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Gundila Manjappa Shetty v. Manjakke Shedthi

Karnataka High Court
Nov 18, 1960
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The decree-holder (respondent) obtained a permanent injunction in a suit restraining the judgment-debtor (appellant), a higher riparian proprietor of neighbouring land, from interfering with the decree-holder's right to take water from a watercourse. The decree-holder later alleged in execution proceedings that the judgment-debtor had deepened his land after the decree, causing water in the channel to percolate into the judgment-debtor's land and diminishing the supply to the decree-holder's land.

In execution, the decree-holder sought an order under sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order XXI, Code of Civil Procedure, including detention of the judgment-debtor in civil prison for disobedience to the injunction. The executing Court appointed a commissioner, whose report substantiated the allegation. The executing Court ordered the judgment-debtor either to lower the watercourse abutting his land or to raise the level of his own land and directed detention if he failed to comply. The judgment-debtor appealed; the lower appellate Court dismissed that appeal. This judgment is from the subsequent (second) appeal, in which the appellant challenges the orders made in execution proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the executing Court could, in execution proceedings, direct the judgment-debtor to lower the level of the watercourse or raise the level of his land and commit him to civil prison under sub-rule (1) of Rule 32, Order XXI, Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether acts committed by the judgment-debtor after the decree (specifically deepening his land causing percolation) give rise to a right to enforcement in execution proceedings or require institution of a fresh suit.
  3. Whether diminution of water caused indirectly by percolation (as distinct from direct tapping or abstraction) can constitute an actionable wrong against an adjoining riparian proprietor.
  4. Whether the executing Court should have declined execution and ordered the decree-holder to bring a separate suit because the factual questions were complex.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Raghunathan)

  • The executing Court lacked competence to direct the judgment-debtor to lower the watercourse or raise his land; the injunction in the suit was merely prohibitory and did not authorize such positive directions in execution proceedings.
  • Where the act (deepening land) occurred after the decree, the remedy should be a fresh suit regarding the new cause of action rather than enforcement in execution proceedings; reliance was placed on Angad v. Madho Ram.
  • The case law (including Ramabrahma Shastry v. Lakhminarasimhany) shows distinctions where a subsequent obstruction not in existence at the time of the prior decree should be the subject of a new suit.
  • There was no clear finding that the deepening occurred after the decree; if the lowering of land had already occurred (or was alleged within the original suit) then the executing Court could not order performance of an act not directed by the original decree.
  • The decision in English v. Metropolitan Water Board was relied upon to argue that diminution caused by indirect percolation (withdrawal of subterranean support) does not give rise to an action; therefore the deepening-induced percolation should not be actionable.
  • Because the factual questions were complex and difficult (existence and cause of diminution), the executing Court should have declined execution and required the decree-holder to institute a separate suit (relying on Pasupati Ramabhadra Raju v. Ayitha Ramanna).

Respondent's Arguments (Decree-holder; counsel Mr. B. Krishna Rao)

  • The executing Court had power under sub-rule (1) of Rule 32, Order XXI, to enforce the injunction, including detention for disobedience, whether the injunction was prohibitory or mandatory; a prohibited act done is as much disobedience as failure to perform a mandatory act.
  • Decisions such as Prag Dutt v. Kedar Nath support the proposition that disobedience includes doing an act the decree forbids, and the executing Court need not be limited to ordering only acts expressly specified in the decree.
  • The percolation complained of was caused by an operation of the judgment-debtor that directly drained or tapped water from the watercourse (i.e., a direct act), and so was actionable; reliance was placed on Karathigundi Keshava Bhatta v. Sunnanguli Krishna Bhatta.
  • The executing Court properly appointed a commissioner, received factual findings that the deepening occurred after the suit, and therefore appropriately proceeded in execution; the matter was not so complicated as to require a fresh suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Angad v. Madho Ram (High Court of Allahabad) Executing Court under sub-rule (5) of Rule 32, Order XXI cannot order demolition of a new structure put up after decree because sub-rule (5) relates to acts the decree required the judgment-debtor to do. The Court distinguished Angad: the present orders were made under sub-rule (1) (punishment for disobedience) and not under sub-rule (5); Angad therefore did not assist the appellant.
Ramabrahma Shastry v. Lakhminarasimhany Where obstruction complained of in a suit did not exist at time of an earlier decree, the plaintiff is not limited to execution of a prior decree and may sue afresh. The Court held this case different: the present injunction prohibited impeding flow, and deepening causing percolation was treated as disobedience of that injunction rather than a wholly new obstruction outside execution.
Prag Dutt v. Kedar Nath (Chief Court of Oudh) Disobedience within Rule 32(1) includes doing something prohibited by the decree; it is not necessary that the decree required a definite positive act to be performed. The Court relied on this authority to support the construction that sub-rule (1) covers prohibited acts done after a decree and justifies detention for disobedience.
English v. Metropolitan Water Board Diminution of a surface stream caused by lowering subterranean support (pumping that merely lowers sub-soil water) was held not to give cause of action where there was no direct tapping of the surface stream. The Court analyzed and distinguished English: it accepted the general principle but found English concerned withdrawal of subterranean support alone; if diminution follows from a direct act tapping the channel, English does not prevent an action. The present case was held to involve direct draining/tapping.
Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar (Shugar's case) Right to water in a defined channel is an incident of property; one cannot touch or diminish that water if it affects neighbours' rights. The Court cited excerpts invoked in English and noted that, if there is direct tapping/draining of an over-ground channel, the principle in Shugar's case would apply; used to support actionable wrong for direct abstraction.
Salt Union v. Brunner, Mond & Co. Abstraction of water or soil by the direct act of an adjoining proprietor may afford ground for action. Cited (through Lord Alverstone's comments in English) as an authority for the proposition that direct abstraction can be actionable; the Court applied that principle to find the present facts analogous.
Popplewell v. Hodkinson Considered in the reasoning of English; relates to principles about abstraction and withdrawal of support. Used in the English judgment; the present Court considered that reasoning when distinguishing English and affirming that direct acts tapping a channel are actionable.
Karathigundi Keshava Bhatta v. Sunnanguli Krishna Bhatta Authority endorsing the view that percolation resulting from a direct operation of an adjoining proprietor (i.e., tapping/draining) may be actionable. The Court agreed with the approach taken in this case and relied on it to reject the appellant's contention that percolation caused by the appellant's operation was not actionable.
Pasupati Ramabhadra Raju v. Ayitha Ramanna An executing Court can take note of altered circumstances but has the discretion in appropriate cases to refuse execution and require a separate suit when the matter is complex. The Court acknowledged the authority but held that here the executing Court had appointed a commissioner, accepted its report, and properly exercised discretion to proceed in execution rather than require a fresh suit.
Chasemore v. Richards Principles about rights to underground water: one has a right to all water which one can draw from different sources (quoted in Lord Hatherley's judgment). Quoted within the English decision as part of the discussion distinguishing rights to subterranean water and rights in defined surface channels; used in the Court's review of English but not applied to defeat the present claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a step-by-step analysis grounded in statutory interpretation of Order XXI, Rule 32 and examination of the factual findings made in the executing Court and on appeal.

  1. Classification of the executing Court's power: The Court first determined that the impugned orders were made under sub-rule (1) of Rule 32, Order XXI (which authorizes detention for disobedience to a decree) and not under sub-rule (5) (which relates to compelling performance of acts specifically required by the decree). The presence of an order for detention if the injunction was not obeyed demonstrated that sub-rule (1) was invoked.
  2. Effect of a prohibitory injunction: The Court accepted the principle (supported by Prag Dutt v. Kedar Nath) that disobedience includes not only failure to perform a positive act but also doing an act that a decree prohibits. Thus, a decree-holder can seek enforcement in execution proceedings where the judgment-debtor has performed a prohibited act after the decree.
  3. Distinguishing authorities limiting executing Court power: The Court distinguished Angad v. Madho Ram because that case concerned sub-rule (5); the present case fell within sub-rule (1)'s ambit, so Angad did not aid the appellant.
  4. Factual finding on timing and causation: The executing Court appointed a commissioner whose report the Court accepted; that report substantiated that the judgment-debtor had deepened his land, causing percolation and diminution of supply. The appellate Court agreed. The Court treated the finding that the deepening occurred after termination of the suit as a factual conclusion not open to challenge in this appeal.
  5. Distinguishing English v. Metropolitan Water Board: The Court examined English closely. It acknowledged English's holding that diminution resulting solely from withdrawal of subterranean support (pumping affecting sub-soil level) did not afford a cause of action where there was no direct tapping of the surface stream. However, the Court identified the critical distinction: where percolation and diminution are the consequence of a direct operation by the higher riparian proprietor that drains or taps the defined channel, that is actionable. The Court concluded the present facts showed direct draining/tapping by deepening the land, and therefore English did not bar relief.
  6. On remedy vs. fresh suit: The Court rejected the contention that the decree-holder was limited to bringing a fresh suit. Because the injunction forbade impeding the free flow and the executing Court found actual disobedience (doing what the decree prohibited), the decree-holder was entitled to enforcement in execution proceedings, including detention for disobedience.
  7. On complexity and discretion: The Court acknowledged the discretion of an executing Court to require a fresh suit in complex cases (Pasupati). But here the executing Court had conducted an inquiry by appointing a commissioner, accepted the report, and found the matter was not too complex to preclude execution. Given those procedural steps and findings, it was not appropriate on appeal to disturb the exercise of discretion.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The orders of the executing Court (and the dismissal by the lower appellate Court) are affirmed: the judgment-debtor was properly ordered to either lower the watercourse or raise the level of his land to prevent percolation, and to be detained in civil prison in default of compliance.
  • The appellant (judgment-debtor) must pay the costs of the respondent in this appeal.

Broader implications: The Court did not purport to lay down any novel general rule beyond applying established principles: (a) sub-rule (1) of Rule 32, Order XXI covers disobedience by doing a prohibited act; (b) diminution caused by a direct act that drains or taps a defined overground channel can be actionable; (c) whether execution should be declined in favour of a fresh suit remains a discretionary, fact-specific determination for the executing Court. The opinion does not claim to establish a new legal precedent beyond these applications to the facts.

Show all summary ...

This is a judgment-debtor's appeal from an order made against him in execution proceedings.

In a suit brought by the decree-holder, who is the respondent in this appeal, a permanent injunction was made against the judgment-debtor restraining him from interfering with the right of the decree-holder to take water from the water course, which was the subject-matter of the suit. The decree-holder and the judgment-debtor owned neighbouring lands, the judgment-debtor being a higher riparian proprietor. The complaint made by the decree-holder was that the judgment-debtor had impede the flow of water in the water course and brought about a diminution in the supply of water to the decree-holder's land.

In the executing Court, the decree-holder charged the judgment-debtor with having deepened his land after the decree, and thereby made the water flowing in the water course percolate into his land, again causing similar diminution, in the supply of water to the decree-holder's land. An order was sought by the decree-holder, under sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, directing the detention of the judgment-debotor in the civil person for his disobedience to the injunction made against him in the suit.

The executing Court appointed a commissioner to investigate into the truth of the allegation made by the decree-holder. The Commissioner's report having substantiated that allegation, that court made an older directing the judgment-debtor to either lower the water course abutting his land or to suitably raise the level of his own land so as to prevent the percolation from the water course. It ordered the detention of the judgment-debtor in the civil prison if he failed to obey that direction.

The judgment-debtor appealed from that order, but the lower appellate Court dismissed his appeal.

In this second appeal, Mr. Raghunathan first urged that it was not competent for the executing Court to direct the judgment-debtor either to lower the level of the water course or to raise the level of his land. According to the argument, since the injunction made in the suit brought by the decree-holder merely prohibited the judgment-debtor from interfering with the right of the decree-holder to use the water flowing in the water course for his own land, if the judgment-debtor had by an act committed by him after the decree, lowered the level of his own land, and thereby made it possible for the water of the channel to percolate into it, the only remedy available to the decree-holder was to institute another suit in respect of the cause of action which had subsequently arisen and not to apply for the enforcement of the injunction in the execution proceedings or to ask for the detention of the judgment-debtor in the civil prison.

In support of this contention, reliance was placed on a decision of the High Court of Allahabad in Angad v. Madho Ram(1).

That was a case in which the decree-holders had brought a suit for the removal of certain constructions from a piece of land and also for the removal of a certain drain opening on to it. The decree which was ultimately passed did not direct the removal of the constructions on the land but made an injunction against the defendants that they should not make any other use of the land beyond keeping those structures upon it. The decree-holders complaint in the execution proceedings was that the judgment debtors put up a new structure, in violation of the injunction made in the suit. The decree-holders applied for a direction that the judgment-debtors should remove that structure, and the contention urged on behalf of the judgment-debtors was that the executing court had no competence to direct the demolition of that new structure. Their Lordships of the High Court of Allahabad expressed the view the demolition of the new structure put up by the judgment-debtors was not one which the executing Court could order, under the provisions of sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure. The ratio of their decision was that since under that sub-rule, it was competent for the executing Court only to direct the act which the decree required the judgment-debtors to do and the demolition of the new structure put up by the judgment-debtors was not an act of that description, it was not competent for the executing Court to Order its removal.

It is clear that Mr. Raghunathan cannot derive any assistance for his contention from this decision. This is not a case in which any order was made by the executing Court, under the provisions of sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order XXI of the Code. Although Mr. Raghunathan contended that in effect by directing the judgment-debtor to lower the level of the channel or to raise the level of his land, the executing Court directed an act to be done by the judgment-debtor under sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order XXI, I am not prepared to say that the executing Court did anything more than merely giving an opportunity to the judgment-debtor to obey the decree which had been made against him under the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order XXI of the Code. That the impugned orders under appeal were made Under sub-rule (1) and not under sub-rule (5) is perfectly manifest from the fact that the executing Court directed the detention of the judgment-debtor in civil prison if he did not obey the order of injunction, in the manner directed by it, which it could not have done under sub-rule (5).

The decision in Ramabrahma Shastry v. Lakhminarasimhany on which Mr. Raghunathan next relied has also no resemblance to the case before me. That was a case in which, in a suit brought for the removal of an obstruction to the right of way, claimed by the plaintiff, the contention of the defendant was that the remedy of the plaintiff was only to execute a decree which he had previously obtained against the defendant. Their Lordships repelling that contention, observed that the obstruction to the right of way complained of in the suit, not having been in existence at the time when the decree was made in the previous suit, it was not possible for the defendant to resist the suit on the plea advanced by him.

But the injunction in the present case which was made in the suit brought by the decree-holder restrained the judgment-debtor from impeding the free flow of water in the watercourse on to the decree holder's land. If by deepening his own land, the judgment-debtor diverted the free flow of water in the water course, by making it percolate into his land, what he did, to mind, amounted to a clear disobedience to the injunction made against him. It is, in my opinion, indisputable that a person disobeys an injunction not only if he fails to perform an act which he is directed to do but also when he does an act which he prohibited from doing. There is as much disobedience in the one case as in the other. It is not easy to understand how the judgment-debtor in this cast can contend that since the injunction granted against him was merely in the nature of a prohibition, and not mandatory, the executing Court cannot find him guilty of having disobeyed it, although it was satisfied that he had done the very thing which he was forbidden from doing. The decree-holder was therefore clearly entitled to ask the executing Court to direct the Judgment-debtor to obey the injunction and in default to commit him to civil prison.

That that is the true construction of sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order XXI of the Code is also clear fro u a decision of the Chief Court of Oudh in Prag Dutt v. Kedar Nath on which the decree-holder's learned advocate Mr. B. Krishna Rao relied. It was pointed out in that case that it is not necessary that some definite act should be required to be performed by the decree before there can be disobedience to the decree within the meaning of Rule 32(1) and that if a person is prohibited from doing something and does it, it is just as much disobedience as if he is ordered to do something and fails to do it.

In my opinion, the contention that the order made by the executing Court in this case was one which it could not have properly made under the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order XXI of the Code must therefore fail.

It was next argued that there was no clear finding by the executing Court that the deepening of his land by the judgment-debtor was made after the decree in the suit. Mr. Raghunathan's contention was that even in the suit one of the allegations made by the decree holder was that the judgment-debtor had lowered the level of his own land, and that no direction was made by the decree in that suit for the restoration of the land to its original level. That not having been done, it was urged, that the decree-holder could not again apply for and order from the executing Court directing the performance of an act which the decree itself did not direct, although the decree-holder had asked for it in the suit.

The infirmity in this contention is that the executing Court, as I understand its, order, accepted as correct the report made by the Commissioner appointed by it that the judgment-debtor had in fact lowered the level of his own land and the finding of the appellate Court, although the executing Court itself did not say so very clearly was that the land had been deepened after the termination of the suit. That being a finding on a question of fact, it would not, in my opinion, be open to the judgment-debtor to contend in this case—and indeed, no such attempt was made before me—that the level of the land had been lowered to the depth to which it had been found to have been lowered even during the pendency of the previous suit.

In that view of the matter, the contention that either under the provisions of Rule 2 of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure or on principles analogous to those incorporated in that rule, the decree-holder was debarred from applying for the direction which the executing Court gave to the judgment-debtor cannot succeed.

It was next urged that even if the judgment-debtor had made it possible for the water flowing in the water course to percolate into his own land, by deepening his own land, the decree-holder, even if there had been any diminution in the supply of water to his own land, could not complain against it. What was urged by Mr. Raghunathan was that cases in which the diminution of water flowing in a watercourse is brought about by directly drawing or tapping water from it, have to be distinguished, and stand on a different footing from those cases in which the diminution is the indirect result of percolation, although such percolation is attributable to an act like the one which the judgment-debtor did in this case.

This contention was founded on the decision in English v. Metropolitan Water Board, and on the observations of Lord Alverstone C.J in it.

The defendants in that case were the owners of a well and of a pumping station situate at a short distance from a natural stream. No access for water to the well from the adjacent soil was possible except at a depth greater that 76 feet, by reason of the fact that the well had been lined with steel cylinders to that depth. The plaintiff was a riparian owner lower down the stream as a result of the defendant's pumping of water from the well, the general level of the water in the soil in the neighbourhood of the well was lowered to the extent of about twelve inches, making the soil dry, and the water flowing down the stream leak out into the well, bringing about a substantial diminution in the volume of the water in the stream by the time it reached the plaintiff's land. It was held in that case that since the defendants did not appropriate any portion of the water of the stream by pumping it up themselves, but merely caused it to sink further into the ground by withdrawing the support of the lower subterranean water the damage to the stream gave no cause of action.

Mr. Raghunathan urged that the principle on which the above conclusion was reached is also the principle by the application of which the question whether the decree-holder in this case can complain of any actionable wrong has to be decided. If in that case, the withdrawal of the support of the lower subterranean water which brought about the diminution of the volume of water in the stream did not give a cause of action to the plaintiff, it was suggested that the deepening of the land by the judgment-debtor, although it resulted in percolation and consequent diminution in the supply of water to the decree-holder, could not amount to an actionable wrong.

It seems to me that there is nothing in the decision in English v. Metropolitan Water Board, which supports this argument. It is a firmly established principle that if a stream of water flows in a known or defined channel, the right to have it run in its natural course is an incident of property, and that an action lies for the infringement of that right. It is equally clear that a lower riparian proprietor can institute an action against the higher riparian proprietor for injuries diversion or abstraction, it being immaterial that the diversion or abstraction was brought about by percolation through the strata, if the percolation was the consequence of some operation of the higher riparian proprietor by which, he directly drained or tapped water flowing in the water course and brought about a diminution in the supply to the lower riparian proprietor. Indeed, in English v. Metropolitan Water Board, Alverstone, to the following passage from the judgment of Lord Hatherley in Grand Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar(2).

“As far as regards the support of the water all one can say is this: I do not think Chasemore v. Richards (7 H.L.O 349), or any other case, has decided more than this, that you have a right to all the water which you can draw from the different sources which may percolate underground; but that has no bearing at all on what you may do with regard to water which is in a defined channel and which you are not to touch. If you cannot get at the underground water without touching the water in a defined surface channel, I think you cannot get at it at all. You are not by your operations, or by any act of yours, to diminish the water which runs in this defined channel, because that is not only for yourself, but for your neighbours also, who have a clear right to use it and have it come to them unimpaired in quality and undiminished in quantity.”

Lord Alverstone C.J thought that Lord Hatherley, whose observations have been extracted above, treated the case as one in which there was direct tapping of an over-ground stream, flowing in a definite channel, and not merely percolating water indirectly affecting the surface stream, and he went on to add:

“I desire to say that if I had been satisfied that the defendants, by their operations, had directly drained or tipped water from the brook which would otherwise have flowed past the plaintiff's property, I should have applied the principle of the judgment in Shugar's case, and have given effect to the opinion which I expressed in delivering judgment, in Salt Union v. Brunner, Mond & Co.(3), that the abstraction of water or soil by the direct act of an adjoining proprietor may afford ground for action; but, having regard to the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber in Poppleuell v. Hodkinson(4), and for the reasons which I have given, I am of opinion that abstraction or diminution of quantity by the withdrawal of support does not come within the same principle.”

Lord Alverstone C.J next proceeded to observe that in the case which he was deciding, he found as a fact that no water from the brook got into or was pumped by the defendants' well, and that the only effect defendants' pumping was to lower the level of the sub-soil water underneath and at the sides of the brook, causing a diminution in the quantity of the water passing the plaintiff's land, and that such diminution was the consequence of the withdrawal of the support and of that alone. Lord Alveistone C.J, it is clear, had no doubt in his mind that if an abstraction of water from a water course and the diminution in the quantity of water flowing in it was the consequence of a direct act of an adjoining proprietor, such act would plainly afford ground for action.

Mr. Raghunathan's argument that Lord Alverstone C.J, expressed his dissent from the enunciation of the law by Lord Hatherley in the Sugar's case, does not appear to me to be well-founded. On the contrary, Lord Alverstone C.J made it clear that if he had been satisfied that the defendants, by their operations had directly drained or tapped water from the brook, which would otherwise have flowed past the plaintiff's property, he would have applied the principle of the judgment in Shugar's case. Not having been so satisfied, he found against the plaintiff.

But in the present case, it is clear that the percolation against which the decree-holder complained was brought about by an operation of the judgment-debtor through which he directly drained and tapped water from the water course, which otherwise would have reached the decree-holder's land or flowed past it.

That being so, this case can have no resemblance to the case of English v. Metropolitan Water Board, where the diminution in the water flowing in the stream was the consequence of the withdrawal of support and of that alone.

It is well established law that the ordinary rule is that although a land owner has a right to the water that percolates or flows from a channel, into his land, it would not be lawful for him to draw or abstract or tap water flowing in a definite overground channel by a direct act, whether it be by deepening his own land or by making an artificial cutting or otherwise. If he does that, it is to my mind clear that the neighbouring land owner who has a right to the water flowing in such over-ground water course has a right of action against him.

My view on this question accords with that taken by Chandrasekhara Iyer, J., as he then was, in Karathigundi Keshava Bhatta v. Sunnanguli Krishna Bhatta, on which Mr. B. Krishna Rao, the learned advocate for the respondent relied. The argument in this case that the judgment-debtor was entitled by his own operation to abstract the water from the water course through percolation is thus unsubstantial and cannot succeed.

It was lastly contended that this was a case in which the executing Court should have declined to make an order in execution proceedings. Mr. Raghunathan contended that the question as to whether there was really a diminution in the water flowing into the decree-holder's land and whether such diminution was the consequence of any act of the judgment-debtor was so complicated and so difficult that it should have been made the subject-matter of an investigation in a properly constituted suit. He referred to a decision of the High Court of Madras in Pasupati Ramabhadra Raju v. Ayitha Ramanna, in which Balakrishna Ayyar, J., expressed the view that although an executing Court can certainly take note of the altered circumstances, it had the discretion to disallow execution in cases in which it considers that the aggrieved party should institute a separate suit for obtaining the relief claimed by him.

It may be, as pointed out by Balakrishna Ayyar, J., although I abstain from expressing any opinion about it, that an executing Court can in appropriate cases direct the aggrieved party to institute another suit; but, even if it could do so, the question as to whether execution should be disallowed on that ground in a particular case is a matter depending on the discretion of the executing Court and on the facts of the case which it has to consider.

Now, in this case, the Commissioner's report that the diminution in the supply of water to the decree-holder's land was the consequence of the deepening of the judgment-debtor's land was accepted by both the Courts. Whatever enquiry was necessary in this case in that regard had been made through a Commissioner which the executing Court appointed for that purpose. It was apparently clear to the executing Court that the investigation which it had to make was neither so complicated nor so difficult as to justify a direction that the decree-holder should institute a separate suit, and if that was what the executing Court thought, it would certainly be not open to the judgment-debtor to contend in this appeal that I should disturb the orders made by the Courts below and direct the decree-holder to institute another suit.

This appeal therefore fails, and, in my opinion, should be dismissed.

The appellant must pay the costs of the respondent in this appeal.