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M/S. New Krishna Bha... v. Commercial Tax Offic...

Karnataka High Court
Dec 2, 1959
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is one of the partners of Hotel New Krishna Bhawan, Malleswaram, Bangalore. On 23 April 1958 he was served with a notice by the Commercial Tax Officer requiring production of account books and vouchers in support of his sales tax return for the year 1956–1957. The petitioner challenged liability to sales tax on the ground that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948 (as amended by Amending Act 25 of 1954) had been declared unconstitutional by the High Court of Mysore on 27 September 1956, and therefore hotel keepers could not be charged under that proviso. The State relied on subsequent Supreme Court authority. The petition was heard by S.R. Das Gupta, C.J., with A.R. Somnath Iyer, J. concurring.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a provision in a statute that offends fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (here, a proviso to S. 3(1) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act) is to be treated as non-existent (nullity) or merely unenforceable (the doctrine of eclipse / dormancy).
  2. Whether there is a conflict in Supreme Court decisions on that point and, if so, which view is binding on the High Court (i.e., how to treat earlier decisions such as Bhikaji Narain and Sundararamier vis-à-vis the later decision in Deep Chand).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. T. Krishna Rao)

  • The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948 (as amended) was declared unconstitutional by the High Court of Mysore and therefore hotel keepers cannot be charged sales tax under that proviso for the year in question.
  • Reliance on Supreme Court decisions (Bhikaji Narain v. State of M.P., AIR 1955 SC 781 and Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 SC 468) that a provision offending fundamental rights becomes unenforceable/eclipsed rather than non-existent; thus the offending provision remains on the statute book and is merely unenforceable until the constitutional bar is removed.
  • Contended that if a provision is merely unenforceable (not non-est), hotel keepers would not be chargeable under the general rates in clauses (a) and (b) of S. 3(1).

State's Arguments (as advanced by the Government Pleader)

  • Relied on the later Supreme Court decision in Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 648, where the majority held that a post‑Constitution law contravening Part III is void ab initio and the doctrine of eclipse does not apply; thus an offending provision must be treated as non-existent.
  • Also contended (as an alternative) that even if the provision were only unenforceable, the petitioner would still be liable to be taxed under S. 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act (the general rates), though the Chief Justice did not find it necessary to decide that point after resolving the constitutional question.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhikaji Narain v. State of M.P., AIR 1955 SC 781 Pre-Constitution laws inconsistent with Part III are rendered void "to the extent of such inconsistency" and may be in a dormant or "eclipsed" condition; after amendment of the Constitution (First Amendment, 1951), such an eclipsed law may become operative again. The opinion records and analyses Das J.'s observations in this case and acknowledges that it supports the doctrine that an unconstitutional provision may be merely unenforceable/eclipsed. The Court considered this authority when assessing conflict with later decisions.
Sundararamier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 SC 468 (1958 SCJ 459) Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest (and severable), the valid portion stays on the statute book; the unenforceable portion may operate proprio vigore when the constitutional bar is removed and need not await fresh legislation. The Court observed that this decision supports the view that an unconstitutional provision can remain on the statute book and become effective again when the constitutional impediment is removed. The judgment was considered in determining whether it conflicted with Deep Chand.
Deep Chand v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 648 The majority held a distinction between Art. 13(1) and Art. 13(2): pre-Constitution laws subsist except insofar as inconsistent, but post‑Constitution laws contravening Part III are nullities ab initio; the doctrine of eclipse does not apply to post-Constitution laws infringing fundamental rights. The Court treated the majority view in Deep Chand as the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the point and binding on the High Court. It concluded that Deep Chand overrides earlier contrary views insofar as there is conflict and therefore the offending proviso must be treated as non-est.
Keshavan v. State of Bombay, 1951 SCR 228 : AIR 1951 SC 128 Earlier articulation of the principle that pre‑Constitution laws may be subject to the doctrine of eclipse when inconsistent with fundamental rights. Referenced in the opinion as part of the line of authority (and as reaffirmed in later cases) that underlies the doctrine of eclipse; considered by the Court when assessing the scope of the earlier decisions vis-à-vis Deep Chand.
Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 123 (1955-1 SCR 613) Affirmation/extension of the doctrine that a pre-Constitution law can be eclipsed by Part III but may be revived when the constitutional bar is removed. Mentioned by the Court as part of the jurisprudential background relied upon by earlier decisions that supported the eclipse/doctrine-of-dormancy approach.
Decision concerning S. 22 of the Madras Act (reported as 1958 SCJ 459 / AIR 1958 SC 468) Considered whether a section inserted after the Constitution (by Adaptation Order) but in a pre‑Constitution Act could be treated as a nullity; the Court in that case held that a law on a topic within competence but repugnant to constitutional prohibitions is unenforceable rather than a nullity. The present Court noted that the 1958 decision dealt with a provision inserted after the Constitution and treated it as unenforceable rather than wiped out; the Court found that decision not to have been considered by the majority in Deep Chand and thus saw a conflict between the lines of authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the core dispute as whether an unconstitutional provision is non-existent (a nullity) or merely unenforceable (the doctrine of eclipse or dormancy). It examined the authorities relied on by both sides.

First, the Court reviewed Bhikaji Narain (AIR 1955) and Sundararamier (AIR 1958). Those decisions were read as supporting the proposition that an enactment inconsistent with Part III may be in an eclipsed or dormant state and need not be treated as wiped off the statute book entirely; when the constitutional impediment is removed the provision can operate again without fresh legislation.

The Court then considered Deep Chand (AIR 1959), relied on by the State, in which the majority drew a distinction between Art. 13(1) (pre‑Constitution laws) and Art. 13(2) (post‑Constitution laws): post‑Constitution laws that contravene Part III are nullities ab initio and the doctrine of eclipse does not apply to them. The Court noted that in Deep Chand the majority characterized the earlier eclipse jurisprudence as applicable to pre‑Constitution laws and held that earlier observations were not authority on Art. 13(2).

The High Court undertook a conflict analysis: it identified a tension between (a) the eclipse/unenforceability reasoning in Bhikaji Narain and Sundararamier and (b) the majority pronouncement in Deep Chand that forbids application of the doctrine of eclipse to post‑Constitution laws. The Court observed that the 1958 Sundararamier decision involved a section inserted after the Constitution and therefore raised particular issues; it further observed that the Sundararamier decision did not appear to have been considered by the majority in Deep Chand.

Addressing the question of which precedent is binding, the Court held that the majority view expressed by the Supreme Court in Deep Chand is binding on the High Court. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the majority pronouncement in Deep Chand was merely obiter because it was not strictly necessary to decide that case or because two judges reserved their opinion. The Chief Justice reasoned that a view expressed by a majority of Supreme Court judges on a proposition of law is the law declared by the Supreme Court and is binding under Article 141. The Court also adopted the principle that the latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court on a point of law overrides earlier contrary views.

Applying that assessment, the Court concluded that the proviso to S. 3(1) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act (as amended) which the High Court of Mysore had held to offend Art. 14 must be treated as non‑existent (non‑est) rather than merely unenforceable. Because the Court resolved the constitutional character of the proviso against the petitioner, it found it unnecessary to decide the separate submission about liability under S. 3(1)(a) and (b).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is DISMISSED. The Chief Justice held that the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948 (as amended) which was found to offend fundamental rights must be treated as non‑existent (a nullity) rather than merely unenforceable.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision in this case is that the petition challenging the demand (based on the proviso) fails and is dismissed; each party will bear its own costs, as ordered by the Court.
  • The Court applied and gave effect to the majority view of the Supreme Court in Deep Chand (AIR 1959 SC 648) as binding on the High Court, and treated that later authority as overriding earlier contrary statements in earlier Supreme Court decisions so far as a conflict existed.
  • The opinion does not purport to establish a new, broader precedent beyond applying existing Supreme Court authority; it addresses the present petition's fate and states the binding effect of the Supreme Court's later pronouncement. The Court did not further adjudicate on the separate question whether the petitioner would be taxable under the general rates in S. 3(1)(a) and (b), because that question became unnecessary to decide after resolving the constitutional point.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: Petition dismissed. A.R. Somnath Iyer, J. agreed. Each party to bear its own costs.

Show all summary ...

S.R Das Gupta, C.J:— The Petitioner before us is one of the Partners of Hotel New Krishna Bhawan, Malleswaram Bangalore. On 23-4-1958, he was served with a notice issued by the Commercial Tax Officer, calling upon him to produce the account books, vouchers etc., in support of his return in respect of the year 1956-1957. The petitioner's contention before us in this petition is that in view of the fact that proviso to sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, as amended by Amending Act 25 of 1954, was held to be unconstitutional by a decision of the High Court of Mysore dated 27-9-1956, the petitioner is not liable to pay any sales tax. In order to understand this contention it would be necessary to set out the material provisions of S. 3 of the Mysore Sales Tax Act, 1948, as amended by Act 25 of 1954. They are as follows:

3. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act:

(a) every dealer shall pay for each year a tax on his total turnover for such year; and

(b) the tax shall be calculated at the following rates:

Rate of Tax. (1) In the case of every dealer whose total turnover is Rs. 7,500 and above, but not exceeding Rs. 10,000 Rs. 25/- per annum. (2) In the case of every dealer whose total turnover exceeds Rs. 10,000 but does not exceed Rs. 25,000 The rate specified in Item (1) on the turnover not exceeding Rs. 10,000 and two pies in the rupee on the turnover exceeding Rs. 10,000. (3) In the case of every dealer whose total turnover exceeds Rs. 25,000 The rate specified in Item (2) on the turnover not exceeding Rs. 25,000 and three pies in the rupee on the turnover exceeding Rs. 25,000.

Provided that if and to the extent to which such turnover relates to article of food and drink sold in a hotel boarding house, restaurant or canteen, the tax shall be calculated at the following rates:—

(1) In the case of every dealer whose total turnover is Rs. 7,500 and above, but not exceeding Rs. 10,000 Rs. 75 per annum. (2) In the case of every dealer whose total turnover exceeds Rs. 10,000 but does not exceed Rs. 36,000 The rate specified in Item (1) on the turnover not exceeding Rs. 10,000 and three pies in the rupee on the turnover exceeding Rs. 10,000. (3) In the case of every dealer whose total turnover exceeds Rs. 36,000 The rate specified in Item (2) on the turnover not exceeding Rs. 36,000 and four and half pies in the rupee on the turnover exceeding Rs. 36,000.

2. It should be noted that the High Court of Mysore declared this provision to be unconstitutional as offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. After the said decision was given the Mysore Sales Tax Act came to be further amended by Amending Act 18 of 1957. The said amending Act only validated collection and levy made under the said proviso, but did not retrospectively affect the old Act. The present case, therefore, is not affected by the said mending Act. The main contention of the petitioner in support of this petition is that the proviso to sub-sec. (1), of S. 3 of the Act having been declared unconstitutional there is now no charging section in respect of the Hotel Keepers. Mr. T. Krishna Rao advocate, appearing for the petitioner urged before us that if there is a provision in a statute which offends the fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution then the said provision is not non-est in the sense, that it does not exist in the Statute Book, but becomes merely unenforceable.

3. In support of that proposition he cited before us two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Bhikaji Narain v. State of M.P, (S) AIR 1955 SC 781 and Sundararamier and Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1958 SCJ 459 : (AIR 1958 SC 468). On the authority of these two decisions Mr. T. Krishna Rao, further contended that the said proviso which specifies the rate at which the Hotel Keepers should be charged, becomes only unenforceable and not non-est. The result therefore, according to him, is that in respect of Hotel Keepers the provision in the Mysore Sales Tax Act fixing the rates at which their turnover would be taxed is unenforceable and the said Hotel Keepers, therefore, cannot be charged with sales tax under the Mysore Sales Tax Act. The position, he conceded, would no doubt be different if the proviso, offending Art. 14 of the Constitution, as was held by Mysore High Court, is to be held as non-existent. In that event, the Hotel Keepers would be liable to be taxed under cls. (a) and (b) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 3, i.e, at the general rates specified in cl. (b).

4. The main question, therefore, which has to be decided in this petition is whether or not a provision in a Statute which is unconstitutional, offending the fundamental rights guaranteed to the citizens, is non-existent or is merely unenforceable. Mr. T. Krishna Rao, as already mentioned, relied on the two Supreme Court decisions in support of his contention that such a provision becomes unenforceable and not non-est. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader appearing for the State relied on a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Deep Chand v. State of U.P, AIR 1959 SC 648, wherein, according to the learned Government Pleader, the majority of the Judges took a different view.

5. I have, therefore, to find out what is the view of the Supreme Court on this point whether there is a conflict between the earlier view expressed in the decisions on which Mr. Krishna Rao relies and the later view on which the learned Government Pleader relies and if so, which of the said two views is binding on this Court.

6. In the case reported in (S) AIR 1955 SC 781, their Lordships of the Supreme Court inter alia, held that if a law which was existing at the time when the Constitution came into force was violative of Art. 19(1)(g) for having imposed restrictions which could not be justified as reasonable Under cl. (6) as it then stood under Art. 13(1) of the Constitution the existing Law became void “to the extent of such inconsistency”. Nevertheless, their Lordships further held, after 18-6-1951, when cl. (6) was amended, the impugned Act ceased to be inconsistent with fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g) read with amended cl. (6) of that Article and it became operative again. In the course of his judgment, S.R Das, Acting Chief Justice as he then was, observed as follows:

“The true position is that the impugned law became as it were eclipsed for the time being by the fundamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, was to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free from all blemishes or infirmity.”

“All Laws, existing or future, which are inconsistent with the provisions of Part III of our Constitution are, by the express provision of Art. 13, rendered void “to the extent of such inconsistency”. Such laws were not dead for all purposes. They existed for the purposes of pre-constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citizens.

It is only against the citizens that they remained in dormant or moribund condition. In our judgment, after the amendment of cl. (6) of Art. 19 on 18-6-1951, the impugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and became revivified and enforceable against citizens as well as against non-citizens. It is true that as the amended cl. (6) was not made retrospective the impugned Act could have no operation as against citizens between 20-1-1950 and 18-6-1951 and no rights and obligations could be founded on the provisions of the impugned Act during the said period whereas the amended cl. (2) by reason of its being expressly made retrospective had effect even during that period.

But after the amendment of cl. (6) the impugned Act immediately became fully operative even as against the citizens.”

7. In the case reported in 1958 SCJ 459 : (AIR 1958 SC 468), the same view seems also to have been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court observed as follows;

“The result of the authorities may thus be summed up: Where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest, assuming of course that the two portions are severable, it cannot be held to have been wiped out of the statute book as it admittedly must remain there for the purpose of enforcement of the valid portion thereof, and being on the statute book, even that portion which is unenforceable on the ground that it is unconstitutional will operate proprio vigore when the Constitutional bar is removed and there is no need for a fresh legislation to give effect thereto.”

8. Mr. T. Krishna Rao strongly relied on these two decisions of the Supreme Court, and particularly on the observations made therein to which I have just now referred. In the later decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 SC 648, on which the learned Government Pleader relied, the majority of the Judges expressed the view that there is a clear distinction between the two clauses of Art. 13. According to their Lordships under cl. (1) a pre-Constitution law subsists except to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Part III; whereas no post Constitution law can be made contravening the provisions of Part III and therefore, the law, to that extent though made, is a nullity from its inception.

9. Their Lordships further held that the doctrine of eclipse has no application to post-Constitution laws infringing fundamental rights as they would be ab initio void in toto or to the extent of their contravention of the fundamental rights. Their Lordships considered the earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in (S) AIR 1955 SC 781 and the observations made therein but held that the said decision was given on Art. 13(1) of the Constitution and it is no authority on the construction and scope of Art. 13(2) of the Constitution. After referring to the observations of Das, J., to which I have referred, their Lordships held as follows:

“The aforesaid passages are only the re-statement of the law as enunciated in Keshavan v. State of Bombay, 1951 SCR 228 : (AIR 1951 SC 128) reaffirmed in Behram Khurshid Pesikaka v. State Of Bombay, 1955-1 SCR 613: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 123) and an extension of the same to meet a different situation. A pre-Constitution law, stating in the words of Das, J. as he then was, exists notwithstanding that it does not exist with respect to the future exercise of the fundamental rights. That principle has been extended in this decision, by invoking the doctrine of eclipse. As the law existed on the statute book to support pre-constitution Acts, the Court held that the said law was eclipsed for the time being by one or other of the fundamental rights and when the shadow was removed by the amendment of the Constitution, the impugned Act became free from all blemish or infirmity. The Legislature was competent to make the law with which Pesikaka's case, 1955-1 SCR 613: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 123), was concerned at the time it was made. It was not a case of want of legislative power at the time the Act was passed, but one wherein the case of a valid law supervening circumstances cast a cloud.”

10. This being the state of the decision of the Supreme Court on this point, the questions which we have to determine are (a) whether or not there is a conflict of views on the point at issue between the earlier decisions and the later decision of the Supreme Court and (b) if so, which of those views is binding upon us. The learned Government Pleader contended before us that there is in fact no conflict between the views expressed in the case reported in (S) AIR 1955 SC 781 and AIR 1959 SC 648 and the view taken by the majority of the Judges in the case reported in AIR 1959 SC 648.

11. This contention of the learned Government Pleader finds some support from the observations of Subba Rao, J., who delivered the majority judgment in AIR 1959 SC 648. His Lordship did not expressly dissent from view expressed by S.R Das, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, in the case reported in (S) AIR 1955 SC 781 but held that those observations relate to a pre-Constitution law. This seems to be clear from the following observations of Subba Rao, J., in the said case:

“A pre-Constitution law, stating in the words of Das, J., as he then was, exists notwithstanding that it does not exist with respect to the future exercise of the fundamental rights. That principle has been extended in this decision by the doctrine of eclipse.

xxxxxx

It was not a case of want of legislative power at the time the Act was passed, but one where in the case of a valid law supervening circumstances cast a cloud.”

12. This is the way in which the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court in AIR 1959 SC 648 interpreted the said earlier decision of the Supreme Court in (S) AIR 195o SC 781 and in my opinion we are bound by that interpretation.

13. But the same thing cannot be said with regard to the other decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1958 SCJ 459 : (AIR 1958 SC 468). In that case the section with which their Lordships were concerned, i.e, S. 22 of the Madras Act, was inserted by the Adaptation Order of the President of India after the Constitution, although the Act itself was pre-Constitution Act. The contention with which their Lordships were concerned in that case, so far as it relates to the present question, was that no action can be taken under S. 22 of the Madras Act, because it was, when it was enacted, repugnant to Art. 286 of the Constitution and was therefore void.

14. Thus, their Lordships were concerned in that case with a section which was inserted after the Constitution. Nevertheless, their Lordships repelled the contention that the section was a nullity, as it was unconstitutional and must be treated as non-est and the impugned Act could not infuse life into it. Venkatarama Ayyar, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court in that case observed as follows:

“Thus, a legislation on a topic not within the competence of the Legislature and a legislation within its competence but violative of constitutional limitations have both the same reckoning in a Court of Law; they are both of them unenforceable. But does it follow from this that both the laws are of the same quality and character, and stand on the same footing for all purposes? This question has been the subject of consideration in numerous decisions in the American Courts, and the pre-ponderance of authority is in favour of the view that while a law on a matter not within the competence of the Legislature is a nullity, a law on a topic within its competence but repugnant to the constitutional prohibitions is only unenforceable.”

15. His Lordship finally summed up the result of the authorities on this point by saying that where an enactment is unconstitutional in part but valid as to the rest, assuming of course that the two portions are severable, it cannot be held to have been wiped out of the Statute Book as it admittedly must remain there for the purpose of enforcement of the valid portion thereof, and being on the Statute Book, even that portion which is unenforceable on the ground that it is unconstitutional will Operate proprio vigore when the Constitutional bar is removed and there is no need for a fresh legislation to give effect thereto. This decision does not appear to have been considered or dealt with by Subba Rao, J., in his judgment in the case reported in AIR 1959 SC 648. It seems to me, therefore, that there is a conflict between the views expressed in (S) AIR 1955 SC 781 and in AIR 1959 SC 648.

16. The next question, which we have to determine is which of these two views is binding on us. Mr. T. Krishna Rao urged before us that the view expressed by the majority of the Judges in the case reported in AIR 1959 SC 648 cannot be said to be the view expressed by the Court. He contended that the actual decision in that case did not proceed on that view and it was therefore merely obiter dicta. Mr. T. Krishna Rao contended that no doubt the law declared by the Supreme Court, by virtue of Art. 141 of the Constitution, shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India, but the view expressed by the majority of the judges on this point in the said case cannot be said to be the law declared by the Supreme Court, firstly because the said view was not necessary to be expressed for the purpose of deciding the said case and secondly because, the remaining two Judges reserved their opinion on this point and did not express any view.

17. Mr. T. Krishna Rao urged that if all the Judges bad expressed their views on that point then it could have been contended that the view expressed lay the majority was the law declared by the Supreme Court. That not being the position Mr. T. Krishna Rao further contended, it cannot be said that the view expressed by the majority of Judges on this point in the said case was the law declared by the Supreme Court and as such binding on this Court.

18. In my opinion, the view expressed by the majority of the Judges on this point in the case reported in AIR 1959 SC 348 is binding on this Court, as the law declared by the Supreme Court. It is not necessary, in my opinion, for a proposition of law declared by the Supreme Court to be binding on this Court that the actual decision of the case should proceed on that proposition. Nor is it necessary, for such proposition to be the law declared by the Supreme Court that all the Judges shall express their views one way or the other on the point. In my opinion, if the majority of Judges of the Supreme Court in a particular case express a view on a proposition of law then that view of the majority of the Judges would be the law declared by the Supreme Court. That being my view, the opinion expressed by the majority of the Judges I In the said case shall be held to be the law declared by the Supreme Court and binding on this Court.

19. The next question which arises for consideration is which of the two views — one expressed in 1958 SCJ 459 : (AIR 1958 SC 468) and the other in AIR 1959 SC 648 — will be binding on us. On this point again there is no doubt some difficulty. But in my opinion, it is the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court which would be binding on us. When, in my opinion, the Supreme Court expressed its view on any particular point of law such expression of view shall be considered as overriding all contrary views expressed on the point in earlier decisions of the same Court. That being my conclusion on these questions this contention of Mr. T. Krishna Rao fails.

20. The learned Government Pleader no doubt contended before us that even if it were held that the particular provision in question was merely unenforceable and not non-est even then the petitioner would be liable to be taxed under S. 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Mysore Sales Tax Act. In view of my decision that the proviso to the said section which is opposed to fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution is non-est and not unenforceable, it is not necessary for me to go into this question. The result, therefore, is that this petition fails and is dismissed. Each party will bear its own costs.

21. A.R Somnath Iyer, J.: I agree.

JD/D.R.R
Petition dismissed.