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Lingamma v. Putte Gowda And Anr.

Karnataka High Court
Oct 11, 1961
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Judgment Summary — K.S. Hegde, J. (Full Bench Reference)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Full Bench reference arises from an order dated 12-12-1960 by a Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Hombe Gowda, J., which referred three specific questions of law to the Full Bench for decision. The questions are framed abstractly and were to be decided on assumptions explicitly stated by the Court: assume that the plaintiff has title to the suit property but has failed to establish possession (actual or constructive) within twelve years from the date of the suit, and assume that the plaintiff, having pleaded that the defendants were his tenants, has failed to establish the tenancy pleaded. The Full Bench was asked to determine, on these assumptions, which article(s) of the Limitation Act apply and whether the plaintiff must prove possession within twelve years to succeed in a suit for possession.

The Court proceeded on the stated assumptions and treated the referred questions as abstract legal questions rather than case-specific factual inquiries. The result of the reference was a determination of the legal effect of Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act under the posed assumptions. The matter (the appeal) was directed to be returned to the Division Bench for disposal in accordance with the Full Bench's answers.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the person who files a suit for possession entitled to succeed unless he shows, in addition to title, that he has been in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit?
  2. Whether a case in which it is proved that the plaintiff or his predecessor has not been in possession at all is governed by Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation Act?
  3. When a plaintiff seeks to eject persons from immovable property claimed by him on the ground that although they entered into such property as tenants, they were in wrongful possession but the plaintiff fails to prove that the defendants entered in such permissive character, is he bound to show that he or some of the persons under whom he claims have been in possession of the property within 12 years before suit?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant's counsel (Sri V. Krishnamurthi) relied on several authorities said to take the contrary view to the prevailing High Court opinions, invoking (inter alia) Jai Chand v. Girwar Singh (ILR 41 All 669; AIR 1919 All 403), Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna (ILR 35 Bom 79), and the recent decision of this Court in Basanna v. Appa Rao (AIR 1959 Mys 227). The thrust of these citations, as described in the opinion, was to contend that the onus of proving adverse possession lies on the defendant and that a plaintiff who establishes title need not necessarily further show possession within twelve years in all circumstances.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Basanna v. Appa Rao, AIR 1959 Mys 227 Held that where a suit is based on title and not on possession or discontinuance and the cause of action arises from a court order, Article 142 does not apply and Article 144 is applicable; if defendant has not proved adverse possession for more than 12 years the suit is maintainable. The Full Bench examined Basanna, noted that it proceeded from the language of the Article without reference to earlier decided cases, and expressly overruled Basanna as unsettling long-settled law of the High Courts.
Bindhyachal Chand (Bindhyacnano) v. Ram Chand, AIR 1934 All 993 Full Bench view that a plaintiff who sues on title must also show possession (or predecessor's possession) within 12 years; it did not accept the ratio of Jai Chand. The Court treated this Full Bench decision as authoritative on the point and used it to reject the contrary ratio of Jai Chand.
Jai Chand v. Girwar Singh, ILR 41 All 669; AIR 1919 All 403 Held (in the cited decision) that on a defendant's plea of adverse possession the onus lay on the defendant to establish adverse possession, and it was not for the plaintiff to prove possession within 12 years. The Court recorded that the ratio of Jai Chand was not followed by the Full Bench in Bindhyachal Chand's case; the Allahabad High Court later did not follow Jai Chand. The present Court did not accept Jai Chand's contrary approach in preference for the view that plaintiff must prove possession within 12 years when title alone is asserted but possession within the statutory period is not otherwise established.
Ahobala Sastry v. Cheluvegowda, 29 Mys LJ 141 Used to support the principle that applicability of a Limitation Act article depends on proved or admitted facts and cannot be evaded by drafting of the plaint. The Court cited this case to reinforce that the question of which Article applies must be determined by proved or admitted facts, not by the form of pleading.
Sangam Lal v. Ganga Din, AIR 1946 All 389 Applied for the proposition that the applicability of a given Article depends on admitted or proved facts; also cited regarding permissive possession failing to be proved amounting to discontinuance. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that if permissive possession is not established it amounts to an admission of discontinuance and thus Article 142 applies.
Official Receiver of East Godavari v. C. Govindaraju, AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB); 29 Mys LJ 141 One of the High Court decisions holding that a plaintiff must prove that he or his predecessor-in-title was in possession within 12 years when suing on title. Placed among the authorities demonstrating the previously uniform High Court view that plaintiffs must prove possession within 12 years in suits based on title.
Bai Ganga v. Baheramshah Dalal, AIR 1947 Bom 300 Listed as one of the High Court decisions supporting the rule that title alone is not sufficient without proof of possession within 12 years. Used as part of the body of High Court decisions showing consistent earlier law contrary to Basanna.
Gopaul Chunder v. Nilmoney Mitter, ILR 10 Cal 374 Also cited among cases which held that a plaintiff must establish possession within 12 years in addition to title. Relied upon to demonstrate the unanimity of High Court decisions on the point.
Chandiprasad v. Awadh Narain Jha Referred to among the decisions aligned with the rule requiring proof of possession within 12 years (citation in the text is incomplete). Included among authorities the Court considered to show the established approach of High Courts.
Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna, ILR 35 Bom 79 Decision where the Court found adverse claimant held possession on behalf of plaintiffs (minors) and thus the case was factually unhelpful to the appellant. The Court observed that this decision did not assist the appellant because it turned on specific factual findings (possession on behalf of minors) rather than the general legal proposition sought.
Adinaranappa v. Mallamma, AIR 1950 Mys 13 Cited for the principle of reluctance to change a long-settled view of law and the importance of stare decisis. The Court relied on this and a quotation from Reilly, C.J. to emphasize that longstanding consistent decisions should not be lightly disturbed, and used this as a reason to adhere to the established High Court view and to overrule Basanna.
40 Mys H. C. R. 435 (Reilly, C.J.) Quoted for the warning that reopening long-settled law may create confusion and unsettlement, thus counsel for stare decisis. Invoked to support the Court's reluctance to depart from the long-standing view that plaintiffs must prove possession within 12 years when suing on title.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in the following structured manner, strictly on the assumptions posed in the reference:

  1. Textual interpretation of Articles: The Court closely analyses the language of Article 142 and Article 144 of the Limitation Act. Article 142 is directed to suits "when the plaintiff while in possession of the property, has been either dispossessed or has discontinued his possession." Article 144 is described as a residuary Article applicable only where no other Article is relevant. The Court concludes Articles 142 and 144 are the only relevant provisions for the questions posed.
  2. Presumption of possession from title: Where there is no evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that the true owner is in possession; the maxim "possession follows title" is accepted by the Court. Thus when a person proves title, the law presumes that either he or his predecessor-in-title had possession at some point.
  3. Effect of proved/non-proved possession facts: If a plaintiff admits or it is proved that he was not in possession at the institution of the suit, then necessarily there must have been either dispossession by a third party or discontinuance of possession prior to suit. The Court clarifies the concepts: "dispossession" when possession of the true owner is taken away by a third party; "discontinuance" when the true owner consciously gives up possession and a third party obtains possession.
  4. Where plaintiff pleads permissive possession (tenancy) but fails to prove it: If a plaintiff alleges that the defendant entered as a tenant (permissive possession) but fails to establish the tenancy, that failure implies that the defendant's possession was without consent and therefore amounts to dispossession. Once the defendant holds without consent, Article 142 becomes attracted and the plaintiff must prove possession within twelve years; otherwise the plaintiff's rights are barred under Article 142.
  5. Precedential analysis and stare decisis: The Court surveys a body of High Court decisions which consistently held that a plaintiff suing on title must also show possession by himself or predecessor-in-title within twelve years. The Court recognises a recent decision of this Court (Basanna) that took a contrary view, but finds it to be contrary to the long line of High Court authorities and to be based primarily on the language of the Article without reference to precedent. Having regard to the long-established view and the principle of stare decisis, the Court declines to follow Basanna and overrules it.
  6. Conclusive application to the referred questions: Applying the interpretive conclusions and precedent survey to the abstract assumptions, the Court holds that Article 142 governs the assumed situations where the plaintiff has title but has not shown possession within twelve years; accordingly the plaintiff must prove possession within twelve years to maintain the suit.

Holding and Implications

The Full Bench answered the referred questions as follows (the Court's core rulings are emphasized):

  • On Question No. 1: The plaintiff must prove not only his title to the suit property but also his possession of the same within twelve years of the suit. In other words, title alone is insufficient where possession within the statutory period is not otherwise shown. (The Court's answer to this question is a mandatory requirement.)
  • On Question No. 2: The relevant Article governing the assumed facts is Article 142 of the Limitation Act (and not Article 144) when the plaintiff, while in possession, has been dispossessed or has discontinued possession; Article 144 remains residuary and applies only where no specific Article governs.
  • On Question No. 3: Where a plaintiff seeks to eject persons on the ground that they entered as tenants but fails to prove the permissive (tenancy) character of their entry, that failure amounts to an admission of discontinuance or results in the defendants' possession being without consent; therefore the plaintiff must establish possession within twelve years before suit.

DISPOSITION: The Court expressly overruled the decision in Basanna v. Appa Rao (AIR 1959 Mys 227) and held in favour of the longstanding High Court view that a plaintiff suing on title must, in addition to title, prove possession (by himself or predecessor-in-title) within twelve years of the suit where the facts show dispossession or discontinuance. The appeal was ordered to be sent back to the Division Bench for disposal according to law in light of this Full Bench decision.

Direct effect on the parties: Under this ruling, under the assumed factual position, a plaintiff who cannot establish possession within twelve years (or show that dispossession/discontinuance does not arise on the proved facts) will be barred by Article 142 and cannot succeed merely on title. The opinion also clarifies the Court's view on the interplay between Articles 142 and 144 and the role of proved/admitted facts in determining which Article applies.

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JUDGMENT K.S. Hegde, J.

1. The following questions of law are referred by a Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Hombe Gowda, J., to the Full Bench for decision as per Order dated 12-12-1960:

1. Is the person who files a suit for possession entitled to succeed unless he shows, in addition to title, that he has been in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit?

2. Whether a case, in which it is proved that the plaintiff or his predecessor has not been in possession at all, is governed by Article 142 or Article 144 of the Limitation. "Act" (to be referred to as the

"Act"
hereinafter)? and

3. When a plaintiff seeks to eject persons from immovable property claimed by him on the ground that although they entered into such property as tenants, were in wrongful possession thereof but fails to prove that the defendants had entered into the property in such permissive character, is he bound to show that he or some of the persons under whom he claims have been in possession of the property within 12 years before suit? These questions are closely interconnected; in fad they are several facets of one question. The questions as referred are abstract questions of law. To decide these questions, we have to proceed on the basis that the plaintiff has title to the suit property, but he has failed to establish his possession, actual or constructive, within 12 years from the date of the suit. We have to assume further that the plaintiff having taken the plea that the defendant was his tenant has failed to establish the tenancy pleaded. We are told that these questions still remain to be decided by the Bench hearing the appeal. For our purpose, we shall proceed on the assumptions mentioned above.

2. The controversies about the true scope of Article 142 had been quietened years back by the decisions of the several High Courts till it was reopened recently by the decision of this Court in Basanna v. Appa Rao, AIR 1959 Mys 227. All the High Courts in India had uniformly taken the view that a plaintiff who sues on the basis of his title, has not only to prove his title, but also his possession within 12 years from the date of the suit. This reference became necessary in view of the decision in Basanna's case AIR 1959 Mys 227.

3. Before proceeding to examine the decisions on the subject, we shall first go to the language used in Article 142. Article 142 speaks of suits for possession of immoveable property when the plaintiff while in possession of the property, has been either dispossessed or has discontinued his possession. Article 144 is a residuary Article. It relates to suits for possession of immoveable property or any interest therein not otherwise specifically provided in the ""Act"". It is quite clear, nor is it disputed, that Article 144 can only apply to cases which are not governed by any other article in the ""Act"". In the present case the controversy centres round Articles 142 and 144, No other Article is relevant for our purpose. Therefore, we have to first see whether the questions formulated could be reasonably brought within the ambit of Article 142.

In a case where dispossession or discontinuance of possession is either admitted or proved, there is no difficulty. But difficulty arises where no specific evidence is available about dispossession of the true owner or his discontinuing his possession. What then is the position? In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the true owner of the property must be deemed to have been in possession of the property. The dictum possession follows title is well known and well recognised by Courts. Therefore, when a person establishes his title to the property, law presumes that either he or his predecessor-in-title was deemed to have been in possession of the property, at some point of time. If the plaintiff either admits or it is proved that he was not in possession of the suit property at the time of the institution of the suit, then necessarily he must have either been dispossessed or he must have discontinued his possession at some point of time prior to the suit. "Dispossession" occurs where the possession of the true owner is taken away by a third party. "Discontinuance" of possession relates to a case where a true owner consciously gives up his possession and some third party gets into possession. For the reasons mentioned already, every suit for possession based on title attracts to itself the mischief of Article 142. It a person having title to the property sues for possession of the suit property on the allegation that the defendant was his tenant but fails to establish the tenancy pleaded, then it follows that he must have either been dispossessed or that he had discontinued his possession prior to suit. Where a plaintiff pleads permissive possession and the defendant admits his possession but denies that he is in permissive possession (in either case the defendant's possession being admitted) if the plaintiff fails to establish his case, then it follows that the defendant's possession was without the consent of the plaintiff. From the time the defendant holds the property without the consent of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff must be deemed to have been dispossessed. In such a case, law requires the plaintiff to establish that he was in possession of the suit property within 12 years from the date of the suit. Otherwise, his rights get barred under Article 142.

4. This takes us to the decisions cited at the Bar. Decisions on the points in controversy are legion-There is no need to refer to all of them. We shall examine the views of the several High Courts and also those cases which throw some new light, on the subject.

5. Before proceeding to discuss the decisions on the points in question, it is necessary to notice that at one time there was a view that the question whether Article 142 or Article 144 applied to the facts of a given case depended on the allegations made in the plaint. This view has been now definitely negatived by a chain : of decisions of different High Courts. It is now well settled that the plaintiff cannot be allowed by skilful drafting of the plaint to evade the inconvenient Article; the decision as to the applicability of the particular Article must necessarily depend on the proved or admitted facts. See: Ahobala Sastry v. Cheluvegowda, 29 Mys LJ 141, Sangam Lal v. Ganga Din, AIR 1946 All 389, and Bhindhyacnano v. Ram Chand, AIR 1934 All 993.

6. Till the decision of this Court in Basanna's case, AIR 1959 Mys 227, all the High Courts were unanimous in holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed unless he shows in addition to his title to the property, that he or his predecessor-in-title was in possession of the suit property within 12 years of the suit. See: Official Receiver of East Godavari v. C. Govindaraju, AIR 1940 Mad. 798 (FB), 29 Mys LJ 141; AIR 1934 All 993, Bai Ganga v. Baheramshah Dalal AIR 1947 Bom 300; Gopaul Chunder v. Nilmoney Mitter ILR 10 Cal 374, and Chandiprasad v. Awadh Narain Jha, .

7. But Sri V. Krishnamurthi, the learned Counsel for the appellant, has invited our attention to three decisions which had taken the contrary view. The first decision cited by him is the one in Jai Chand v. Girwar Singh, ILR 41 All 669 : AIR 1919 All 403(2). Therein It was held that on the defendant's plea of adverse possession the onus lay on him to establish the adverse possession pleaded and it is not for the plaintiff to prove his possession within 12 years. But the ratio of that decision was not followed in the Full Bench decision in Bindhyachal Chand's case, AIR 1934 All 993. Dealing with the decision in Jaichand's case, ILR 41 All 669 : AIR 1919 All 403 (2), Sulaiman, C. J. who wrote the leading judgment in Bindhayachal Chand's Case, AIR 1934 All 993, observed that in that case there was a presumption that the plaintiff therein, who was a Zamindar, had both title to the suit property and that he was in possession of the same; therefore the defendant who had set up adverse possession against him had to prove adverse possession for the statutory period. Though the Full Bench did not specifically over-rule the decision in Jai Chand's Case ILR 41 All 669 : AIR 1919 All 403 (2), the ratio of that decision definitely did not find favour with the Full Bench. The Allahabad High Court in its later decisions has not followed the decision in Jaichand's Case: ILR 41 All 669 : AIR 1919 All 403 (2). See: AIR 1946 All 389.

8. Next reference was made to Vasudeo Atmaram v. Eknath Balkrishna, ILR 35 Bom 79. We do not think that this decision is of any assistance to the appellant. In that case the Court found as a fact that the possession of the person who claimed adversely to the true owners was really on behalf of the plaintiffs who. were minors, she having been their de facto guardian. The only other decision cited in support of the contention of the plaintiff is the recent decision of this Court in Basanna's Case AIR 1959 Mys 227. In that case it was held :

"Article 142 emphasises "while in possession of the property plaintiff has been dispossessed or has discontinued possession". Where the plaintiff's suit is based on title and not on possession or discontinuance of possession and the cause of action is based upon an order of the Court holding that the plaintiff is not in possession, there cannot be any question of "while in possession", he was dispossessed. As such the case of the plaintiff does not come within the purview of Article 142 of the Limitation "Act". The Article that is applicable is Article 144 -- the residuary Article.

Where in such a case the defendant has not proved his adverse possession, for more than 12 years the suit is maintainable."

(As summarised in the head note). There is no reference to decided cases in Basanna's case, AIR 1959 Mys 227. The Court proceeded solely on the basis of the language of the Article, which we have considered already. The view taken in that case is opposed to the decisions of all the High Courts including that of the Old Mysore High Court. That decision has unsettled the settled law. As observed in Adinaranappa v. Mallamma, AIR 1950 Mys 13:

"We would like to add one other reason for being reluctant to change the view already taken by this Court. As observed by Reilly, C. J. in 40 Mys H. C. R. 435:

'When there is nothing in view of the law adopted In such a case which is in itself unjust or opposed to the public interest and the case was decided many years ago so that it is not improbable that many transactions have been made in the light of that decision, It would be improper to re-open such a question by a reference to a Full Bench and so possibly create confusion and unsettlement.' Thus the principle of stare decisis stares us In the face."

That principle applies with greater force to the points under consideration in, this appeal. For well over a quarter of century the Courts in India have been taking consistent view about the position of the law involved in this case. There are no compelling reasons to take a different view. We accordingly overrule the decision in AIR 1959 Mys 227.

9. The second question of law formulated for our decision is but a facet of the first question. Our answer to that question is found in our earlier discussion. Nothing more need be said.

10. Now coming to question No. 3, the general principles enunciated earlier apply with equal force to this question as well. Further, several Courts have taken the view that when the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant was in permissive possession of the suit property is not established, the allegation in question amounts to an admission of discontinuance of plaintiff's possession and therefore, his case falls under Article 142. See AIR 1946 All 389; and. 29 Mys LJ 141. This appears, to be the correct view both in principle and on authority.

11. In the result, our decision on question No. 1 is that the plaintiff has to prove not only his title to the suit property but also his possession of the same within twelve years of the suit; on question No. 2 we hold that the relevant Article is Article 142 of the ""Act""; and on question No. 3, we hold that the plaintiff, who seeks to eject persons from immoveable property claimed by him, on the ground that although they entered into such property as tenants, were in wrongful possession thereof but fails to prove his allegations has to establish his possession within 12 years of the suit.

12. Now the appeal will go back to the Division Bench for disposal according to law in the light of the decision in this reference.