly for 2 reasons:

(1) A partner in a partnership cannot be the firm's employee and therefore this is only a share of profit from the firm.

(2) If the person who received the salary was a partner, whatever may be the capacity in which he received salary whether as partner or in any different character, the provisions of Section 16(1)(b) would justify the inclusion of the same in assessing the share income.

On the aforesaid facts, the following question of law arises:

“Whether on the facts of this case, and having regard to Section 10(4)(b) and Section 16(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, the salary paid as per Clause 7 of Annexure “A” is liable to be excluded from the assessment of the assessee H.U.F and assessed in the hands of the individual Sri G.V Dhakappa.”

Both parties agree to the statement as drafted above. The learned Counsel for the assessee wants the following question also to be referred to the High Court:

“Whether the inclusion of the salary paid by the firm to Shri Gurunath Dhakappa, for services rendered by him as Manager in the total income of the assessee family, is legal and proper?”.

We consider that the controversy between the parties is brought out in the question as formulated in Para 6 above. We, therefore, reject this suggestion.”

The concern with which we are concerned in this reference was originally a Hindu Undivided Family concern. It was dealing in and continues to deal with betelnuts, cardamoms, pepper, etc. Its place of business is at Sirsi in North Kanara District. Even during the time when the business was run by the joint Hindu undivided family of the parties, the petitioner Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa was in charge of the management and for the work done by him, he was being remunerated at Rs. 500 per month. At the time of the hearing of this reference, we were told that Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa is a Law Graduate and that before he took up the management of the partnership business, he was an Advocate by profession. But this submission was not substantiated by any material on record.

The Hindu undivided family of Shri Dhakappa was divided in the year 1957 and thereafter the coparceners entered into a partnership, as per the registered deed, dated 26th August, 1957 and marked as Annexure “A” in the case. As seen from that deed there were as many as 13 partners. Under the deed of partnership the partners are to share the profits and losses of the partnership business in accordance with the provisions contained in the deed. Under Clause 7 of the deed, partners have agreed that Shri Gurunath Venkatrao Dhakappa (the petitioner herein) “party of the first part and hereto manager of the partnership business shall continue as manager on a monthly remuneration of Rs. 500”. Clause 8 provides that Mohan Vasudevrao Dhakappa the eighth party to the deed and Shri Shamsunder Vasudevrao Dhakappa “hereto Assistant Managers of the Partnership business shall continue as Assistant Managers on a monthly remuneration of Rs. 200 each”. Clause 9 says that “the manager may at any time for the good and efficient conduct of the partnership business appoint and/or continue appointment of one more Assistant Manager from amongst the partners to assist him on a salary to be Borne by him”. Clause 10 provides for the maintenance of account nooks, to which the partners should have access at all time. Clause 11 prohibits the manager from doing certain things. Clause 15 enumerates the powers of the manager. Clause 16 sets out the duties of the Assistant Managers. On an examination of the partnership deed, it is clear that the partners had agreed to remunerate the manager for the duties performed by him. Therefore, the present case is not one that falls within the scope of Section 9 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, but it falls under Section 13(a) of that Act, which provides that subject to contract between the partners, a partner is not entitled to receive remuneration for taking part in the conduct of the business. In the instant case there is a contract to the contrary. Hence it is not possible to agree with the learned Counsel for the Revenue that the remuneration received by Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa is only a share of his profits. We do not think that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co.(1) is apposite for our present purpose. That decision turned on the provisions of the English Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897. The rights and duties of the partners in a partnership firm, in this Country is governed by the provisions of the Partnership Act and not by abstract doctrines such as that a person cannot be an employee as well as his employer. Further in this case, we are not on the question whether the remuneration received by Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa should be deducted from the profits of the partnership firm. The only question that we have to decide is whether the remuneration received by Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa should be considered as his individual income or that of his family. Hence we are not concerned with Section 10(4)(b) or Section 16(1)(b) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 in this case. But, if under the law of partnership a partnership firm cannot remunerate a partner, there was no need for Section 10(4)(b) or Section 16(1)(b) of the Income-Tax Act. But this is only by the way. In my view the correctness of the decision of the Bombay High Court in S. Magnus… v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Bombay City Ii, Bombay,…., Bombay City II(2) which accepted and adopted the law as enunciated in Ellis v. Joseph Ellis & Co. is open to doubt. But the question of law decided in that case does not specifically arise for decision in this case.

As mentioned earlier, all that we have to decide in this case is whether remuneration received by Shri Dhakappa should be considered as his income or that of his family. In that view, the decision of the Madras High Court in R.A Goodsir & Co., Madras v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Madras is also not relevant.

Now coming to the real point in controversy, namely whether the remuneration given to Shri Dhakappa should be held to be his individual income or the income of his family, this essentially a quest on of fact, and we have to answer that question with reference to the facts of this case. It is true that the capital for the partnership firm was provided by Shri Dhakappa's family and therefore the earnings made by the firm are in a way traceable to the capital supplied by the family. But it must be remembered that investment is but one fact of a bus ness. The know-how, and intelligent direct on is no less important. Business concerns do not earn profit's merely because capital is invested in them. Much depends on the persons who are in charge of the business. Captains of industries and managers of bus ness concerns should possess, business knowledge, tact, capacity, drive and numerous other qualities. The ability of Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa in the matter of business management was evidently recognised by the family even when the bus ness was conducted by the Hindu undivided family. As mentioned earlier, even at that time he was paid a remuneration of Rs. 500 per month. The remuneration so paid must necessarily be held to be his personal income. Otherwise there was no point in the Hindu undivided family paying remuneration in one hand and receiving it by the other. There is no reason to think that there was any charge in the circumstances when the undivided family broke up and a partnership was formed. From the available material, it appears that all the partners did not take part in the business. Most of them merely supplied the capital and shared the profits and losses. Hence there is nothing surprising if they agreed to remunerate the manager and the assistant managers. It may be and it is very likely that one of the reasons for selecting Shri Gurunath v. Dhakappa as manager was that he was one of the partners. But that cannot be said to be the sole reason or the exclusive reason. There were thirteen partners. The choice need not have fallen on him if he had no extra qualifications. It is likely that he was selected for the reason that the partners thought that his services would benefit the partnership and therefore they agreed to remunerate him for his skill and ability.

In this case, it cannot be said that the management by Shri Dhakappa involved any risk to his family as such. Nor can it be said except in a very remote sense—that he took the and of the family for the purpose of management.

In my opinion, the present case falls within the rule laid down by the Patna High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Darsanram which in my opinion, if I may say so with respect, lays down the law correctly.

In this connection I should have been happy to cite with approval the decision of the Madras High Court in Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. S.N.N. Sankaralinga Ayyar but for the doubt cast on its correctness by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal v. Kalu Bobu Lal Chand(3).

Then we come to the decision of the Supreme Court in Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Delhi(4) which supports the conclusion reached by me.

On behalf of the Revenue, strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal v. Kalu Babu Lal Chand. Therein one R, the karta of a Hindu undivided family, was one of the promoters of a company to be floated, took over a business as a going concern and carried on the business on behalf of the company until it was incorporated in December 1930; the articles of association of the company provided that R would be the first managing director specified his remuneration and required the company to enter into an agreement with R; the agreement however was not actually entered into until January 1934; it was found by the Appellate Tribunal that the shares held in the names of R and his brother were acquired with funds belonging to the joint family and the family was in enjoyment of the dividends paid on these shares; further, the company was floated with funds provided by the family and R made no contribution in that respect; the company was all along financed by the family prior to the accounting year relevant to the assessment year 1943–1944 the managing director remuneration received by R was credited in the books of the family in the assessment for 1943–1944 for the first time it was claimed that the whole of the managing director's remuneration constituted the personal earnings of R and should not be added to the income of the family; Art. 132 of the Articles of Association of the said company provided that the first managing director would be the said R. or “his assigns or successors in business whether under his name or any other style or firm” and that the said R would continue to be the managing director until he would resign or be found guilty of any act of fraud or dishonestly or be removed in the manner thereinafter provided. The right of management given to R was a vested right, assignable as well as heritable. It is under those circumstances the Supreme Court held that the managing director's remuneration received by R was as between him and the Hindu undivided family, the income of the family and should be assessed in its hands. Dealing with this case, this is what the Supreme Court observed in Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi: (at page 25):

“Counsel for the respondent also relied on Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kalu Babu Lal Chand where the managing director's remune-remuneration was held to be the income of a joint family to be assessed as such in its hands. That case is distinguishable. There the karat of a Hindu undivided family took over a business as a going concern and carried on the business till the company was incorporated. The shares in the name of the karta and his brother were acquired with the funds of the joint family. The company was floated with the funds of the joint family and was financed by it and the remuneration received was credited in the books of the family. The office of the Managing Director itself was assignable. The articles of association provided that the karta or his assigns or successors in business “whether under his name or any other style or firm” would be the managing director of the company and he was to continue for life until removed because of fraud or dishonesty. Thus the acquisition of business the flotation of the company and the appointment of the managing director were inseparably linked together. The facts of that case were quite different from that of the present case …………”

Counsel for parties have cited various other decisions. We have not thought it necessary to deal with them as such one of them turned on the peculiar facts of its case. As regards the principal of law concerned, there is not much room for dispute. The real difficulty arises in supplying that principle to the facts of a given case.

Applying the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Gokul Chand v. Hukan Chand Nath Mal the Supreme Court in Kalu Babu Lal Chand's case and in Piyare Lal Adishwar Lal's case to the facts of the present have come to the conclusion that the question referred to us must be answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. In other words, my answer to that question is that the inclusion of the salary paid by the firm to Shri Gurunath Dhakappa, for services rendered by him as manager, in the total income of the assessee family, is illegal and improper.

Revenue to pay the costs.

Advocate's fee Rs. 250.