These matters were consolidated for judgment because they raised common questions of law. The petitions are W.Ps Nos. 243 and 256 of 1959 and W.P. No. 1166 of 1960. The petitioners are coffee planters in Coorg District (two petitioners in 243 and 256 of 1959 are father and son; the son is the common petitioner in the earlier two petitions). The Wealth-tax Officer, Mysore Circle, assessed the petitioner in W.Ps Nos. 243 and 256 of 1959 for assessment years 1957–58 and 1958–59 by an order dated 28 January 1959. For 1957–58 net wealth was determined at Rs. 4,79,657 with tax Rs. 1,398.29; for 1958–59 net wealth was determined at Rs. 4,25,303 with tax Rs. 1,126.52. A notice of demand was served on 7 February 1959 and the taxes were paid on 11 February 1959. W.P. No. 243/59 challenges the 1957–58 assessment and W.P. No. 256/59 challenges the 1958–59 assessment; the relief sought in those petitions was certiorari (or other writ) to call for and quash the Wealth-tax Assessment No. 2.g/57–58 dated 28 January 1959 or to direct redetermination of net wealth excluding “points” declared in favour of the petitioner by the Coffee Board.

In W.P. No. 1166 of 1960 the Wealth-tax Officer, Coorg Circle, had steps in hand to determine the petitioner's net wealth for assessment years 1959–60 and 1960–61. That petitioner had previously been assessed for 1957–58 and 1958–59 and had preferred appeals under the Wealth-tax Act in respect of those assessments. The petitioner in W.P. No. 1166/60 sought a writ of prohibition (or other appropriate writ) restraining the respondent from taking into consideration the “points” declared in his favour by the Coffee Board in computing net wealth.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the “points” allotted to coffee growers by the Coffee Board (the “coffee points”) constitute assets (specifically capital assets or actionable claims) of the growers and therefore must be included in computing “net wealth” under the Wealth-tax Act.
Whether the Wealth-tax Act (so far as it brings within its ambit items that may be described as agricultural income) is ultra vires Parliament's legislative competence — i.e., whether Parliament may, directly or indirectly, tax what is effectively agricultural income contrary to the distribution of legislative powers between Centre and States.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

“Coffee points” should not be regarded as “assets” for the purposes of the Wealth-tax Act and therefore should not be included in computation of net wealth.
If “coffee points” were to be treated as taxable under the Act, they amount to “agricultural income” and Parliament has no competence to tax agricultural income (that power being reserved to States), so far as inclusion of such items would trench on State powers; therefore the Act (to that extent) is ultra vires.
Reliance was placed on authorities and doctrinal passages to argue that an unliquidated or contingent claim is not necessarily a “debt” or “asset” and that a right to a payment not presently liquidated may not be a debt within certain statutory contexts.
Specific reliance was placed on a decision (Indian Coffee Board, Batlagundu v. State of Madras) to argue that the Coffee Board is an independent dealer and not a representative of producers, so the Board does not hold coffee as agent for growers.

Respondent's / Revenue's Arguments

The “points” awarded by the Coffee Board represent a valuable, enforceable and transferable right to payments (dividends) and therefore amount to an “asset” or actionable claim within the meaning of the Wealth-tax Act and related legal concepts.
Even where a right to payment depends on future declaration (dividends), such a right may be valued on reasonable grounds and, if properly valued by the Wealth-tax Officer, its inclusion cannot be impugned.
As a matter of constitutional law and taxation, incidental overlap by Parliament into matters of State competence does not of itself render a statute invalid; the proper test is pith and substance.
There is a close relationship between income and capital and an item properly regarded as an asset may include what would otherwise be called income; hence “agricultural income” can be included in net wealth if it fits within the statutory definition of “assets”.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Indian Coffee Board, Batlagundu v. State of Madras [1954] 5 S.T.C. 292	Relied on by petitioners to argue that the Coffee Board is an independent dealer and not a representative/agent of producers.	The court held the decision was not relevant to the main issue: the matter before the court was the value of “coffee points” (a right to payments), not the physical possession of coffee in the hands of the Board.
Sabju Sahib v. Noordin Sahib 1898 I.L.R. 22 Mad. 139	Cited to support the proposition that an unliquidated claim may not be a “debt” (in the context of the Succession Certificate Act).	Used by petitioners to argue an unliquidated claim is not a debt; the court considered such authorities but focused on whether the right was an asset/actionable claim for wealth-tax purposes.
Sundar Das v. Secretary of State A.I.R. 1938 Lah. 533	Authority for the proposition that not all claims are “debts” and unliquidated claims may not be attachable.	Relied upon by petitioners; the court distinguished the attachment/debt context from the broader concept of “assets” under the Wealth-tax Act and treated valuable enforceable claims as assets.
Webb v. Stenton 1883 11 Q.B.D. 518 (cited in other authorities)	Quoted in decisions as defining “debt” as a sum payable or payable in future by reason of present obligation.	Referenced indirectly in argument about the meaning of “debt”; court observed that “asset” is broader than “debt” and includes valuable rights.
Banchharam Majumdar v. Adyanath Bhattacharjee 1909 I.L.R. 36 Cal. 936	Quotation used to illustrate legal meaning of a “debt” in some contexts.	Referenced for the conceptual distinction between debts and other valuable claims; court relied on broader statutory definitions to classify “coffee points” as assets.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Blott [1921] 2 A.C. 171	Passage on conversion of profits into capital and how undistributed profits remain income until properly disposed.	Invoked in argument about whether rights to future payments are income or capital; the court noted the analogy but focused on statutory treatment of actionable claims as assets.
Spencer v. Coleman	Held that certain unpaid portions of surplus in liquidation (paid to an account) were not a “debt” due to a shareholder and not attachable by garnishee.	Cited in argument to show that some contingently payable sums are not “debts”; court observed that whether an item is a “debt” is not decisive for whether it is an “asset” under the Wealth-tax Act.
Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons A.I.R. 1942 F.C. 33	Decided scope of provincial versus central taxation; principle that pith and substance decides validity and incidental encroachment may be ignored.	Cited by the court as an apt precedent: incidental overlap does not render statute invalid; used to reject the petitioners' competence argument against Parliament.
Governor-General-in-Council v. Province of Madras (Privy Council)	Affirmed principle that the real nature (pith and substance) of a tax determines its category, not its name.	Relied on by the court for the constitutional analysis that the pith and substance of the Wealth-tax Act is tax on capital assets and incidental inclusion of agricultural items does not invalidate it.
Ralla Ram v. Province of Bombay (Federal Court)	Discussed whether a tax was, in substance, a tax on income or on property and upheld provincial competence where pith and substance was acceptable.	Used to support the proposition that overlapping effects do not necessarily make a law ultra vires if its essential character falls within legislative competence.
Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v. Province of Bombay; J.N. Duggan v. Commissioner of Income-tax; Municipal Commissioner, Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Gordandas Hargovandas; Mammad Keyi v. Wealth-tax Officer	These decisions were referenced as examples or related authorities in the context of division of taxation powers and the pith-and-substance test.	The court stated these cases did not advance the petitioners' position and are instances of application of the rule in Boddu Paidanna's case.
K. Soma Shekharrao v. K.S. Mishra; Varjivandas Jamnadas v. Maganlal Chhabildas	Authorities establishing that rights to recover insurance money or similar contingent rights are actionable claims and transferable.	Invoked to support the proposition that certain future or contingent rights are actionable claims (and thus assets) for legal purposes; court relied on the principle to hold coffee points are actionable claims.
Hunsraj Morarjee v. Nathoo Gangaram; Jaffer Meher Ali v. Budge-Budge Jute Mills Co.; Alkash Ali Khalifa v. Nath Bank Ltd.	Authorities showing that rights or interests in contracts are actionable claims.	Used by the court to underpin the classification of the coffee growers' rights to dividends as actionable claims and therefore assets.
Muttapukunlla Chinnappareddi v. Masineni Venkaiaramanappa Somayya	Held that where a sale is set aside an implied contract to repay purchase money is an actionable claim within the Transfer of Property Act.	Referred to illustrate that enforceable contractual rights are actionable claims; the court relied on that principle in classifying coffee points as actionable claims/assets.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded by examining statutory scheme, the nature of the rights conferred by the Coffee Act and the statutory definitions in the Wealth-tax Act:

Statutory framework under the Coffee Act: The court examined provisions including section 25 (compulsion to deliver surplus produce to the Board, the Board's valuation and classification powers), section 26 (marketing by the Board and pool fund mechanism) and section 34 (payments from the pool fund — divisional payments or “dividends” to registered owners). From these provisions the court drew three conclusions: (a) registered owners are compelled to deliver surplus produce to the Board; (b) the Board controls pooled coffee (storage, curing, marketing) and assesses value by differential scale; and (c) once coffee is delivered for pooling the registered owner retains no rights in the coffee itself except the statutory right to receive payments under section 34.
Nature of “points” and payments: The court described how the Coffee Board's differential scale awards “points” based on type, grade and quality; points are aggregated and an average value per point is computed from net sale proceeds; payments (dividends) are made only when the Board declares them and until such declaration growers have no actionable claim to specified sums, although they have a right to receive payments when declared.
Definition of “asset” under the Wealth-tax Act and allied law: The court observed that “net wealth” is computed by reference to assets as defined in the Act and that section 2(m) and section 4/5 of the Wealth-tax Act contemplate inclusion of tangible and intangible assets. The court noted that movable property is property of every description except immovable property and that “coffee points” are movable property.
Characterisation of “coffee points” as assets/actionable claims: The court focused on the statutory declaration (section 25(6) of the Coffee Act) that holders of points have the right to receive payments under section 34. The court held that this is a tangible, valuable, enforceable and transferable right — therefore an “actionable claim” within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act and an “asset” within the Wealth-tax Act. Even though exact value before declaration of dividends may be speculative, valuation on reasonable grounds by the Wealth-tax Officer is permissible.
On whether amounts are “debts”: The court examined authorities on the definition of “debt” and unliquidated claims but concluded that whether the Board's obligations are properly classified as “debts” was not decisive; the relevant question for wealth-tax was whether the growers' rights constituted assets on the valuation date. The court emphasized that the word “asset” has a broader connotation than “debt” and includes valuable rights which may be actionable claims even if not presently liquidated or attachable.
Constitutional competence and pith-and-substance analysis: Addressing the contention that inclusion of “coffee points” equated to taxing agricultural income (a State subject), the court applied the pith-and-substance doctrine. It relied on precedents (notably Boddu Paidanna and other federal/provincial cases) to hold that incidental overlap into State matters does not render a law ultra vires where the essential character of the law (here a tax on capital assets) falls within parliamentary competence. The court therefore rejected the challenge that the Wealth-tax Act unconstitutionally invaded State taxation powers merely because items describable as agricultural income might be incidentally included as assets.
Conclusion of reasoning: Given that “coffee points” are enforceable, transferable rights to payment (actionable claims) and therefore assets, and given the constitutional acceptability of incidental incursions where pith and substance lies within Parliament's competence, the court held that the Wealth-tax Officer was entitled to treat coffee points as assets for net wealth computation and that the parliamentary enactment was not ultra vires on the grounds urged.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: Petitions dismissed.

Consequences and immediate effects:

The court held that “coffee points” allocated by the Coffee Board constitute valuable, enforceable and transferable rights — actionable claims — and therefore are “assets” within the meaning of the Wealth-tax Act and must be taken into account in computing the net wealth of the petitioners on the relevant valuation dates.
The court rejected the constitutional challenge that the Wealth-tax Act was ultra vires of Parliament because it allegedly taxed agricultural income; the court applied the pith-and-substance test and held incidental inclusion of items akin to agricultural income does not invalidate the statute where the central aim is taxation of capital assets.
Practical consequences for the parties: The assessments challenged in W.Ps. Nos. 243 and 256 of 1959 (and the threatened consideration in W.P. No. 1166/60) stand; the Wealth-tax Officer's approach to value and include coffee points in net wealth was upheld. Costs were awarded against the petitioners (advocate's fee Rs. 250).

This summary is confined to the reasoning and holdings set out in the provided opinion and does not extend beyond the information contained in that text.

Show all summary ...

1. These petitions raise common questions of law and hence they could be conveniently dealt with in one judgment.

2. The petitioner in W.Ps Nos. 243 and 256 of 1959 (common petitioner) is the son of the petitioner in W.P No. 1166/60. They are coffee planters in Coorg District. The Wealth-tax Officer, Mysore Circle, Mysore, has assessed the petitioner in W.Ps Nos. 243 and 256 of 1959 for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59 as per his order dated January 28, 1959. For the assessment year 1957-58, the net wealth of that petitioner as on March 31, 1957, was determined at Rs. 4,79,657 and a tax of Rs. 1,398.29 was levied. For the assessment year 1958-59, his net wealth as on March 31, 1958, was determined at Rs. 4,25,303 and a tax of Rs. 1,126.52 was levied. He was served with a notice of demand on February 7, 1959, requiring him to pay the tax demanded on or before the dates specified therein. He has paid on February 11, 1959, the taxes demanded. These assessments are the subject-matters of challenge in W.Ps Nos. 243 and 256 of 1959. W.P No. 243/59 relates to the assessment year 1957-58 and W.P No. 256 of 1959 relates to the assessment year 1958-59. In these petitions (W.Ps Nos. 243 and 256 of 1959), the petitioner therein prays for the issue of writs of certiorari or any other appropriate writs, orders or directions calling for the records of the proceedings in the case, i.e, the Wealth-tax Assessment No. 2.g/57-58 dated January 28, 1959, and quashing the same or to direct the respondent to redetermine his “net wealth” in the relevant years after excluding from consideration the “points” declared in favour of him by the Coffee Board.

3. The Wealth-tax Officer, Coorg Circle (respondent), has taken steps to determine the net wealth of the petitioner in. W.P No. 1166/60 for the assessment years 1959-60 and 1960-61. He had already been assessed for the assessment years 1957-58 and 1958-59. He had preferred appeals under the Wealth-tax Act (to be referred to as the Act hereinafter) in respect of those assessments. The petitioner therein prays for the issue of a writ of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or direction prohibiting the respondent from taking into consideration the “points” declared in his favour by the Coffee Board in computing his “net wealth”.

4. In computing “net wealth” of the petitioners, the Wealth-tax Officer has taken into consideration the “points” declared in their favour by the Coffee Board. As mentioned earlier the petitioners in these petitions are coffee planters. They are the registered owners under the Coffee Act, 1942 (Central Act No. 7 of 1942) of coffee estates. The Coffee Act compels every registered owner to deliver his entire surplus produce to the Coffee Board. Section 25(1) of the Coffee Act prescribes:

“All coffee produced by a registered estate in excess of the amount specified in the internal sale quota allotted to the estate or when no internal sale quotas have been allotted to estates, all coffee produced by the estate, shall be delivered to the Board for inclusion in the surplus pool by the owner of the estate or by the curing establishment receiving the coffee from the estate.”

5. In the instant case, no internal sale quotas have been allotted to the estates concerned. As per section 26, the Coffee Board is required to take all practical measures to market the coffee included in the surplus pool and all sales thereof should be conducted by or through the Board. The Board is required to maintain two separate funds, a general fund and a pool fund. All sums realised by sales by the Board of coffee from the surplus pool is required to be credited to the pool fund, subject to the deduction of duty of excise on coffee payable by the registered owners of estates. The pool fund has to be applied only to:

“(a) the making to registered owners of estate of payments proportionate to the value of the coffee delivered by them for inclusion in the surplus pool;

(b) the costs of storing, curing and marketing coffee deposited in and of administering the surplus pool;

Provided that where, after meeting the above requirements, if there remains any excess in the pool fund, the Board may, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, transfer the whole or any part of such excess to the credit of the general fund.”

6. Section 34 of the Coffee Act lays down:

“34. (1) The Board shall at such times as it thinks fit make to registered owners who have delivered coffee for inclusion in the surplus pool such payments out of the pool fund as it may think proper.

(2) The sum of all payments made under sub-section (1) to any one registered owner shall bear to the sum of the payments made to all registered owners the same proportion as the value of the coffee delivered by him out of the year's crop to the surplus pool bears to the value of all coffee delivered to the surplus pool out of that year's crop:

Provided that in calculating the sum of all payments made under subsection (1) and the value of the coffee delivered to the surplus pool out of the year's crop, respectively, any payment accepted by a registered owner as final payment in immediate settlement for coffee delivered by him for inclusion in the surplus pool and the value of any such coffee shall be excluded.”

7. On an examination of the provisions of the Coffee Act, the following conclusions are available: (1) the registered owners are compelled to deliver to the Coffee Board their entire surplus produce, (2) coffee delivered to the Coffee Board for inclusion in the surplus pool remains under the control of the Board which is responsible for its storage, curing and marketing, the Board is required from time to time to prepare a differential scale for the valuation of coffee, and in accordance with that scale classify the coffee in each consignment delivered for inclusion in the surplus pool according to its kind and quality, and assess its value based on its quantity, kind and quality, and (3) when coffee is delivered or is treated as having been delivered for inclusion in the surplus pool, the registered owner whose coffee has been so delivered retains no rights in respect of such coffee except his right to receive the payments as provided in section 34.

8. From the supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner in W.P No. 1166 of 1960, who was at one time a member of the Coffee Board, we get the following:

“Pooling the coffee grown by all the registered growers and marketing the same by the Board and payment from the pool fund to the registered growers are the main features of the coffee marketing scheme operated under the Coffee Act, 1942. It is obligatory on every registered grower to deliver his coffee to the coffee pool. The growers deliver their coffee to the ‘pool agents’ appointed by the Board. The pool agents cure the coffee and thereafter samples are drawn from each lot and assessed by a panel of assessors appointed by the Board with reference to the ‘differential scale for the valuation of coffee’ prepared periodically by the Coffee Board under the powers conferred by clause (4) of section 25 of the Coffee Act. Since there are two types and in each type several grades of Coffee, the ‘differential scale’ has fixed ‘points’ for the different types and grades. Points are fixed with reference to cured coffee in terms of 50 kilos (formerly in terms of hundredweights).

Plantation Grade Arabica Cherry Robusta Cherry Robusta Parchment. Grade Points PB 85 PB 70 56 58 A 80 Flats, clean 66 54 56 B 77 garbled 64 52 54 T 71 bulk, 5% 48 46 47 Blacks and bits 53 triage basis blacks and browns bits 38 36 37”

9. For 1 cwt. (now 50 Kilos) of Arabica Plantation A of fair average quality, 80 points are awarded; for Pea Berry it is 85 points and for lesser grade the points are less. If the quality falls below the fair average quality, the assessors awarded lesser points. Plus points are awarded for qualities above the fair average. For each lot delivered to the pool, the total number of points is separately worked out depending upon the type, grade, quality and quantity of coffee. The total of all the points awarded to a registered grower for one coffee season is aggregated after the final deliveries and that total number represents the points awarded to a registered grower. The grand total of all the points awarded to all the registered growers is made up at the end of the crop year. The net sale proceeds of the entire coffee pooled in respect of each year's crop is divided by the grand total of all the points awarded to all the growers and the average value per point is determined.

10. The payments by the Board are made in instalments as and when funds are available for distribution and these are popularly called “dividends”. When funds are available the Board declares the amount for payment. Soon after the payment is declared, the pool agents are asked to furnish claim statements of amounts payable to the growers who have pooled coffee with them. Claim statements are checked by the office of the Board and the cheques are sent to the pool agents who credit the amounts to the accounts of the registered growers. It is only after the payments are declared by the Board, claim statements could be filed on the basis of the number of the points awarded and until such declarations are made the registered growers have no right to claim any amount from the Board.

11. The differential scale of valuation is prepared on the basis of the market performance of the different types and grades of coffee in the previous years. The differential scale now in force has been in existence for the past several years. Since the entire coffee available for marketing is pooled and the net sale proceeds have to be distributed in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 34, the common denominator for the pooled coffee has to be determined and “points” are awarded.

12. The question for consideration is whether the “points” allotted to the owners can be considered as the capital assets of the owners in the respective years.

13. The charging section in the “Act” is section 3. That section says:

“Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for every financial year commencing on and from the first day of April, 1957, a tax (hereinafter referred to as wealth-tax) in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu undivided family and company at the rate or rates specified in the Schedule.”

“Net wealth” is defined thus in section 2(m) of the Act:

“‘Net wealth’ means the amount by which the aggregate value computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act of all the assets, wherever located, belonging to the assessee on the valuation date, including assets required to be included in his net wealth as on that date under this Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee on the valuation date other than,—

(i) debts which under section 6 are not to be taken into account; and

(ii) debts which are secured on, or which have been incurred in relation to, any asset in respect of which wealth-tax is not payable under this Act.”

“Net wealth” has to be computed as provided in section 4 of the Act. Section 5 provides for certain exemptions. In particular we would like to notice the exemptions mentioned in sections 5(1)(v) and 5(1)(vi). Section 5(1)(v) exempts, in the computation of “net wealth”, the rights under any patent or copyright belonging to the assessee, provided that they are not held by him as assets of a business, profession or vocation and no income or benefit accrues to him therefrom, Section 5(1)(vi) excludes the right or interest of the assessee in any policy of insurance before the moneys covered by the policies become due and payable to the assessee in the matter of computing “net wealth”.

14. From the foregoing, it follows that in computing the “net wealth” of the assessee, assets tangible and intangible have to be taken into account. If the “points” allotted to the petitioners can be considered as “assets”, then they will have to be valued while computing their “net wealth” during the relevant years.

15. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that “coffee points” cannot be considered as “assets”. It was further contended on their behalf that if “coffee points” were intended to be included within the reach of the “Act”, then the same being “agricultural income”, Parliament was in-competent to legislate in that regard. Let us first address ourselves to the question whether “coffee points” allotted to the petitioners can be considered as their “assets”. We have earlier noticed that section 25(6) of the Coffee Act declares that the persons to whom “coffee points” are allotted have the right to receive the payments referred to in section 34. It is true that the coffee delivered to the Board remains under the control of the Board which is responsible for its storage, curing wherever necessary, and the marketing of that coffee. It would not be correct to say that a registered owner who has delivered coffee is not entitled as of right to get the value of that coffee, or that he should depend on the good graces of the Board for getting the value of the coffee delivered. On an examination of the scheme of the Coffee Act, as well as its provisions, it appears to us that the Coffee Board has a statutory duty to sell the coffee in the most advantageous manner and distribute the prices fetched to those who have delivered coffee. We are clear in our opinion that if the Coffee Board fails to discharge its statutory functions, it can be compelled to do so by interested parties. Under our Constitution, to acquire and dispose of property is a fundamental right. The State can impose only reasonable restrictions on those rights and that in the interest of the general public, We are unable to read the provisions of the Coffee Act as laying down that once the registered owner has delivered his coffee to the Coffee Board, he is left with no rights in respect of that coffee. It is true that he may not know the exact price that his coffee might fetch or when he is going to get that price. But without doubt his right is a tangible right and a valuable right. He can sell as well as transfer that right. No restrictions are placed by the Coffee Act on the rights of the owners recognised by the laws of the land. Till final “dividends” are declared, “coffee points” have to be valued on the basis of expectations. This is nothing new. It is a conception well known to markets. But the valuation fixed may not be exact. So long as the valuation fixed by the Wealth-tax Officer is a reasonable valuation, it is not open to question,

“Assets” as defined in section 2(3) of the “Act” includes property of every description, movable or immovable. “Moveable property” has been defined in the General Clauses Act to mean property of every description except immovable property. Therefore “coffee points” are clearly movable properties.

16. Some controversy was raised as to whether the amounts that may be realisable from the Coffee Board for the “coffee points” can be considered as “debts” due from the Coffee Board. Relying on the decision in Indian Coffee Board, Batlagundu v. State of Madras [1954] 5 S.T.C 292., it was contended by Sri G.K Govinda Bhat, that the Coffee Board is not a representative of the producers nor does it hold the goods on their behalf; it is an independent “dealer” and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Coffee Board was in constructive possession of the coffee on behalf of the growers. We do not think that the decision in question has any relevancy on the point under consideration. The coffee that was in the hands of the Coffee Board was not taken into consideration in determining the “net wealth” of the petitioners. What was taken into consideration is the value of the “coffee points” allotted to them. The right to the “coffee points” is itself a valuable right.

17. Relying on a passage in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act (fourth edition, at page 735), it was contended that in order to be a “debt”, it must be an obligation to pay a liquidated or a certain sum of money, a debt may be present or future, if it is present, it is present, it is existent or now due and owing, if it is future, it is existent but accruing or payable in the future.

18. Similarly, reliance was placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in Sabju Sahib v. Noordin Sahib 1898 I.L.R 22 Mad. 139. to show that an unliquidated claim was not a debt within the meaning of section 4(1)(a) of the Succession Certificate Act, 1889. Relying on the decision in Sundar Das v. Secretary of State A.I.R 1938 Lah. 533. it was urged that all claims are not debts and unless a claim has become a “debt” the same cannot be attached and cannot be sold under section 60, Civil Procedure Code. Advantage was tried to be availed of from the observation “that there can be no doubt that the word ‘debt’ in its ordinary legal acceptation means a debt either owing, or accruing, or, as put in the case of Webb v. Stenton 1883 11 Q.B.D 518., it is either a sum of money now payable or a sum of money which will become payable in the future by reason of a present obligation “of Mookerjee J. in Banchharam Majumdar v. Adyanath Bhattacharjee 1909 I.L.R 36 Cal. 936..

19. Next, reliance was placed on a passage in the address of Viscount Haldane in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Blott [1921] 2 A.C 171.. The passage in question runs thus:

“If there were any doubt as to the power of the company, in point of principle, to convert such accumulated profits into capital, it seems to me that the principle is recognised by section 40 of the Act of 1908, which expressly enables a company to return accumulated profits in reduction of the paid up capital of the company. Clearly on such a return the profits cease to be income and become capital. But the general principle does not rest merely on this section; it appears to follow from reasons of a wider kind. A shareholder is not entitled to claim that the company should apply its undivided profits in payment to him of dividend. Whether it must do so or not is a matter of internal management to be decided by the majority of the shareholders. He cannot sue for such a dividend until he has been given a special title by its declaration. Until then, no doubt, the profits are profits in the hands of the company until it has properly disposed of them, and it is assessable for income-tax in respect of these profits. But if, acting within its powers, it disposes of these profits by converting them into capital instead of paying them over to the shareholders, that, as I conceive it, is conclusive as against all the outside world, including the Crown, and the form of the benefit which the shareholder receives from the money in the hands of the company is one which is for determination by the company alone.”

20. Support was also sought from the decision in Spencer v. Coleman. Therein the portion of the surplus assets of a company in liquidation, which belonged to a shareholder who could not be found, was in compliance with sub-section (3) of section 15 of the Companies (Winding Up) Act, 1890, paid by the liquidator to the “companies liquidation account” with the Bank of England. It was held that it was not a “debt” due to the shareholder, and it could not be attached by his judgment-creditor by means of a garnishee order under Order 45, rule 1, of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

21. The controversy whether “the value of the” coffee points to which the registered owners are entitled to is a “debt” due from the Coffee Board does not appear to us to be relevant for our present purpose. In determining the “net wealth” of the assessee, the relevant question is whether they are “assets” of the assessee, on the valuation date, wherever they might have been located. A “debt” due to an assessee is undoubtedly an item of his “asset”. But the word “asset” has a larger connotation. Valuable rights are also “assets”. Even a claim which is not attachable, if it is otherwise valuable, is undoubtedly an “asset”.

22. Under section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, “‘actionable claim’ means a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by mortgage of immovable property or by hypothecation or pledge of movable property, or to any beneficial interest in movable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the civil courts recognize as affording grounds for relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent, accruing, conditional or contingent.”

23. It has been laid down in a large number of decisions that the right to recover the insurance money on the death of the assured person or on the expiry of the endowment period is an actionable claim and the same is transferable: see K. Soma Shekharrao v. K.S Mishra and Varjivandas Jamnadas v. Maganlal Chhabildas.

24. A right or interest in a contract is held to-be an actionable claim: see Hunsraj Morarjee v. Nathoo Gangaram, Jaffer Meher Ali v. Budge-Budge Jute Mills Co. and Alkash Ali Khalifa v. Nath Bank Ltd.

25. In Muttapukunlla Chinnappareddi v. Masineni Venkaiaramanappa Somayya, J. held that where a sale is set aside, a contract to repay the purchase money must be taken to be an implied term of the contract of sale between the vendor and the vendee; the right of the vendee to claim enforcement of this contract is an actionable claim within the meaning of section 130 (of the Transfer of Property Act) and is, therefore, clearly assignable. Such a right is not a mere right to sue within the meaning of section 6(e)(of the Transfer of Property Act).

26. The provisions of section 5 of the “Act” which provides for exemptions in respect of certain assets pointedly indicate that “assets” as defined in the “Act” include also “actionable claims”. If it is otherwise, there was no point in exempting the right or interest of the assessee in any policy of insurance before the moneys covered by the policies become due and payable to the assessee.

27. As seen earlier, the right to get “dividends” as and when declared by the Coffee Board is a valuable right. It is both enforceable and transferable. Therefore, it is an “actionable claim”. That being so, the “coffee points” are “assets”, as defined in the “Act”, the value of which has to be taken into account in computing the “net wealth” of the assessees.

28. The next ground of attack of Sri G.K Govinda Bhat is that “coffee points being” agricultural income”, Parliament has no competence to levy any tax on them either directly or indirectly and to the extent that “agricultural income” is required to be included in computing the “net wealth” of the assessees, the “Act” is ultra vires of the powers of Parliament. He urged that the source of the power of Parliament to enact the Act is Entry 86 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution, which says:

“Taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of companies.”

29. The power to tax “agricultural income” is allocated to the States as per Entry 46 of List II of Schedule VII. Therefore Parliament could not do indirectly what it could not do directly. According to him, Parliament had clearly transgressed into the field reserved for the States and as such the “Act” must be struck down, at any rate to the extent it purports to bring within its reach “agricultural income” it should be held invalid. The effect of his contention is, if the encroachment is ignored, in course of time, encouraged by the decisions of courts and the helplessness of the States, the Centre is likely to impair the legislative powers reserved for the States and thus make a mockery of the provincial autonomy.

30. Quoting from a passage in Indian Tax Reform (Report of a Survey) by Mr. Nicholas Kaldor, Sri Bhat contended that Mr. Kaldor on whose advice the “Act” had been enacted had suggested to the Government of India to levy annual taxes on “capital wealth” as distinguished from tax on “income”. According to Sri Bhat, the “income” of the assessment year cannot be a constituent part of the taxable “capital asset”. If it is otherwise, he urged, it would be double taxation. Further, it was urged that if the “income” that is taken into consideration is “agricultural income” it would be robbing the contents of one of the heads of taxation reserved for the States. It was lastly urged that “agricultural income” is a defined expression. The definition of “agricultural income” as given in section 2(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, has been given constitutional recognition and, therefore, any income that falls within that definition should not be considered as “capital assets”. With a view to emphasise the distinction between “income” and “capital”, Sri Bhat invited our attention to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shaw Wallace and Company. Therein their Lordships stated that “income” in the Income-tax Act connotes a periodical monetary return “coming in” with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity, from definite sources. The source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return, excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall. Thus “income” has been likened pictorially to the fruit of a tree, or the crop of a field. It is essentially the produce of something which is often loosely spoken of as capital; but capital, though possibly the source in the case of income from securities, is in most cases hardly more than an element in the process of production.

31. The contentions of Sri Bhat, interesting as they are from a politico-legal point of view, do not appear to be germane for our present purpose.

32. In computing the “assets” of an assessee, the Wealth-tax Officer is not precluded from taking into consideration the assessee's “agricultural income”, so long as that income can be considered as an item of the “assets” of the assessee. As contended by Sri. D.M Chandrasekhar, the learned counsel for the revenue, a thin line divides “income” from “capital”.

33. As per the charging provision in the “Act”, the “net wealth” of the assessee on the relevant date is liable to be taxed. We have earlier considered the scope of the expression “net wealth”. Hence, so long as “agricultural income” can be considered as a part of the “assets” of the assessee, the same cannot be excluded from the scope of the expression “net wealth”.

34. Sri Bhat's contention that Parliament had no competence to indirectly trench upon the powers reserved for the States is no more res integra. It is now well settled that any incidental encroachment by Parliament on a field reserved for the States or vice versa does not affect the vires of a statute or any provision therein. A case somewhat similar to the one we are considering came up for consideration before the Federal Court in Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna & Sons. Therein the question was whether the Provincial Legislature was competent to levy sales tax on the first sale of goods manufactured or produced in the country and thereby encroach upon the right of Parliament to levy Central Duty of Excise. The contention that the Provincial Legislature had no competence in that regard was repelled by the Federal Court. Gwyer C.J, dealing with that contention, observed thus:

“The duties of excise which the Constitution Act assigns exclusively to the Central Legislature are, according to In re Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, duties levied upon the manufacturer or producer in respect of the manufacture of production of the commodity taxed. The tax on the sale of goods, which the Act assigns exclusively to the Provincial Legislatures, is a tax levied on the occasion of the sale of the goods. Plainly a tax levied on the first sale must in the nature of things be a tax on the sale by the manufacturer or producer; but it is levied upon him qua seller and not qua manufacturer or producer. It may well be that a manufacturer or producer is sometimes doubly hit; but so is the taxpayer in Canada who has to pay income-tax levied by the province for provincial purposes and also income-tax levied by the dominion for dominion purposes: see Caron v. King, Forbes v. Attorney-General for Manitoba. If the taxpayer who pays a sales tax is also a manufacturer or producer of commodities subject to a central duty of excise, there may no doubt be an overlapping in one sense; but there is no overlapping in law. The two taxes which he is called on to pay are economically two separate and distinct imposts. There is in theory nothing to prevent the Central Legislature from imposing a duty of excise on a commodity as soon as it comes into existence, no matter what happens to it afterwards, whether it be sold, consumed, destroyed or given away.”

35. This decision was approved by the Privy Council in Governor-General-in-Council v. Province of Madras. The Judicial Committee observed that it is not the name of the tax but its real nature, its “pith and substance”, as it has sometimes been said, which must determine into what category it falls.

36. We may next refer to the decision of the Federal Court in Ralla Ram v. Province of Bombay. The question for determination in that case was whether the provisions of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act were beyond the powers of the Provincial Legislature which enacted it.

37. The court opined that, in substance, the property tax levied under section 3 of the Punjab Urban Immovable Property Tax Act fell within item 42 of the Provincial List and is not a tax on income falling within item 54 of the Federal List of the Government of India Act, 1935, although the basis of the tax is the annual value of the building. It is not impossible to reconcile the seeming conflict between the provision of the Act in question and the Income-tax Act. The extent of the alleged invasion by the Provincial Legislature into the field of the Federal Legislature is not so great in the case in question as to justify the view that in pith and substance the impugned tax is a tax on income. It was, therefore, within the legislative competence of the Punjab Legislature to levy such a tax.

38. The decisions in Sir Byramjee Jeejeebhoy v. Province of Bombay, J.N Duggan v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Muncipal Commissioner, Muncipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Gordandas Hargovandas and Mammad Keyi v. Wealth-tax Officer, cited by Sri Bhat do not help the petitioner's case. In fact they are instances of the application of the rule laid down in Boddu Paidanna's case A.I.R 1942 F.C 33..

39. It is well settled that in interpreting the scope of the entries in the Lists in Schedule VII of the Constitution, the widest possible amplitude must be given to the words used and each general word must be held to extend to ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly be said to be comprehended in it. It is well known that the entries in the several Lists are not scientific-ally drawn up. There is considerable overlapping. This is in a way inevitable. Therefore, any minor encroachment ought to be ignored. While investigating into the validity of a statute or any provision therein, the courts have only to determine the true pith and substance of the legislation. In so doing any incidental trenching ought to be ignored. So viewed, the “Act” purports to levy and collect tax on capital assets. If any “agricultural income” incidentally falls within the net of taxation, the validity of the “Act” cannot be properly assailed. We are not satisfied that there are good grounds to hold that any provision in the “Act” is ultra vires of the powers of Parliament.

40. In the result, these petitions fail and they are dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 250 (one set).

41. Petitions dismissed.