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C. Muttu v. Bharath Match Works, Sivakasi

Karnataka High Court
Aug 7, 1963
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Analytical Summary of the Opinion — Revision Petition Challenging Dismissal of Suit No. 163 of 1958

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner originally instituted Small Cause Suit No. 163 of 1958 in the Court of the II Additional Subordinate Judge, South Kanara, Mangalore on 31-7-1958 against P.K. Periaswamy Nadar, Proprietor, Bharata Match Works, Sivakasi, for recovery of Rs. 974-49 nP with future interest and costs.

It was later discovered that P.K. Periaswamy Nadar had died on 1-6-1958 — before the suit was filed. On 19-9-1958 the petitioner applied under Order XXII Rule 4 and Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) to amend the plaint by deleting the name of P.K. Periaswamy Nadar and substituting S. Thangamani Ammal as defendant. The Subordinate Judge permitted the amendment; Thangamani Ammal was brought on record and served.

Thangamani Ammal filed a written statement asserting, inter alia, that the suit was a nullity because it had been instituted against a person who was already dead at the time of filing and that no amendment to substitute her could be permitted; she contended the suit should be dismissed in limine. The Subordinate Judge heard the preliminary point on maintainability, reviewed decisions of several High Courts, concluded the suit filed against a person dead at the institution date was a nullity, and dismissed the suit with costs.

The petitioner filed this revision petition challenging the correctness of the Subordinate Judge's order. One judge referred the matter to a Division Bench because it raised the important question whether a suit brought against a person who was dead at the time of filing can be amended by substituting another person as defendant.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit instituted against a person who was dead at the time of its institution is a nullity.
  2. Whether such a suit may be amended by deleting the name of the deceased original defendant and substituting another person (for example, the deceased's legal representative) as defendant — in particular, whether permission under Order XXII Rule 4, Order I Rule 10(2) or Section 151 C.P.C. to amend is maintainable in that circumstance.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner (through Sri Padubidri Raghavendra Rao) submitted that the application under Order XXII Rule 4 and Section 151 C.P.C. to amend the plaint by deleting the name of P.K. Periaswamy Nadar and substituting the respondent was maintainable even though the original defendant was dead at the time the suit was instituted.
  • Numerous High Court decisions were cited on behalf of the petitioner in support of the maintainability of the amendment application.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent (S. Thangamani Ammal) contended that P.K. Periaswamy Nadar had died before the suit was filed (1-6-1958) and therefore the suit filed on 31-7-1958 was a suit against a dead person and a nullity.
  • Consequently, the respondent argued, no amendment bringing her on record as substitute defendant could lawfully be allowed and the suit was liable to be dismissed at the outset.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Savitramma v. Nanjundappa, 25 Mys. LJ 113 (Division Bench, former High Court of Mysore) Held that when a suit is brought against a sole defendant who had died before institution, the suit is a nullity and the court has no jurisdiction to substitute the legal representative under Section 153 or Order I Rule 10(2) C.P.C. The Court treated this decision as directly analogous and relied on it as a principal authority supporting the rule that substitution is not permissible where the sole defendant was dead before suit institution.
Mohun Chunder Koondoo v. Azeem Gazee Chowkeedar, 12 Suth W.R. 45 : 3 Beng LR AC 233 (Sir Barnes Peacock C.J.) Courts have no jurisdiction to decide a suit filed against a dead person; such a suit is a nullity. Quoted as establishing the foundational principle that a suit issued against a dead man is a nullity; later followed by other High Courts.
Veerappa Chetty v. Tindal Ponnen, ILR 31 Mad 86 (Madras High Court) Presentation of a plaint corresponds to issue of a writ; issue of a writ against a dead man is a nullity, so a plaint presented against a dead person is likewise a nullity. Applied as supporting authority for the nullity principle; cited to show Madras High Court alignment with that view.
In re Arunachalam Chettiar, 30 Ind Cas 679 : AIR 1916 Mad 440 Followed the view that a suit instituted against a dead person is a nullity. Noted by the Court as one of the Madras decisions following the same principle.
Rasa Goundan v. Pichamuthu Pillai, 42 Ind Cas 539 : AIR 1918 Mad 794 Reaffirmed the rule that a suit filed against a dead person is a nullity. Cited among Madras precedents consistent with the nullity rule.
Rampraiab Brijmohandas v. Gowrishankar Kashiram, 85 Ind Cas 464 : AIR 1924 Bom 109 (Bombay High Court) Where defendant dies before the suit and suit is brought in his name, the suit is a nullity; orders allowing amendment to substitute legal representatives are nullities; bona fides or ignorance is immaterial. Quoted by the Court (Mulla J.'s observation) to support the proposition that amendment/substitution is impermissible when the original defendant was dead at institution date.
Bejoy Chand Mahatap Bahadur v. Amulya Charan Mitra, 24 Ind Cas 112 : AIR 1914 Cal 895 (Calcutta High Court) Provisions for substitution of heirs of deceased defendant apply only where the original defendant was alive at the date of institution; substitution not meant for cases where defendant was dead before institution. Relied upon to support the interpretation that substitution applies only where the defendant was alive at institution and omission to use "substituted" in rules is deliberate.
Sisir Kumar v. Manindra Kumar Biswas, AIR 1958 Cal 681 (Division Bench, Calcutta High Court) Explained that Order I Rule 10(2) distinguishes between 'addition' and 'substitution' and that sub-rule (2) contemplates addition but not substitution where there is no party already on record to be added to. Used by the Court to elucidate the limits of Order I Rule 10(2) and to reinforce the conclusion that substitution where the sole defendant was dead at institution is not contemplated.
Municipal Corporation of Karachi v. Baradiojumoo Mughal, AIR 1946 Sind 20 After review, held that a suit filed against a dead person is a nullity and the court has no jurisdiction to grant applications under Order I R.10 or under Order XXII Rrs. 4 and 9; bona fide or mala fide of plaintiff immaterial. Cited as a Sind High Court decision reinforcing the unanimous High Court view that such suits are nullities and cannot be remedied by amendment/substitution.
Hira Lal v. Kalinath, AIR 1962 SC 199 (Supreme Court) Contains observations by the Chief Justice that a suit instituted against a person who was dead at the time may render the Court lacking inherent jurisdiction; these remarks lend support to the nullity view. The Court noted that while there is no direct Supreme Court decision on the exact point, observations in this Supreme Court decision lend support to the High Court view adopted by the Division Bench.
Ledgard v. Bull, 13 Ind App 134 (Privy Council) Referenced in Hira Lal (as relied upon by parties in that case) in the context of challenges based on lack of jurisdiction (as discussed by the Supreme Court in Hira Lal). Included in the opinion's discussion as part of the authorities considered by the Supreme Court in Hira Lal; relied upon indirectly in the analysis of jurisdiction issues.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Division Bench considered the narrow legal question whether a suit filed against a person who was already dead at the time of institution is a nullity and whether an application to amend the plaint by substituting another person as defendant is maintainable.

The Court analyzed the competing submissions: the petitioner argued the amendment application under Order XXII Rule 4 and Section 151 C.P.C. was maintainable even though the original defendant had been dead at the time of filing; the respondent argued the suit was a nullity and could not be remedied by substitution.

The Court undertook a review of decisions from several High Courts and earlier authorities. From these authorities the Court distilled and emphasized the following points (expressly stated in the opinion):

  • No substitution of a defendant can be permitted where there was a sole defendant and that defendant was dead at the time the suit was instituted — a suit in such circumstances is a nullity from its inception.
  • Where there are multiple defendants and one of them was dead when the suit was filed, decisions permit the legal representatives of that deceased defendant to be brought on record (subject to limitation objections), because the suit was validly presented as regards the living defendants.
  • When an appeal is filed and a party was dead on the date of presentation of the appeal memorandum, courts have permitted legal representatives to be brought on record because an appeal is a continuation of valid original proceedings where the defendant was alive at institution and died subsequently.

The Court relied on multiple authorities (cited in the table above) to conclude that substitution in the circumstances of this case — where there was a sole defendant who had died prior to the institution of the suit — was impermissible. The Court also observed that there is no direct decision of the Supreme Court on the exact point, though observations in Hira Lal v. Kalinath were noted as supportive of the nullity principle.

Applying this legal framework to the facts, the Division Bench agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the suit instituted on 31-7-1958 against P.K. Periaswamy Nadar (who had died on 1-6-1958) was a nullity, and therefore the order allowing substitution of the respondent was without jurisdiction and could not stand.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Division Bench upheld the order of the II Additional Subordinate Judge dismissing the suit and refused the petitioner’s revision: the revision petition is dismissed with costs and the Subordinate Judge's order is affirmed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the suit instituted by the petitioner against P.K. Periaswamy Nadar is declared a nullity because the defendant had died before institution; the attempted amendment to substitute S. Thangamani Ammal was impermissible and the suit was properly dismissed with costs.
  • Legal consequence reaffirmed: consistent High Court authority establishes that where a sole defendant is dead at the time of filing, the suit is a nullity and substitution of another person as defendant cannot be permitted; in contrast, substitution may be permissible where (a) there are multiple defendants and the suit was validly filed as to the surviving defendants, or (b) in appeal proceedings which continue original valid proceedings.
  • Scope of precedent: the Court noted there is no direct decision of the Supreme Court on the precise point, but observed that Supreme Court remarks in Hira Lal v. Kalinath lend support to the conclusion reached — the opinion therefore follows and applies established High Court authorities rather than establishing a novel Supreme Court precedent.

Result: Revision petition dismissed with costs; the Subordinate Judge's dismissal of the suit is affirmed.

Show all summary ...

Hombe Gowda, J.:— This Revision petition which is directed against the order of the II Addl. Subordinate Judge, South Kanara, Mangalore, in Small cause suit No. 163 of 1958 dismissing the suit with costs, has been referred to a Division Bench by one of us, as it raises an important question, whether a suit brought against a person who is later discovered to have been dead at the time the suit was filed can be amended by substituting another person as defendant.

2. The petitioner filed a suit against one P.K Periaswamy Nadar, Proprietor, Bharata Match Works, Sivakasi, on 31-7-1958, for recovery of the sum of Rs. 974-49 nP. with future interest and costs, in the Court of the II Addl. Subordinate Judge, South Kanara, Mangalore. Subsequently it was found that P.K Periaswamy Nadar, the defendant, had died on 1-6-1958, that is, long prior to the date of the filing of the suit. The petitioner, therefore made an application under Order XXII rule 4 and Sec. 151 of the C.P.C on 19-9-1958 and prayed for permission to amend the plaint by deleting the name of P.K Periaswamy Nadar and substituting the name of S. Thangamani Ammal in the cause title of the plaint and to amend the second paragraph of the plaint suitably as a consequence this amendment. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the application and permitted the plaint to be amended. Thangamani Ammal was thus brought on record as defendant in the suit and was served with summons. She filed her written statement raising several contentions against the claim of the petitioner. She inter alia contended that P.K Periaswamy Nadar, the sole defendant against whom the suit was originally instituted, had died on 1-6-1958 and that the shit filed against him on 31-7-1958 was a suit filed against a dead parson and was a nullity and, therefore, no amendment of the plaint could have been allowed permitting the plaintiff-petitioner to implead her as the defendant in the place of P.K Periaswamy Nadar. She contended that the suit was liable to be dismissed in limine.

3. The fact that P.K Periaswamy Nadar had died on 1-6-1958, that is, long before the suit was filed against him, was not disputed by the respondent. The certified extract from the register of deaths in the Municipality of Shivakasi during the month of June 1958 relating to the date of death of P.K Periaswamy Nadar was produced and marked as an exhibit in the case. The learned Subordinate Judge heard the parties on the preliminary point regarding the maintainability of the suit against the respondent. After examining the decisions of the several High Courts cited before him, the learned Subordinate Judge held that, the suit filed by the petitioner, on 31-7-1958, against the sole defendant P.K Periaswamy Nadar who had died on 1-6-1958 was a nullity and no application for substitution of the respondent in place of the original sole defendant, could have been allowed and the suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. He accordingly dismissed the suit with costs. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this revision petition.

4. The short point for decision is whether the suit filed by the petitioner on 31-7-1958 against P.K Periaswamy Nadar who had died on 1.6.1958 was a nullity and whether the order permitting the petitioner to substitute the respondent in place of the original defendant is without jurisdiction. It is urged by Sri Padubidri Raghavendra Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the petitioner's application filed under Order XXII rule 4 and section 151 of the C.P.C was for permission to amend the plaint by deleting the name of P.K Periaswamy Nadar and substituting the name of the respondent in his place, is clearly maintainable though the original defendant was dead at the time the suit against him was instituted. A number of decisions of several High Courts were cited before us on the point. On a review of them, we are of the opinion that there is no room for doubt, that the application of the type presented by the petitioner for deleting the name of P.K Periaswamy Nadar, who was not alive on the date the suit was instituted and for substitution of the name of the respondent in his place, is not maintainable. The decisions lay down that the question as to whether there was a bona fide mistake or ignorance on the part of the plaintiff is foreign to the suit and that no application for substitution of another person as defendant in the place of the defendant who was no more on the date the suit was instituted, as his legal representative on record, can be permitted.

5. In Savitramma v. Nanjundappa, 25 Mys. LJ 113, a Division Bench of the former High Court of Mysore considered the very question raised in this, revision petition. Venkataranga Iyengar, J. who delivered the judgment in the case, reviewed the case law on the point and held that when a suit is brought against a person as a sole defendant and that person is found to have died before its institution, the suit is a nullity from its inception and the court has no jurisdiction to substitute as defendant the legal representative of the deceased and allow the suit to proceed against him either under section 153 or under Order I, rule 10(2) of the C.P.C The facts of that case were exactly similar to the facts in the case before us. The plaintiff in the said suit had filed a suit against one Naranappa on the 5th of March 1945. It was subsequently found that Naranappa had died on 28th November 1944, that is, prior to the institution of the suit. The application under Order XXII rule 4 of the C.P.C to bring on record Savitramma, the daughter of Naranappa, as his legal representative was made by the plaintiff. When Savitramma was served with the notice, she contended that her father had died on 28th November 1944, i.e prior to the institution of the suit and the suit filed against a dead person was a nullity and was liable to be dismissed. The trial court rejected this contention and allowed the plaintiff to amend the plaint by substituting, the name of Savitramma in place of Naranppa as defendant in the suit. Being aggrieved by this order, Savitramma filed the revision petition before the former High Court of Mysore. The revision petition was allowed and the order passed by the trial court was set aside. As already stated, the court held that the suit filed against Naranappa who was dead prior to the presentation of the plaint, was a nullity and the court had no jurisdiction to allow the amendment prayed for.

6. In Mohun Chunder Koondoo v. Azeem Gazee Chowkeedar, 12 Suth W.R 45 : 3 Beng LR AC 233 Sir Barnes Peacock C.J who delivered the judgment of the Bench held that courts have no jurisdiction to decide the suit filed against a dead person and it is a nullity. This decision was followed by the Madras High Court in Veerappa Chetty v. Tindal Ponnen, ILR 31 Mad 86 and observed in the Madras case as follows:—

“It does not appear to have ever been suggested that the issue of a writ against a dead man could be anything but a nullity, and we see no reason for regarding the presentation of a plaint, which under our system corresponds to the issue of the writ, as anything more”.

7. This decision was followed by Sadasiva Aiyar and Napiet JJ. In re: Arunachalam Chettiar, 30 Ind Cas 679 : (AIR 1916 Mad 440) and by Srinivasa Aiyangar, J. in Rasa Goundan…Defendant v. Pichamuthu Pillai…Plaintiff Opposite Party., 42 Ind Cas 539 : (AIR 1918 Mad 794 (1)). The High Court of Bombay took the same view in Rampraiab Brijmohandas v. Gowrishankar Kashiram 85 Ind Cas 464 : (AIR 1924 Bom 109). In that case Mulla J. observed thus:

“If he (defendant) dies before the suit and a suit is brought against him in the name in which he carried on business, the suit is against a dead man and it is a nullity from its inception. The suit being a nullity, the writ of summons, issued in the suit, by whomsoever accepted is also a nullity. Similarly, any order made in the suit allowing amendment of the plaint by substituting the legal representative of the deceased as defendant and allowing the suit to proceed against him is also a nullity. It is immaterial that the suit was brought bona fide and in ignorance of the death of such person”.

8. In Bejoy Chand Mahatap Bahadur v. Amulya Charan Mitra 24 Ind Cas 112 : (AIR 1914 Cal 895) a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that the provisions as to the substitution of the heirs of a deceased defendant as parties to the suit in his place apply only to cases where the original defendant was alive at the date of the institution of the suit. In Sisir Kumar v. Manindra Kumar Biswas, AIR 1958 Cal 681 the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court followed the above decision and K.C Das Gupta, J. (as he then was) who delivered the judgment observed as follows:—

“Sub-rule (2) of O. I, r. 10 is not limited to cases of bona fide mistake. For two parts of this sub-rule provide for two different powers of the court. The first gives the court the power to strike out the name of any party improperly joined as plaintiff or defendant. The second part provides for the addition of a party as the plaintiff or defendant where it appears to the court that such person ‘ought to have been joined’. The use of the words ‘joined’ and ‘added’ is significant. Omission to use the word ‘substituted’ cannot but be considered deliberate. It must, therefore, be held that the power given to the Court under sub-rule (2) of R. 10 of O. 1 to add a party contemplates only those cases where there is somebody else as plaintiff or defendant and the effect of, bringing on record another person as plaintiff or defendant would be really a case of ‘addition’ of plaintiff or defendant. A case of mere substitution as distinct from addition is not contemplated in sub-r. (2). If the Court strikes out the names of the defendants and brings on the record the name of another person as sole defendant this will not be a case of addition at all. If there had been some other person on the record as defendant, even after the names of the original defendants were struck out, that would be a case of addition and might be allowed by the Court in proper circumstances.”

9. A careful review of the decisions of the several High Courts relating to substitution of a defendant in a suit in place of the original defendant makes it clear(1) that no such substitution can be permitted in a case where there was a sole defendant, (2) where there are more defendants than one and one of them was dead when the suit was filed, the Courts have held that the legal representatives of the deceased defendant can be brought on record subject to any question of limitation that may be raised by the legal representatives of the deceased person who were brought on record as the suit had been validly presented in so far as the living defendants are concerned, and (3) where an appeal is filed against a person who was dead on the date of the presentation of the memorandum of appeal, the Courts have held that the appellant can be permitted to bring the legal representatives of the dead person on record. In other words, the Courts have held that substitution is permissible. The principle on the basis of which the Courts have taken this view is that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and as the suit had been validly instituted and the defendant died subsequently, an application to bring his legal representatives under Order XXII, Rule 4 is maintainable and the legal representatives can be brought on record. But in cases where there was a sole defendant and he was dead before the suit was instituted, all the High Courts have held that such a suit is a nullity and no application for amendment of the plaint by deleting the name of the original defendant and substituting another person in his place, can be permitted. In Municipal Corporation of Karachi v. Baradiojumoo Mughal, AIR 1946 Sind 20 Thadani, J. after reviewing the decisions of the several High Courts dealing with this question, held that Where a suit is filed against a dead person, a Court has no jurisdiction to grant an application under O.I.R 10, or under O. 22, Rr. 4 and 9 or do any other act authorised by the Civil Procedure Code, as the suit filed against a dead person, is a nullity. His Lordship further held that bona fides or mala-fides of the plaintiff are immaterial. There is no direct decision of the Supreme Court on the point. But some observations of the learned Chief Justice in Hira Lal v. Kalinath AIR 1962 SC 199 lend support to our view that a suit filed against a dead person is a nullity. This is what the learned Chief Justice says:

“The only ground on which the decision of the High Court is challenged is that the suit instituted on the original side of Bombay High Court was wholly incompetent for want of territorial jurisdiction and that therefore, the award that followed on the reference between the parties and the decree of the Court, under execution, were all null and void. Strong reliance was placed upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Ledgard v. Bull, 13 Ind App 134 (PC). In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. There was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the Bombay High Court where the suit was instituted by the plaintiff-decree-holder. The plaint had been filed after obtaining the necessary leave of the High Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. Whether the leave obtained had been rightly obtained or wrongly obtained is not a matter which can be agitated at the execution stage. The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution proceedings only on the ground that the Court which passed the decree was lacking in inherent jurisdiction in the sense that it could not have seisin of the case because the subject-matter was wholly foreign to its jurisdiction or ‘that the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, or some such other ground which could have the effect of rendering the Court entirely lacking in jurisdiction in respect of the subject-matter of the suit or over the parties to it. But in the instant case there was no such inherent lack of jurisdiction.’”

(Underlining (here into ‘ ’) is ours.)

10. It is thus clear that a suit filed by the petitioner against a dead person was a nullity and that the learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly justified in dismissing the suit on the ground that the respondent could not be substituted in the place of the Original defendant who was dead on the date of the presentation of the suit. We do not find any good ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge.

11. In the result, therefore, for the reasons mentioned above, this revision petition fails and the same is dismissed with costs.

BH/R.G.D
Petition dismissed.