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Kempe Gowda v. Lakkegowda

Karnataka High Court
Nov 28, 1951
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from litigation concerning certain family lands formerly belonging to Venkata Rao and his sons. During proceedings in a partition suit, a composition deed dated 1-7-1934 allegedly settled debts by conferring particular properties on creditors. Chikka Nagappa (and sons) were creditors to whom monies were due under three separate simple mortgage deeds; some properties were alleged to have been absolutely transferred to them under the composition. Subsequent to those mortgages, the same properties were the subject of a possessory mortgage in favour of P. S. Rama Rao. The defendant is an assignee of Rama Rao's mortgage and is in possession.

The plaintiff (a transferee from Chikka Nagappa) sued the defendant in the first suit asserting ownership and possession based on the composition deed, and alternatively claiming payment due under one of the simple mortgage deeds (Exhibit J). The trial Court granted a decree for possession; the Subordinate Judge on appeal dismissed the suit; this Court disallowed the claim for possession on the ground that Rama Rao was not bound by the composition deed and therefore the defendant (as assignee of Rama Rao) was entitled to possession. However, this Court directed sale in respect of Exhibit J if the defendant did not make payment of an amount to be fixed under Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act, after accounting for values and encumbrances. The learned Munsiff later held the amount recoverable from the suit properties was Rs. 1,073, which was confirmed on appeal.

The defendant appealed the fixation of the amount (S.A No. 6 of 49-50). Separately, the plaintiff filed a subsequent suit for redemption of Rama Rao's mortgage (now assigned to the defendant); the Subordinate Judge decreed that suit, and the defendant appealed (R.A No. 154 of 48-49). Thus there existed, between the same parties and over the same properties, (i) a decree directing sale in enforcement of a simple mortgage and (ii) a decree for redemption.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Which of the two inconsistent decrees between the same parties and properties should stand: the earlier decree directing sale in enforcement of the simple mortgage, or the later decree for redemption?
  2. Whether the plaintiff's subsequent suit for redemption is barred by Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., by failure to claim the relief in the earlier suit) or by principles akin to res judicata — including whether the pecuniary jurisdiction of the earlier forum affects that bar.
  3. In S.A No. 6 of 49-50: whether the amount fixed as recoverable from the suit properties (as determined under Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act and by accounting for values and prior encumbrances) is correct.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent / Plaintiff (Sri Lakshminaranappa)

  • Contended that the earlier suit concerned only whether Rama Rao's mortgage subsisted and did not consider the equity of redemption.
  • Argued that because the mortgage amount (or the redemption relief) was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsiff's Court where the first suit was filed, the doctrine of res judicata (or the bar) cannot apply to the later suit filed in the Subordinate Judge's Court.
  • Expressed before the Court that the plaintiff would be satisfied if the decree for redemption were upheld (i.e., indicating a preference in relief).

Appellant / Defendant (Sri Subba Rao)

  • Contended that the composition deed cannot be treated as a conveyance and that, in any case, Rama Rao did not consent to the composition and thus his rights under the possessory mortgage were unaffected.
  • Argued that the decree for sale which had become final was conclusive, and consequently the later decree for redemption was legally unsustainable.
  • In S.A No. 6 of 49-50, contended that prior encumbrances on properties (not included in the suit though subject to the mortgage) should not have been taken into account when fixing the amount recoverable from the appellant's properties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govind Hari v. Parashram Mahadeo, 25 Bom 161 Explains that the rule preventing splitting of claims/remedies (now reflected in Order II, Rule 2) seeks to prevent abandonment of a portion of a claim or remedy; a plaintiff who omits part of his claim cannot later sue in respect of it. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the plaintiff, having omitted to seek redemption in the earlier suit, must be deemed to have abandoned that relief and cannot pursue it now.
Rama Rao v. Venkayamma, AIR 1931 Mad 705 Holds that Order II, Rule 2 and related clauses operate even when the alternative reliefs would separately be cognizable by different jurisdictions (i.e., pecuniary differences do not prevent the rule's operation). The Court applied this authority to reject the plaintiff's contention that pecuniary jurisdiction of the first forum prevented application of Order II, Rule 2.
Ram Autar v. Shankar Dayal, AIR 1926 Pat 87 Support for the proposition that alternative reliefs and the rule against splitting claims/remedies are applicable in analogous circumstances. Cited as part of a body of authority to support the Court's conclusion that the plaintiff ought to have sought redemption in the first suit and cannot evade Order II, Rule 2.
Harnam Singh v. Bhola Singh, AIR 1921 Lah 309 Another authority supporting the same general principle against splitting claims/remedies. Used to reinforce the Court's conclusion on the inapplicability of the later redemption suit where the relief could and should have been sought earlier.
Gretton v. Haward, (1819) 1 Swan 409 Sets out the maxim against advancing contradictory positions (approbate and reprobate); a party cannot simultaneously assert inconsistent titles or change preference between inconsistent claims. The Court invoked this maxim to reject the plaintiff's attempt to both enforce rights as mortgagee (in the earlier proceedings) and later insist on redemption as owner, describing such conduct as "blowing hot and cold".
Hari Raj Singh v. Ahmad-Ud-Din Khan, 19 All 545 Holds that in calculating contributions or liabilities, an existing liability on properties that are to bear burden must be taken into account. The Court relied on this case in S.A No. 6 of 49-50 to support the view that prior liabilities should be taken into account when fixing the amount recoverable from specific properties under Section 82 (pre-amendment).
Gopal Das v. Durga Singh, 38 Ind Cas 649 (All) Explains the law under Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act: the liability of a property is ascertained by its value less the liability under an earlier mortgage affecting that property. The Court applied this principle to affirm that prior encumbrances on properties should be deducted when determining the liability of particular items, supporting the lower Courts' method of calculation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first observed the practical and logical inconsistency between a decree for sale (enforcement of a mortgage) and a later decree for redemption over the same properties — if the property is sold, redemption is impossible; if redeemed, a sale directed by the earlier decree would be nugatory. The central legal yardstick employed was Order II, Rule 1 (requirement to frame suit to afford final decision) and Order II, Rule 2 (consequence of omitting a relief which could have been claimed).

The Court analyzed the plaintiff's position in the earlier suit and found that the plaintiff had advanced two alternative rights there: (a) as owner under the composition deed seeking possession, and (b) alternatively as a prior mortgagee (under Exhibit J) seeking enforcement of that mortgage. The Court noted Section 101 of the Transfer of Property Act permits a prior mortgagee to enforce rights even though he may have become owner; the plaintiff had availed himself of that exception in the earlier suit by seeking relief as a mortgagee where advantageous, but did not pursue redemption as an alternative remedy at that time.

The Court treated "cause of action" as encompassing the same facts which the plaintiff now relies upon for redemption, and therefore concluded the omission to claim redemption in the earlier suit amounted to abandonment of that remedy under Order II, Rule 2. The Court rejected the argument that the pecuniary jurisdictional limit of the earlier forum insulated the later suit from this rule, relying on authority (Rama Rao v. Venkayamma) that the rule applies even when reliefs would be cognizable by different jurisdictions.

The Court additionally invoked the equitable/logic maxim against approbation and reprobation — a party cannot choose inconsistent positions successively — to emphasize that the plaintiff who had chosen to pursue the remedy available as mortgagee in the earlier proceedings could not later switch to insist upon redemption.

On the sufficiency of the composition deed as a conveyance the Court remarked on practical and stamp-duty implications that raised doubt about treating the composition deed as effecting absolute sales of many properties to multiple persons. However, since the Court was allowing the appeal on other grounds (Order II, Rule 2 and related principles), it declined to decide the composition-deed issue finally.

In S.A No. 6 of 49-50 the Court addressed the correctness of the amount fixed as recoverable from the suit properties. The lower Courts had relied on the parties' agreement concerning which properties should bear the liability and their market values, and had deducted the proportionate value of items in plaintiff's possession (after allowing for amounts payable under other mortgages) when apportioning the liability against items in defendant's possession. The appellant's objection — that prior encumbrances on properties should not have been included in the calculation — was rejected. The Court held Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act (as it stood prior to amendment) required taking prior liabilities on properties into account, and cited the authorities Hari Raj Singh and Gopal Das to support that approach.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The appeal concerning the suit for redemption is allowed; the plaintiff's suit for redemption is dismissed with costs throughout.
  • S.A No. 6 of 49-50 (challenge to the amount fixed) is dismissed with costs.
  • Cross-objections in the redemption appeal are dismissed without costs; cross-objections in S.A No. 6 of 49-50 are dismissed without costs.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The decree for sale (being final) remains effective and is not set aside by the Court's disposition of the redemption suit; the Court treated the later decree for redemption as barred and therefore without effect.
  • The amount determined by the Courts below (including the figure of Rs. 1,073 fixed by the learned Munsiff as recoverable from the suit properties, as noted in the opinion) and the method of calculation (accounting for values of properties in plaintiff's possession and deducting prior encumbrances under Section 82 as applicable) stand affirmed by the dismissal of S.A No. 6 of 49-50.

Broader legal implication: The opinion applies and reinforces the operation of Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (and related authorities) to bar subsequent suits for reliefs omitted in an earlier proceeding even where the reliefs might have been cognizable by different courts due to pecuniary limits. The Court did not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond its application of existing authorities; no new precedent was explicitly declared in the opinion.

Order: Appeal allowed (redemption suit dismissed with costs); S.A No. 6 of 49-50 dismissed (with costs); cross-objections dismissed as above.

Show all summary ...

1. These appeals are the offshoots of the decision of this Court in S.A No. 182 of 45-46 which arose out of a suit filed by the Respondent for a declaration of his right to and possession of the plaint schedule properties and in the alternative for a decree for sale on the foot of a mortgage deed marked Exhibit J. The facts which are not in dispute are fully stated in the judgment of that appeal and need only be briefly referred to, to appreciate the points in controversy.

2. The lands involved in this litigation formerly belonged to the family of one Venkata Rao and his sons. One of the sons of the said Venkata Rao filed a suit for partition of the family properties and during the pendency of the appeal preferred against the decree of the trial Court in that suit, a settlement appears to have been arrived at between the members of the family on the one hand and the creditors on the other. The terms of the settlement were embodied in a document styled composition deed dated 1-7-1934, by which certain properties of the family are said to have been given to the respective creditors in discharge of their claims. One of such creditors was Chikka Nagappa and sons to whom monies were due under three separate deeds of simple mortgage for satisfaction of which the suit properties besides others are said to have been absolutely transferred. Subsequent to the mortgages in favour of Chikkanagappa these properties were mortgaged with possession to P.S Rama Rao. Defendant as assignee of this mortgage is in possession of the properties. The plaintiff as transferee from Chiknagappa sued defendant for possession of the properties, alleging that the mortgage debt of Rama Rao was satisfied by the composition deed and plaintiff was owner thereof. As an alternative to this relief, he claimed payment of the amount due under one of the three simple mortgage deeds Exhibit J executed in favour of Chikkanagappa. The defendant contended that the composition deed cannot be treated as a conveyance and, in any case, since Rama Rao did not consent to the composition it does not affect his rights under the possessory mortgage. Rejecting these contentions the trial Court granted a decree for possession. The learned Subordinate Judge, on appeal, dismissed the suit in toto but this Court disallowed the claim for possession of the properties on the view that Rama Rao was not bound by the composition and as such the defendant as assignee of the mortgage was entitled to be in possession of the properties but granted a decree with respect to the simple mortgage under Exhibit J by directing sale of the properties now in dispute in the event of the defendant not making payment of the amount to be fixed under Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act by taking into account the amount due under the mortgage deed and the value of the suit properties and of others which were subject to the mortgage. In pursuance of this direction, the learned Munsiff held that the amount recoverable from the suit properties is Rs. 1073/- and this is confirmed in appeal. The defendant has preferred S.A No. 6 of 49-50 questioning the correctness of the amount fixed. The other appeal R.A No. 154 of 48-49 arises from a suit filed by the same plaintiff subsequent to the decision in the former second appeal for redemption of the mortgage effected in favour of Rama Rao and now assigned to the defendant. The plea of the defendant inter alia was that the suit was not maintainable by virtue of the claim and the decision in the former suit. The learned Subordinate Judge decreed the suit and the defendant has as in the other case appealed.

3. There is thus a decree for sale in one and a decree for redemption in another suit, the parties and properties relating to both being the same. Apparently both decrees cannot be given effect to as enforcement of one may render the other futile and unnecessary. If the properties are sold, redemption is not possible. If redemption is allowed, sale is not called for, as it is tantamount to plaintiff getting his own property sold for money due to him. The learned Subordinate Judge does not seem to have noticed the incongruity and conflicting features of the situation but Sri Lakshminaranappa, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent, recognising these, expressed that plaintiff is satisfied if the decree for redemption is upheld. Sri Subba Rao on behalf of the Appellant argued that the decree for sale has become conclusive and that being so the decree for redemption is legally unsustainable. The question therefore to be determined is as to which of the two decrees is to stand and which has to be set aside.

4. The plaintiff himself does not allege that the decree for sale which has become final is ineffective for any reason or that he has given up his rights under it. The only ground on which its executability is sought to be avoided is that decree for redemption is passed in a subsequent suit. It is curious that the person seeking this is the person who applied for and obtained the decree. Apart from this, the ground must disappear if the relief of redemption could not be granted in the later suit and the decree is not warranted.

5. To avoid multiplicity of suits, Rule I of Order 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that a suit should be so framed as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and prevent further litigation concerning them. Rule 2(3) states:

“A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs but if he omits except with the leave of the Court to sue for all such reliefs he shall not after-wards sue for any relief so omitted.”

6. Sri Lakshminaranappa contended that the only question in the earlier suit was whether the mortgage to Rama Rao was subsisting and there was no consideration of anything relating to equity of redemption. He also argued that since the mortgage amount was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Munsiff's Court in which the first suit was filed, the doctrine of res judicata cannot apply to the suit now filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The arguments advanced are plausible but cannot prevail.

7. It is not shown that apart from the composition deed there is any basis for the respondents to urge a right to redeem the defendant's mortgage. The deed recites that in settlement of certain debts the suit properties and some others were given to respondent's transferor. Relying on this the plaintiff claimed in the first suit to be the owner of the properties and as such entitled to possession thereof. Anticipating the contingency of Rama Rao's mortgage being an impediment to his getting possession as owner he put forward an alternative claim on the foot of the prior mortgage and not a claim by virtue of his being owner to redeem Rama Rao's mortgage in the event of its being found to be subsisting. In short, he wanted possession if possible without liability for any payment on his part or else recovery of the money due under a prior mortgage, alleging ownership for the purpose of the primary relief and to be the mortgagee as regards the alternative claim. He could claim the latter relief as Section 101 of the Transfer of Property Act enables a prior mortgagee to enforce his rights as such when it is to his advantage notwithstanding the fact of his having become the owner of the mortgaged properties.

8. Cause of action as has been pointed out in several cases means the facts necessary to be proved if traversed by defendant, for the plaintiff to succeed in his claim. All the facts and circumstances on the strength of which plaintiff now seeks redemption are exactly the same as those which existed at the time of the former suit. Having availed himself of the advantage of the exception to the rule of merger under the section the plaintiff now assumes the notion of owner to insist upon defendant submitting to redemption. I do not think that plaintiff can be allowed to adopt this course now. The plaintiff set up two rights in the first suit one as owner and another as a prior mortgagee. He could not as prior mortgagee enforce redemption of defendant's mortgage, the rule being “Redeem up, foreclose down”, but there was no hindrance to his seeking redemption in the capacity of owner. As was pointed out in ‘Govind Hari v. Parashram Mahadeo’, 25 Bom 161:

“Section 43 (replaced by O. 2, R. 2 of the present Code) is directed against two evils: the splitting of claims and the splitting of remedies: If a man omits from his suit a portion of his claim he shall not afterwards sue in respect of it: if he omits one of his remedies he cannot afterwards, pursue it.”

9. By his failure to seek redemption in the first suit, the plaintiff must be deemed to have abandoned or relinquished his claim with respect to it under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff cannot escape this consequence because the suit for redemption has to be filed in a Court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction than that competent to try the suit for possession based on title or for sale in enforcement of the simple mortgage. This is a factor which has a bearing on the question of res judicata but does not take away the bar imposed by Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C As observed by Pandalai J. in ‘Rama Rao v. Venkayamma’, AIR 1931 Mad 705

“Order 2, R. 2 and Clauses 1 and 3 are not limited in their operation to cases where of two reliefs open to a plaintiff on the same cause of action both are cognisable by the same Court. They are operative even when those reliefs taken separately and alone would be cognizable in different jurisdictions.”

10. The fact that the reliefs were claimable in the alternative cannot prevent the application of the said rule. See ‘Ram Autar v. Shankar Dayal’, AIR 1926 Pat 87 and ‘Harnam Singh v. Bhola Singh’, AIR 1921 Lah 309. The plaintiff ought to have asked for redemption in the first suit and filed it in a Court of competent jurisdiction to try it and he cannot be permitted to evade the operation of Order 2, Rule 2 by adopting a different course. Sri Lakshminaranappa has not cited any cases or referred to any statutory provision in support of the claim under circumstances such as those presented in this case. Instances of successive claims for redemption referred to by him are not of help as this is not a case of that kind but is a case in which redemption was not claimed at all though it was possible in a prior suit and the present claim is inconsistent with the relief which has been obtained.

11. Another objection to the suit for redemption is that a party entitled to more than one relief cannot be allowed to shift his preference to one or the other from time to time. It seems to me that the respondent having made the choice and exercised the option of enforcing his right as mortgagee in preference to that of owner cannot now change his ground. Such volte-face would be nothing short of what is termed as “blowing hot and cold” and the principle that a party cannot both approbate and reprobate applies to him. In ‘Gretton v. Haward’, (1819) 1 Swan 409*, Plumber. M.R observed

“The instances in which Courts of law have applied the maxim…………‘He is not to be heard who alleges things contradictory to each other’ are instances of ‘inconsistent titles’ whether to the same subject or different subjects, the assertion of one title being incomplete without a negation of the other. It is a maxim not of morality but of logic and compels elections between claims in respect not of the injustice, but of the technical impracticability, of their contemporaneous assertion.”

12. The sufficiency of the composition deed to convey titles was also disputed by the Appellant's counsel. It has to be noticed that debts running to thousands of rupees payable to several persons are settled in the deed by conferring on them rights of ownership on different items of properties and that if there were deeds of conveyance the stamp duty payable is far more than what is prescribed for a composition deed. If as contended for respondent the deed is effective in transferring rights of ownership to several persons in several properties it would be a cheap substitute for a number of sale deeds and the provisions of the Stamp Act for payment of duty on conveyances could be easily circumvented. Sri Lakshminaranappa learned Counsel for Respondent argued that in view of the recitals in the deed being clear and the deed being registered, the requirements of a sale are satisfied. In the appeal filed by the Appellants against the decree of the trial Court allowing the claim of respondent to be declared owner of the properties the learned Subordinate Judge held that the composition deed could not be construed as conveying rights of ownership and dismissed the suit. Notwithstanding the terms of the document and the fact of registration. I think, the question whether it can be relied upon as a completed sale of several properties in favour of several persons is open to doubt. Since the appeal is to be allowed for reasons already mentioned, there is no need to further deal with this.

13. I would therefore allow the appeal and dismiss the suit for redemption with costs throughout. Cross-objections are dismissed without costs. S.A 6 of 49-50: In S.A No. 6 of 49-50 the only point for consideration is whether the amount which the two Courts have fixed as being recoverable from the suit properties is correct. For determination of the amount, the Courts below have relied on the agreement of parties concerning the total extent of properties which should bear the liability for the mortgage debt and its market value. As some of the items are in possession of the plaintiff himself in pursuance of the composition deed, proportionate value of these has to be deducted from the mortgage debt and the balance only to be held recoverable from the items in defendant's possession. In estimating the value of properties in plaintiff's possession for this purpose allowance is made for the amounts payable under other mortgages in favour of the plaintiff and subtracting such amounts from the market value of these the remainder is taken into account. The Appellant contends that the prior encumbrances on the properties which are not included in the suit but which are subject to the mortgage should not have been taken into account while fixing the amount recoverable from the properties in the possession of the Appellant. Both Courts have held that this is not possible and Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act prior to the Amendment which governs this case supports this view. Hari Raj Singh v. Ahmad-Ud-Din Khan’, 19 All 545 and ‘Gopal Das v. Durga Singh’, 38 Ind Cas 649 (All) are directly in point. In the former case it was held that

“In calculating the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled by way of contribution he was bound to take into account the liability which existed on most of the villages………”

and in the latter as follows:

“The law as to rights under the two mortgages is very clearly set forth in Section 82 of the Transfer of Property Act. The liability of property A was to be ascertained by finding the value of property but from the value of property T should be deducted the amount of liability of property T under the earlier mortgage.”

14. Sri Subba Rao has not cited any case which takes a different view or drawn our attention to any provision laying down a different principle. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. As a consequence of this the cross-objections filed by the plaintiff are dismissed but without costs.

B/D.R.R
Order accordingly.